The Russian Challenge

1. Introduction
In the introduction to a previous Chatham House Report on
Russia – Putin Again: Implications for Russia and the West –
published in February 2012, the authors remarked that ‘the
West will feel Russia’s pain’ as it ‘lashes out while in denial
of its own condition’.
Some of the authors of Putin Again have once more
contributed chapters to this new report, describing how
both the pain and the denial they predicted are now making
themselves felt. But none of them foresaw just how radically
and rapidly Russia would move to challenge the post-Cold
War security order, seizing Crimea within two years of
Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin in May 2012 and
embarking on the dismemberment of eastern Ukraine.
This report examines four key questions. First, what caused
this challenge? Second, where is Russia heading? Third,
what are the possible geopolitical consequences in the
widest sense? And finally, at the tactical and strategic levels,
how should the West act and react?
The authors of this report believe that the major Western
actors have yet to absorb the full implications of Russia’s
descent into authoritarian nationalism. It will take greater
imagination than has been shown to date to develop an
effective response to Moscow’s manoeuvres, supported as
they are by both traditional and unconventional methods
and means. Western strategy will have to take account of
two incontrovertible facts. First, Moscow and the West have
competing, conflicting and entirely incompatible agendas.
Second, Putin is a fundamentally anti-Western leader whose
serial disregard for the truth has destroyed his credibility as
a negotiating partner. Consequently, it is unwise to expect
that any compromise with Putin will produce long-term
stable outcomes in Europe.
To date, the United Kingdom has not settled on a truly
strategic approach. Meanwhile the Obama administration
and many European leaders apparently still hope that
the crisis will somehow fade away. But the precedent of
Georgia in 2008 demonstrated that even if Ukraine were to
disappear from the headlines, this would not imply a return
to peace and stability in Europe. The West would dearly like
Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko to patch up some sort
of an accommodation with Putin, so that attention can be
turned to other pressing global problems. This report warns
how short-sighted and futile such an arrangement would be.
The report addresses six important aspects of the
Russian challenge. In Chapter 2, Roderic Lyne outlines
the background to current events, tracks the evolution of
Putin’s outlook on the West, and explains the president’s
new model for Russia, concluding that it is unsustainable.
Philip Hanson examines this unsustainability in Chapter
3, showing how Russia’s economic decline is as much due
to long-term structural factors as it is to contemporary
pressures. James Sherr contributes an analysis of Russia’s
involvement in the struggle over Ukraine in Chapter 4,
and highlights the risks posed by Western inaction in the
face of Russian political manoeuvring. James Nixey argues
in Chapter 5 that Russian foreign policy has, in fact, not
changed significantly for over a decade, and that the desire
for control over the post-Soviet periphery (and consequent
inevitable adversarial relations with the West) is a
persistent factor in Moscow’s planning. In Chapter 6, Keir
Giles analyses the tools deployed by the Russian state to
maintain that control – with a particular focus on Russia’s
upgraded military capabilities, refined information
warfare techniques and distinctive interpretation of ‘soft
power’. Andrew Wood completes the circle in Chapter 7,
urging the West to consider how it will deal proactively
with the risks of Russia after Putin.
Vladimir Putin has chosen the strategic approach of
rebuilding ‘Fortress Russia’. It is a key contention of this
report that his policy risks both figurative and literal
bankruptcy for Russia, and potentially the premature
departure of its current leader. The timing of this
departure and the nature of what may follow cannot
be predicted. The West’s key players must plan for all
eventualities, at the same time as resisting Russia’s
illegitimate and illegal activities today.
The report finishes by offering specific recommendations to
address both current and future challenges. It constitutes a
plea for Western governments to think much more deeply
about the level of support that should be provided to
Ukraine; about how future crises can be pre-empted or at
the least managed better; and above all, about how Russia
can be managed over the long term for the greater security
of Europe.
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