The Russian Challenge
20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate
20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate
- No tags were found...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Russian</strong> <strong>Challenge</strong><br />
An Enfeebled Economy<br />
Regional administrations face (in aggregate) a modest<br />
deficit, created in part by their efforts to raise the pay of<br />
state employees along the lines promised by President Putin<br />
in May 2012. Individual regions face particular difficulties,<br />
from which they will be bailed out by soft loans from the<br />
federal budget.<br />
<strong>The</strong> recent fall in investment has already been mentioned.<br />
One influence on this has been the highest-ever net outflow<br />
of private capital. In 2014 this totalled $154 billion, or close<br />
to 10 per cent of GDP if the latter is converted to dollars at<br />
the end-year ballpark figure of R60=$1. 59<br />
A net private capital outflow has been a feature of the postcommunist<br />
<strong>Russian</strong> economy in every year except 2006 and<br />
2007. When it is particularly large and accompanied by a<br />
dwindling current-account balance-of-payments surplus,<br />
it threatens the comfortable balance-of-payments position<br />
that has been the norm for Putin’s Russia. Figure 5 depicts<br />
the recent situation.<br />
Figure 5: Russia’s current-account balance and net flows<br />
of private capital, 2005–17 ($bn)<br />
$bn p.a.<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
-50<br />
-100<br />
-150<br />
-200<br />
Balance-of-payments current account<br />
Net private capital flows<br />
2005<br />
2006<br />
2007<br />
2008<br />
2009<br />
2010<br />
2011<br />
2012<br />
2013<br />
2014<br />
2015<br />
2016<br />
2017<br />
Note: <strong>The</strong> projections for 2015–17 are those contained in the CBR’s<br />
baseline scenario.<br />
Source: CBR, http://www.cbr.ru/publ/ondkp/on_2015(2016-2017).pdf.<br />
<strong>The</strong> near future: 2015–16<br />
On 27 November 2014 OPEC decided not to cut crude<br />
oil production quotas. Oil prices fell on the news, and so<br />
did the rouble. This was followed by a fall in forecasts<br />
for the <strong>Russian</strong> economy in 2015 as the imaginations of<br />
the scenario-makers struggled to keep up with events.<br />
Table 1 presents some key points from the 1 December<br />
projections for 2015 from one official, one independent and<br />
one international forecaster.<br />
Table 1: Selected projections of <strong>Russian</strong> economic<br />
figures for 2015 based on assumed price of Urals crude<br />
Alfa-Bank a CBR World Bank<br />
Average oil price, $/b 40 60 70<br />
GDP, % change year<br />
on year<br />
-3.8 -4.5 to<br />
-4.7<br />
-1.5<br />
Note: Based on different assumptions about the average annual price in 2015.<br />
a A later Alfa-Bank estimate (email from Natalya Orlova of Alfa-Bank of 17<br />
December) estimates that in the first quarter of 2015 GDP could be down year on<br />
year by 7–10%. When the January and February declines proved to be less than<br />
this, Alfa tweaked its GDP forecast for the year to an overall fall of only 2–3%<br />
(Alfa-Bank ‘Macro Insights’, 19 March 2015).<br />
Sources: Alfa-Bank ‘<strong>Russian</strong> Economic Spotlight’ of 1 December 2014; CBR<br />
as reported by the US–Russia Business Council (USRBC) Daily Update of 16<br />
December 2014; World Bank World Economic Outlook.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first two forecasts bear the scars of the collapse in oil<br />
prices and in the currency during the weeks that preceded<br />
their publication. Forecasts of these orders of magnitude<br />
continued to be generated into 2015. Even so, they may not<br />
be durable. <strong>The</strong> volatility of both key numbers and forecasts<br />
serves as a warning of what is the largest single problem<br />
for the <strong>Russian</strong> economy in the short term: an unusually<br />
heightened degree of uncertainty. This is considered further<br />
in the next section.<br />
By the end of 2014 at least one thing was clear. <strong>The</strong><br />
country faced a recession. An anti-crisis plan was being<br />
prepared, but agreement on it proved difficult. That,<br />
along with the vacillations of the CBR – which raised its<br />
key interest rate to 17 per cent to combat inflation and<br />
capital outflow, and then cut it back unexpectedly to 15<br />
per cent and, from mid-March, to 14 per cent – diminished<br />
the business community’s already low confidence in<br />
policy-making. A degree of consumer hardship looks to be<br />
built into these forecasts: inflation is high and MinEkon<br />
envisages a clear fall in real wages. Whether this hardship<br />
produces anything more than widespread grumbling is<br />
another matter.<br />
It is time to start looking at the problems that underlie the<br />
<strong>Russian</strong> economy’s weak performance and, apparently, still<br />
weaker prospects.<br />
59<br />
‘TsBR: Ottok kapitala iz Rossii v 2014 vyros v 2.5 raza’ [‘CBR: the capital outflow from Russia in 2014 rose by 2.5 times’], Vedomosti, 16 January 2015.<br />
16 | Chatham House