The Russian Challenge

The Russian Challenge
Russia’s Changed Outlook on the West: From Convergence to Confrontation
values. Before the end of his first term, in March 2004,
the first of these objectives was beginning to override the
second and the third.
In the ‘Millennium’ manifesto that he issued on 29
December 1999, on the eve of assuming the presidency,
Putin declared: ‘Our state and its institutions and structures
have always played an exceptionally important role in the
life of the country and its people.’
As prime minister, he was the principal instigator of the
renewed campaign, from October 1999, to bring secessionist
Chechnya back under central control – which Yeltsin had
failed to achieve in the first Chechen war of 1994–96.
In his first set-piece ‘Annual Address to the Federal
Assembly’ of 8 July 2000, Putin argued that a ‘vertical of
power’ and ‘dictatorship of the law’ were essential for the
governance of Russia: ‘The authorities must be guided
by the law and the single executive power vertical that
is formed in accordance with it … we insist on a single
dictatorship – the dictatorship of the law.’ To exercise
stronger control over Russia’s regions and their governors
(who at the time were still independently elected),
Putin created seven federal districts under presidential
appointees. His explicit purpose was to consolidate
‘the structures of the presidential vertical of power
in the territories’. 4
Putin’s proclaimed objective on coming to power was
not to change Russia’s direction of travel, but rather to
use a stronger state as a more effective instrument of
modernization. He sought to combine ‘the universal
principles of a market economy and democracy with
Russian realities’. 5 Russia’s place in the world depended
on the success of economic reform. In asserting in his
Millennium manifesto that Russia ‘was and will remain a
great power’, Putin stressed that in the modern world might
did not depend on military strength but on the ability of a
country to create and use advanced technologies, ensure
the wellbeing of its people, protect its security and uphold
its interests in the international arena. In his annual address
of 2003, he said that the ‘ultimate goal’ of returning Russia
‘to its place among the prosperous, developed, strong and
respected nations … will only be possible when Russia gains
economic power. … We can achieve this kind of Russia
only through sustainable and rapid growth.’ This in turn
depended on producing competitive goods and services
and on private initiative, both from Russian business and
from foreign companies working in Russia – ‘the driving
force of economic growth’.
Putin was equally clear, early on, in proclaiming adherence
to universal and democratic values. Russia had:
entered the highway along which the whole of humanity is
travelling. Only this way offers the possibility of dynamic
economic growth and higher living standards. … We have
come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based state, and
personal and political freedom. … History proves all dictatorships,
all authoritarian forms of government are transient. Only
democratic systems are intransient. 6
He argued in his first annual address that Russia needed
political parties with mass support (not ‘parties of officials
which are attached to the government’), a truly free media
and freedom of speech.
In seeking closer integration with the West, Putin sought
to revive a trend towards partnership which had faltered
in Yeltsin’s second term, especially during NATO’s 1999
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. He invited the
NATO secretary-general to Moscow and began to develop
friendships with Western leaders. The West in turn
welcomed the emphasis on reform and gave active support
through multilateral and bilateral programmes. Russian
foreign policy, said Putin in his 2001 annual address, should
be based on ‘clearly defined national priorities, pragmatism
and economic effectiveness’. 7 Economic interests should be
protected. A good reputation was important: ‘this is why we
must fulfil all our long-term commitments and agreements’. 8
At this stage Putin did not see a conflict between Russia’s
interests in the ‘near abroad’ (the former Soviet states on its
borders) and closer relations with the West. While he gave
top priority to ‘further integration in the CIS’, 9 he described
integration with Europe as ‘one of the key areas of our
foreign policy’: ‘our efforts to build up a partnership with
the European Union will become even more important’. 10
Year after year, Putin wanted to speed up the process of
acceding to the World Trade Organization (which was not
finally achieved until 2012).
He put down markers that Russia wanted its place in the
world to be respected, and its voice to be heard in decisionmaking,
but stated the case in much milder terms than
he was to use later. In his 2001 annual address, he asked
Russia’s international partners to acknowledge Russia’s
4
Annual address to the Federal Assembly, 8 July 2000.
5
‘Millennium’ manifesto, 29 December 1999.
6
Ibid.
7
Annual address to the Federal Assembly, 3 April 2001.
8
Ibid.
9
In 2000 the Commonwealth of Independent States comprised Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Ukraine had been a founding member in 1991 but refused to ratify the CIS charter in 1994, and had the status of a participant but
not an official member.
10
Annual address to the Federal Assembly, 3 April 2001.
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