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The Russian Challenge

20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Russian</strong> <strong>Challenge</strong><br />

An Enfeebled Economy<br />

Regional administrations face (in aggregate) a modest<br />

deficit, created in part by their efforts to raise the pay of<br />

state employees along the lines promised by President Putin<br />

in May 2012. Individual regions face particular difficulties,<br />

from which they will be bailed out by soft loans from the<br />

federal budget.<br />

<strong>The</strong> recent fall in investment has already been mentioned.<br />

One influence on this has been the highest-ever net outflow<br />

of private capital. In 2014 this totalled $154 billion, or close<br />

to 10 per cent of GDP if the latter is converted to dollars at<br />

the end-year ballpark figure of R60=$1. 59<br />

A net private capital outflow has been a feature of the postcommunist<br />

<strong>Russian</strong> economy in every year except 2006 and<br />

2007. When it is particularly large and accompanied by a<br />

dwindling current-account balance-of-payments surplus,<br />

it threatens the comfortable balance-of-payments position<br />

that has been the norm for Putin’s Russia. Figure 5 depicts<br />

the recent situation.<br />

Figure 5: Russia’s current-account balance and net flows<br />

of private capital, 2005–17 ($bn)<br />

$bn p.a.<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

-150<br />

-200<br />

Balance-of-payments current account<br />

Net private capital flows<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

2008<br />

2009<br />

2010<br />

2011<br />

2012<br />

2013<br />

2014<br />

2015<br />

2016<br />

2017<br />

Note: <strong>The</strong> projections for 2015–17 are those contained in the CBR’s<br />

baseline scenario.<br />

Source: CBR, http://www.cbr.ru/publ/ondkp/on_2015(2016-2017).pdf.<br />

<strong>The</strong> near future: 2015–16<br />

On 27 November 2014 OPEC decided not to cut crude<br />

oil production quotas. Oil prices fell on the news, and so<br />

did the rouble. This was followed by a fall in forecasts<br />

for the <strong>Russian</strong> economy in 2015 as the imaginations of<br />

the scenario-makers struggled to keep up with events.<br />

Table 1 presents some key points from the 1 December<br />

projections for 2015 from one official, one independent and<br />

one international forecaster.<br />

Table 1: Selected projections of <strong>Russian</strong> economic<br />

figures for 2015 based on assumed price of Urals crude<br />

Alfa-Bank a CBR World Bank<br />

Average oil price, $/b 40 60 70<br />

GDP, % change year<br />

on year<br />

-3.8 -4.5 to<br />

-4.7<br />

-1.5<br />

Note: Based on different assumptions about the average annual price in 2015.<br />

a A later Alfa-Bank estimate (email from Natalya Orlova of Alfa-Bank of 17<br />

December) estimates that in the first quarter of 2015 GDP could be down year on<br />

year by 7–10%. When the January and February declines proved to be less than<br />

this, Alfa tweaked its GDP forecast for the year to an overall fall of only 2–3%<br />

(Alfa-Bank ‘Macro Insights’, 19 March 2015).<br />

Sources: Alfa-Bank ‘<strong>Russian</strong> Economic Spotlight’ of 1 December 2014; CBR<br />

as reported by the US–Russia Business Council (USRBC) Daily Update of 16<br />

December 2014; World Bank World Economic Outlook.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first two forecasts bear the scars of the collapse in oil<br />

prices and in the currency during the weeks that preceded<br />

their publication. Forecasts of these orders of magnitude<br />

continued to be generated into 2015. Even so, they may not<br />

be durable. <strong>The</strong> volatility of both key numbers and forecasts<br />

serves as a warning of what is the largest single problem<br />

for the <strong>Russian</strong> economy in the short term: an unusually<br />

heightened degree of uncertainty. This is considered further<br />

in the next section.<br />

By the end of 2014 at least one thing was clear. <strong>The</strong><br />

country faced a recession. An anti-crisis plan was being<br />

prepared, but agreement on it proved difficult. That,<br />

along with the vacillations of the CBR – which raised its<br />

key interest rate to 17 per cent to combat inflation and<br />

capital outflow, and then cut it back unexpectedly to 15<br />

per cent and, from mid-March, to 14 per cent – diminished<br />

the business community’s already low confidence in<br />

policy-making. A degree of consumer hardship looks to be<br />

built into these forecasts: inflation is high and MinEkon<br />

envisages a clear fall in real wages. Whether this hardship<br />

produces anything more than widespread grumbling is<br />

another matter.<br />

It is time to start looking at the problems that underlie the<br />

<strong>Russian</strong> economy’s weak performance and, apparently, still<br />

weaker prospects.<br />

59<br />

‘TsBR: Ottok kapitala iz Rossii v 2014 vyros v 2.5 raza’ [‘CBR: the capital outflow from Russia in 2014 rose by 2.5 times’], Vedomosti, 16 January 2015.<br />

16 | Chatham House

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