The Russian Challenge
20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate
20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Russian</strong> <strong>Challenge</strong><br />
A War of Narratives and Arms<br />
East–West discord. It was the result. It arose because<br />
fundamental interests were in dispute, and it ended<br />
when they ceased to be in dispute. Today they are in<br />
dispute again. Had there been no Cold War, the issues<br />
at stake in Ukraine would be no different from what<br />
they are now. Either the West bases its interests on<br />
a Europe of sovereign states, free to chart their own<br />
course, or it resigns itself to a coerced stability and the<br />
certainty of future conflicts.<br />
• Ukraine’s sustainability as a sovereign state and<br />
an integrated one depends first and foremost on<br />
Ukrainians. Nevertheless, they cannot succeed<br />
without Western support. That support must be<br />
multi-dimensional, well resourced and toughly<br />
conditional. Strategic patience is needed as well.<br />
A weak and fractured state is at war with a nuclear<br />
power. Ills that are embedded and systemic cannot<br />
be remedied without time and resources. Both the<br />
aid provided and the aid envisaged by the European<br />
Union, United States and International Monetary<br />
Fund are a life-support system, but not a launching<br />
pad for reform. In seeking an alchemy that will<br />
underwrite reforms without deferring them, financial<br />
assistance must be matched by institutional support<br />
and elements of co-management.<br />
• Towards Russia, strategic patience might not be<br />
enough. In the long term, time works against it.<br />
Within two years, the combination of sanctions and<br />
low oil prices is likely to have a debilitating effect<br />
on the <strong>Russian</strong> state. Yet it never was likely that the<br />
Kremlin would agree to a war of attrition on the<br />
West’s terms, at least so long as other tools of policy<br />
existed. Those tools are force and the threat of force.<br />
Because of them, time works even less to Ukraine’s<br />
advantage than to Russia’s. Ukraine and its Western<br />
partners need to find a way of devaluing these tools<br />
and turning time to their own advantage. That will<br />
require deterrence, not only on Ukraine’s western<br />
border but within the country too. <strong>The</strong> West has<br />
already undertaken modest measures to improve<br />
Ukraine’s defences. We do not know how Putin will<br />
respond if they gather momentum. What we do know<br />
is how he responds to weakness.<br />
It is time to abandon the notion that the Kremlin is<br />
concerned about anybody’s welfare other than its own.<br />
As the leaders of the Ukraine insurgency themselves<br />
lament, they are but pawns in a bigger game. In this<br />
struggle, Moscow does not care whether its ‘compatriots’<br />
flourish or starve. It does not care about Western<br />
goodwill unless it can be used against the West.<br />
Nevertheless, Russia’s policy will change when its<br />
governing elites conclude that the current course is<br />
damaging the country’s interests and their own. With<br />
firmness and patience, that outcome is achievable. <strong>The</strong> longterm<br />
aim of Western policy should be to remove the new<br />
dividing lines that <strong>Russian</strong> policy has created. Meanwhile<br />
Western governments should be alert to any signs of ‘new<br />
thinking’ in the country and give thought to the contours of<br />
a diplomatic settlement that Russia might one day wish to<br />
honour. But until the premises of <strong>Russian</strong> policy change, any<br />
agreement is likely to be the opposite of a solution, and any<br />
respite gained is likely to be very short-lived.<br />
32 | Chatham House