Norwegian Party Assistance in Tanzania

Norwegian PartyAssistance in Tanzania

Erik Henningsen and Einar BraathenNorwegian PartyAssistance in TanzaniaNIBR Report 2009:16

Title:Author:Norwegian Party Assistance inTanzaniaErik Henningsen and Einar BraathenNIBR Report: 2009:16ISSN: 1502-9794ISBN: 978-82-7071-794-1Project number: O-2747Project name:“Evaluation of the NDS projects inTanzania”Financial supporter:Norwegian Centre for DemocracySupport (NDS)Head of project:Abstract:Summary:Einar BraathenThe report presents an analysis based on afield study of the projects of Høyre and theCentre Party, respectively, and their partnersin Tanzania. It makes recommendations withregards to future project activities.EnglishDate: June 2009Pages: 94Price: NOK 250,-Publisher::Norwegian Institute for Urban andRegional ResearchGaustadalléen 210349 OSLOTelephone (+47) 22 95 88 00Telefax (+47) 22 60 77 74E-mail: nibr@nibr.nohttp://www.nibr.noPrinted: Nordberg A.S.Org. no. NO 970205284 MVA© NIBR 2008

1PrefaceThis report presents the results of an evaluation carried out for theNorwegian Centre for Democracy Support (NDS) of threepolitical party assistance projects implemented in Tanzania byHøyre and Senterpartiet. The project leader has been EinarBraathen, and the principal researcher and author of the report hasbeen Erik Henningsen.The team is grateful to Eva Langslet and Sylvia Eide, coordinatorsat the NDS, for their facilitation of the evaluation and assistance tothe team. Thanks are also rendered to informants from Høyre,Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen for their frankness inresponding to questions from the team and help in thepreparations of the field study. The team has appreciated thedetailed comments on the first draft of the report fromSenterpartiet and Høyre and the partners in Tanzania. The teamhas tried to accommodate all relevant comments into the finalversion of the report. Nonetheless, the authors alone bear theresponsibility for the report, its recommendations and conclusions.We are grateful to Mr. Mudasia Kadasia, who was the Kiswahiliinterpreter and assistant during the field work, and to allinformants in Dar-es-Dalaam, Mwanza and Magu for theirhospitality, openness and spirit of cooperation. Finally, we aregrateful to Peris Jones and Gro Sandkjær Hansen for commentson a draft version of the reportOslo, June 2009Marit HaugResearch DirectorNIBR Report: 2009:16

2Table of ContentsPreface...................................................................................................... 1List of abbreviations............................................................................... 4Summary.................................................................................................. 51 Introduction .................................................................................. 101.1 The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support........ 111.2 International party assistance ........................................ 121.3 Challenges to democratisation in Tanzania................. 141.4 Fieldwork and method................................................... 162 Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi............................. 202.1 Background and organisation of projects.................... 202.1.1 Project objectives ............................................................ 212.1.2 Project activities and expenditure................................. 222.1.3 Project management ....................................................... 242.1.4 Norwegian partners as implementers of projectactivities ............................................................................ 262.1.5 Vijana na Ushawishi as appendix to Haki naDemokrasia ........................................................................ 272.2 Impacts of Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana naUshawishi ........................................................................... 282.2.1 Project participants’ appraisals of Haki naDemokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi .............................. 292.2.2 Understanding of study circle methodology andrelevance of study material ............................................ 322.2.3 Vikundi as economic enterprises.................................. 332.2.4 The posho-syndrome ..................................................... 362.2.5 Focus on Norway............................................................ 422.2.6 Atmosphere of distrust .................................................. 442.2.7 The role of CODRA....................................................... 462.2.8 Exclusion of UDP from projects ................................. 49NIBR Report: 2009:16

32.3 The sustainability of Haki na Demokrasia andVijana na Ushawishi.......................................................... 512.4 Recommendations for Haki na Demokrasia andVijana na Ushawishi.......................................................... 543 Democracy in Tanzania .................................................................... 583.1 Background...................................................................... 583.1.1 Project objectives ............................................................ 593.1.2 Rooting in party organisations ...................................... 603.1.3 Project activities .............................................................. 613.1.4 Project participants’ assessments of activities............. 633.1.5 Beyond women and youth............................................. 653.1.6 Ad hoc nature of activities............................................. 663.1.7 From events to learning process................................... 673.1.8 Study trips vs. Exposure trips ....................................... 683.2 Recommendations for Democracy in Tanzania .............. 694 Concluding remarks ..................................................................... 73References.............................................................................................. 76Appendix 1 List of interviewees:........................................................ 79Appendix 2 Letter from Norwegian Centre for DemocracySupport............................................................................. 84Appendix 3 Project proposal .............................................................. 85NIBR Report: 2009:16

4List of abbreviationsCCM - Chama Cha MapinduziCHADEMA -Chama cha Demokrasia na MaendeleoCODRA - Community Development and ReliefAgency of TanzaniaCUF - Civic United FrontIDU - International Democratic UnionIRI - International Republican InstituteNDI - National Democratic Institute forInternational AffairsNDS - Norwegian Centre for Democracy SupportNIBR - Norwegian Institute for Urban andRegional ResearchNIMD - Netherlands Institute for MultipartyDemocracySACCO - Savings and credit co-operative societyTCD - Tanzania Centre for Multiparty DemocracyUDP - United Democratic PartyNIBR Report: 2009:16

5SummaryErik Henningsen and Einar BraathenNorwegian Party Assistance in TanzaniaNIBR Report: 2009:16The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support was established bythe Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in 2002, as a politicallyneutral non-profit organisation with the aim of strengthening theNorwegian foreign policy goal of securing good governancethrough the promotion of multiparty democracy and free electionsin other parts of the world. More specifically, the objective ofNDS has been to facilitate the use of the experience andcompetence of Norwegian political parties in the development ofstrong and stable democracies in countries in the South.This report is an evaluation of three projects of international partyassistance that are implemented in Tanzania with funding fromNDS. Two of the projects which are considered in the report arecarried out in Magu district in the Mwanza region in the North-Western part of Tanzania. Haki na Demokrasia (Rights andDemocracy) is a cooperation project between the NorwegianSenterpartiet (Centre Party) and the local branches of Chama ChaMapinduzi (CCM), Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama chaDemokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) in Magu district. Vijanana Ushawishi (Youth and Influence) is a cooperation projectbetween Senterungdommen (Centre Party Youth) and the youthwings of the CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu. The thirdproject considered in the report, Democracy in Tanzania, is acooperation-project between the Norwegian Conservative Party(Høyre) and CHADEMA.NIBR Report: 2009:16

6The projects that are implemented in Magu district by theSenterpartiet and senterungdommen are described and analysed inchapter 2 of the report. Haki na Demokrasia has been running since2005. The project targets the members of the district branches ofCCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu and employs the studycircle methodology to impart knowledge about issues of rights anddemocracy to project participants. The long term objective of theproject is to strengthen civil society through capacity building ofgrassroots leaders from the party organisations, youth and womenorganisations in order to enhance unity, democracy and sustainabledevelopment in Magu district. Vijana na Ushawishi, which started in2006, target the young membership of the political parties. Thelong term objective of the project is to strengthen the position ofyouth within political parties and in Tanzanian democracy.The core activity in both projects is the study circle groups withlocal members from CCM, CUF and CHADEMA. The studycircle groups are established by facilitators who have receivedtraining at seminars with the Norwegian project partners. Thegroups meet on a continuous basis at the facilitator’s homelocation. At the end of 2008 120 facilitators have received trainingas a part of the Haki project and 40 persons have received similartraining in the Vijana project. Apart from the activities of the studycircle groups, project activities consist of seminars with theNorwegian project partners, production of study material for thestudy circle groups and study trips to Norway. The report notesthat the frequency of visits to Tanzania by the Norwegian projectpartners is high and points out that, given the overlaps inobjectives and target groups, the creation of two projects in Magudistrict was unnecessary.The projects seem to be well known to representatives of thepolitical-administrative system in Magu. In group interviews withproject participants it was reported that the projects have affectedlocal communities in Magu positively in three ways. Firstly, theprojects are reported to have improved the working relationsbetween the political parties and made it possible for members ofdifferent parties to discuss matters of community development in aconstructive atmosphere. Secondly, the projects are reported to haveincreased the political participation of women and youth. Thirdly,the projects are reported to have improved project participantsunderstanding of matters of good leadership and good governance.NIBR Report: 2009:16

7In Magu it is common to expect payment for participation indevelopment projects. According to the study circle groupfacilitators interviewed for this study, it is difficult to recruitmembers to a project for educational purposes only. As anincentive for recruitment, most of the study circle groupsinterviewed for the evaluation engages in economic activities, suchas micro-credit funds. These activities contribute to thesustainability of the project, but may also give study circle groupsan exclusive character.An important incentive for participation in the project is theallowance payment participants receive for attending seminars withthe Norwegian project partners. Reflecting on the issue ofallowances, the report notes that this may create unrealisticexpectations about the material rewards of project participation,that it creates problems of free riding on project resources, whichin turn enhances the need for monitoring activities, and that itelevates actual or perceived gate keepers of project resources intopositions of power. The report notes project participants’ interestfor the study trips to Norway, which seems to be an importantincentive for recruitment to the project, and that the projects seemto have promoted a glorification of Norway as a socio-economicideal. The report further notices that there is rivalry and suspicionbetween project participants with regards to the distribution ofthese rewards in the projects.The Haki and Vijana projects are administered locally by an NGOwhich is owned by an MP from Magu district. The MP has acentral role in the projects, formally as the project coordinator andsymbolically as a provider of the project. In Tanzania,development projects are common vehicles for the dispensing ofpolitical patronage to the poor. Reflecting on this circumstance,the report points out that the use of the NGO in the projects isunfortunate. The report further notes that the second largestopposition party in Magu district and a rival to the MP, UnitedDemocratic Party (UDP), has to a large extent been excluded fromthe project.The study circle approach is potentially a low-cost method ofeducation that can be appropriated by people with little formaleducation, but the Haki and Vijana projects have taken on acharacter as parallel structures and are not sustainable in theirNIBR Report: 2009:16

8present mode of operation. If the Norwegian financial support iswithdrawn, it is likely that the project activities in Magu will cometo an end.Given the problematic features of the projects, continued fundingof Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects is notrecommended. If similar projects are to be implemented in otherdistricts in Tanzania it is important that they give more emphasisto the study circle methodology’s potential as a decentralised andlow-cost educational approach, that clear criteria of eligibility forparticipation by political parties are developed, and that the projectavoids contributing to the fragmentation of local governancestructures.Chapter 3 in the report describes and analyses the Democracy inTanzania project, which started in 2006. Democracy in Tanzania issmaller than the projects implemented in Magu district in terms ofits budget, and unlike those it is a bilateral project of “sisterparty”cooperation. The objective of the project is to help CHADEMAbecome a good, decent and effective opposition party. Morespecifically, the goals of the project are to encourage more womento contest for positions in the party and in Parliament, and toproduce a larger group of young aspiring leaders withinCHADEMA. Project activities mainly consist of seminars. In 2008Høyre visited Tanzania two times together with the SwedishModeratarna. On both occasions the Scandinavian team gave twoseminars for youth and two seminars for women. Since 2007Høyre has been running a standard seminar concept featuringgeneral tools for party work. The main teaching components ofthe seminars are: recruitment of members, communication skills,campaigning skills and SWOT-analysis. In addition to the seminaractivities, the project includes study trips to Norway forCHADEMA officials.In interviews with party members who had participated inseminars and party officials at the CHADEMA headquarter it wasreported that the skills and knowledge conveyed at the seminarsare relevant and useful. It was reported that the seminars areimportant occasions for networking among party members andthat they strengthen the cohesion of the party’s membership. Partyofficials also reported that relations with foreign political partiesNIBR Report: 2009:16

9lend prestige to CHADEMA and may be helpful in terms of votersupport.In interviews with CHADEMA officials it was pointed out that theHøyre’s standard seminar concept has been appropriated byresource persons in CHADEMA, and that new seminar conceptsshould be developed for future visits. In particular, the party has aneed for training of electoral candidates in the run up to the nextelections. This would imply a shift of focus away from women andyouth. Also, the party has needs for research and policy advice,assistance for the development of the informational infrastructureof the party and for organisational development.In interviews with CHADEMA officials it was reported that thereis a lack of continuous communication with Høyre and thatproject activities tend to be of an ad hoc nature. As a result of this,the project tends to take on the character of a series of eventsrather than a cumulative process. The short time frame forplanning of activities makes it difficult to ensure that the rightpeople are invited to seminars and to coordinate the activities withCHADEMAs engagements with other providers of partyassistance. It was also pointed out in interviews that study trips toNorway may be of dubious value to the party organisation unlessthere are follow up activities in CHADEMA afterwards.The report recommends that Høyre and CHADEMA developyearly activity plans for the project, and that Høyre establishes aproject team with representatives from the women and youthmovements of the party. It is further recommended that projectactivities are given the form of training of trainers and that writtenmanuals are developed for the seminars. Finally, it isrecommended that study trips to Norway should not be a part ofthe project activities.NIBR Report: 2009:16

101 IntroductionIn November 2008 the Norwegian Institute for Urban andRegional Research (NIBR) was commissioned by the NorwegianCentre for Democracy Support (NDS) to carry out an evaluationof three party assistance projects that are implemented in Tanzaniawith funding from NDS. This report documents the study whichwas carried out by NIBR, presents our analysis of the threeprojects and makes recommendations with regards to futureproject activities. Two of the projects which are considered in thereport are carried out in Magu district in the Mwanza region in theNorth-Western part of Tanzania. Haki na Demokrasia (Rights andDemocracy) is a cooperation project between the NorwegianSenterpartiet (Centre Party) and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM),Civic United Front (CUF) and Chama cha Demokrasia naMaendeleo (CHADEMA) in Magu district. The project target themembers of the district branches of CCM, CUF and CHADEMAin Magu and employ the study circle methodology to impartknowledge about issues of rights and democracy to projectparticipants. Vijana na Ushawishi (Youth and Influence) is acooperation project between Senterungdommen (Centre PartyYouth) and the youth wings of the CCM, CUF and CHADEMAin Magu. The third project considered in the report, Democracy inTanzania, is a cooperation-project between the NorwegianConservative Party (Høyre) and CHADEMA. In the terms ofreference for the project (Appendix 2) it is specified that theevaluation should illuminate the following questions with regardsto the three NDS-projects in Tanzania:1. Does the projects contribute to making CHADEMA a moreeffective political party and to strengthening grassrootsinfluence in CCM, CHADEMA and CUF? With regards tothe last question, the evaluation should consider theNIBR Report: 2009:16

11usefulness of the study circle approach employed bySenterpartiet and Senterungdommen.2. Do NDS and its partners have routines to ensure quality andeffectiveness in the projects, including budgetary andfinancial accuracy?In accordance with the terms of reference the principal goal of theevaluation is to promote learning from project experience amongpartners involved in NDS-projects. It is further stated in the termsof reference that the evaluation should take local socio-politicalcontextual circumstances into account. In line with this, the projectproposal on which the evaluation is based (Appendix 3) states thatthe study aims to identify and describe mechanisms that contributeto the realisation of the projects objectives or that works tosubvert them. Thus the aim of the evaluation is not only toaccount for the positive and negative effects of the projects, but topromote understanding of how and why these effects have beenbrought about. The project proposal further states that the twoprojects that are implemented in Magu district is the main focus ofthe study. One reason for this choice of focus is that the Maguprojectsare larger than the third project in terms of budget sizeand in terms of the number of activities and people involved.Another reason is that the projects in Magu employ an innovativeapproach to party-assistance, the effects of which are interesting todocument.1.1 The Norwegian Centre for DemocracySupportThe Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support was established bythe Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in 2002, as a politicallyneutral non-profit organisation with the aim of strengthening theNorwegian foreign policy goal of securing good governancethrough the promotion of multiparty democracy and free electionsin other parts of the world. More specifically, the objective ofNDS has been to facilitate the use of the experience andcompetence of Norwegian political parties in the development ofstrong and stable democracies in countries in the South.NIBR Report: 2009:16

12In 2006 the centre was reorganised and became an independentorganisation consisting of a Council, a Board and a Secretariat. TheCouncil has consisted of the party secretaries and two otherrepresentatives from all the political parties represented inParliament. The Board has been made up of representatives of thepolitical parties and three independent experts and convened twoto four times a year to consider and approve applications forproject funding. The secretariat, which is staffed with two persons,has been responsible for the day to day activities of the centre,facilitation of the activities of the Board, and processing of projectapplications. In 2008 NDS provided funding for 16 partyassistance projects, which were carried out in seven countries inAfrica, Asia and Latin-America. NDS has been fully financed bythe Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.In May 2009 the NDS Council decided to shut down the centre.At the same time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signalled that theNorwegian government will continue to fund a programme ofinternational party assistance.1.2 International party assistanceProjects funded by NDS belong to the subfield of internationaldemocracy assistance which is commonly referred to as partyassistance. 1 Programmes of international party assistance havebeen in existence since the 1960s, but as Kumar (2004) notes, theexpansion of this field of activities has mainly taken place in thepost-cold war era in conjunction with the wave of transitions tomultiparty democracy in developing countries. The growth inprogrammes of party assistance ties in with the emphasis onpolicies of good governance among donors in the same period.In liberal democracies political parties have historically taken onimportant roles of interest articulation, interest aggregation andcontrol over government. Political parties in developing countriesoften fail to fulfil some or all of these roles. They are often weak in1 Party assistance can be defined as “any type of international assistance gearedtowards individual parties or the party system as a whole, with the purpose ofstrengthening democracy in a given country” (Caton 2007: 6).NIBR Report: 2009:16

13terms of internal organisation and internal democracy. They maylack a social foundation and be undermined as institutions bycorruption and informal politics of clientilism. The principal aimof programmes of party assistance is to strengthen political partiesand to improve the legal and regulatory environment in which theyoperate (Kumar 2004). Party assistance focus on areas such asorganisational development of parties, internal democracy withinparties, election campaigning, political participation ofdisadvantaged groups and multiparty collaborations.Donor support to political parties is controversial, mainly becauseit can be seen as interference in sovereign national politics. Partyassistance therefore seldom takes the form of direct financial orcommodity aid to political parties. It is provided in the form ofcapacity building and training activities, but may also take theforms of technical assistance, policy advice, polling and researchassistance, and study trips. As this indicates, party assistance tendsto be premised on a belief in the power of dialogue and theimparting of knowledge as means of bringing about politicalchange.According to Amundsen (2007), donor support for political partiesis channelled through at least 32 European and two Americanparty-affiliated organisations. Among these are single party-basedfoundations, like the German Stiftungen, whose programmes ofparty assistance mainly take the form of bilateral sister-partyarrangements. Another type of actors is the American single partyaffiliatedNGOs National Democratic Institute (NDI) andInternational Republican Institute (IRI), which operates mainly ona multiparty basis abroad. A third category of actors are multipartybased NGOs like the Netherlands Institute for MultipartyDemocracy (NIMD), which implements projects of both abilateral and a multiparty nature in its cooperating countries.The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support belongs to the lastcategory, but unlike NIMD its role has largely been restricted tothe funding of projects of party assistance. With two exceptions,the projects funded by NDS have all been implemented byNorwegian political parties and local partners in the South. In 2007about two thirds of NDS’ budget was spent on bilateral projectand the rest on multiparty projects. The part of the budget whichwas spent on multiparty projects was increased in 2008 (KjøstvedtNIBR Report: 2009:16

14et al 2008). In terms of the scale of its programme, NDS hardlycompares to any of the abovementioned organisations. In 2008NDS’ total budget was about EUR 1.0 million. 2 In 2004-5 NDI,IRI and the two largest German foundations all spent more thantwenty million Euros on party assistance, while NIMDsexpenditure was EUR 6.1 millions (Caton 2007).1.3 Challenges to democratisation in TanzaniaAfter nearly thirty years of one-party rule, multiparty politics wasreintroduced in Tanzania in 1992. The ‘second wave’ of politicalliberalisation in Africa in the 1990s was in most places stronglyinduced by international donor pressure, but in Tanzania thetransition to multiparty politics came about mainly as a result ofdomestic political processes. The call for political pluralismemerged from within the ruling CCM party, what somecommentators view as a tactical attempt to secure the party’sfuture dominance in the country (Pietla, Ojalammi-Wamai andLaakso 2002). In the wake of the constitutional reform, effortshave been made by the Tanzanian government to separate the civilservices from the structures of the CCM-party and to achievedevolution of political power through a local government reformprogramme. Unlike some of its neighbouring countries, ethnicityplays a modest role in Tanzanian politics. 3 The policy of nationalunity which was pursued by CCM under the one-party era hasbeen carried forward in the multiparty era through a ban onregional and religious parties. In other respects Tanzania conformsto contemporary patterns of politics in African countries.The political system in Tanzania is generally characterised bycentralised structures of decision making, which gives people at thegrassroots level little scope for exerting influence. Elected localpolitical bodies, in particular at the sub-district level, havetraditionally been assigned a role as implementers of decisionstaken at higher levels of government. In the governing tradition of2 Personal communication with the secretariat3 One important exception to this is Zanzibar, where communal identities is amajor source of political mobilisation In the last two elections Zanzibar hasbeen rocked by extensive political violence.NIBR Report: 2009:16

15CCM, the emphasis has been on military-style mobilisation of thepeople to effectuate directives from the central government, ratherthan on democratic participation. As with other revolutionaryparties that view themselves as the champions of the interests ofthe downtrodden masses, the immediate strategy is not “to involvethe people in prolonged discussion about whether or not toterminate their misery but to move them to act in a well-directedand disciplined manner to attack the enemy or the problem as theysee it” (Mihyo 2003: 77. Italics in original). To achieve a shift inorientation from mobilisation to participation in matters ofgovernment is accordingly a major challenge of democratisation.The abovementioned Local Government Reform Programme canbe seen as a step in this direction (Braathen et al 2005). But asShivjy and Peters (2000) notes in this regard, it is ironic that thereform programme should target the district level of government,which was put in place in the 1980s with the intention ofstrengthening the central government’s grip over localgovernments.Another challenge of democratisation in Tanzania is theproliferation of politics of clientilism. Since the opening of thecountry to the market economy in the 1980s, politics in Tanzaniahave increasingly come to rely on informal networks whichfacilitate personal “deals” rather than on impersonal rules andinstitutions. As Hyden (2005) notes, more than a cause ofcorruption, clientilism has become the very backbone on whichTanzania’s power structure depends. As such it affects politics atall levels of government, from the national down to the local. Inthe one-party era individual Members of Parliament were highlydependant on the resources of the CCM party to retain power intheir local constituencies, and thus tended to act as agents of thecentre at the periphery. With the shift to multipartyism, CCM is nolonger able to provide its MPs with the necessary resources to stayin power and as a result of this, a change in the power structure ofCCM has occurred:“First, it has increasingly become dependant onleaders who can deliver constituencies to Parliamentirrespective of their ideology or record in terms oftransparency. Second, its MPs have built patron-clientnetworks that help them to raise funds and retainsupport in their constituencies. Most of theseNIBR Report: 2009:16

16networks are aimed at controlling not only power butalso resources and business opportunities. As theCCM becomes increasingly dependant on thesenetworks, its government cannot avoid givingpreferential treatment to its patrons in the areas ofimport permits, land allocation, public contract andlicenses” (Mihyo 2003: 87).In a recent study from the Mwanza region, Lange (2008) notes thatgrowing class polarisation since the 1980s have served to amplifytendencies of clientilism in local politics. As a consequence of this,women and youth, who are generally less economically resourcefulthan men, are effectively excluded from competition for politicalpositions.This situation can be interpreted as an invitation for partyassistance. Under such circumstances, international efforts tostrengthen political parties as democratic institutions can be a wayof enlarging the space of political participation for ordinarycitizens. But this can also be seen as a futile endeavour. A maincriticism of party assistance, Kumar (2004) notes, is that if whatreally matters in politics is individual politicians, it is pointless tostrengthen political parties. Support to political parties may ineffect turn out to be support to powerful individuals. As we shallsee in the pages that follow, these questions are highly relevantwith regards to the NDS projects in Tanzania as well.1.4 Fieldwork and methodGiven the evaluation’s aim of stimulating learning from projectexperience, we have employed an explorative research approach.Research questions and themes have been allowed to emerge inand through our dialogue with informants.The evaluation is based on two types of information sources.Firstly, a desk study of project documents provided to us by NDSand project partners in Norway and Tanzania. The second sourceof information is semi-structured interviews with persons who aredirectly or indirectly involved in the projects in Tanzania andNorway (see Appendix 1. for a list of interviewees). In this regard,the study relies on a combination of personal interviews and groupNIBR Report: 2009:16

17interviews. Most of the personal interviews we carried out wereframed as conversations on the basis of a list of questions aboutthe projects we brought to the interviews. Apart from solicitingfactual information about the projects, we encouraged informantsto reflect on how the projects have affected themselves asindividuals, their political party organisations and the localcommunities to which they belong, and to reflect on possibleproblems and shortcomings of the projects. In the groupinterviews we tried to engage interviewees in discussions aboutsimilar questions.Fieldwork in Tanzania was carried out over a period of two weeksin January 2009. In Dar es Salaam we interviewed party officials atCHADEMAs headquarter, the director of Tanzania Centre forMultiparty Democracy (TCD), party officials from UnitedDemocratic Party (UDP) and a representative of the RoyalNorwegian Embassy. In many of these interviews we collectedviewpoints and information about the projects in Magu. The mainfocus of most of the interviews we carried out at the CHADEMAheadquarter was the Democracy in Tanzania project. In addition todiscussions with party officials involved in the project, weinterviewed four CHADEMA members who had participated inproject activities. These informants were selected by CHADEMAon our request. During the interviews a CHADEMA employeeacted as interpreter. In the other interviews we carried out in Dares Salaam, communication with informants was in English orNorwegian.In Magu district we carried out interviews with the local steeringcommittees of the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishiprojects and members of nine study circle groups from the twoprojects. We interviewed the District Commissioner, the DistrictPlanning Officer and the District Executive Director in Maguabout the projects, as well as the chairpersons of the district partybranches of CHADEMA and UDP. In six of the villages where weinterviewed study circle groups, we carried out interviews withlocal leaders (District executive officers, chairpersons of schoolcommittees, chairperson of Village Council). In Mwanza town weinterviewed the regional secretaries of CCM and CHADEMA anda representative of CUF. Here we also interviewed representativesof the NGO Community Development and Relief Agency ofTanzania (CODRA). CODRA made practical arrangements forNIBR Report: 2009:16

18most of the interviews we carried out in Magu and Mwanza andescorted us to the villages where the study circle groups arelocated. In all of these interviews communication was translatedfrom Kiswahili to English by an interpreter employed by NIBR.The selection of study circle groups for interviewing was made bythe members of the steering committees of the two projects, whowere instructed by us to select only study circle groups that arewell functioning. Our reason for choosing this “best caseapproach” was to avoid criticism that the conclusions we arrive atin the report might stem from having met with the “wrong”informants. The meetings with the study circle groups took placein school buildings or outdoors where the groups normally meet.The number of persons who were present during these meetingsranged from more than twenty to four (not counting theinterviewers). In the two first villages we carried out a groupinterview with all the members of the study circle group, groupinterviews with three women and three male members of thegroup, and a personal interview with the study circle groupfacilitator. For practical reasons, the rest of the meetings featuredonly a group interview with the members of the study circle groupand a personal interview with the facilitator.In most cases, the project participants appeared to be familiar withthe group interview as a type of social situation. This may be dueto the fact that meetings of a similar nature have been held onseveral occasions in connection with monitoring missions of theNorwegian project partners. In our talks with the Norwegianproject partners, it was repeatedly underscored that, in theirexperience, project participants in Magu tend to “only tell youwhat they think you will hear”, and that this poses a challenge withregards to obtaining credible information. We were left with asimilar impression in the group interviews we carried out in Magu.Here it was difficult to engage project participants in discussionsand we hardly ever encountered any open disagreements aboutassessments of the projects among interviewees. For the most part,project participants made approving statements about the projects.Most of these comments were centred on a few themes only,which made the responses we solicited from the different groupsquite predictable. On several occasions, project participants voicedthese “standard” assessments even when we inquired aboutdifferent matters. This is not to suggest that the statements wereNIBR Report: 2009:16

19untrue, but rather that there was a lack of spontaneous reflectionand nuanced viewpoints in the responses we got from projectparticipants in group interviews. The “front stage” (Goffman1971) character of the communication was underlined by the factthat, in three cases, the study circle groups had prepared writtenstatements, which was presented by a group member at the start ofthe meeting. When pushed to reflect on problems and challengesthat affect the projects, project participants sometimes pointed tothe need for more resources from the Norwegian donors. Apartfrom this, project participants were reluctant to talk aboutproblems that might affect the projects during the groupinterviews. One reason for this might be that project participantsfind it inappropriate to air criticism or to talk about sensitive issuesin public settings like these and in the presence of foreign visitors.Another reason might be that informants see it in their interest toavoid saying things that could place the project in an unfavourablelight, out of a fear that this may harm the project or shut them offfrom the project.Based on our observations of the immediate context ofcommunication, we consider the personal interviews we carriedout with study circle facilitators a more credible source ofinformation than the group interviews. In the personal interviews,the communication between interviewers and interviewees wasmore relaxed and informants spoke with greater nuance about theprojects. In addition to approving comments, they pointed toperceived problems in the projects and voiced criticisms of actorsinvolved in them. Some themes that emerged in the initialinterviews with facilitators proved to be catalysts for reflection inmost of the other interviews as well. For instance, we found thatthe facilitators could easily relate to questions about the challengesof recruiting members to the study circle groups. Having explainedthat it was difficult to recruit members to the study circle groups, itfell natural in the flow of the conversation that the facilitatorsshould proceed to explain why this was the case, and in doing sothey touched on various features of the projects which neversurfaced during the group interviews.NIBR Report: 2009:16

202 Haki na Demokrasia andVijana na UshawishiIn this chapter we describe the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana naUshawishi projects that are implemented in Magu district bySenterpartiet and Senterungdommen and local partnerorganisations. The projects target the members of the districtbranches of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA in Magu and employ thestudy circle methodology to impart knowledge about issues ofrights and democracy to project participants. In the sections thatfollow we highlight both positive and problematic features of theprojects we were alerted to during our fieldwork. In many cases wemake direct comments upon observations as we move through thesections. The observations are summarised and discussed furtherin the two closing sections of the chapter.2.1 Background and organisation of projectsMagu district is located in the Mwanza region of Tanzania andborders on Lake Victoria in the West and Kenya to the North. In2004 the total population of the district was 433 773, the majorityof which belongs to the Sukuma ethnic group. Most settlements inthe district are classified as rural and agriculture is the by far mostcommon source of employment (Magu District Council 2005).The administrative and commercial centre of the district is Magutown, which is located along the Mwanza-Musoma road, the maintransport line in the district. As in most other rural districts ofTanzania, CCM is the political party in dominance. It holds a largemajority in the District Council, and chairs most of the 124 VillageCouncils of the district. The two Members of Parliament fromMagu are currently both representing CCM.NIBR Report: 2009:16

21Senterpartiet has since 1999 supported a community developmentproject in Magu district which is run by CARE Norway. The ideafor the Haki na Demokrasia project was born on a visit to theproject by representatives of Senterpartiets Studieforbund (CentreParty Adult Education Organisation). In Magu the Norwegiansmet with local political leaders, among them the Hon. Dr. RafaelChegeni, the Member of Parliament for Busega constituency inMagu representing CCM. The local leaders took an interest in theNorwegian organisation’s use of study circles, and the possibilityof employing this methodology locally for purposes of capacitybuilding. It was agreed from the outset that the project shouldtarget the grassroots population of the district and in particularwomen and youth. In 2002 Senterpartiet was granted financialsupport from NDS to carry out a pre-project in Tanzania. On thebasis of consultations with Tanzanian political actors in 2002 and2003 it was decided that the project should not be restricted to theCCM membership, as originally planned, but be of a cross-partynature. A letter of understanding concerning participation in theproject was signed by national and local representatives of CCM,CUF and CHADEMA in 2004. In 2005 NDS granted support toHaki na Demokrasia for pilot activities, and the project commencedthe following year.Vijana na Ushawishi is an offshoot of the Haki project whichspecifically targets the young membership of the political parties.The idea for the project was brought up in talks between arepresentative of Senterungdommen and representatives of theyouth wings of the political parties in Magu during a project visitfor Haki na Demokrasia. In 2006 Senterungdommen was grantedsupport from NDS to carry out a pre-project in Magu duringwhich an agreement about project participation was signed by theleaders of the youth wings of CCM, CUF and CHADEMA andthe Norwegian partner. Vijana na Ushawishi commenced the nextyear.2.1.1 Project objectivesProject documents of the Haki and Vijana projects emphasise thatthe level of socio-economic development in Magu district is low,because of a lack of grassroots democracy and good governance.Project documents from Vijana na Ushawishi highlight the weaklyNIBR Report: 2009:16

22developed role of youth in Tanzanian politics, both in terms of theformal organisation of the youth wings of the political parties andmore generally with regards to political participation. In thebaseline studies for both projects it is stated that there is a “criticalneed to support human rights, and to promote democratic andparticipatory governance” in the district. In interviews weconducted with representatives of the Norwegian partners, theyaffirmed the relevance of Senterpartiets ideology ofdecentralisation to the projects and their conviction that “changemust come from below”, i.e. through processes of politicalparticipation among the grassroots population. These convictionsextend as well to the application of the study circle methodology inthe projects. In our talks with representatives of the Norwegianpartners they highlighted the low cost nature of these activities andtheir low demands in terms of formal qualifications of participantsas factors which make the methodology suitable as a means ofempowering the African grassroots population. The Norwegiansalso underscored the inherent value of participation in studycircles, as form of activity which is egalitarian and democratic bynature.The stated long term objective of Haki na Demokrasia is “tostrengthen civil society through capacity building of grassrootsleaders from the party organisations, youth and womenorganisations in order to enhance unity, democracy and sustainabledevelopment in Magu District”. The project goal is specified as “toempower women and youth so that they will be able to havegreater influence in the democratic decision process”. The longterm objective of the Vijana project is “to strengthen the positionof youth within political parties and in Tanzanian democracy”.More specifically the project aims to “empower the youthbranches of the political parties in Magu and to strengthen youngpeople’s role in the local party organisations”. Here, as in the Hakiproject, the goal of contributing to the empowerment ofgirls/women is generally emphasised.2.1.2 Project activities and expenditureThe core activity of the Haki and Vijana projects is the study circlegroups which have been established in Magu with local membersfrom CCM, CUF and CHADEMA. The study circle groups areNIBR Report: 2009:16

23established by facilitators, who have received training at seminarswith the Norwegian partners, and number up to twentyparticipants, usually from the facilitator’s home location. Thegroups meet on a continuous basis, but with varying frequency. Inthe nine groups we visited during our fieldwork in Magu, thisvaried from once every month to weekly meetings. At themeetings various issues of democracy and citizen’s rights arebrought up for discussion among the participants. The emphasisof the activities is on participation and the inclusiveness of learningprocesses. At the end of 2008 120 facilitators have receivedtraining as a part of the Haki project and 40 persons have receivedsimilar training in the Vijana project.Usually three members of the project team of Haki na Demokrasia’sNorwegian partner have visited Tanzania for a duration of twoweeks, or more, three times a year since the start of the project.During these stays the team conducts training of study circlefacilitators and other seminar activities with project participants.They also go on monitoring missions to study circle groups andhave meetings with project partners and other actors in Magu andwith party representatives from the regional and national offices.Local project participants who have been trained as trainers by theNorwegian partners contribute to the seminars in Magu. Anevaluation workshop is conducted with project participants duringone of the team’s yearly visits. The training and the study materialproduced for the Haki project are divided into five topical steps ormodules. At the initial training seminar, facilitators are trained inthe study circle methodology and the management of study circlegroups. As the study circle groups progress through the studymaterial, their facilitators are to receive training on the topics“Leadership and democracy”, “Parliament and gender”, “Localgovernment decision level (sub-village-ward)”, “Local governmentdecision level (district/region)” and “Corruption”. The Norwegianpartner has produced three study material booklets in Kiswahili forthe project. Nine project participants in Magu have been trained asstudy material writers and have produced the final two studymaterial booklets.Exchange trips to Norway are also included in the project activitiesof Haki na Demokrasia. On two occasions, project participantsfrom Magu and party officials from the national offices of CCM,CUF and CHADEMA have visited Norway in connection with theNIBR Report: 2009:16

24National Congress of Senterpartiet. As a representative of theNorwegian project partner pointed out, this is the ultimatemanifestation of membership democracy in Norwegian partypolitics, and as such an important occasion for learning for theTanzanian project partners. In addition, project participants havevisited the Norwegian Parliament and study circles with membersfromSenterpartiet. A change of programme is planned for 2009,where the Tanzanian visitors will follow Senterpartiet during theelection campaign. The project has been granted support fromNDS amounting to NOK 574 000 in 2006, NOK 599 000 in 2007and NOK 726 000 in 2008. Most of the money is allocated to theimplementation of activities in Tanzania (travel costs, cost ofworkshops) in connection with the visits from the Norwegianpartner. In 2008 these costs amounted to about NOK 520 000.The spending on production of study material in 2008 was NOK89 000 and about NOK 51 000 was spent on administration andmonitoring activities carried out by Tanzanian associates. Theadministrative costs of the Norwegian partner amounted to aboutNOK 66 000. Another large but irregular source of expenditure inthe project is the exchange trips to Norway. The budget for theexchange trip to Norway in 2007 was about NOK 189 000.The project activities of Vijana na Ushawishi replicates those of theHaki project, but on a smaller scale. Since 2007 the project teamfrom the Norwegian partner has visited Tanzania three times toconduct training seminars, monitor study circle groups and havemeetings with project partners and other actors in Magu. Twomodules of study material booklets were produced by theNorwegian partner in 2008, and a “training of trainers”-seminarwas carried out the same year. Included in the project activities in2008 was an exchange trip to Norway for project participants fromMagu in connection with the National Congress of Senterpartiet.Another trip is taking place in 2009. NDS granted Vijana naUshawishi support of NOK 433 000 in 2007 and 521 000 in 2008.The budgetary allocations are of the same pattern as in the Hakiproject.2.1.3 Project managementSenterpartiet has established a committee within the party which isresponsible for the Haki project, and the implementation of theNIBR Report: 2009:16

25project is delegated to the adult education organisation of theparty. Here, a project team of three persons has been establishedto ensure the continuity of the activities. Included in the team is aformer citizen of Tanzania and resident of Magu. This teammember has taken on a critical function as an advisor in theproject, we were informed. For the Vijana project a project groupof five persons from Senterungdommen have been established.The team answers to the Board of Senterungdommen. In Magu aSteering Committee with two members from each of the threepolitical parties, have been set up for both projects. Included in thecommittees are the party secretaries from the district branches ofthe three parties/youth wings. The committees are responsible forthe contents of the projects (including the selection of participantsto seminars) and other project activities and meet regularly to planproject activities.Both projects are administered locally in Tanzania by the Mwanzabased NGO Community Development and Relief Agency ofTanzania (CODRA). The founder and owner of the organisation isthe abovementioned Busega MP, the Hon. Dr. Rafael Chegeni.Chegeni is the project coordinator on the Tanzanian side for bothprojects, and CODRA is the practical facilitator of all projectactivities in Magu. Apart from making arrangements for seminaractivities and meetings of the Steering Committees and studymaterial writers, the organisation monitors the activities of thestudy circle groups and communicates with the project partners inNorway. In addition to CODRA, a group of project participantshave been appointed as monitors of the study circle groups in theHaki project. Monitoring reports are submitted to the SteeringCommitte and CODRA distributes English summaries of thereports to the Norwegian partners (most of the documentationmade by the Tanzanian partner is in Kiswahili). On the Norwegianside the project is well documented in writing. Apart from theannual project reports to NDS and yearly activity plans, the projectteam prepares thorough reports from all project visits.Financially the Norwegian partners are responsible for theprojects. In Tanzania CODRA prepares bills for all expensesconnected to seminar and meeting activities of the projects.Members of the Norwegian project team reviews thedocumentation, e.g. by checking allowance payment against theNIBR Report: 2009:16

26agreed rates and attendance lists and settles the bills in cash duringtheir stays.2.1.4 Norwegian partners as implementers of projectactivitiesBefore we venture into details about local perceptions of Haki naDemokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi in Magu, it is worthcommenting upon some of the features of the projects we havealready accounted for. We have seen that the Norwegian projectteams travel to Tanzania frequently for visits that last for severalweeks, and that they take on a prominent role in terms of theimplementation of training activities in the projects. Local projectparticipants have been trained as trainers and contribute at theseminars, but it seems that in the main these events are facilitatedby the members of the Norwegian project teams. We have alsoseen that most of the budgetary spending in the two projects goesto this type of activities.One of the ironies of development projects that employ“participatory” or “bottom up” approaches is that they often, to aconsiderable extent, are imposed upon local communities fromoutside actors. While the stated aim of such projects usually is toallow people to take responsibility for their own development, thefrequent use of external facilitators betrays a lack of trust in thecapabilities of the people targeted by the projects (Green 2000). Arelated form of criticism which is raised against participatorydevelopment projects is that participation tends to take the formof events rather than process (McNeish 2001). In several of ourmeetings with participants from the Haki and Vijana projects itwas commented that the duration of the seminars is too short andthat, as a consequence of this, facilitators are forced to rushthrough the various topics leaving insufficient time for discussionsamong the seminar participants. This is a familiar theme indiscussions on activities of party assistance or democracy support,which we will return to in Chapter 3.Another important objection which can be raised against theNorwegians role as implementers of project activities is that it is anexpensive way of running the projects. In 2008 NOK 520 000 outof the total project budget of 724 000 of the Haki project wasspent on workshop and seminar activities. Out of this aboutNIBR Report: 2009:16

27249 000 was spent on the Norwegian participation in theseactivities. One may wonder how many qualified Tanzanians thatcould have been employed on a full time basis as mobile trainersfor the project for the same amount of money?2.1.5 Vijana na Ushawishi as appendix to Haki naDemokrasiaIt should be evident from the descriptions of Haki na Demokrasiaand Vijana na Ushawishi we have provided above that theobjectives and goals of the two projects are to a large extentoverlapping. In both projects the ambition of contributing to theempowerment of youth and women is given high priority,rhetorically as well as in practice. Special seminars for women/girlsonly, have been conducted in both projects. What separates thetwo projects most clearly in this regard is the goal of Vijana naUshawishi of strengthening the youth branches of the politicalparties in Magu. As noted, CCM, CUF and CHADEMA all haveregistered youth wings as parts of the party organisations, butthese are not autonomous organisational entities as in Norway. Ina conversation with a representative of the Norwegian partnersfrom the Vijana project, it appeared that they had abandoned thegoal of establishing autonomous youth party organisations inMagu, and have chosen instead to focus on capacity building ofyoung individuals. It became evident as well in the conversationthat in this context “youth” is an elusive category – in Magu theage-limit for membership in the youth wing of CCM is 45 years –and that this have posed quite a challenge to the project withrespect to the recruitment of participants. This circumstance wasconfirmed in our fieldwork in Magu where we visited four studycircle groups that belong to the Vijana project. In three of thegroups most of the members were clearly of a young age. In theforth group, the facilitator was in his forties and several othermembers looked to be of the same or older age. To preventpersons who are clearly not youths from taking on central roles inthe project, an age-limit of 35 years has been put into practice withregards to the members of the Steering Committee of Vijana naUshawishi.In our talks with members of the Steering Committee of Vijana naUshawishi they repeatedly underscored the project’s lack ofNIBR Report: 2009:16

28resources in comparison to the Haki project. Among other thingsthey complained about a shortage of study materials, whichprevent study circle groups from progressing and about irregularvisits by the Norwegian partner. According to the members of theSteering Committee many participants of the Vijana project feelthat the Haki project is favoured by the Norwegian donors, andthat they as project participants are discriminated. When seen inconnection with the overlaps in objectives and target groupsbetween Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi this raises thequestion of the feasibility of running two NDS projects in Magu.There are good reasons to believe that the objective ofstrengthening the role of youth in political parties in Magu couldhave been better served by channelling more resources into justone project. This would have made for a smaller engagement onthe Norwegian side and reduced the organisational complexity andadministrative needs associated with the project activities. We willreturn to this question in the closing sections of the chapter.2.2 Impacts of Haki na Demokrasia and Vijanana UshawishiIn this section we account for responses we were given toquestions of how Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi haveaffected local communities in Magu district. As will be evident inthe pages that follow, opinions about the degree of success of theprojects differ among the actors who are directly or indirectlyinvolved in the projects. It should be emphasised, however, thatthere is a wide ranging consensus among the persons we came incontact with during our fieldwork in Magu, in Mwanza and in Dares Salaam that in principle Haki Na Demokrasia and Vijana naUshawishi are good projects, which may potentially be ofconsiderable importance as a means of promoting democratisationin Tanzania. In this regard, interviewees point to the great need foreducating the grassroots population on issues of democracy.Interviewees also point to the multiparty nature of the projects andthat they may contribute to the development of a constructiveclimate among the competing political parties. Many of the actorswe contacted outside of Magu district voiced the opinion that theprojects ought to be exported to other districts in Tanzania.NIBR Report: 2009:16

29It can be noted as well that the projects seem to be well known torepresentatives of the political-administrative system in Magu. Onour tour of visits to the study circle groups, we had talks with localleaders not directly attached to the projects. These includedschairpersons of Village Councils, chairpersons of the schoolcommittees, members of Ward Development Committees andVillage Executive Officers, mainly to establish if they were familiarwith the projects. The local leaders we talked to all seemed to bewell aware of the projects existence, and voiced positiveassessments about them. Awareness of the Haki na Demokrasia andVijana na Ushawishi projects was also confirmed in meetings wehad with district counsellors from CCM and CUF, the DistrictPlanning Officer and the District Commissioner in Magu. In ameeting with the District Executive Director of Magu it emergedthat he had not heard of the projects. This may be due to the factthat he had recently taken up the position and was coming from adifferent region of the country.2.2.1 Project participants’ appraisals of Haki naDemokrasia and Vijana na UshawishiWhen asked to reflect on the impact of Haki na Demokrasia andVijana na Ushawishi, members of the Steering Committees andmembers of the study circle groups pointed in particular to threeways in which the projects have affected their local communities.Firstly, the most frequently reported impact of the Haki and Vijanaprojects concerns the working relations between the competingpolitical parties in Magu district. It seems that the projects havebeen very successful in terms of removing animosities betweenmembers of the different political parties. In meetings with projectparticipants we were repeatedly offered accounts of how, prior tothe Haki and Vijana projects, members of the three politicalparties could not sit down together to discuss matters of interest tothe local community, or hardly even speak to each other at all. Thissituation had now changed, we were told, as a result of the crosspartystudy circle groups and other project activities, which haveallowed members of the different parties to cooperate andexchange views on matters of community development. As notedabove, these opinions were echoed in assessments of the projectsmade by party officials at the regional and national offices.NIBR Report: 2009:16

30Given the unison emphasis on this point among interviewees, wenevertheless find reasons to question the significance of thereported change. The reported harmonisation of relations betweenparties does not resonate well with what is commonly knownabout the pragmatism of the Tanzanian population with regards toparty affiliation. On several occasions where project participantstalked about how the Haki and Vijana projects had improvedrelations between the political parties, we asked them if it was notthe case that animosities between political parties are only maderelevant in election times. In most such cases project participantsclearly confirmed that this was indeed the case. What this suggestsin turn is that the reported change in relations between the politicalparties may be overstated. It is worth pointing out that, while theaim of promoting a climate for civilised communicative exchangesbetween the political parties is laudable, this should not bemisconstrued as a matter of erasing the boundaries between theparties. There is a worrying side to the reported harmonisation ofrelations between the parties as well, which we will return to this inour discussion of politics of co-optation below (c.f. section 2.2.7).Secondly, most project participants seem to agree that the projectshave increased the political participation of women and youth atthe various locations where study circle groups have been set up.In most of the groups we visited it was reported that the projecthad enabled women and/or youth to take on a more active andvisible role in various kinds of public meetings in the localcommunity. In most of the groups we visited several women andyouth attested that they would compete for political positions inthe upcoming grassroots elections. It was also reported in severalstudy circles that the projects had contributed to open up a widerdiscussion within the local community of the rights and duties ofmen and women within the household. When asked to explainmore precisely how these changes have been brought about, thetypical answer was that women and youth have gained “courage”to take on roles as public actors as a result of the projects. Thiswas attributed to knowledge gained through participation in thestudy circle groups about the rights of women and youth toparticipate in public affairs. The change was also attributed to therole of study circles as a training ground for public speaking.Another reason, which was highlighted by a project participant, isthat the projects provides women and youths with an arena inNIBR Report: 2009:16

31which to make contacts with influential politicians at the regionaland national level.The significance of this type of change should not beunderestimated. As Lange (2008) notes with regard to Tanzanianlocal politics, grassroot women often find it hard to take the floorin public meetings where they risk being ignored or even ridiculed.The frequency with which these accounts were voiced amongproject participants adds to their credibility, but again there arereasons to believe that the reported change may be overstated. Asit turned out, several of the women who voiced these opinionswere already holding political positions for which they had beenappointed prior to their participation in the project. Thus onewoman who claimed to have been “empowered to speak inpublic” by the project was a counsellor in the District Council.Another woman, who made similar claims about the project, alsotold us that she was renowned for her abilities as a public speakerand that this had been a great asset to her when campaigning forthe position of MP in 2005. A more significant test of the project’ssuccess with regards to the empowerment of women and youthwill come with the grassroots election in 2009.Thirdly, most of the study circle groups we visited reported thatthey had made use of knowledge about good leadership and goodgovernance which they had gained through participation in theprojects. When asked to specify what they had learned in thisregard, many project participants pointed to the irrelevance ofparty affiliation as a basis for selecting leaders as one of theprincipal teachings of the project. As we were explained,participation in the study circles had opened project participant’seyes to the argument that, as voters, they should not blindlysupport candidates fielded by their own party but rather makedecisions on the basis of the candidate’s merits as political leaders.Two Village Council chairpersons who were members of studycircle groups told us that the project had made them better leaders.Another Village Council chairman we talked to explained that eventhough he was not a member of the kikundi, he had received astudy material booklet from Haki Na Democracia and that this hadhelped him become a better leader. A study circle group facilitator,who had previously campaigned for a position in the DistrictCouncil, attested that her principal motivation for joining theproject was to educate her potential voters on issues of anti-NIBR Report: 2009:16

32corruption in the hope of easing the pressure for making payoutsin the next election.Members of the study circle groups also highlighted the knowledgethey had gained about transparency and accountability in the localgovernance system. One study circle group reported that itsmembers had put an end to the taxation of sales and purchases ofcattle in the area by the Village Council, by informing members ofthe local community about the illegality of this practice. In severalinstances it was reported that the study circle groups have writtenletters to local authorities at the district, ward and village leveldemanding insight into budgetary and financial matters. Theseaccounts were confirmed by the District Planning Officer, whotold us that citizens and the Village Councils in the district weremuch more inquisitive about budgetary matters than what used tobe the case a few years ago. It seems in particular that the studycircle groups have impacted the Village Councils. As mentioned,two of the study circle groups we visited had Village Councilchairpersons as members. Many of the group members we metheld other positions in Village Councils.2.2.2 Understanding of study circle methodology andrelevance of study materialWe asked the study circle groups about their practicing of thestudy circle methodology and about the relevance of the studymaterial they were using. Apart from stating their satisfaction withthe way the groups were run and that the study material was“good”, the members of the study circle groups had little to say inthis regard. In two groups, members pointed out that thetreatment of the Tanzanian parliamentary system in the booklets istoo superficial. It was reported in several study circle groups thatthe training on democracy and rights differs from ordinary schooleducation in the sense that “everyone is allowed to speak” and thatthey take their time in discussing topics until they are understoodby all members of the group. Study circle group members alsopointed out that they are careful about allowing womenopportunities to speak at the meetings. Generally study circlegroup members displayed an attitude of reverence with regards tothe democratic rules and procedures of the groups. One of thestudy circle groups we visited had even adopted a constitution. InNIBR Report: 2009:16

33addition to the trained facilitator, most of the study circle groupshad appointed members to the positions of chairperson andsecretary through internal elections, either on a rotational basis,from meeting to meeting, or for longer periods of time. In mostcases the study circle group-organisation included the position oftreasurer as well. As we shall see below, in the handling of theirinternal economic affairs, the study circle groups make up animportant arena for practicing what the Haki and Vijana projectspreaches about transparency and accountability.2.2.3 Vikundi as economic enterprisesIn the Norwegian tradition study circles are usually temporarygroupings formed on the basis of a shared topical interest of theirmembers. To the puzzlement of the Norwegian partners, projectparticipants in Magu insisted from the very beginning of the Hakina Demokrasia project that the study circles should rather operate aspermanent groups at various locations in the district. This ishighlighted by the Kiswahili name which is used locally todesignate the study circles, kikundi, the literal translation of whichis “group”. In many cases we were struck by the degree to whichmembers of the study circle groups we visited displayed a sense ofcollective identity and solidarity as kikundi members in spite oftheir crossing party affiliations. This is reflected in the fact thatgroups have taken names, such as Suduka (“To awaken”) or Imani(“Faith”). Group integration may even extend to the point offormal recognition of vikundi as organisations: in one of the groupswe visited, we were shown a document issued from the localauthorities certifying that the study circle group was a recognisedcommunity based organisation.An important source of group cohesion in the vikundi is the rolethey have taken on as economic co-operatives. As we came tolearn, this seems to be an essential precondition for the successfuloperation of study circle groups. At the village of Nassa Ginnery,we visited a kikundi which was founded in 2005. According to itsfacilitator, it is considered a “model group” within the project.When presenting the group’s activities to us, the facilitatorunderscored that, in his opinion, it is pointless to try to promoteideas of democracy and rights to members of the local communityunless it is coupled with “economic liberation”. Most people in theNIBR Report: 2009:16

34area are poor smallholder farmers, whose concerns for a large partlie with the immediate challenges of survival of the household, thefacilitator pointed out. Projects that aim to educate people onmatters of democracy can only work if they are seen to be directlylinked to people’s experienced needs, he asserted, implicitlyaffirming the slogan “You cannot eat democracy!”. Over the lasttwo-three decades the Tanzanian tradition for self-help activitieshave eroded, partly because of abuses from the state apparatus,which have engendered disillusionment with regards to suchactivities and partly because of the influx of the internationallyfunded development industry. As a result of the proliferation ofdonor projects with no input from local communities, people inthe Mwanza region have come to expect payment for taking partin communal work (Mwanjala 2003, quoted in Lange (2008)).For such reasons it initially proved very difficult for the facilitatorat Nassa Ginnery to recruit members to the study circle group.When he approached members of the local community in thisregard, they would always ask him about what kinds of materialrewards they would receive from joining the group. The momentpeople learned that the project was about education only, theywould usually tell him to forget about it. To promote recruitmentto the kikundi and to ensure the continual commitment of itsmembers to the activities of the group, the members hadestablished a savings and credit co-operative society (SACCO),locally known as an Ifogongo. Each member of the kikundi has madean original contribution of Tzs 5000 to the fund, from which theycan lend money at a certain interest rate. At the end of a year thesurplus generated by the fund is split among the shareholders. Inthe facilitator’s assessment, vikundi which exist for educationalpurposes alone are “weak”, that is, in danger of dissolving becauseof a lack of commitment among their members. These viewpointswere echoed in the other study circle groups we visited. All thefacilitators we spoke to, presented us with accounts of how theyhad struggled to recruit members to their study circle groups, forsimilar reasons as the ones cited above. Thus the facilitator of arecently founded kikundi in Itumbili in Magu town, told us thatwhen it had dawned on the initial members of the group that therewas little in the way of material rewards to be accrued from theirparticipation, most of them had disappeared from the group andrefused to return the study material booklets they had beenNIBR Report: 2009:16

35provided with. When the facilitator called upon members to attendmeetings they would ask “Kuna posho? Wazungu wamekuja?” (“Isthere allowance payment? Have the Europeans come?”). If heranswer was negative, they would tell her that they were notinterested. In an effort to rebuild the group, the facilitator haddecided to establish an ifogongo fund as an incentive for recruitmentand to further the cohesion of group members.As we were informed, mafogongo has for long been a widespreadeconomic practice among people in the Mwanza region. Morerecently, under the banner of “micro-credit”, the Tanzaniangovernment has encouraged people to engage in such activities.Out of the nine study circle groups we visited, seven groupsreported that they were engaged in joint economic activities. Inmost cases these were mafogongo funds. Two of the groups wevisited were engaged in the business of chicken rearing, selling eggsand poultry, and in one case the kikundi members had joinedefforts to dig a well. In another group, the members had jointlyinvested in a sewing machine, which was used for commercialpurposes. The group aimed to expand the business by hiring asewer. It can be noted that while most of the vikundi meet on aweekly basis or every two weeks, one of the groups we visited thatdid not report about economic activities only convene once amonth.The combination of deliberations on citizen rights and chickenfarming may seem peculiar – as one party official at a nationaloffice remarked in this regard: “We are a political party, not a bankor a chicken farm!”. The emergence of these economic enterpriseswithin the confines of study circles on democracy and rights canbe seen as a reflection of a pragmatic outlook among projectparticipants. To our minds, it is only natural that a project whichaim to “empower the grassroots” through participatory methodsshould come to take on features that reflect the mentality of itstarget group. According to the facilitator of the kikundi at NassaGinnery and other project participants we talked to, there are noconflicts between the economic and educational objectives of thevikundi: when the groups convene, the members spend some oftheir time on matters pertaining to their joint economic enterprise;then, in the remaining time, they discuss issues of democracy andrights. In our estimation, the inclusion of these economic activitiesinto the life of the study circle groups are among the best signs weNIBR Report: 2009:16

36encountered during our entire fieldwork that the groups mighthave a basis for existence even in the absence of funding from theNorwegian donor, and hence of the sustainability of the Haki andVijana projects. In the continuation of this point, it should also benoted that, by taking on the role of economic cooperatives, thestudy circle groups have become important arenas for practicingwhat the Haki and Vijana projects teaches about good governance.In all of the groups we visited it seemed that the members weresatisfied with the ways in which the businesses were managed. Inseveral cases, kikundi members emphasised that the managementof the funds or other businesses was conducted in accordance withthe principles of transparency and accountability promulgated inthe projects.Having said this, it is worth pointing out that this development isnot without potential problems. For one thing, the funds andother businesses may give the study circle groups a more exclusivecharacter. One may reasonably assume that there are manypotential members of the study circle groups in Magu who cannotafford an entry-contribution of for instance Tzs 5000. We askedthe members of one of the study circle groups about this. Theirreply was that the group was open to anyone, including peoplewho do not contribute to the fund. In spite of this, it seemsunlikely that study circle members who do not partake in theeconomic activities will participate on an equal footing with theother members and with the same motivation. Another potentialproblem is that such funds and businesses may function asveritable invitations for political patronage. For this reason aCHADEMA official at the national office, was deeply scepticalabout the use of such funds for purposes of party recruitment. Inhis experience, the funds are prime targets of “politicalcorruption”, i.e. bribery. We did not inquire about this possibilityin Magu, but given what is known about Tanzanian politics, thereis an obvious plausibility to the argument. This is substantiated bythe fact that in all of the vikundi we visited, members requesteddonations to their businesses from the Norwegian donor.2.2.4 The posho-syndromeAs Green (2003) notes, the stakeholder workshop has become aninstitutionalised element in Tanzania’s development culture to theNIBR Report: 2009:16

37extent of being treated as a proxy for project output. Especially inprojects of capacity building, workshops have taken on a role asone of the most important manifestations of the projects as atangible reality. In tandem with this development, “workshopping”has emerged as a mode of income-extraction among Tanzanians.The attractiveness of workshop attendance, Green shows, stemspartly from the prestigious nature of these events. Oftenworkshops are conducted in high-status places and the events areusually ripe with signifiers of global modernity, like electronicequipment and four wheel drive cars. Also, these are occasions formaking potentially career-enhancing contacts with high rankinggovernment officials and with representatives of internationalorganisations. In the experience of representatives of theNorwegian partner of Haki na Demokrasia, people in Magu attachgreat prestige to attendance in the workshops and conference thathave been held in connection with the project.Apart from these symbolic rewards, workshops represent awelcomed opportunity, especially for under-salaried governmentemployees, to extract incomes far higher than what they normallyreceive. It is customary in Tanzania that participants are providedwith allowance payment for attending workshops. Indeed, asGreen points out, this has become an essential precondition forattracting participants to the events in the first place. Theworkshop and seminar activities that have been conducted as apart of the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects areno exception to this rule. Since the inception of Haki naDemokrasia in 2005 a large number of people from Magu, membersof the Steering Committee, study circle facilitators and otherproject participants, have been given the opportunity to participatein the workshop and seminar activities of the two projects.Participants to these events are given an allowance and arerefunded travel expenses within reasonable limits. Allowances arepaid in cash, which gives workshops participants the option ofchoosing a less expensive form of accommodation than what iscatered for in the allowance rate, and save some of the money.Apart from the payments for seminar attendance, members of theSteering Committees and project participants who have beenappointed as trainers of trainers, study material writers andmonitors receive allowances in connection with various meetingassignments they take on in the projects.NIBR Report: 2009:16

38Representatives of the Norwegian partner told us that in the firstyears of the Haki na Demokrasia project the allowances rates weremuch too generous, but that through a series of adjustments theyhad now landed on a reasonable level of payments. This isreportedly one area in which the Vijana na Ushawishi project hastaken advantages of experiences gained in Haki na Demokrasia,which have allowed the partners to cut short much of theexperimentation with allowance rates.While the income opportunities offered by the Haki and Vijanaprojects must appear incremental by Western standards, they areno doubt deemed very important by the project participants wecame in contact with. A recurring request at our meetings with thestudy circle groups was that there should be more seminars andthat more people should be given a chance to participate. In manycases, project participants complained that the cost of living hadrisen and that allowance rates and the refunding of travel costsshould be adjusted to the new circumstances. Three femalemembers of a kikundi we talked to, insisted throughout theconversation that they were being “exploited” as projectparticipants and that they should be given a more generouscompensation from the Norwegian donor. Project participants’expectancies for remuneration are not restricted to seminar andworkshop events. As many of our informants asserted, in Maguface to face encounters with wazungu (Europeans) are generallyclassified as opportunities for attaining money or other materialgoods. One project participant explained that most peoplenaturally assume that visiting foreigners are kubwa (“big” i.e.wealthy) and prone to hand out money to locals they come incontact with. In our meetings with the study circle groups andother project participants we were often reminded about thiscircumstance, and in some cases people who attended themeetings asked us directly for money. On one occasion, we wereinformed by a study circle facilitator that two persons who werenot members of the group had turned up for the meeting, and thatthe probable reason was that they had heard that wazungu werecoming and saw this as an opportunity to get some money.As representatives of the Norwegian partners attested to ininterviews, since the beginning project participants fixation onmoney issues has been a major distracting factor in the projects.Apart from the threats it poses in terms of the sustainability ofNIBR Report: 2009:16

39Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi, this “posho-syndrome”– as one of our informants termed the matter – can be seen toaffect the projects in several ways. Firstly, it may work to createunrealistic expectations among vikundi members about the materialrewards which might be accrued from participation in the projects.As noted, on our tour of meetings with the vikundi we encounteredmany requests for donations from the Norwegian partners. Inmany cases, the requests were directly linked to project objectives.Thus several study circle facilitators told us that they would bemore effective in establishing new groups in locations that liebeyond walking distance if they were given means of transportsuch as a bicycle or a motorbike. But there were also signs thatproject participants had misunderstood the nature of the projects.In one of the study circle groups we visited, this becameparticularly evident. Talking about the difficulties involved inrecruiting members to the kikundi, the chairman of the groupexplained that potential members often ask what kind of rewardsthat lie at the end of the study circles training on democracy. Whenconfronted with such questions the chairman would tell peoplethat at the end of the training lie donations from Norway whichwill enable the group members to start small businesses, like forinstance a cafe or a hairdressing saloon. When asked to clarify if hehimself held this belief, the chairman confirmed that: “Yes, this ismy hope and my expectation”. The other study circle groupmembers confirmed that they too were looking forward todonations from Norway that would allow them to start smallbusinesses.Secondly, the posho syndrome has created problems of “free-riding”on project resources by persons associated with the projects. Theincident we described above where two “extra” members of astudy circle group turned up for a meeting with us is symptomaticin this regard. Judging from what we were told by the Norwegianpartners, members of the Steering Committees and CODRArepresentatives, it has been a recurring problem in the projects thatpersons who are not committed to the projects, or who belong tonon-operative study circle groups, have been selected forparticipation in seminars and other project activities. In such casesit would appear that people are “only after the money”. It seemsthat not all of the 120 study circle groups that exist on paper in theHaki na Demokrasia project actually meet on a regular basis.NIBR Report: 2009:16

40Members of the Steering Committees we talked to pointed out thatthey had discovered that in some cases study circle groups have asmany as eighty members, which indicates that the groups havebeen set up for the sole purpose of providing people withopportunities to go to seminars. 4Thirdly, the problem of free riding seems to be a direct cause forthe emergence of a more complex project organisation in the Hakiand Vijana projects. As noted, a group of project participants(facilitators and members of the Steering Committees) have beentrained as monitors of study circle groups. The main purpose ofthe monitors is to establish whether registered study circle groupsare operative and well functioning, and hence, which projectparticipants that are entitled to attend seminars and other projectactivities. The operative concept in this context is that of “spirit ofvolunteerism”. As we were explained by representatives of theNorwegian partner, the monitors that were first trained in 2008have yet to fulfil their work obligations in a satisfactory manner,which caused the project management to implement a retraining ofthe monitors at the end of the year. In addition to the activities ofthe appointed monitors, employees of CODRA are carrying outmonitoring activities as well.The problem of free riders being selected for participation inproject activities is not restricted to regular project participants andstudy circle facilitators. In several reported cases, members of theSteering Committees have clung on to their positions, in spite ofno longer having an active role in the project or in spite of beingviewed as illegitimate representatives of their political parties. Thisdirects us to a fourth way in which the struggle among projectparticipants to extract posho has come to shape the Haki and Vijanaprojects. Clearly, some of the actors that are involved in theprojects have been elevated into positions of power vis a vis otherproject participants and local party organisations as “gate keepers”with regards to the scarce material and symbolic resources (money,education, prestige, contacts) that are released through theprojects. Most obviously this would include the members of the4 In a comment to a draft version of this report a representative of CODRAstates that all the 120 study circle groups meet regurarily. A representative of theNorwegian project partner estimated that there are about 100 groups that meetregurarily.NIBR Report: 2009:16

41Steering Committees and employees of CODRA, but anyone thatpartake in decisions about the selection of project participants forseminar attendance, participation in study trips, or with regards toappointments for various functions within the projects belongs tothe category. For instance we were given the impression thatkikundi facilitators in many cases influence decisions about whichproject participants are selected for seminar attendance.In some reported cases, it seems that such actors have used thispower actively to further their personal interest. On a study trip toDodooma for members of Haki na Demokrasia in 2008,representatives of the Norwegian partner discovered that some ofthe participants had been selected on the basis of promises ofpersonal favours to a member of the Steering Committee. One ofour interviewees claimed that a member of the Steering Committeewas using this position as a leverage to increase his influencewithin his own party, threatening to shut it off from the project ifit did not abide by his wishes. More generally, actors that holdsuch gate keeper positions can exercise this power in a passive andunspoken manner. Thus in one of the kikundi we visited, we wereinformed by the facilitator that the members of the group did notdare to air the complaints they had against CODRA. Employees ofCODRA have made no direct treats of shutting the group out ofthe project, he explained, but the mere knowledge that they havethis capacity keeps the study circle group members from makingcomplaints against the organisation.In our talks with the members of the steering committees, withCODRA employees and with representatives of the Norwegianpartner it was often underscored that money issues have been amajor problem in the Haki and Vijana projects, but that slowly butsteadily things have improved over the years. Gradually, it isclaimed, the message that the projects are of an educational natureand not about material rewards have sunk in among the projectparticipants. In our experience, there are good reasons to questionthe correctness of this narrative of gradual improvement. Not onlydoes it contradict much of what we saw and heard in our fieldworkin Magu. Given what has been stated above about conditions ofpoverty and lack of social capital in Magu, it is tempting toconclude that there is a strong element of wishful thinking to thisstory.NIBR Report: 2009:16

42There are good reasons as well to question the appropriateness ofthe emphasis which is placed on project participants’ spirit ofvolunteerism in the Haki and Vijana projects. One of thederivative objectives of the Haki and Vijana projects, it seems, isto nourish attitudes among project participants that correspond tothe Norwegian notion of “dugnadsånd” and hence to enhance thesocial capital of local communities in Magu district. In ourdiscussions with members of the Steering Committees, CODRArepresentatives and representatives of the Norwegian partners,they highlighted “spirit of volunteerism” as an important criterionfor selecting project participants for seminar attendance and otherproject functions. The same emphasis is found in study materialbooklets used in the project. The effect of this may be to impose aclassification upon project participants, as either self-sacrificingand truly committed individuals or selfish opportunists. It shouldbe emphasised again that the allowance culture we have dwelled atis the product of the international aid industry. The projectpartners of the Haki and Vijana projects have chosen to contributeto this culture. To provide economic incentives for participation inthe projects and simultaneously demand that participation shouldbe based on volunteerism is to invite hypocritical responses.2.2.5 Focus on NorwayStudy- or exchange trips to donor countries are a popular andseemingly obligatory component of projects of party assistance(Kumar 2004), and so too in the Haki and Vijana projects.Wherever we went in Magu district, members of study circlegroups displayed a striking awareness about the possibilities forbeing selected as participants in exchange trips to Norway entailedin the Haki and Vijana projects. On numerous occasions kikundimembers we met with made declarations about their desire to goto Norway and that there should be more exchange trips. Astrategy we came to employ to “break the ice” with members ofstudy circle groups that proved difficult to engage in conversationswas to ask them if they wanted to go to Norway. Usually thiswould call forth affirmative comments and smiles and laughterfrom the kikundi members. On one such occasion, we told themembers of a study circle group in a remote village of the districtwho had unanimously stated their desire to go to Norway that thecountry is freezing cold. Did they really want to go to such a place,NIBR Report: 2009:16

43we asked the kikundi members jokingly. ”We are ready! We willbring our coats”, they promptly declared.The exchange trips to Norway undoubtedly acts as an incentive forrecruitment to the Haki and Vijana projects, and incidentally alsofor recruitment to political parties that are included in the projects.In an interview we conducted with the chairman of CHADEMAin Magu district, he pointed out that a positive effect of theprojects is that they act as a stimulus for recruitment toCHADEMA. Having learned about the Haki and Vijana projects,people enlist as members of CHADEMA, he said, with the hopeof getting the chance to travel to Norway.A member of the Steering Committee of Haki na Demokrasia hadbeen a visitor to Norway on one occasion, and had in particularbeen impressed by the level of gender equity in Norwegian society.She told us with astonishment about how one of her female hostsin Norway “lived in a big house, all by herself”. This emphasis onthe relations between the genders in Norway was echoed by otherproject participant who had not visited Norway. When we askedthe vikundi about what they had learned through the projects,several members highlighted the knowledge they had gained aboutNorway and in particular about the role of women in Norwegiansociety.In the Haki and Vijana projects Norway take on connotations of a“Promised Land” in more than one sense: Firstly, the exchangetrips to Norway are no doubt perceived by many as a “grandprize” of project participation. This may contribute to fuelunrealistic expectations among regular vikundi members about therewards that are entailed in project participation. Those who havebeen selected to go on such trips so far are contact persons fromthe national offices of the three parties, CODRA employees andSteering Committee members. While ordinary project participantsmay have high hopes of going to Norway, their actual chances ofbeing selected for such assignments are small. Considering thehigh-cost nature of these trips, one may also ask if this activitypays off in relation to the project objectives. Study trips abroad arehighly prestigious in Tanzania, and may as such be of critical valueas a component in the personal curriculums of aspiring toppoliticians.But as a party official from CHADEMA’s nationaloffice pointed out, when it comes to development of the partyNIBR Report: 2009:16

44organisation such trips are usually of dubious value. In our view,this argument applies with equal force – or more – in a project thataims to empower the political grass roots. We will return to discussthis topic in the chapters below.Secondly, there is a tendency among the participants of the Haki andVijana projects to conjure up images of Norway as a socioeconomicUtopia against which Tanzania is measured. Given thedifferences in wealth between the two countries, this is perhapsunavoidable, and there are obviously important lessons to be learntfrom the Norwegian experience for Tanzanians, for instance withregards to policies on gender equity. This granted, there arenevertheless good reasons to caution against a strong focus onNorway in projects such as these. The stated objectives of theHaki and Vijana projects are to empower members of thegrassroots population in Magu and to promote good governance.Implied in these objectives are the goals of sensitising projectparticipants to their rights and duties as citizens and ofencouraging them to actively further these values as public actors.What this must mean in turn, is that the projects should seek topromote a sense of civic patriotism or pride in being citizens of theUnited Republic of Tanzania among project participants – not aglorification of Norway.2.2.6 Atmosphere of distrustAs noted, during our fieldwork in Magu district we were constantlyreminded about the expectation among locals that visiting wazunguprovide money or other goods to people they come in directcontact with. On one such occasion, we met with members of aVijana na Ushawishi study circle group on a street corner in thevicinity of Magu town. At the start of the meeting we explained themembers of the group that we wanted to air some questions withthem collectively, and later have an individual talk with the groupfacilitator. Having completed the group session, we thanked thekikundi members for their time and told them that we now had afew more questions we wanted to discuss with the facilitator only.In spite of this, and another attempt on our side to politely dismissthe group members, they remained seated seemingly waiting forsomething to happen. It was only after being told more bluntlythat they should now leave the place, that the youths took farewellNIBR Report: 2009:16

45with us and left. After the group members had dispersed, thefacilitator was visibly distressed and told us that he could tell wewere inexperienced in this game, taking him aside like this. Nowthe other group members assumed that we would give him“something”, he told us, and this would get him into a lot oftrouble as soon as we left the place. The kikundi members were allhiding in the nearby houses, waiting for us to leave, he said. Laterthey would confront him and demand their share of what theythought he had been given.It should be emphasised that the Norwegian project partners havenever given out money in meetings with study circle groups. Theepisode is illustrative of the general expectation regarding foreignvisitors we described above, but also of the atmosphere of rivalryand distrust which characterise the Haki and Vijana projects. Wehave already noted the complaints of the Steering Committee ofVijana na Ushawishi that the project is being treated as a stepchildby the Norwegian donor in comparison to the Haki project.Members of the Steering Committee also told us that, because ofthe lack of resources, project participants accuse them ofpocketing money from the project themselves. The existence ofsuch suspicions was confirmed in our meetings with the vikundifrom both projects. In several such meetings, facilitators and othergroup members confided to us that they suspected that themembers of the Steering Committees were “eating” off the projectbudget. Similar accusations were levelled against CODRA. Studycircle group members complained in particular that CODRAemployees deduct money from the allowances they are entitled toreceive for seminar attendance and buy food to them at a muchlower cost. Other complaints were related to the selection ofpersons for seminar attendance. Thus, in one of our meetings, thechairman of a kikundi complained to us that the facilitator of thegroup, who was also a member of the Steering Committee, wassystematically picking his own friends among the group membersfor seminar attendance. In another kikundi, female membersaccused the facilitator and other male members of the group ofconspiring to ensure that only men were selected for seminarparticipation, and in yet another group, there were complaints thatthose among them that had gone to seminars were unwilling toshare what they had learned with the rest of the group.NIBR Report: 2009:16

46It is beyond the scope of this study to make detailed assessmentsof the truth value of any of these accusations. What can beasserted with certainty is that an atmosphere of distrust withregards to the distribution of the material and symbolic resourcesthat are released through the projects is reigning among projectparticipants. It seems that anyone who have a say in decisionsabout who-gets-their-share of project resources, or who are seento occupy such positions, naturally come under the suspicion ofother project participants. As was pointed out to us by members ofthe Steering Committees, many such complaints are based onerroneous understandings among project participants of theamount of money which is injected into the project by theNorwegian donor. Judging from the interviews and groupdiscussions we carried out in Magu, the belief is widespread amongpeople involved in the Haki and Vijana projects, and especially theregular study circle participants, that “somewhere” in the projectorganisation large material resources are hidden and that“someone” is reaping off rewards from these resources.This should not, in our opinion, be dismissed as a matter of pettyintrigues and envy. As several project participants testified to, thistype of grievances poses a real threat to the legitimacy of theprojects and may lead to the dissolving of study circle groups. Nordo we think that this problem should be seen as a “childhooddisease” that will go away once the true nature of the projects isunderstood by the local population in Magu. There is a tendency inparticipatory development projects to assume that rural Africansnaturally constitutes harmonious communities (Cooke and Kothari2001), which often proves to be far removed from the actualsituation on the ground. As long as one of the principal motivesfor participation in the Haki and Vijana projects is to accruematerial rewards and as long as there is any scope for favouritismor self-enrichment in decisions about the distribution of goodsamong project participants, the atmosphere of distrust we havedescribed is likely to prevail.2.2.7 The role of CODRAAbove we have noted that some of the project participants we metwith in Magu accused CODRA of withholding money the projectparticipants were entitled to receive as allowance payment. Again itNIBR Report: 2009:16

47should be emphasised that it is beyond the scope of this study tomake thorough assessments of this type of allegations. It is worthunderscoring that apart from the abovementioned accusations wehave not been presented with any evidence that indicateirregularities on the part of CODRA in the financial managementof the project. These allegations can in our opinion just as easily beattributed to the climate of distrust described above as to anyactual wrongdoings of employees of the organisation. The routinesof accounting and financial management employed in the projectprobably present employees of CODRA with opportunities to“eat” of the project budget. In interviews with a member of theNorwegian project team it was pointed out that the cash dealingswith project resources was far from an optimal solution, but apractical necessity when operating in Magu district and that theNorwegian partner have chosen to put its trust in CODRA. Onone occasion it was discovered that an employee of CODRA stolefrom the project. This person has been removed from theposition. It should also be noted in this regard that representativesof the Norwegian project partners we talked to expressed greatsatisfaction with the work that has been carried out by CODRAfor the projects.The use of CODRA in the Haki and Vijana projects has beencontroversial in the NDS-system for several reasons. Partly,members of the NDS Board have been opposed to the use ofNGOs in NDS project on grounds of principle. Partly they havequestioned the use of an organisation with close ties to powerfulpolitical interests as the facilitator of a multiparty project. Asnoted, the idea for the Haki na Demokrasia project was born at ameeting in Magu between representatives of Senterpartiet and theBusega MP Rafael Chegeni. Chegeni has had a central role in theproject since its inception, as the officially designated projectcoordinator, and through the use of CODRA in the day to dayrunning of the projects. Chegeni has on two occasions been aguest at the National Congress of Senterpartiet in Norway as arepresentative of the project. He has participated in most of theworkshops which have been conducted for the project, oftengiving the opening speech of the events. At the conference whichwas held for the project in Mwanza in 2008, Chegeni gave theopening and closing speeches. In our visits to the study circlegroups, several facilitators presented the diplomas they had beenNIBR Report: 2009:16

48issued with to certify that they had completed different trainingmodules as study circle facilitators. Some of the documents are cosignedby Chegeni and representatives of the Norwegian projectpartners. Some are signed by Chegeni alone. To be sure, this mustbe a powerful symbolic affirmation of the MP’s role as a providerof the projects to participants.The MPs “ownership” of the Haki and Vijana projects wasacknowledged directly or indirectly in many of the conversationswe had with project participants in Magu. One project participantwe spoke to complained that CODRA was behaving as if it wasthe organisation’s own money, rather than the Norwegian partners,which was spent on the project. Mostly, however, projectparticipants expressed their gratitude to Chegeni for providing thisopportunity to people in Magu, and several of our intervieweesspoke of the MP in praise. Thus, a study circle facilitator fromCUF explained in an interview that she did not consider itproblematic to participate in a project which is “owned” by a MPfrom CCM, as long as the “project is good”. Another projectparticipant from CHADEMA we talked to, spoke for long abouther hatred of the CCM party. When confronted with the questionof how she could participate enthusiastically in a project which isowned by a MP from the same party, she explained that this was adifferent matter altogether, since Chegeni is a very “good man”who have done “great things” for his community. The statementthrows a new and disturbing light on the project’s teaching aboutthe irrelevance of party allegiance when deciding on which politicalleader to support, touched on above.The success of Tanzanian political leaders is often measured bytheir ability to attract donor funding to their local constituencies,and development projects have become common vehicles fordispensing political patronage to the poor (Lange 2008). As Hyden(2005) notes, in Tanzania political power is predominantlyexercised through networks of informal relations. In sucharrangements, which may extend from the national level of politicsdown to the local communities, public resources are distributed aspersonal favours of political patrons to clients, who respond withloyalty to the individual leaders rather than to the institutions theyrepresent (Clapham 1992). Unlike market transactions, which,ideally, are balanced exchanges and where relations between theparties can be terminated once the transactions are completed, theNIBR Report: 2009:16

49inequalities in wealth and influence which lie at the base of suchpatron-client relations places the recipients of the favours under adiffuse and lasting moral obligation to return to the benefactor.This type of power relations, it can be noted, is often sustained bya moral economy centred on notions of paternal care. AsScatzberg (2001) notes, one of the prototypical thought-modelsfrom which political legitimacy is derived in African countries isthat of the father providing for his family. There are good reasonsto assume that such patron-client relations conforms to localunderstandings of what “accountable leadership” amounts to inMagu. It should be emphasised, however, that this is a form ofpolitical authority which militates strongly against the notion ofgood governance which underlies the Haki and Vijana projects aswell as the objective of contributing to the empowerment of thegrassroots population. What is essentially at stake in a politics ofclientilism, is the reproduction of asymmetric social relationsbetween political elites and the populace and the manoeuvrings of“big men” to sustain or extend their followings. For these reasons,and regardless of the merits of CODRA as technical facilitatorsand of Chegeni as a political leader, we find the association of theHaki and Vijana projects with CODRA unfortunate.2.2.8 Exclusion of UDP from projectsSeveral of our informants claimed that the Haki and Vijanaprojects are used as means to strengthen Chegenis position and toneutralise the opposition in Magu. These assessments aresupported by the fact that the opposition party UDP to a largeextent has been excluded from the projects. In project documentsfrom the planning phase of Haki na Demokrasia UDP figures asone of the parties that are to be included among the projectpartners, but as matters fell this did not happen. When asked aboutthis, a representative of the Norwegian project partner explainedthat, at the time, Chegeni advised Senterpartiet that UDP was onthe verge of breaking up in Magu district. UDP was therefore leftout among the partners in the project. UDP members have beenincluded in several study circle groups, the Norwegian partnerpointed out in this connection. This was confirmed in our meetingwith the study circle at Nassa Ginnery, where one of the kikundimembers stated that he represented UDP.NIBR Report: 2009:16

50Nationally, UDP is a marginal party with only one Member ofParliament. In Magu district it is the second largest oppositionparty. Party officials from the national office of UDP we talked to,claimed that the party considers Magu district as one of itsstrongholds which is to be given high priority in the upcomingelection in 2010. According to the chairman of UDP in Magu, theparty has branches and members throughout the district. In theward elections in 2005 UDP won two seats against CUFs four andCCMs twenty one. CHADEMA is not represented in the DistrictCouncil. In the Parliamentary election in 2005 in Magu Mjinji oneof the two constituencies in Magu, the CCM candidate won theseat with 68% of the votes against the CUF candidates 23.8%.Here, the candidates for UDP and CHADEMA won 4.3% and 2%respectively. In Chegeni’s constituency Busega, he won the seatwith 72.7% of the votes against the UDP candidates 23.8%. HereCUF won 3.5% and CHADEMA 0% of the votes.This adds substance to the claim made by UDP officials that theirparty is Chegenis greatest rival in Magu district. When learningabout Haki na Demokrasia, the chairman of UDP in Magu told us,UDP asked CODRA to be included in the project, but the requestwas denied. The UDP representatives from the national partyoffice we spoke to, voiced similar opinions about the projects.They had been alerted about the Haki and Vijana projects in ameeting with representatives of the Norwegian project partner atthe Tanzania Centre for Multiparty Democracy in 2008. At themeeting they had pointed out to Senterpartiet officials that, in theiropinion, UDP was the strongest opposition party in Magu districtand expressed their concerns about the fact that it was notincluded in the projects. The UDP party officials found it curiousthat in spite of this, UDP had not been invited to participate in theconference that was held for the project in Mwanza later that year.Much has been made of the multiparty nature of the Haki andVijana projects. We see no good reasons why UDP as animportant opposition party in Magu district to a large extent havebeen excluded from the projects, regardless of which state theparty may be in. This circumstance invites speculation about theNIBR Report: 2009:16

51project being used as a scheme to further the interest of politicalactors. 52.3 The sustainability of Haki na Demokrasiaand Vijana na UshawishiA request we recurrently encountered among vikundi members inMagu was that the Norwegian partners should provide them withvisible insignia of their membership in the Haki and Vijanaprojects. In a meeting we had with a Vijana na Ushawishi studycircle group in Sogesca, the members requested to be given “sare”(“uniforms”), like t-shirts and caps with the project logo, so thatthey could more easily identify themselves as representatives of the“Chama cha Vijana” (“Party of Youth”) to other members of thelocal community. Considering that the youths had initiallypresented themselves as members of three different parties, wefound this use of terminology puzzling. When asked to clarify thematter, the kikundi members told us that they indeed consideredthemselves to constitute a political party and that, nowadays, whenattending public meetings they would do so as self-declaredrepresentatives of the Party of Youth.This anecdote is telling, not only of the fact that the Haki andVijana projects have encouraged youths to take on a more activerole in the public life of their local communities, but of how insome cases project participants may develop a shared identity, evento the extent that they come to think of themselves as a politicalparty, presumably in opposition to the parties from which theywere originally drawn! While this identity affirmation was asingular occurrence in our fieldwork, it is indicative of a broaderand important feature of the Haki and Vijana projects. As Lange(2008) notes, there is an inherent contradiction in contemporarypolicies to promote good governance in developing countries suchas Tanzania. On the one hand, this objective is pursued through5 It should be mentioned in this regard that we have not discussed the exclusionof UDP from Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi with projectparticipants in Magu. It was only after leaving Magu we were alerted to thissituation, and at no time during our fieldwork in Magu did any of the actors wecame in contact with mention this matter.NIBR Report: 2009:16

52donor supported local government reform programmes, whichaim to devolve and decentralise political authority and power tolocal elect government bodies. On the other hand, donor fundedprojects aimed to promote good governance often seek to bypassthe same local authorities, which are seen as sluggish and corrupt,in order to access the “people” or the “grassroots” directly. Inparticular, there is a tendency in projects that employ participatoryapproaches (such as the Haki and Vijana projects) to workthrough non-elected bodies, like NGOs, CBOs and appointedcommittees, which operate either in insulation from local authoritystructures or with weak linkages to them. As Lange shows, rivalriesbetween ambitious actors belonging to such parallel structures andlocal government structures may serve to undermine policy goalsof service production and good governance.The picture of the Haki and Vijana projects which have come tolight in the preceding pages is precisely that of a parallel structurewhich has emerged alongside and in separation from the alreadyexisting organisational structures of political parties and of localgovernment in Magu district. As we have seen, there are reasons tobelieve that study circle groups have developed linkages to VillageCouncils in the district, but when it comes to the political partyorganisations in Magu the connection is arguably weak. CCM,which is the all-dominant party in Magu district, partakes in theHaki and Vijana projects, but as representatives of both CCM andthe Norwegian partner testified to, it does so with less enthusiasmthan CUF and CHADEMA. A measure of CCMs half-heartednesswith regards to the projects is found in the fact that no nationalrepresentatives of the party attended the conference which washeld for the projects in Mwanza in November 2008. It issymptomatic too, that when we inquired to find contact personsfor the Haki and Vijana projects at the national level of CCM tointerview during our stay in Tanzania, it proved difficult to findanyone. As noted above, the secretary of the regional office ofCCM pointed out to us that the Haki and Vijana projects belongto Chegeni and CODRA rather than to CCM. The party secretaryreferred in this connection to the local political “system”.Members of Parliament are important politicians he asserted, butnot key actors in the local government structure, nor are theyessential to the party organisation of CCM at the local level. In theparty secretary’s opinion, the Haki and Vijana projects have notNIBR Report: 2009:16

53properly recognised the historic and present role of CCM inTanzanian politics, and are biased toward the opposition. In theconversations we had with the party secretaries of CCM in Maguand Mwanza it was pointed out that, unlike the opposition parties,CCM has the organisational capacity and the resources toimplement the Haki and Vijana projects on a broad scale in Magudistrict and elsewhere. To this it can be added that the mainopposition party in Magu, UDP, has to a large extent beenexcluded from the Haki and Vijana projects while CHADEMA,which has few voters in Magu, has been given a prominent role inthe projects.There are two problems in particular which ensue from theprojects character as a parallel structure. Firstly, there is thepossibility of conflict and rivalries between actors who belong tothe Haki and Vijana projects and actors belonging to the partyorganisations and local government institutions in Magu. The timeand resources available for this study have not allowed for athorough illumination of this question. But as we have seen, thereare indications that project participants who hold gatekeeperpositions in the projects have used this power to gain leverageagainst their own parties. The second problem has to do with thesustainability of the Haki and Vijana projects, or lack thereof. It isworth reiterating that the basic idea behind the projects was to usethe study circle methodology as a way of disseminating knowledgeamong members of the grassroots population in Tanzania. Theattractiveness of this idea is that it envisages that large numbers ofpeople can be educated on important matters of democracy in anear cost free way. In theory, the process of knowledgedissemination through study circles could be expected toproliferate in a self-perpetuating manner. In their actual operation,we have seen, the Haki and Vijana projects have moved in quite adifferent direction. The inputs of money and technical assistancefrom the Norwegian partners have been extensive since the startof the projects. The frequency of visits from Norway to conductseminars is remarkable, yet these efforts have not enabled theproject to operate independently of the Norwegian partner. Aproject organisation has been set up with various functions, all ofwhich are remunerated, which is overseen and administered by aNGO, which is also compensated for its efforts. This situation hasbeen further complicated by the establishing of a second separateNIBR Report: 2009:16

54project with very similar objectives to the first and with a targetgroup which is also difficult to distinguish from the first project. Ifthe projects expand their membership along the lines that havebeen pursued up until today, the project organisations must alsogrow in size and complexity and the need for administration willincrease as well. To be sure, this state of affairs is not compatiblewith the idea of cost free knowledge dissemination.The projects can thus be described as “artificial” in the sense of anorganisational structure which to a large extent is upheld by theresources which are injected into it by the Norwegian partner.There is much to suggest that in the event of a removal of thefinancial and technical assistance from Norway the structure whichhave been put in place in Magu will collapse. We have noted howthe use of mafogongo funds and other economic activities in thestudy circle groups pulls in a different direction, and may provide abasis of sustainability for the projects. Yet in our overallassessment, this can hardly make up for the fact that, more thananything else, what keeps the wheels of the project turning atpresent is the drive to extract posho. This assessment, it is worthnoticing, is widely shared by project participants in Magu. In someof our conversations with members of the Steering Committees,study circle group facilitators and other project participants weasked directly if they thought the projects could be carried onwithout financial support from Norway. The answers we receivedto this question were all negative.2.4 Recommendations for Haki na Demokrasiaand Vijana na UshawishiAt this juncture it is worth repeating some of the points we madeat the start of the chapter: We have seen that there are indicationsthat the Haki and Vijana projects do have an impact on localpolitics in Magu district, and that the projects have contributed toseveral of their objectives. It is commonly reported by intervieweesthat the projects have improved working relations between thepolitical parties in Magu. The projects are reported to haveencouraged women and youth to take on a more active role aspublic actors. There are indications that the projects havecontributed to promote more accountable conduct in the localNIBR Report: 2009:16

55government organisation from the sub-village to the district level.The projects clearly respond to NDS’ primary objective ofcontributing to democracy building in new and unstabledemocracies as well as to its more specific aims of promotingparticipation among women and youth and of strengtheningcontacts between central, local and grassroots levels of politicalparties. All actors we have been in contact with in Magu, Mwanzaand elsewhere in Tanzania with regards to Haki na Demokrasia andVijana na Ushavishi concur in their basic assessments of theprojects as potentially important contributions to the education ofthe grassroots population on issues of democracy and civic rights.However, we have also seen that the Haki and Vijana projects areflawed in important respects. The reliance on technical assistancefrom the Norwegian partners is too extensive and the creation oftwo projects with overlapping objectives and target groups was anunnecessary manoeuvre, which have enlarged the projectorganisations and the engagement on the Norwegian side.Distracting visions of Norway as a “Promised land” have beenfostered among project participants and the projects havesuccumbed to the allowance culture of the aid industry, which inturn have created problems of free riding on project resources andunrealistic expectations of material returns among projectparticipants. The projects have taken on the character of a parallelstructure along side existing structures of party and localgovernment. In their present mode of operation the projects arenot sustainable. We have seen as well that there is an element ofarbitrariness in the inclusion of political parties in the projects. Thesecond largest opposition party in Magu district, UDP, has to alarge extent been excluded from the projects, while CHADEMA,which is not represented in the District Council, has beenincluded. Even more problematic, the projects are likely to havecome under the influence of partisan political interests in Magudistrict. Given this situation, continued funding of the projects inMagu can not be recommended.The idea of using the study circle methodology as a means ofempowering the grassroots population in Tanzania can still provefruitful in our opinion. Clearly, the Haki and Vijana projects haveaddressed an important need. We have noted Shivji and Peters(2000) criticism that the Local Government Reform Programme inTanzania has failed to target local authorities at the sub-districtNIBR Report: 2009:16

56level. To compensate for this, Shivji and Peters call for acomprehensive programme of civic education aimed to sensitiseactors at the grassroots level of government about their democraticrights. For this end, they say, existing programmes of civiceducation in Tanzania, which tend to take for granted that the roleof village and sub-village government bodies is restricted to theeffectuation of decisions that are taken elsewhere, must bereplaced by a programme which is premised on the experiencesand concerns of the grassroots population itself. Theirrecommendations have to a large extent been adopted in thesubsequent phases of the Local Government Reform Programme,to which the Norwegian government has strongly contributed as adonor (Braathen et al. 2005).The study circle methodology is a potential bottom-up answer tothe educational challenge posed by Shivjy and Peter. If projectsrelated to Haki na demokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi are to beimplemented in other districts in Tanzania, they shouldincorporate lessons learned from Magu. Firstly, this must entail thatprojects should give stronger emphasis to the study circlemethodology’s potential as a decentralised and low-cost tool ofeducation. This would require a simplification of the projectorganisation and reduced dependency on technical assistance fromthe Norwegian partners. The Norwegian project partner shouldcontribute to the training of trainers in districts where the projectis implemented. Apart from this, the role of the Norwegianpartner in the project should be restricted to tasks of productionof study material, planning, peer-reviewing, and administration.Secondly, clear-cut criteria should be developed for which politicalparties that are to be included in the project in districts where it isimplemented. A reasonable suggestion in this regard is that theinclusion of political parties in the project should be contingent ontheir popular support in districts where the project is implemented.The target group of projects can for instance be specified as thedistrict branches of political parties that are represented in DistrictCouncils where the project is implemented. To preserve themultiparty focus of the project, it should be implemented indistricts where there is a relative balance of power between CCMand opposition parties. Thirdly, the project should avoidcontributing to the fragmentation of governance structures indistricts where it is implemented. The project should beNIBR Report: 2009:16

57administered locally by the participating political partiesthemselves. This means in turn that the project should beimplemented in districts where the political parties have thecapacity needed to perform these functions.An interesting alternative is to shift the focus of the project fromparty assistance to a broader support for local democracy. In sucha case, the target group of the project could be the members of theVillage Councils in districts where the project is implemented.Most of the project functions of training, monitoring, coordinationand administration could be performed by the communitydevelopment offices of the District Councils, which have resourcesand competence relevant to these tasks. Districts can be selectedon the basis of documented efforts to promote democracy andaccountability in local politics. With regard to NDS’ principal goalof promoting democracy and good governance, this approachmight prove more fruitful than the approach which has been triedout in Magu district. What is lost in terms of direct capacitybuilding of political parties can be outweighed by gains in terms ofthe strengthening of institutions of local multiparty democracy.NIBR Report: 2009:16

583 Democracy in TanzaniaIn this chapter we describe the cooperation project between Høyreand CHADEMA Democracy in Tanzania which has been runningsince 2006. The project is mainly devoted to capacity building ofCHADEMA members, and in particular women and youth,through seminar activities at various locations in Tanzania. As inthe previous chapter we will highlight positive and problematicfeatures of the project as we move through the sections, whilesaving some of our discussions to the closing section of thechapter.3.1 BackgroundDemocracy in Tanzania came about at CHADEMA’s initiative wewere informed by the projects contact person in Høyre. TheTanzanian party contacted Høyre through the InternationalDemocrat Union (IDU) and requested a cooperation project withits Norwegian counterpart. In 2005 Høyre was granted financialsupport from NDS to carry out a pre-project in Tanzania. Thepurpose of the pre-project was to conduct seminars withCHADEMA and to allow Høyre to get to know the party betterthrough meetings with party officials. In the pre-project report it isconcluded that the Høyre delegation was given a positiveimpression of CHADEMA. A cooperation agreement was signedby Høyre and CHADEMA during the visit, and the Democracy inTanzania project commenced the following year.Democracy in Tanzania differs from the Haki and Vijana projectsdescribed in the preceding chapter in several senses. Mostobviously it does so by virtue of being a bilateral “sister-party”arrangement between Høyre and CHADEMA. The budgetary sizeof the project is smaller, with annual budgets of about NOKNIBR Report: 2009:16

59190 000. In 2008 the project was give an extra grant which madefor a total spending of NOK 411 000. Project activities are of atime limited nature, and are usually carried out over a period of afew weeks every year in connection with the Norwegian partner’svisits to Tanzania. As we have seen, the Haki and Vijana projectsare very much tied to a specific geographical location in Tanzania.Democracy in Tanzania is rather rooted in the top-leadership ofCHADEMA and project activities are carried out in alternatelocations. This points in turn to a difference in philosophybetween the two projects: while the Haki and Vijana projectsclearly reflects Senterpartiets ideology of decentralisation and theassociated belief that “change must come from below”, a Høyrerepresentative we interviewed with regards to Democracy in Tanzaniarather stated his conviction that, in order to be effective inbringing about change in the party organisation, it is essential thata sense of ownership to the project is created in the top-leadershipof CHADEMA.3.1.1 Project objectivesDemocracy in Tanzania departs from the observations that Tanzaniais an emerging democracy with a corrupt government dominatedby the CCM party and that the government seeks to impede thedevelopment of the political opposition. In project documents it isemphasised that CHADEMA is a stable and serious party,committed to the fight against corruption and as such the“cleanest” party represented in Parliament. To supportCHADEMA is accordingly seen as a way of strengtheningdemocracy in Tanzania. It is also emphasised in project documentsthat, like Høyre, CHADEMA is a party which is based onconservative values, as indicated by its membership in IDU.In the application for grants from NDS for 2006, the statedobjective of Democracy in Tanzania is to “help CHADEMA becomea good, decent and effective opposition party”. It is also stated thatif CHADEMA “alone or together with other political parties areable to challenge CCM in the next elections in 2010 or 2015, thenour work is a success”. The present relevance of these objectivesfor Democracy in Tanzania was confirmed in conversations we hadwith the project’s contact person in Høyre, who emphasisedrecruitment of new members to CHADEMA and the voterNIBR Report: 2009:16

60support achieved by the party in the upcoming elections asmeasures of the success of the project. In later projectapplications, these objectives have been supplemented by the goalsof strengthening the role of women and youth within the party.More specifically, it is stated that the goal of the project is toencourage more women to contest for positions in the party and inParliament, and to produce a larger group of young aspiringleaders within CHADEMA. In the application for grants for 2008the goals are stated more modestly as: “To get a broader base ofwomen and youth that is trained in political skills. And that theybecome active and ready to play a role in CHADEMA and inTanzanian politics”. Commenting on these objectives, the Høyrerepresentative, highlighted women and youth as categories of thepopulation who are “untainted” (“ubesudlet”) by the “corruptionof the past”.An additional goal of the project, which was highlighted in ourconversations with the Norwegian contact person, is to promotelearning about Tanzania in Høyre’s party organisation.3.1.2 Rooting in party organisationsIn Norway the International Office of Høyre is responsible forDemocracy in Tanzania. The project has been approved by theleadership of the party, which is regularly updated ondevelopments in the project. Several persons have beenresponsible for the implementation of the project on the side ofHøyre. At present the project is administered by the leader of thesecretariat of the party’s programme committee. In CHADEMAthe Party Leader and the Director of International Affairs areresponsible for the project, which is administered at the party’sInternational Office. The cooperation agreement with Høyre hasbeen approved by the party’s Board of Directors. It wasunderscored by both partners that all project activities areanchored in CHADEMA’s Strategic Plan.It can also be noted that throughout the pre-project and projectperiod, Høyre has implemented Democracy in Tanzania incooperation with other international actors. In the pre-project andthe first year of Democracy in Tanzania, Høyre cooperated with theBritish Conservative Party/Westminster Foundation forDemocracy. In 2007 project activities were carried out inNIBR Report: 2009:16

61cooperation with the Swedish Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, and in2008 project activities were carried out in cooperation with theSwedish party Moderaterna. On the whole, Høyre views thesepartnerships as fruitful since they have allowed the party to drawadvantages of accumulated experience from party assistance workin Tanzania. Another reported advantage of the cooperation withModeraterna is that it allows the two parties to pool resourceswhen implementing seminar activities in Tanzania.3.1.3 Project activitiesAs noted, Democracy in Tanzania is for the most part devoted toseminar activities. In 2006 two seminars were conducted; a twoday “youth training” seminar and a three days “training of trainers”conference. In 2007 Høyre carried out two seminars in Tunduru inthe South Western part of Tanzania, one for the parliamentariangroup of CHADEMA and the other for the party’s Women’sMovement. In 2008 the team from Høyre and Moderatarna visitedTanzania two times, and implemented project activities in Dar esSalaam and Mbeya. On both occasions the team gave two seminarsfor youth and two seminars for women. Two prominent womenfrom Høyre headed one of the seminars. One seminar wasdevoted to the strengthening of the different management levels ofthe party organisation in Dar es Salaam. The focus of the seminarin Mbeya was on the imparting of campaign skills to women andyoung party members.As the Norwegian contact person explained to us, since 2007Høyre has in effect developed a “basic course” (“grunnkurs”),which is run at the different seminars. The main teachingcomponents of the seminars are: recruitment of members,communication skills, campaigning skills and SWOT (Strenghts,Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis. What Høyre tries toconvey to participants at the seminars, it was explained, is a set ofgeneral tools for party work. It is left to Tanzanian partner toappropriate the teaching and elaborate the tools in ways that makethem relevant to the local circumstances. In line with this,CHADEMA brings two types of interpretation expertise to theseminars. A condition for seminar attendance is that participantsare competent in English, but in actuality this is rarely the case.Therefore the talks given by representatives ofNIBR Report: 2009:16

62Høyre/Moderatarne are translated simultaneously into Kiswahiliby local interpreters. In addition, CHADEMA brings localresource persons to the events, who seek to adapt what is taughtby Høyre to the Tanzanian reality in separate seminar sessions.In advance of the seminars, Høyre contacts CHADEMA and askthe party to prepare a proposal for seminars within the availablefinancial limits. When the partners have agreed on the topicalcontents and the time and venue of the activities, CHADEMAtakes care of all practical arrangements including the recruitmentof local resource persons and seminar participants. The selectionof seminar participants is made by a committee consisting of theparty’s Director of Training, Director of Youth and Director ofWomen, who contacts local level party organisations and asksthem to nominate candidates for participation in the events. Thecandidates must submit their personal CVs, and a shortlist ispresented to the committee, out of which it selects the participantsto the seminars. As we were informed, the persons chosen forparticipation are typically potential leaders. At the end of seminars,participants are asked to fill in evaluation forms. Since 2008evaluation reports, which summarise teachings and makesassessments of the activities, are prepared by the Tanzanianpartners after the implementation of the seminar activities. 6 Thesedocuments are to be distributed to the party leadership inCHADEMA and to the Norwegian partner. A bill for the projectactivities is presented to the Norwegian partner and settled duringthe visit.In addition to the seminar activities, Democracy in Tanzania includesexchange trips to Norway for CHADEMA members. Beginning in2006 the Party Leader of CHADEMA and one more partyrepresentative, have visited Norway each year and held meetingswith various party officials from Høyre, participated in the party’sNational Congress and visited municipalities with Høyrechairmanship.6 We were shown the report from the seminar in June. The report from theDecember seminar was still in preparation at the time of out visit.NIBR Report: 2009:16

633.1.4 Project participants’ assessments of activitiesIn this section we account for assessments of Democracy in Tanzaniawhich were forwarded to us in interviews with partyrepresentatives of Chadma. Mainly these were party officials fromthe CHADEMAs national headquarter. In addition, four regularparty members who had participated in seminars in 2008 wereinterviewed. 7On the whole, the interviewees expressed their satisfaction withthe project. Several party officials emphasised that, apart from thetime limits (an issue we will return to in section 3.1.6 below), thedialogue between the two partners about project activities isworking well. It was reported in this regard that the contactpersons from Høyre listen to the wishes of CHADEMA in theplanning of activities, and that they show flexibility in allowingCHADEMA to draw its own agenda in the seminars through theuse of local resource persons.When it comes to the party representatives’ appraisals of projectactivities, most of our interviewees reported that the skills andknowledge that are imparted at the seminars are relevant. Inparticular, seminar participants found the skills of recruitment andcampaigning they had been taught to be useful. Severalinterviewees said they had employed these skills successfully torecruit new members to the party. Another positive effect of theproject activities, which was highlighted by party officials, is thatthe seminars stimulate networking among party members. As waspointed out to us by a party official, CHADEMA lack the capacityto sustain continual lines of communication with the membershipat different organisational levels and in different geographicallocations. To gather party members in a region, or from the wholecountry, is highly valuable in terms of familiarising oneself with theparty organisation, the official emphasised. An associated effect ofthe seminars is that they contribute to the cohesion of the party’smembership. When party members are invited to seminars such asthese, a party official explained, they feel that they are “givensomething important” from the party, and therefore they become7 These informants were selected by the CHADEMA national office at ourrequest. One of the informants does not fit the description ”regular”, as she infact was a member of the National Executive Committe of the party.NIBR Report: 2009:16

64more loyal to the party. Party officials from the Women’smovement pointed out that at one of the seminars the Høyrerepresentatives had encouraged the seminar participants to findpractical ways of attracting members to the party. This had givenbirth to the idea of using SACCOs, savings associations similar tothose described in the previous chapter (c.f. section 2.2.3), as ameans of recruitment and membership cohesion. The use ofSACCOs within the women’s movement was considered by theparty officials to be successful.Yet another perceived positive effect of the project activities thatwas highlighted by interviewees, is that relations with foreignactors such as Høyre lend prestige to CHADEMA. Thus, oneparty official pointed out that CHADEMA always issue pressstatements in connection with the study trips to Norway topromote their image as an internationally connected party. It wasalso pointed out in interviews that seminars have been helpful interms of promoting an image of CHADEMA as a powerful partyat by-elections in Tanzania. Several seminars which have beenconducted for the Democracy in Tanzania project outside of Dar esSalaam have been tied to parliamentary by-elections. “Whenpeople in the villages see that we are coming with wazungu, thisshows them that CHADEMA is a big party”, a party official statedin this regard, adding that: “This has a big impact on peoplebecause it shows them that we are an international party”. As canbe imagined, there are mixed views on this practice amongTanzanian political actors. In Tunduru in 2007, a seminar withHøyre was conducted during the campaign period. Commentingupon the seminar, a party official noted that this was “verycontroversial”. The presence of foreigners “in the middle of thecampaign” had served to “raise eyebrows” among theircompetitors, he explained, adding that while some “perceive thatwe are a powerful party, others rather see that we are being usedby whites”. According to CHADEMA officials, the episodesparked negative commentary in local news media. Two membersof the Norwegian delegation were arrested by the police during thevisit to Tunduru. The contact person for Democracy in Tanzania inCHADEMA emphasised that, to avoid controversy, seminars withHøyre which are held in connection with by-elections must beconducted some time in advance of the elections. Thus, theNIBR Report: 2009:16

65seminar in Mbeya in December 2008 was held two weeks beforethe campaign period started.3.1.5 Beyond women and youthWe have noted how the seminars conducted for Democracy inTanzania feature sessions headed by the Norwegian/Swedishpartners in combination with sessions headed by local resourcepersons. According to the contact person for the project inCHADEMA, the “grounding” in the Tanzanian experience of theteachings of the Scandinavians that is provided by local resourcepersons is essential with respect to the productivity of theseminars. On the whole, the contact person found the combineduse of local and Scandinavian resources at the seminars to beworking well. He did however underscore that it is time for theproject partners to develop new training concepts. By now,CHADEMA’s local resource persons are well trained in theconcept which has been used since 2007, he pointed out. It wouldtherefore be a waist of resources if Høyre carries on with thestandard concept in future visits. The contact person underscoredthat CHADEMA want to take the project “beyond training ofwomen and youth” and rather focus on trainings on campaignskills for the party’s electoral candidates in the run up to the nextelections. This would imply that the target group of the activities isin effect shifted to middle aged men. Judging from our talks withthe Norwegian contact person, such a shift of focus in the projectactivities is seen as interesting by Høyre as well.“To support women and youth” has without doubt become amantra in discourses on party assistance and democracy support,and may as such act as a constraint on the development of otherlegitimate areas of party assistance. Given Democracy in Tanzania’sgoal of helping CHADEMA to increase the party’s representationin Parliament, a shift of focus onto training of electoral candidatesis probably an effective way of spending project resources. Bydoing so, however, the reformist ambitions of the project wouldbe reduced to that of helping CHADEMA winning electionsalone, and this ambition hinges on an analysis of Tanzanianpolitics of questionable validity we will retun to below. It can benoted, however, that CHADEMA needs capacity building in othertopical domains. The contact person from CHADEMA pointed inNIBR Report: 2009:16

66particular to three such potential areas of assistance. Firstly, theparty needs assistance in the form of research activities and expertadvice to develop comprehensive policies and the party “brand”.Secondly, there is a need for assistance to develop the informationinfrastructure of the party, for instance with regards to themembership records. Thirdly, there is a need for assistance on coreissues of “party building” or “party organisation”, such as internalelections and management functions. The last area is targeted incooperation project CHADEMA has with other donors, such asKonrad Adenauer Stiftung, IMD/TCD, Westminster Foundationfor Democracy and Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, but in spite ofthis there is a great need for more support on matters of partyorganisation, we were informed.3.1.6 Ad hoc nature of activitiesThe main objections to the way Democracy in Tanzania is carried outwhich we encountered among party officials in CHADEMA wererelated to the lack of continual communication with Høyre, andthe ad hoc character of project activities. It seems that theseminars that have been conducted for the project have beenorganised on very short notice. What happens prior to seminars,we were explained, is that Høyre contacts CHADEMA withinformation about the amount of money available for a seminar inthe near future. Then it is left to CHADEMA to prepare a projectproposal and make the necessary practical arrangements,sometimes within a time span of a week. In between seminars, itseems, there is little communication between the project partners.As a party official from CHADEMA remarked in this regard:“Now we hear nothing. And we know nothing about what willhappen in 2009”. 8CHADEMA officials highlighted several problems which ensuefrom this lack of communication. Firstly, it was complained thatthe project takes the form of a series of singular events rather thana cumulative process. One party official in CHADEMA we spoke8 In a comment to a draft version of this report, a representative of Høyrepointed out that Høyre is not the only cause for this lack of communication. Ithas often proved difficult for Høyre to get in touch with the Tanzanian projectpartner.NIBR Report: 2009:16

67to, emphasised that he would much prefer that the cooperationwith Høyre was of a more programmatic nature. The way thingswork in the project, he explained, CHADEMA can evaluate butnot monitor activities, since these are unique one-timeoccurrences. Secondly, the short planning horizon of the activitiesmakes it difficult for CHADEMA to see to it that the right peopleare invited to the seminars, and hence to ensure that the activitiesare as efficient as possible in terms of developing the partyorganisation. As the projects contact person in CHADEMA madeclear to us, the drive for posho we described in the previous chapter(c.f. section 2.2.4) is a major concern in the Democracy in Tanzaniaproject as well. In his estimation, about 60-70% of the youths and50-60% of the women who are invited to seminars are seriousparticipants. With more time at their disposal, he asserted, it wouldbe possible for CHADEMA to carry out a more careful screeningof candidates for seminar attendance. Talking about the seminarswhich were conducted in December 2008, another party officialexplained that for one of the seminars the national office had twodays to select the participants and for the other seminar just oneday. A third problem ensuing from the lack of communication withHøyre is that it makes it difficult for CHADEMA to coordinatethe activities of the project with the party’s other engagementswith foreign donor organisations. If CHADEMA was given ayearly schedule of activities for the project, it would be easier forthe party to identify thematic gaps in the support it receives forcapacity building and to get the best out of all the projects, it waspointed out in this regard. Fourthly, several party officials ofCHADEMA we talked to emphasised that the project would bemore rewarding to the youth and women’s movements of theparty if there was continual communication and exchange ofexperiences with their counterparts in Høyre.3.1.7 From events to learning processWe have noted the objection that project activities take the formof singular events. In the continuation of this point it is worthnoticing too that several party officials from CHADEMAcomplained that the seminars are too packed with learning tasksand that the high numbers of participants at the seminars (usually40-80) makes it difficult to have thorough discussions on thevarious topics. Talking about the seminar that was conducted forNIBR Report: 2009:16

68the women’s movement in June 2008, a party official noted that somuch was to be covered in three days, and that time did not allowthe participants to digest what was being taught. From apedagogical perspective this is not effective, the official noted.Along with several other CHADEMA officials we spoke to, theparty official attested that international resource persons hardlyever bring written material to the seminars they conduct, not evenhand-outs at presentations. In the party officials’ opinion, theseminars would have been more rewarding to participants if theverbal teaching had been coupled with written study materials, forinstance in the form of booklets.These statements finds resonance in comments we received aboutthe seminars conducted for the Haki na Demokrasia and Vijana naUshawishi projects (c.f. section 2.1.5 above), and in the findings ofother studies of international party assistance. In a survey of partyassistance in Kenya, Henningsen (2006) found that a recurringobjection to these activities among local party officials was that theactivities have the character of events rather than learningprocesses. As Kumar (2004) notes in this regard, this type oftraining is usually of a short term nature, rarely exceeding three tofour days, with little follow-up: “At most, it seems that a smallsummary of discussions is prepared and distributed among theparticipants after an event is over” (2004: 17). One way ofcompensating for the short term nature of donor engagements,Kumar points out, is to focus activities of trainings of trainers. Ashe goes on to state: “Developing a core group of trainees at partyheadquarters who can train regional and local units of the party iscrucial to the effectiveness of any training program” (2004: 17).According to project documents, Democracy in Tanzania did include“training of trainers”-activities in its first year of operation. In ouropinion, a shift of focus to this type of activities could be aninteresting way of ensuring that the project as far as possible worksto stimulate comprehensive learning processes amongCHADEMA members. We will return to this topic in the closingsection of the chapter.3.1.8 Study trips vs. Exposure tripsAs noted, since 2006 the Party Leader and other top politiciansfrom CHADEMA have visited Norway on three occasions as aNIBR Report: 2009:16

69part of Democracy in Tanzania. In a senior party official’s opinion,study trips such as these are crucial learning experiences forTanzanian politicians. To travel to Scandinavia and see that peoplethere actually practice what they preach at seminars in Tanzaniaadds an important flavour to the teachings, he underscored.Another party official we spoke to was of a more mixed opinionwith regards to such trips. In particular, he was concerned that thevisitations should be used as study trips properly speaking, whichcan be of benefit to the party organisation and not as “exposuretrips” for individual politicians. If such trips are well planned and ifthere are follow up activities in CHADEMA afterwards todisseminate the knowledge gained abroad, this can be useful to theparty organisation, the party official asserted. Usually however,there is no feedback to the party organisation in connection withstudy trips to donor countries. In these cases, the only purposesserved by the trips are related to the image building of individualpoliticians, and as such this is not an efficient use of projectresources. For the prize of sending a single politician to Norway,CHADEMA could have arranged a workshop with thirtyparticipants, the party official noted. Talking specifically about theDemocracy in Tanzania project, the party official said that theinvitations from Høyre should be directed to the party and not toindividual politicians, as happened on one occasion. In his opinion,NDS should establish a “qualifying mechanism” to determinewhich party members are selected to go to Norway, andCHADEMA should establish routines to ensure that feedback isgiven to the party organisation in connection with such trips.3.2 Recommendations for Democracy inTanzaniaDemocracy in Tanzania is a less complex project than the Haki naDemokrasia and Vijana na Ushawishi projects described in theprevious chapter, and with a smaller scope for intrigue andsubversive processes. We have seen that CHADEMA officialsexpress a general satisfaction with the project and with theflexibility of the Norwegian partner. Clearly, Democracy in Tanzaniacontributes to the project’s stated objectives of makingCHADEMA a more effective party and of strengthening the roleof women and youth within the party. It is reported that the skillsNIBR Report: 2009:16

70and knowledge that are imparted to CHADEMA members in theseminars are useful, especially with regards to recruitment andcampaigning. The seminars with Høyre are seen to contribute tointegration of the party organisation and to the projection of afavourable external image of the party. We have highlightedshortcomings of the project tied to insufficient planning and adhoc nature of project activities, the lack of continualcommunication between the project partners and the eventcharacterof the trainings. It seems that the need for more roundsof Høyre’s “basic course” has been exhausted in CHADEMA andparty officials make requests for the development of new seminarconcepts. We have noted the criticism against study trips toNorway as mainly a matter of career enhancement of individualpoliticians.We have seen that project activities of Democracy in Tanzania aregeared towards the imparting of campaigning and recruitmentskills to CHADEMA members, and that the project partners wantto focus future activities more directly on training of electoralcandidates. In view of the project objective of helpingCHADEMA to become an effective party this is a legitimate andreasonable choice of focus. A principal function of political partiesis after all to be instruments of voter mobilisation in elections, andas we have seen there is a reported need in CHADEMA for suchtraining. If Høyre and CHADEMA are to proceed with the projectin this direction, it is advisable that activities are of a nature whichdo not invite accusations of foreign interference in Tanzanianelection processes. Common rules of etiquette in internationalengagements aside, it is clearly stated in the NDS Regulations thatthe organisation does not support electoral campaigning and that acautious approach should be taken to activities in connection withelections.The extent to which a focus upon campaigning is congenial withNDS’ primary objective of promoting representative multipartydemocracies in new and unstable democracies is debatable. Theanalysis upon which Democracy in Tanzania rests, partly affirms theideological affinity between Høyre and CHADEMA, partly itaffirms that CHADEMA is the “cleanest” party represented inParliament in Tanzania. It is beyond the scope of this study toattempt to assess the seriousness of CHADEMA as a politicalparty. It can be noted, however, that, in general, African politicalNIBR Report: 2009:16

71parties’ claims to be rooted in ideologies on the Western left-rightspectrum are superficial and theories that envisage politics as astruggle between corrupt and anti-democratic actors on the oneside, and “clean” and democratically minded actors on the other,are poor guides to African politics. As we have noted severalplaces above, analysts of political power in Tanzania underscorethe relative insignificance of formal institutions of government andpolitical party and the importance of informal patron-clientrelations. Local notions of political legitimacy often corresponduneasily with Western liberal-democratic understandings of goodgovernance and accountable leadership. In line with theseconsiderations, it can be noted that the reformist profile of theproject would be strengthened if the focus of activities was shiftedonto the other topical domains where CHADEMA has needs forcapacity building (policy development, information infrastructure,party organisation) that we identified above.We have noted the criticism that project activities of Democracy inTanzania tend to be of an ad hoc nature. In light of this, severalsuggestions for the improvement of the project can be made:Firstly, Høyre and CHADEMA should prepare yearly activity plansfor the project, which would allow for better planning of projectactivities and coordination with other projects. Secondly, projectactivities should take the form of training of trainers. Given themodest scale of the project, this is probably the most effective wayof spending resources. Thirdly, to ensure the educationaleffectiveness of project activities the project partners shoulddevelop written manuals for the seminar concepts in a low-costand durable format which can be disseminated among theCHADEMA membership. Fourthly, to improve communicationbetween the project partners and to ensure the continuity of theproject, it is advisable that Høyre establishes a project team withrepresentatives from the women’s and youth organisations of theparty. With regards to several of these suggestions, Høyre canprofit from an exchange of experiences with the project teams ofSenterpartiet and Senterungdommen.For understandable reasons, representatives of the Tanzanianpolitical parties are wary about making criticisms against theirNorwegian partners. This adds weight to the objections against theexchange trips to Norway we noted above. Such trips may berewarding to individual politicians and may serve to strengthenNIBR Report: 2009:16

72relations between political parties in Norway and Tanzania. But inour opinion the high cost nature of these activities and theirdubious value with regards to development of the partyorganisation does not justify their inclusion into NDS-projects.NIBR Report: 2009:16

734 Concluding remarksThe Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support was formally shutdown on May 5. 2009. Nevertheless, as we noted in theintroduction, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has signalled that itwill carry on with the funding of a programme of Norwegianinternational party assistance. This opens up for debate about theform of organisation that should be employed in the futurescheme of Norwegian party assistance. Donor countries usedifferent types of organisation to channel party assistance torecipient countries, and some of these may serve as models for afuture programme of Norwegian party assistance. We will leavethis question to the planned evaluation of the NDS system, whichis to be ready by the autumn 2009. In what remains of this reportwe will put forward some other general suggestions with regards tothe design of a future scheme of Norwegian party assistance.In spite of having been in existence for several decades,international party assistance can still be described as an emergingfield of international development aid. According to Caton (2007),party assistance is generally characterised by a simultaneous lack ofsystematisation and contextualisation. Projects of party assistancehave often been based on idealist engagement rather than onprofessionalism. Apart from the overarching goal of promotingdemocracy, there is no agreed general framework among the actorsoperating in this field about what party assistance is supposed toachieve and how it should be implemented. At the same time,actors operating in this field tend to apply the same solutionseverywhere rather than to tailor the content of the assistance to thelocal political, social and cultural context in the places where theyoperate.The NDS projects we have considered in this report can hardly bedescribed as the products of a consistent Norwegian strategy toNIBR Report: 2009:16

74promote multiparty democracy in Tanzania. The projects of Høyreand of Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen have come about asseparate initiatives which have been brought under the NDSumbrella. There is little connection between the projects in termsof the approach to party assistance they employ. While the projectof the Conservative Party is based on a conception of Tanzanianpolitics as a struggle between democratic and undemocratic actors,those of Senterpartiet/Senterungdommen are rather premised onthe belief that lack of democracy is caused by a lack of knowledgeand dialogue among political actors. Above we have notedHyden’s (2005) assessment that clientilism is the very backbone ofpolitics in Tanzania. Accordingly, it is the economic resources ofrivalling elite actors rather than the power of informed argumentsor of party ideology and party allegiance which matters in politics.If this assessment is correct, one may question the relevance andrealism of the approaches employed both by Høyre and bySenterpartiet/Senterungdommen.A future programme of Norwegian party assistance shoulddevelop comprehensive analyses of the political situation in thecountries to which party assistance is directed. While projects ofparty assistance that are implemented in a country may be ofdifferent size and nature, they should be based on a common setof goals and a strategy for how Norwegian party assistance shouldbe applied, which is derived from the analysis of the politicalsituation. In this connection it is important as well to ensure thatNorwegian party assistance is coordinated with that of otherinternational actors and to consider if there are particular areas orniches to which the Norwegian contribution should be directed.In the continuation of this point it is relevant to ask if the presentpractice of leaving the implementation of projects to the politicalparties is a good way of meeting the complex challenges involvedin international party assistance. As was pointed out in ourinterviews with the Norwegian project partners, exchange ofexperience between Høyre and Senterpartiet/Senterungdommenabout the implementation of the projects have been minimal.Apart from the processing of applications for funding the NDSsecretariat has had little bearing on the projects. Some of themistakes made in the projects we have highlighted in precedingpages could probably have been avoided if the projects to a largerextent had been based on expert advice. A better solution might beNIBR Report: 2009:16

75that projects to a greater extent are implemented by professionalswith relevant competence and that the Norwegian political partiesrather take on a role as dialogue partners with political parties incooperating countries. What this suggests in turn is that theorganisation responsible for the Norwegian programme of partyassistance must command a greater amount of resources than whathas been the case in NDS, or alternatively that it shouldconcentrate its activities in a few projects in a few countries only.Another question that should be given attention in connectionwith the establishing of a new programme of party assistance, iswhether political parties should be targeted directly, as has beenthe case up until now in NDS, or whether assistance should begiven in more indirect ways through assistance for legal andregulatory reforms, the strengthening of electoral commissions orcapacity building of parliaments and locally elected governmentbodies. In countries where there is little to be gained in terms ofpromoting democracy from direct support to political parties,these indirect forms of assistance can be a more viable way ofchannelling resources.Lastly, the forms in which party assistance is delivered should betaken up for consideration in connection with the establishing of anew programme. In the report we have dwelled at the problemsand challenges that are tied to the use of seminars and workshopsin the NDS projects, and there are good reasons to assume thatthese are not unique to Tanzania. Workshops and seminars arewell established methods of channelling resources to the recipientsof party assistance, perhaps to the extent of being seen as a“natural” solution, but this is not necessarily the most effectiveway of strengthening political parties in cooperating countries.One alternative we have pointed to in the report is to concentrateactivities on training of trainers. In connection with theestablishing of a new programme of party assistance other formsof support should be explored as well.NIBR Report: 2009:16

76ReferencesAmundsen, Inge (2007): “Donor Support to Political Parties:Status and Principles”. Chr. Michelsens InstituteBraathen, Einar, Chaligha, Amon and Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge(2005): “Local governance, finances and service delivery inTanzania: A summary of findings from six councils”.Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional ResearchCaton, Mathias (2007): “Effective Party Assistance. StrongerParties for Better Democracy”. International Institute fordemocracy and Electoral AssistanceCooke, Bill and Kothari, Uma (2001): “The case for Participationas Tyranny”. In Cooke, Bill and Kothari, Uma (eds.)Participation. The New Tyranny? London: Zed BooksClapham, Christopher (1992): Third World Politics. An Introduction.London: RoutledgeGoffman, Erwing (1971): The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.Harmondsworth: PenguinGreen, Maia. (2003): ”Globalizing Development in Tanzania.Policy Franchising through Participatory ProjectManagement”. Critique of Anthropology 23(3).Henningsen, Erik (2006):”Support for Kenyan Political Parties. AnOverview of Activities of NGOs and Institutions”. RoyalNorwegian Embassy, NairobiNIBR Report: 2009:16

77Hyden, Goran (2005): “ Why do things happen the way they do? Apower analysis of Tanzania”. Embassy of Sweden in Dar EsSalaam.Kjøstvedt, Hilde, Abdel-Salam, Wadah and Ingdal, Nora (2008):Evaluation of Political Parties Cooperation Projects:Norwegian Labour Party Women and Fateh WomenKumar, Krishna (2004) “International Political Party Assistance.An Overview and Analysis”. Netherlands Institute ofInternational RelationsLange, Siri (2008): “The Depoliticisation of Development and theDemocratisation of Politics in Tanzania: Parallel Structuresas Obstacles to delivering Services to the Poor”. In Journal ofDevelopment Studies vol. 44 (8)Magu District Council (2005): Utawala bora na mpango wakupambana na rushwa katika halmashauriMcNeish, John (2001): Pueblo Chico, Infierno Grande: Globalisation andthe politics of participation in highland Bolivia. Doctoraldissertation, Goldsmiths College, University of London.Mihyo, Paschal (2003): “Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM): ARevolutionary Party in Transition, Tanzania”. In Salih, M.A.Mohamed (ed.): African Political Parties. Evolution,Institutionalisation and Governance. London: Pluto PressMwanjala (2003): Internal Audit Report to the City Director ofMwanza, 13.02.2003, Mwanza City CouncilPietila, Tuulikki, Ojalammi-Wamai, Sanna and laakso, Lisa (2002):“Elections at the Borderland. Voter Opinion in Arusha andKilimanjaro Tanzania” in eds. Cowen, M., Laakso, L. MultipartyElections in Africa. Oxford: James Currey.Schatzberger, Michael (2001): Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa.Father, Family, Food. Bloomington: Indiana University PressShivjy, Issa and Peter, Chris M. (2000): “The Village DemocracyInitiative: A Review of the Legal and InstitutionalNIBR Report: 2009:16

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79Appendix 1List of interviewees:In Mwanza and MaguSteering Committee of Haki na Demokrasia:Manyanza StaslausDominique BubeshAmina ChedielMarco KahuludaZena ZachariaSteering Committee of Vijana na Ushawishi:Mshemasi BahayiSamweli BulayiEmmanuel SabuniTeddy KachiluM. MayandikiyaStudy circle groups from Haki na Demokrasia:Time and place: Nyamikoma 13/1Facilitator/party: Sylvestre Ntobi CCMNIBR Report: 2009:16

80Number of persons present in group interview: 22Local leader interviewed: C. Kicmka, Chairperson SchoolCommitteeTime and place: Nassa Ginnery 13/1Facilitator/party: Ramadhan Msoka CCMNumber of persons present in group interview: 14Local leader interviewed: N. Mbuba, Chairperson SchoolCommitteeTime and place: Kisesa 14/1Facilitator/party: Amina Chediel CUFNumber of persons present in group interview: 11Local leader interviewed: A. Marore, Chairperson SchoolCommitteeTime and place: Matela 14/1Facilitator/party: Mashiku Kamata CHADEMANumber of persons present in group interview: 12Local leader interviewed: T. Nicus, Village Executive Officer, D,Shija, Chairperson Village CouncilTime and place: Itumbili 15/1Facilitator/party: Fatuma Omari CUFNumber of persons present in group interview: 4NIBR Report: 2009:16

81Study circle groups from Vijana na Ushawishi:Time and place: Sogesca 13/1Facilitator/party: Monica Mwelevu CHADEMANumber of persons present in group interview: 13Local leader interviewed: J. Luzerera, Village Executive OfficerTime and place: Nyamahanga 14/1Facilitator/party: Peter Lupasha CHADEMANumber of persons present in group interview: 8Local leader interviewed: M. Mariko, Chairperson SchoolCommitteeTime and place: Nyalikungu 15/1Facilitator/party: Emmanuel Sabuni CCMNumber of persons present in group interview: 6Time and place: Nyalikungu 15/1Facilitator/party: Dotto Guloli CHADEMANumber of persons present in group interview: 8Magu District Council:The District CommissionerThe District Executive DirectorThe District Planning OfficerNIBR Report: 2009:16

82Politicians:J. Ngongosiki UDPN. Lupondije CHADEMAB. Abdallah CUFS.Masinde CHADEMAK. Ndaghine CCMCODRA:Samuel IbambasiIn Dar es SalaamCHADEMA:John MnyikaJohn MremaHamadi YosufAnthony KomuRegia MtemaDeo MeckDavid KafuliaNaomi KaikulaStephen MbogoVictor KimeseraDady IgogoAlly ShaibuAnina LitakaFarida MonibaEsther JacobNIBR Report: 2009:16

83UDP:Isaac CheyoJohn NkoloTCD:Daniel LoyaRoyal Norwegian Embassy:Kjersti TromsdalIn Norway:Rune Aale-HansenInger BigumErlend FuglumHilde Søraas GrønnhovdAnne Marie LerfallNIBR Report: 2009:16

84Appendix 2Letter from Norwegian Centre forDemocracy SupportNIBR Report: 2009:16

85Appendix 3Project proposalProject proposalEvaluation of NDS projects in TanzaniaNorwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research1/10-2008IntroductionNDS has invited NIBR to submit a project proposal for theevaluation of three cooperation projects implemented by Høyre,Senterpartiet and Senterungdommen and their respective partnersin Tanzania. The principal goal of the evaluation is to promotelearning from project experiences among partners involved inNDS-projects. More specifically, the aim of the evaluation is toilluminate the following questions:1. Does the projects contribute to make Chadema a moreeffective political party and to strengthen grassrootsinfluence in CCM, Chadema and CUF? With regards tothe last question, the evaluation should consider theusefulness of the study circle approach employed bySenterpartiet and Senterungdommen.2. Do NDS and its partners have routines to ensure qualityand effectiveness in the projects, including budgetary andfinancial accuracy?NIBR Report: 2009:16

86In what follows we present NIBRs approach to these researchquestions, our plan for the study, the project organisation andbudget.The transition to multiparty politics in TanzaniaAfter nearly thirty years of one-party rule under Chama ChaMapinduzi (CCM) multiparty politics was reintroduced in Tanzaniain 1992. In the wake of the constitutional reform, efforts havebeen made by the Tanzanian government to separate the civilservices from the structures of the CCM-party, to create a space ofoperation for civil society actors and to achieve devolution ofpolitical power through a local government reform programme.The ‘second wave’ of political liberalisation in Africa was in mostplaces strongly induced by international donor pressure, but inTanzania the transition to multiparty politics came about mainly asa result of domestic political processes. The call for multipartyismemerged from within CCM, what some commentators view as atactical attempt to secure the party’s future dominance in thecountry. Tanzania differs from its neighbouring countries, also inthe sense that ethnicity does not feature prominently in partypolitics. The policy of national unity which was pursued by CCMunder the one-party era has been carried forward successfully inTanzania after the introduction of multipartyism, through a ban onregional and religious parties. Important exceptions to this areZanzibar and the Kilimanjaro district, where communal identitiesare a major source of political mobilisation. 9In other respects Tanzania conforms to the contemporary patternof party politics in Africa. Political parties in Tanzania are generallydescribed as weakly developed democratic institutions. Partly, thispoint to their centralised, top-down, structures of decision making,which gives members at the grassroots level little scope forexerting influence. Partly, it points to the tendency that politicalparties come to serve as the personal instruments of wealthyindividuals rather than as institutions of political massmobilisation. In a recent study from the Mwanza region, Lange9 In the last two elections Zanzibar has been rocked by political violence. CUF isinvolved in two of NDS projects that are to be considered in the evaluation, butthe scope of the evaluation does not allow us to dwell on the Zanzibar situation.NIBR Report: 2009:16

87(2008) notes that growing class polarisation since the 1980ies haveserved to amplify tendencies of patron-client politics in localpolitics. As a consequence of this, women and youth, who aregenerally less resourceful economically than men, are effectivelyexcluded from competition for political positions.Appeals to values of liberal democracy among political actors inTanzania may thus be little more than a rhetorical wrapping ofactual political processes. Understanding and coping withdifferences in political culture is an important challenge toNorwegian political parties who want to enter into cooperationwith parties in Tanzania.NDS-projects in TanzaniaThe projects which are to be considered in the evaluation are:Democracy in Tanzania, a cooperation project Høyre carried out withits partner Chadema in 2007. The project consisted of twoseminars held in Tunduru, one with the parliamentary group ofChadema and the other with the woman’s movement of the party.The activities were carried out in cooperation with the JarlHjalmarsson Foundation. Included in the project was a visit toNorway for the party leader and a MP of Chadema, who whereofficial guests at Høyre’s National Delegates Conference, hadmeetings with party representatives and visited the municipality ofOppegård. The stated goal of the project was to make Chadema amore efficient party.Haki Na Demokrasia is a more extensive ongoing cooperationproject between Senterpartiet and CCM, Chadema and CUF inMagu district, Mwanza region. The project has been running since2006, following pilot activities in 2002, 2003 and 2005. The aim ofthe project is to strengthen the political parties through capacitybuilding of the grassroots membership in Magu district. Theproject makes use of the study circle methodology to stimulatelearning and discussions on issues of democracy among partymembers. Project activities include training of study circle leaders,training of local study material writers and the production ofstudy-material booklets in English and Kiswahili. Included in theproject is also “training of trainers”, to ensure that the activities arecarried on in the future independently of the Norwegian partners.The project is overseen by a steering committee with membersNIBR Report: 2009:16

88from the three parties. Project activities are facilitated by CODRA,a local NGO. The study circles which have been establishedoperate continuously at the village level. In 2008 about 60 studycircle groups with a total of about 1200 members were active inMagu districtVijana na ushawishi is an offshoot of Haki Na Demokrasia which hasbeen run by Senterungdommen in partnership with the youthbranches of CCM, CUF and Chadema in Magu district since 2006.The goal of the project is to empower the local youth branches ofthe three political parties and to strengthen young people’s role inthe local party organisations. As with Haki Na Demokrasia, theproject relies on the study circle methodology and project activitieshave in the main focused on the training of study circle leaders andthe production of study material.While all three projects fall into the category of ‘capacity building’they present us with two markedly different approaches to achievethis end. With respect to the overarching goal of the evaluation ofpromoting learning among NDS partners, it will be interesting todraw comparisons between the Høyre-Chadema project and theSenterpartiet/Senterungdommen CCM,Chadema and CUFprojects as contrasting case studies.The Høyre-Chadema project employed a conventional approach tocapacity building of political parties. In a study of donor fundedactivities to support political parties in Kenya, Henningsen (2006)found that the bulk of these activities consisted ofworkshops/seminars with external facilitators directed atrepresentatives at the national executive level of the politicalparties. To throw light on the Høyre-Chadema project, it will beimportant to make project participants specify how and in whatways the activities have contributed to strengthen Chadema. Onereported problem with this type of activities is that they tend totake on the character of singular events rather than learningprocesses. As Green (2003) notes in a study of workshops as thestandardised tool of ‘participatory’ development activities inTanzania, participants to these events are often motivated by otherconcerns than the stated goals of workshops (e.g. prestige, materialbenefits) and workshop facilitators are often ignorant with regardsto the socio-cultural context in which they operate.NIBR Report: 2009:16

89Most of our efforts will be devoted to document theSenterpartiet/Senterungdommen-CCM, Chadema and CUFprojects in Magu. Partly, this is because these projects are moreextensive with regards to the number of people involved, theirbudgetary size and their duration. Partly it is because these projectscan be described as innovative in several respects. As the studyfrom Kenya indicates, the grassroots membership of politicalparties has to a large extent been neglected by NGOs andinstitutions who work to strenghten political parties. The studycircle approach is an interesting attempt to embed learningprocesses in political parties in a more thorough manner than whatis often the case in capacity building projects. In our study we willstrive to document the ways in which the study circle groups havefunctioned, and describe mechanisms that make them successfulor that works to subvert them. In this connection it is important toconsider whether the competence gained by grassroots membersthrough participation in study circles works to enhance theirpolitical influence. Capacity building of woman and youth may beof little consequence if the structures of exclusion which keepthem out of political positions remain intact.MethodTo illuminate these questions, we will carry out a study based onsemi-structured interviews with persons involved in the projects inNorway and Tanzania and a review of relevant documents. Morespecifically, we will carry out fieldwork in Tanzania in December2008 over a period of two weeks. Four to five days will be spent inDar Es Salaam and/or Dodoma, where we will conduct interviewswith MPs and representatives of the woman movement ofChadema who participated in the cooperation project with Høyre.Here, we will also interview national representatives of CCM andCUF with regards to the national impact of the projects ofSenterpartiet and Senterungdommen. The rest of our fieldworkwill be spent in Magu district in Mwanza region. In Magu we willcarry out interviews with members of the steering committee fromCCM, Chadema and CUF, project facilitators from CODRA andstudy material writers. Based on consultations with the steeringcommittee and CODRA we will select three well functioning studycircles from the Senterpartiet project and three from theSenterungdommen project, and carry out interviews with studycircle leaders and two or more members of each study circle. PriorNIBR Report: 2009:16

90to and after the fieldwork in Tanzania, we will conduct interviewsin Norway with representatives of Høyre, Senterpartiet andSenterungdommen who have had central roles in the projects.NIBR Report: 2009:16