Loosening-Konys-Grip-July-2013-FINAL

LOOSENING KONY’S GRIPEffective DefectionStrategies for Today’s LRAJuly 2013a publication ofauthored byPHIL LANCASTER & LEDIO CAKAJ

TABLE OF CONTENTSMethodology.............................................................................................................................................................. 3Executive Summary and Recommendations........................................................................................... 4Map: LRA attacks, January 2010 – June 2013................................................................................................... 8I. Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 9II. The Final Chapter?: The LRA of 2013................................................................................................. 11A. Composition................................................................................................................................................ 11B. Area of operations....................................................................................................................................... 12Map: Estimated location of LRA groups ................................................................................................. 13C. Kony and LRA command dynamics ........................................................................................................... 15D. Communications......................................................................................................................................... 16E. Modus operandi........................................................................................................................................... 17III. Homeward Bound: Debating Defection Within the LRA................................................................... 19Map: Defection of long-term members of the LRA, January 2012 – June 2013.............................................. 20IV. A Region in Chaos: The Context for DDR Initiatives......................................................................... 27Map: Counter-LRA military bases vs. LRA area of operations......................................................................... 28V. The Forgotten Pillar: The State of LRA Defection Initiatives ............................................................ 34Map: Come Home message range vs. LRA area of operations....................................................................... 35VI. Bring Them Home: Towards a Better Strategy for Encouraging Defection..................................... 40A. Key considerations for Come Home messages.......................................................................................... 40B. Shortwave and FM radio............................................................................................................................. 43Map: FM radio Come Home broadcast coverage vs LRA area of operations......................................... 45C. Leaflets and other physical items................................................................................................................ 46D. Helicopter loudspeakers.............................................................................................................................. 48E. Safe Reporting Sites (SRS).......................................................................................................................... 49F. Reintegration assistance.............................................................................................................................. 51G. Expanding into fresh mediums.................................................................................................................... 52VII. Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 54Annex I: Estimated LRA composition....................................................................................................................... 55Graphic: Estimated LRA composition and combatant capacity ..................................................................... 55Annex II: Approximate LRA group locations............................................................................................................ 56Annex III: Profiles of select Ugandan LRA commanders......................................................................................... 58LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 2

ABOUTPublished© July 2013 The Resolve LRA Crisis InitiativeAuthorsPhil Lancaster PhD, was General Romeo Dallaire’s MilitaryAssistant during the Rwandan genocide. After retiringfrom the Canadian Army, Phil spent more than adecade working for UNICEF, the World Bank, and theUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).He is the former director of MONUC DDR, and led theWorld Bank’s LRA Diagnostic Study. His work has focusedon LRA issues for the past several years.Ledio Cakaj (@LedioCakaj) is an independent researcherwith a focus on armed groups, demobilization andreintegration of former combatants, and security sectorreform in central Africa. Ledio has spent the last fiveyears working almost exclusively on the Lord’s ResistanceArmy for various organizations including theWorld Bank, Enough Project, and Small Arms Survey.He has written a series of reports and articles for publicationssuch as Jane’s Intelligence Review, the AfricaReport, and the Journal of East African Studies.Editing and ResearchMETHODOLOGYThe report was commissioned by The Resolve LRACrisis Initiative (The Resolve). It was researched andwritten by Phil Lancaster and Ledio Cakaj, independentconsultants, and edited by Paul Ronan, who alsocontributed original research. Invisible Children alsocontributed funding for the research.The authors and editor collected information containedin this report from a variety of sources, including firsthandinterviews with former members of the LRA. Intotal, they interviewed 22 former LRA combatants orabductees. Additional interviews were conducted withcivil society leaders and aid workers in LRA-affectedareas; representatives from the United Nations, AfricanUnion, and donor countries; and representativesfrom regional governments and military forces.Most interviews took place in March and April 2013during trips to Obo in the Central African Republic(CAR); Yambio and Nzara, South Sudan; Dungu in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (Congo); and Guluand Kampala, Uganda. Extensive information was alsocollected from a review of existing literature on theLRA crisis, as well as previous interviews in LRA-affectedareas conducted by the authors and editor.Paul Ronan (@pauldronan) is a co-founder of The Resolve,and currently serves as the Director of Policy. Hetravels frequently to Uganda and LRA-affected areasof Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, and SouthSudan. Paul recently authored Hidden in Plain Sight:Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave,published in April 2013. He is also a frequent contributorto media outlets, Congressional briefings, andthink tank forums. Prior to co-founding The Resolve,he worked in the Caritas International and FranciscansInternational UN advocacy offices in New York.Cartography and DesignKenneth Transier (@ktransier) is a Project Manager forThe Resolve. He is also the primary cartographer anddesigner for the LRA Crisis Tracker’s periodic securitybriefs.Cover photoCome Home leaflet airdrop, Invisible ChildrenLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 3

Loosening Kony’s GripEffective Defection Strategies for Today’s LRAEXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is likely weakerthan it has been in at least 20 years. LRA groups arescattered across an area in central Africa the size of California,and morale among the Ugandan combatantsthat comprise the core of its force is at a new low. Atleast 31 Ugandan LRA combatants, which is approximately15 percent of the LRA’s core Ugandan fightingforce, defected in 2012 and through the first six monthsof 2013. As of May 2013, there were approximately 500total combatants and dependents within the LRA, operatingprimarily in Central African Republic (CAR)and Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo). Ofthese 500 people, approximately 250 are combatants,including up to 200 Ugandans and 50 low-rankingfighters abducted primarily from ethnic Zande communitiesin CAR, Congo, and South Sudan.Pressure from Ugandan military operations againstthe LRA in CAR and Congo has contributed to thebreakdown of morale and discipline within the ranksof Ugandan LRA combatants. Launched in December2008 with significant US support, Ugandan operationshave been unable to decisively dismantle theLRA’s command structure or comprehensively protectcivilians from LRA attacks. Nor are they likely todo so soon, as Ugandan troops are not permitted tooperate in Congo and have suspended operations inCAR since the March 2013 coup there. However, overthe past four years, the Ugandan military has protectedmajor population centers, kept LRA groups on therun, disrupted their communications, and made basicsurvival extremely difficult. Ugandan LRA combatantsare growing disillusioned with the LRA leadership’sfailure to maintain contact with fragmented groups orprovide a realistic strategy to accomplish its long-timegoal of seizing power in Uganda. Some are also disenchantedwith the group’s recent shift towards forms ofbanditry, including the harvesting of elephant ivory.In response, LRA leader Joseph Kony has attempted toreconsolidate his control over the rebel group. In thepast year, he has ordered the execution of several seniorofficers, including those who have disobeyed ordersto not sleep with abducted women whom Konyhad taken as his “wives.” He has ostracized others,particularly elderly fighters unable or unwilling toendure the grueling life in the forests of eastern CAR.In their place, Kony has transferred operational leadershipto the youngest remaining generation of Ugandanfighters. He has also allowed the use of High Frequency(HF) radios to improve coordination betweengroups, even though he is most likely aware that suchcommunications may be monitored by the Ugandanarmy with the help of the US military.Kony has also tried, with limited success, to reach outto former backers in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).LRA groups acting on Kony’s orders have been incontact with SAF officers in Kafia Kingi, a disputedenclave along the border between Sudan and SouthSudan, at least since the end of 2009. An LRA group,likely including Kony, was reportedly based near theDafak SAF garrison in Kafia Kingi for over a year, untilFebruary or early March 2013. Recent defector reportsindicate Kony may have returned to Kafia Kingi sincethen. However, the SAF has so far refused to providethe LRA with substantial military support.The apparent weakening of the LRA’s internal cohesion,their long tradition of holding civilian populationshostage to deter attacks, and the historic failureof military operations to achieve a decisive victory suggeststhat the most timely and cost-effective approachto dismantling the LRA is to encourage increased defections.The large majority of people in the LRA wereforcibly conscripted, and most, including many Ugandans,want to defect. However, obstacles to defectionforce many to remain with the LRA. Would-be escapeesface a gauntlet of deterrents, including the risk ofLRA punishment if they are caught, long journeys fromremote LRA bases through unfamiliar and treacherousterritory, and the risk of being harmed or killed by localcommunities or military forces they encounter.When LRA members manage to defect, they face anuncertain future. Reintegration support for returnees isshamefully inadequate. Former abductees, particularlyadults, must often face the challenge of rebuilding livelihoods,overcoming trauma, and coping with communitystigmatization with little support. Awareness ofthese difficulties, combined with the risks of attemptedLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 4

escape, discourages many from defecting.However, a well-resourced and dynamic disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategycould help break Kony’s grip on the rebel group, allowhundreds of abductees to peacefully return to theirfamilies, and help keep civilians safer from further LRAattacks. If executed well, such a strategy could producea positive feedback cycle in which information fromdefectors helps DDR actors design more effective initiativesthat can increase the rate of defections.Currently, an alphabet soup of actors is attempting toput together such a strategy, with local civil societygroups, the international organization Invisible Children,the United Nations peacekeeping mission inCongo (MONUSCO), and US military advisers playingleading roles. They have used a range of tactics, includingFM radio broadcasts, leaflets, helicopter-mountedspeakers, and Safe Reporting Site (SRS) locations toreach LRA members with “Come Home” messages,while also working with local communities to ensuredefectors are safely received.However, DDR initiatives are far from their full potential.They are largely being implemented where internationalactors have established bases, but this coversjust a fraction of the territory LRA groups operate in,and even in those areas implementation is sparse anduneven. Despite proven cases of success, DDR receivesa fraction of the funds spent on military and humanitarianoperations in LRA-affected areas. DDR effortsare also hampered by the bureaucratic inefficienciescaused by the need to coordinate efforts among dozensof actors across multiple borders – as well as the lack ofinterest from regional governments preoccupied withother crises.A better coordinated, multi-pronged approach is neededto improve existing DDR efforts. More thoroughinvestigations of LRA activity, particularly in northeasternCAR and Kafia Kingi, are needed to maintainan up-to-date understanding of the rebel group. DDRactors must continue to refine Come Home messages,adapting them to take advantage of LRA group movementsand internal friction, as well as to provide practicalinformation to help defectors escape safely. DDRactors must also expand the infrastructure needed todeliver those messages, ensuring that FM radio towers,leaflet drops, helicopter sorties, and Safe ReportingSites saturate the full geographic range of LRA movements.They must also collaborate with local communitiesto ensure that defectors are received safely andcollaborate with United Nations (UN), African Union(AU), and national security forces to minimize the riskof LRA reprisal attacks. Finally, a surge in reintegrationsupport is needed to increase the “pull factor” forwould-be defectors.Though the LRA has ceased to be a political threat toany regional state, it continues to menace vulnerablecivilians across a large swath of Africa. The comingmonths represent a critical window of opportunity toencourage as many defections as possible before Konyis able to reconsolidate control of the LRA, renew motivationin the ranks, and diminish opportunities to encouragedefection. It would be a tragedy if momentumwere lost and Kony given the opportunity to reinvigoratehis forces in his usual fashion – by committing newatrocities against innocent civilians.RECOMMENDATIONSTo the African Union• Request permission from authorities in CAR forthe US and the Ugandan military (UPDF) to immediatelybegin helicopter speaker broadcasts andleaflet drops in the prefectures of Mbomou, HautKotto, and Vakaga;• Request permission from the Sudanese governmentto conduct Come Home message leafletdrops and radio broadcasts in the disputed KafiaKingi enclave.To the Congolese government• Acknowledge the threat LRA attacks pose to civiliansin Haut Uele and Bas Uele districts;• Grant permission to the US government and NGOsto conduct helicopter speaker broadcasts overCongolese territory.To the Ugandan government• Negotiate, through the AU, the resumption of LRApursuit and civilian protection operations in easternand northeastern CAR as soon as security permits;• Promptly return Ugandan combatants who leavethe LRA to Uganda, refrain from forcing them tojoin the UPDF, and institute a policy of giving allformer combatants a six-month “readjustment period”in northern Uganda before allowing them tojoin the military;LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 5

• Publicly announce if any senior LRA commanderswill be held liable for crimes committed, and ensureall other returning members of the LRA aregranted amnesty upon returning to Uganda;• Fully fund rehabilitation programs for formercombatants and communities in northern Ugandaaffected by the conflict;• Fully fund the Amnesty Commission’s operationsand resettlement activities.To the US government• Authorize another six-month rotation of US militaryadvisers to deploy to forward locations inLRA-affected areas;• Benchmark ongoing US assistance – including thedeployment of military advisers and DDR initiatives– against progress in dismantling the LRA’scommand structure and demobilizing remainingcombatants;• Ease restrictions on approvals for DDR-focusedflights and expand airlift capacity to allow for rapidreactions to Come Home messaging opportunitiesacross all LRA-affected areas of CAR;• Direct USAID to significantly increase funding forcommunity-based LRA defector reintegration assistance;• Direct the Department of Defense to make significantlymore funds available to US military advisersin the field for flexible, needs-based defection effortssuch as leaflet distribution, helicopter speakermissions, and community sensitization;• Encourage the sustainability of SRS locations byproviding funding to support the project for atleast one year after US military advisers withdrawfrom the region.To UPDF troops and US military advisers in easternCAR and South Sudan• Continue to provide civilian protection at all SRSlocations in eastern CAR and South Sudan;• Continue to employ a policy of rapid reaction tocivilian attacks followed by relentless pursuit;• Immediately resume the distribution of ComeHome messages by leaflets and helicopter broadcastsin eastern CAR;• Using MONUSCO’s model, establish mobile FMradios at strategic UPDF deployments in easternCAR.To MONUSCO DDRRR and peacekeepers• Expand leaflet drops and begin helicopter speakerbroadcasts in Haut Uele and Bas Uele districts;• Establish SRS locations in Haut Uele and Bas Uele,complete with civilian protection mechanisms;• In the short-term, expand mobile FM radio broadcaststo all MONUSCO bases in Haut Uele and BasUele where the mission does not already have apermanent radio;• In the medium-term, create permanent FM stationsat bases in Duru and Ango;• Develop and expand civilian liaison and intelligencegathering activities;• Develop a more effective civilian protection system.To Come Home message actors• Ensure communities in CAR, Congo, South Sudan,and Uganda have substantial input into ComeHome message campaigns and SRS projects;• Collectively distribute 300,000 Come Home leafletsper month for the next 12 months;• Continue to refine Come Home messages to ensureLRA members receive practical information onhow to safely defect;• Launch specific Come Home message campaignstargeting the 20-25 LRA officers most likely to defect;• Expand the input of former Ugandan LRA combatantsinto Come Home message campaigns, includingby forming an advisory council of formercombatants, and compensate them for their efforts;• Improve collective monitoring and evaluation ofthe relative success of different Come Home messagesand mediums, including by creating a collectivedatabase of all returnees from the LRA thattracks what factors influenced their escape.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 6

To donors• Fund the construction or expansion, with accompanyinglocal capacity building to broadcast ComeHome messages, of community FM radio stationsin Bakouma and Bangassou, CAR; Ango, Congo;and Raga, South Sudan;• Increase funding for organizations such as GuluSupport the Children Organization (GUSCO),World Vision, and others that provide medical andpsychosocial assistance to Ugandan LRA returnees;• Increase funding for livelihoods projects in northernUganda that benefit LRA returnees, includingformer male combatants, as well as host communities;• Increase funding for reintegration programs inCAR, Congo, and South Sudan that support community-ledprojects that benefit both LRA escapeesand communities victimized by LRA violence;• Ensure that reintegration programs in CAR, Congo,and South Sudan provide support for adultescapees, particularly those living in remote ruralareas;• Provide funds for a comprehensive mapping ofthe LRA command structure and combatant force,combining existing information with supplementaryresearch.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 7

Map: LRA attacks, January 2010 – June 2013SUDANLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunityLRA attack 2010LRA attack 2011LRA attack 2012LRA attack 2013SOUTH SUDANCARN100km200kmDR CONGOLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 8

I. INTRODUCTIONThe overall situation in the LRA-affected zones of CentralAfrican Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (Congo), and South Sudan continues to bedominated by uncertainty, fear, and insecurity. Militaryand diplomatic efforts made under the auspicesof the African Union Regional Cooperation Initiativefor the Elimination of the LRA (AU RCI-LRA), workingin collaboration with the UN and its Regional LRAStrategy, have generated some progress towards thegoals of ending LRA violence and protecting civilians.However disappointing the results in some areas, thecombined effect of civilian and military initiatives hasmade life difficult for the LRA. Based on past experience,it is likely that any loss of momentum in thecounter-LRA initiative will be used by the LRA to reorganizeand reconstitute.While the current focus on a collaborative internationalapproach to the LRA problem continues to enjoy broadsupport, at least in public rhetoric, the goal of knittingtogether a strategy binding the AU, UN, and nationalgovernments has yet to be translated into effective andcoordinated action on the ground. The much vauntedAU Regional Task Force (AU RTF), the multi-nationalforce operating under the umbrella of the RCI-LRA,continues to be plagued by a lack of funding, poor logistics,and political challenges that render it virtuallyineffective in providing protection to civilians livingunder threat of LRA attack, who are predominantly ofthe Zande ethnic group. On the ground, the AU initiativeis seen as a hollow exercise in diplomacy.Recent research indicates that LRA cohesion is weakening.It is possible that the majority of groups mightfinally disintegrate if sufficient pressure on them canbe sustained. The campaign to encourage voluntarydefections acts in concert with military operations andcontributes to them by reducing LRA strength. Militaryand non-military interventions together act aspush-pull factors and are effective to the extent thatthey complement each other.The limited successes of Ugandan forces, supported intheir operations by United States expertise and logistics,stand out as positive achievements, particularlyin the areas of intelligence gathering and disruption ofLRA communications, command, and control. The continuingpresence of self-defense militia units in SouthSudan has also been effective in reducing the level ofinsecurity in LRA-affected areas of Western EquatoriaState (WES).In spite of the operational challenges, the campaign toencourage and facilitate voluntary defections has madesome progress over the past year, particularly in CARand South Sudan. Such efforts, however, take place ina context of inconsistent military pressure on the LRAand still suffer from a number of other crippling weaknessesthat can be traced to political and institutionaldysfunctions affecting many of the organizations involved.UN missions in the region, which should play key rolesin facilitating defections, are hampered by an absenceof coordination between missions, the lack of key personnelon the ground, and Byzantine decision makingand procurement systems that are simply too slow tocope with rapidly changing operational needs. Theseweaknesses have a direct impact not only on efforts toencourage voluntary defections, but also on the abilityof would-be defectors to come out safely.In addition, the sheer number of international agencies,international non-governmental organizations(NGOs), and local civil society groups involved incounter-LRA initiatives generate frictions that operateas a drag on collective action. At best, the internationaleffort can be understood as a fumbling attempt, inwhich the good will and best efforts of many playersfall short of the mark – but nevertheless create a positiveeffect.The purpose of this paper is to develop proposals forimproving efforts to counter the LRA by encouragingand facilitating defections from the group. To be effective,a defection campaign must be based on a soundknowledge of the organization it targets. Consequently,the paper begins with an extensive description andan analysis of the LRA’s composition, modus operandi,and area of operations, while commander profiles canalso be found in the annexes. It follows with an analyticaldescription of the contributions of various counter-LRAinitiatives and how they interact. The paperthen focuses on what can be done to improve the rateof voluntary defections. This part of the paper devotesconsiderable attention to related issues that impinge onthe actions of those involved in encouraging or facilitatingdefections.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 9

Throughout this paper, the authors advance the thesisthat the LRA is under considerable stress as a result ofcurrent counter-LRA measures, both military and civilian.The Ugandan combatants and senior commandersthat form the core of the LRA are currently sufferingserious morale problems that are manifesting themselvesin increased defections and divisions among thetop commanders. Absent a political solution or a definitivemilitary success – both seemingly unlikely giventhe history and status quo of the conflict – encouragingdefections remains the most promising strategy toweaken the capacity of the LRA and reduce violenceagainst civilians.The various crises in CAR, Congo, and South Sudanimpede efforts to capitalize on the current upheaval inthe LRA and raise valid questions about the wisdom ofcontinuing to focus on the LRA. However, the failureto definitively address the LRA conflict may give thegroup an opportunity to initiate another round of attacksthat can only aggravate regional instability. Failureto fully dismantle the group’s command structureand capacity to regenerate will reverse the progressthat has been made and raise the cost of an eventualsolution.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 10

II. THE FINAL CHAPTER?The LRA of 2013The LRA of 2013 is a much-changed group, or clusterof groups, compared to the many forms it has takensince the late 1980s. In its smallest size to date, numberingapproximately 250 fighters in total, the organizationled by Joseph Kony has recently confronted aseries of near-terminal challenges and now appears tobe losing some of its cohesion. The Ugandan-led militaryoffensive that started in December 2008, knownas Operation Lighting Thunder, has forced most seniorLRA commanders to retreat to eastern CAR, leavingonly a few groups scattered in Congo. Communicationsbetween group commanders have been difficult,with some groups forced to operate independently formany months.Hardships brought about by years of pursuit by Ugandantroops, working in collaboration with UnitedStates military advisers, have taken a toll on seniorLRA commanders, particularly those in their 40s orolder, who seem to be losing their enthusiasm to continuefighting. In response, Kony has transferred commandresponsibility over his ever dwindling groups toyoung Ugandan fighters in their mid to late 20s.Kony has also distilled his fighting force to the smallestpossible critical mass that would allow him to surviveuntil conditions improve, which he has done before.Despite the lengthy Ugandan military campaign – enteringits fifth year in December 2012 – Kony might oncemore be correct in his calculations. Ugandan and UStroops have suspended their operations in CAR sincethe 24 March coup there, and Ugandan troops have notbeen permitted in Congo since September 2011.In addition, Kony appears to have reestablished contactwith elements of the LRA’s former patron, theSudan Armed Forces (SAF), particularly in 2012 and2013, although the SAF has not given substantial supportto the LRA. 1 If Ugandan military operations cometo a premature end and Kony succeeds in receivingconsiderable military support from the SAF, the LRAwill once again have the opportunity to regroup andpersevere.1 For more information on the relationship between the LRAand the SAF, see The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Sudan’sHarboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013,” April 2013.A. CompositionThe term “Army” in the Lord’s Resistance Army is amisnomer. There never was an “army” in the conventionalmeaning of the word. The LRA has almost alwaysbeen an assembly of groups composed of a fewformer professional soldiers, farmers-turned-combatants,and women and children. It has primarily preyedon civilians and exploited regional instability whiletypically avoiding military confrontations.With the exception of a few veteran combatants includingKony and Okot Odhiambo, almost everyone else inthe LRA was abducted. Such is certainly the case forthe non-Ugandans who were abducted in the last decadefrom CAR, Congo, and South Sudan. The majorityof the Ugandan component of the LRA is composedof people abducted before the end of 2006, when thelast LRA group left Uganda and moved to Congo. 2The oft-made claim that the LRA is composed mostlyof child soldiers is now inaccurate though many Ugandanfighters, if not the vast majority in the LRA today,were abducted as children. With the exception of childrenborn in the bush, all the Ugandans in the LRA todayare adults. There are, however, Congolese, CentralAfrican, and possibly South Sudanese children amongthe fighters scattered in LRA groups throughout centralAfrica.It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of LRAgroups as their composition is fluid and most groupsare highly mobile. 3 Recent reports from former combatantsand from Ugandan intelligence analysts suggestthat there are between ten and 15 separate operationalgroups today, mostly based in the eastern part of CAR.2 A small number of Ugandans joined the LRA during Jubapeace talks, such as Okello Mission. See Mukasa, Henry,“LRA rebel pins Sudan on support,” The New Vision, 5 April2010. Children have also been born to Ugandan parents inthe bush.3 There have been cases in which LRA groups have remainedin one place for a significant period of time. This includesa group of LRA that established a camp in the KafiaKingi enclave, along the border of Sudan and South Sudanbetween late 2010 and early 2013. Other possible exceptionsare groups that may have temporarily settled in Congo’s BasUele district, near the border with CAR, and groups thathave set up camps in Garamba National Park in Congo’sHaut Uele district.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 11

A typical LRA group consists of between eight and 20armed fighters, all men and mostly Ugandan, with betweenfive and ten women and children. At least twogroups have different ratios with few fighters andmany of Kony’s “wives” and children. Smaller groups,referred to within the LRA as “standbys,” are formedfor specific operations such as looting. Groups occasionallycoalesce for meetings or prayer sessions withKony and other commanders or for large-scale operations.Groups commanded by the senior leaders, suchas Kony and Odhiambo, tend to be larger but these toooften split into smaller units to increase flexibility or toconfuse pursuing forces.Of the approximately 500 remaining people in theLRA, there are about 270 men, most of them armed,but only up to 200 Ugandan fighters, who constitutethe backbone of the LRA. 4 As of April 2013, there wereapproximately 250 total armed combatants within theLRA, highlighting how the group’s fighting capacity isgreatly reduced from its peak of approximately 2,700armed combatants around 1999. 5 There are also about140 women and 70 children within the LRA. Womenand children are usually not armed but many womenparticipate in looting parties. The number of non-Ugandanmen and women tends to be fluid as many are abductedor released as dictated by the particular group’sneeds and their capacity to feed themselves.B. Area of operationsLRA groups are scattered over a huge area approximatelythe size of California that encompasses easternCAR, northeastern Congo, and, periodically, the KafiaKingi enclave, a disputed border area claimed by Sudanand South Sudan. LRA forces have not committedan attack in South Sudan since mid-2011, and rarely ifever traverse the area anymore. The LRA has not operatedin Uganda since 2006.4 The number of remaining men, women, and children remainingin the LRA is very difficult to estimate. The estimatescontained in this paper are based on interviews conductedwith more than a dozen recent returnees. For detailed informationand graphics regarding numbers of fighters, women,and children within the LRA, see Annex I.5 Cakaj, Ledio, “The Lord’s Resistance Army of Today,”Enough Project, November 2010. Lancaster, Philip, GuillaumeLacaille, and Ledio Cakaj, “Diagnostic Study of theLord’s Resistance Army,” International Working Group onthe LRA, World Bank, June 2011. See Annex I for graphicsshowing the decline in LRA combatant capacity from 1999-2013.1. Central African RepublicMany LRA groups are currently based in CAR, operatingin a vast area that encompasses four of the country’ssixteen prefectures: Haut Mbomou, Mbomou,Haut Kotto, and Vakaga. The LRA first entered CARthrough Haut Mbomou in 2008, but have since beenpushed west and north by Ugandan forces, which areconcentrated in the Haut Mbomou towns of Obo andDjemah.In recent years, many LRA groups have operated in thesparsely populated area north of the intersection of theChinko and Vovodo rivers, in Mbomou and Haut Kottoprefectures. One such group that has operated in thisarea includes senior commanders Leonard “Lubwa”Bwone, Francis Abuchingu, and Alphonse Lamola. Thegroup previously included OnenChan AciroKop “AngolaUnita,” but he may no longer be traveling withthem. These veteran fighters appear to have had a fallingout with Kony in mid-2011 and were placed underthe supervision of younger escorts in their twenties,who both protect them and prevent their defection. 6 Asof May 2013, at least one other group of about 28 peopleoperated in the vicinity of Agoumar in Mbomouprefecture.To the west of the Chinko-Vovodo confluence, the LRAhas periodically conducted massive abduction andlooting raids on towns along the Bangassou-Fode-Bakouma-Nzakoaxis, including the looting of a uraniummining facility in Bakouma in June 2012. 7 Ugandantroops and US advisers have rarely had the capacityto operate that far west, allowing LRA groups to attackcommunities with impunity.Though LRA groups have operated more cautiously inHaut Mbomou prefecture, where Ugandan troops andUS advisers are concentrated, they still commit periodicattacks there, including some within a few kilometersof Obo. As of March 2013, two satellite groupsreporting to Odhiambo seemed to be operating northof Obo. 8Senior LRA commanders, including Kony, also operatein the ungoverned areas of Vakaga and northern HautKotto prefectures. Media reports claimed that LRA6 Caesar Achellam, a top commander who left the LRA inMay 2012, was likely also exiled by Kony and subsequentlydecided to escape with his “wife” and a young bodyguard.7 Invisible Children + The Resolve LRA Crisis Tracker, “2012Annual Security Brief,” February 2013.8 Author interview with former combatant, Gulu, 3 April2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 12

Map: Estimated location of LRA groupsSUDANLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunityEstimated locationof LRA groupCARSOUTH SUDANEstimated location of LRA groups as ofApril 2013, denoted by group commanderDR Congo1) Major Thomas Okello “Odano”2) Major Denis Obol “the one-eyed”3) Second Lieutenant Okello RayCAR4) Major Michael Odooki “Gwee”5) Jon Bosco Kibwola6) Second Lieutenant Richard7) Major Massimiliano Watmon8) Second Lieutenant Oloo9) Second Lieutenant Okwera10) Captain Bosco Oroko Loriada11) Otto LadeereKafia Kingi12) Joseph Kony*Unidentified locationMajor Okot LuwilaMajor Kidega Murefu “Min Tigi Tigi”Okot OdhiamboCaptain Otim Larwedo*Kony’s group may be operating in northeasternCARN100km200kmDR CONGOLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 13

aiders were responsible for a series of brutal attacksin this region in June 2013 in which 18 civilians werereportedly killed and over 50 others abducted, but theperpetrator of those incidents remains unidentified. 92. Kafia Kingi enclaveSince 2009, LRA groups have also frequented the KafiaKingi enclave, which shares a border with CAR’s Vakagaprefecture. 10 An LRA group led by Otto Agwengfirst travelled there in late 2009 to establish contactwith the SAF, which controls the enclave. LRA groupsreturned to Kafia Kingi in 2010, at which point a groupof at least 20 fighters, led by Otim Ferry, established asmall base near the SAF garrison at Dafak, alongsidethe Umbelasha river. 11In late 2011 and 2012, the LRA expanded its presencein Kafia Kingi, establishing semi-permanent campsthat Kony and other senior commanders periodicallyinhabited. By March 2013, the LRA had abandonedthese camps, possibly returning to CAR or to anotherlocation within Kafia Kingi. However, recent defectorsfrom the LRA indicate that Kony and a small groupreturned to Kafia Kingi in April 2013. It is also possiblethat by the end of May 2013, Kony was located in Vakagaor Haut Kotto prefectures in northern CAR. 123. Democratic Republic of the CongoAlthough there are fewer LRA groups operating inCongo than in CAR, since 2010 the group has committedapproximately 74 percent of its nearly 1,200 attacksthere. 13 Many of these attacks have occurred in a relativelydensely populated area of Haut Uele districtroughly bounded by the Congo-South Sudan borderand the Doruma-Bangadi-Ngilima-Dungu-Faradje-Abaroad.This area includes Garamba National Park (Garamba),where the LRA first established bases in Congo in2005. Ugandan troops destroyed those bases duringOperation Lightning Thunder in December 2008, butthe park remains a critical refuge for LRA groups. LRAcombatants have clashed with park rangers on several9 Al Jazeera, “LRA rebels ‘kill villagers in Central Africa,’”16 June 2013. Editor email exchange, humanitarian worker,Bangui, CAR, 15 July 2013.10 For more details on the LRA’s periodic presence in KafiaKingi, see The Resolve, “Hidden in Plain Sight, ” 2013.11 See “Hidden in Plain Sight,” 2013.12 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Gulu, 24June 2013.13 LRA Crisis Tracker, statistic calculated 13 July 2013.occasions, but reportedly favor the northern half of thepark, where the rangers rarely operate. 14As of May 2013, more than 40 people were believed tooperate in at least two different groups in and aroundGaramba, including a small LRA group of about 15people operating in the northern part of Garamba,near the town of Nabanga in South Sudan’s WesternEquatoria State. 15 Another small group may operatealong the Dungu-Faradje axis. Testimony from womenwho were released by the LRA in March 2013 indicatesthat the group operating further north may have establishedtemporary bases there and contained seniorcommanders, while the group operating along theDungu-Faradje axis was tasked primarily with lootinggoods. 16The LRA has also had a somewhat continuous presencein Bas Uele district, to the west of Haut Uele. LRAattacks have occurred primarily on communities on theDoruma-Banda-Ango road. There have also been periodicreports of large movements of LRA into Bas Uelefrom CAR, possibly with the intention of establishingbases there. 17 However, the relative lack of communicationssystems, military forces, and humanitarianagencies in Bas Uele has made it extremely difficult toconfirm reports of LRA activity in the area.In recent years, LRA groups in Congo were led by ColonelVincent Okumu Binansio “Binany,” but he waskilled by Ugandan troops in CAR in January 2013.Leadership of the Congo groups has likely passed toone of his deputies, possibly Major Thomas Odano. Itis possible that members of these groups were responsiblefor a series of messages sent to local communitiesnear Faradje in early May 2013 indicating they wantedto escape. 18 If so, the messages could indicate that Binany’sdeath has triggered instability within LRA groupsoperating in Congo.14 Author interview with JIOC, Dungu, Congo, 4 April 2013.15 Author interview with former LRA combatant, Kampala,Uganda, 11 June 2013.16 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Gulu,Uganda, 9 April 2013.17 Author interview with Ugandan military official, Obo,CAR, April 2013. See also Cakaj, Ledio, “This is Our LandNow: LRA Attacks in Bas Uele, Northeastern Congo,”Enough Project, May 2010.18 For more on these messages, see Voice of Peace, “How DRCongo is missing chances to encourage LRA defections,” 13July 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 14

C. Kony and LRA command dynamicsThe LRA exists primarily as vehicle to ensure the survivalof Kony and a handful of senior commanders. Therank-and-file within the LRA stay with the LRA primarilyout of fear of this upper echelon of commanders,without which the LRA would collapse. Thoughthe LRA command structure has faced unprecedentedstress since 2008, Kony has overseen a series of adaptions,including promoting a younger generation offighters that could ensure its survival into the future.1. The challenges of maintaining cohesionAfter Ugandan troops destroyed the LRA’s establishedbases in Garamba in December 2008, Kony struggled tomaintain a degree of control over his fragmented andscattered organization. Rightly guessing that use ofsatellite phones and High Frequency (HF) radios couldbetray his position and invite Ugandan army attacks,Kony turned to using messengers and pre-arrangedmeetings to communicate with his commanders.However, as the Ugandan offensive continued, thegroups became increasingly disconnected. By mid-2009, barely six months after the launch of OperationLightning Thunder, there were as many as 20 distinctLRA groups. Some were based in Garamba NationalPark, while others were hundreds of kilometers to thewest in Bas Uele. Kony and his main unit were at least400 kilometers to the northwest of Garamba, in CAR’sHaut Mbomou prefecture.Long distances between commanders and a lack ofdirection from Kony created confusion among thetroops, leading in turn to increased defections andinsubordination. Understanding the long distanceto Uganda to be an effective deterrent to defectionsand hoping the Ugandan army would cease its costlypursuit, Kony moved further away from Congo anddeeper into CAR in 2010 and 2011. During this timehe sent his personal bodyguards to bring some groupsoperating in Congo and South Sudan to CAR while hisemissaries continued to seek favor with SAF elementsin the Kafia Kingi enclave. 19 According to former combatants,Kony hoped to move most of the LRA to Sudanese-controlledterritory in Kafia Kingi or SouthernDarfur, while leaving a group to maintain a presencenear the northwestern part of Garamba, the LRA’s oldbase and a potential bridge back to Uganda. 2019 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Guluand Kampala, 2011-2013.20 Ibid.Many fighters who tried to join Kony in CAR between2009 and 2011 were killed, captured, or defected. Topcommanders Bok Abudema, Santo Alit, and Okello Kalalangwere among those killed by the Ugandan military(UPDF). 21 Other influential commanders killed inthe last two years include Captains Michael Otika andJustin Atimango, Kony’s chief security and personalsecretary, respectively. 22 It appears that influentialcommander and Kony protégée, Otim Ferry was killednear Pasi, Congo at some point in 2012. 23 Some groupsmade it to CAR but did not meet Kony for a long time.Such was the case with at least one group in CAR underthe leadership of a Captain Okwere. 242. Maintaining discipline within the LRASince the end of 2011, Kony has tried to reorganizehis forces but has struggled to assert his authorityover troops he has not seen for years. Sometimes lackingdirect communications, he has used his personalbodyguards to carry messages to other commanders,including news of promotions and demotions – as wellas execution orders. Some leaders and their groupswere almost forcibly brought to CAR from Congo.This was the case with Dominic Ongwen and his smallunit, which used to operate between Congo and SouthSudan along the Duru River. Ongwen was injured in abattle in early 2011 but eventually brought to see Konyin CAR. Kony demoted him on the spot and threatenedto have him executed for insubordination. By Augustof 2012, Ongwen had reportedly crossed the ChinkoRiver and moved further north into CAR. Ongwen hasa long history of discord with Kony, who may fear thatOngwen wants to defect. In the past, Ongwen was forgivenfor reasons such as family ties – Kony is marriedto one of his sisters – or his bravery in battle. But likemany other senior leaders in the LRA, Ongwen operatesin CAR under the orders of a much younger commander,though defectors indicate he may have been21 Cakaj, Ledio, “On the heels of Kony: the untold tragedyunfolding in CAR,” Enough Project, 24 June 2010. Seealso BBC News, “Uganda reports killing LRA commanderAbudema in CAR,” 2 January 2010.22 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Gulu,3-4 April 2013.23 Ibid.24 According to at least three former combatants, Okwere’sgroup did not see Kony for about four years from the endof 2008 until the end of 2012. Binany’s group brought Okwereto Dafak, travelling from Bangadi in Congo to Kafia Kingi.Interviews with former LRA combatants, Kampala andGulu, 28 March and 3-4 April 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 15

promoted back to senior leadership in recent months. 25Whatever his present status, his case illustrates some ofthe inner tensions among LRA senior leaders.Ongwen, however, may be an exception to the rule.There have been at least four reported cases in 2013 inwhich Kony ordered the executions of commandersfor insubordination. 26 While such reports remain unconfirmed,two former LRA combatants claimed thatKony ordered the execution of three mid-level commandersat the end of 2012 for allegedly raping youngCongolese women. In early 2013, Kony appears to haveordered the killing of Otto Agweng, his former chief ofsecurity and one of the most feared men in the LRA, foralleged adultery. 27 Agweng was also in charge of thefirst group that reached Kafia Kingi in October 2009.There are also reports that Kony’s half-brother, MajorDavid Olanya, impregnated one of Kony’s “wives.” 28Olanya was arrested on Odhiambo’s orders and demotedfrom overall command of LRA groups in CAR. 29All previous cases of fighters sleeping with Kony’s“wives” were punished by death, but it is unclear whathas happened to Olanya. Former combatants claimthat he will not be executed since he is related to Konyby blood.Olanya’s case is the latest in a series of breaches of disciplinein the LRA caused by hardships and Kony’sinability to control his itinerant commanders. The exiledgroups of Lamola, “Angola Unita,” and Bwone arealso the result of Kony’s loss of confidence in seniorcommanders and, possibly, vice-versa. According toformer combatants, Kony, responding to reports thatthese commanders complained of being tired of theconstant treks through the bush, accused them of beinglazy and unable to lead. 303. The golden generationTo strengthen his hold on the LRA command structure,Kony has transferred operational responsibilitiesto younger commanders. Part of the last generation of25 Editor interview with Ugandan military official, Obo,CAR, April 2013.26 Author interview with Ugandan military official, April2013.27 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Gulu, 24June 2013.28 Author interview with former LRA combatants, 7 April2013.29 Ibid.30 Author interview with Ugandan intelligence analyst,Kampala, 10 April 2013.Ugandans abducted before the LRA moved to Congoin the mid-2000s, these commanders were abductedas children and indoctrinated through their formativeyears. Many of them, including Binany, Otim Ferry,and Jon Bosco Kibwola, earned Kony’s trust whileserving as part of his bodyguard unit.Frequent changes at the operational leadership leveland increasing cases of lack of discipline are signs of organizationalstress. As explained above, Kony has triedto reverse the trend and to maintain his authority bydemoting senior officers, executing disobedient commanders,and promoting younger fighters. Though hehas used similar command strategies in the past, thisis the first time he has systematically promoted theyoungest generation of Ugandan fighters.4. Leadership roles for non-Ugandans?“Kony has become too quarrelsome, making it hard for theUgandan commanders to serve him well.” Ugandan militaryanalyst, 10 April 2013If Kony becomes unhappy with the current crop ofyounger Ugandan officers, he will have to turn tonon-Ugandan fighters to assume command positions.Most of these are from the Zande ethnic group abductedfrom communities in CAR, Congo, and South Sudansince 2005.Should Kony promote non-Ugandans to command positions,it would mark a dramatic shift in the LRA’s essentialcharacter. A rebel force run by Zande fighters ina predominantly Zande territory, with a huge recruitingpotential, would be much harder to contain thanthe current LRA groups. But, to be successful, Konywould likely be forced to adapt the raison d’etre of theLRA to fit the Zande context.To motivate Zande officers, the LRA could try to usethe political grievances of Zande communities, whichhave historically been marginalized by elites in Bangui,Kinshasa, and Juba, and are increasingly frustratedwith the failure of government officials to address thechronic lack of security, governance, and developmentin their communities.D. CommunicationsLRA groups operating at significant distances fromone another have struggled to maintain communicationssince 2008. Some groups, particularly those ledby Kony and other top commanders such as OkotOdhiambo, have maintained limited communicationsthrough messengers while other groups have had littleLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 16

or no contact with one another.There are, however, recent reports that most groups,particularly those based in CAR, have resumed communicatingvia HF radios in what appears to be aconcerted effort by Kony to reorganize his fragmentedorganization. Throughout the early to mid-2000swhen LRA groups were based in southern Sudan andUganda, Kony and his commanders communicated viaHF radios, or what combatants refer to as “radio calls,”even though they were aware that their conversationswere monitored by the Ugandan army. Commandersused sophisticated coded messages, though Ugandanmilitary analysts managed to break some of the codes.In the immediate aftermath of Operation LightningThunder, Kony curtailed the use of HF radios and satellitephones but by late 2012 he seemed to have reversedthat decision. It is likely that he understandsthe risks of being tracked through the radio signals butsees them as a necessary means to prevent the completedisintegration of the LRA.There are now about 15 radio call signs, meaning thatat least ten group leaders are active on-air. Kony andOdhiambo have a signaler each in their respectivegroups, thus their two groups have four radio call signs(two used for the signalers and two for the commandersthemselves). The rest are used by separate groups.According to former combatants, radio contact is madeat specified times set in advance. Those handling theHF radios move a considerable distance from theirbase before coming on air. Satellite phones, many ofthem in the hands of commanders since the Juba peacetalks of 2006-2008, are not normally used for communicationbut rather for their GPS navigation capacity.While it is possible that Kony reverted to using HF radiosout of necessity despite the obvious risks of beingtracked or overheard, it seems that, “he is acting emboldenedrecently,” as an analyst put it. 31 This could be dueto the recent events in CAR leading to the overthrowof President Bozizé, which could have given Kony newhope that his forces can exploit the increasing instabilityin CAR to gain a new lease on life.E. Modus operandiThe LRA’s efforts to curry favor with the SAF since2009 have brought about a significant change in thegroup’s modus operandi. Though there is no credibleevidence that the SAF provided the LRA with substan-31 Author interview with Ugandan military analyst, Kampala,10 April 2013.tial military support since then, the LRA’s relationshipwith Sudanese troops connected the LRA to localizedbartering opportunities. 32 For instance, the SAF helpedthe LRA access local markets, such as Songo in SouthDarfur State, where LRA members exchanged cropsthey cultivated and bush meat for salt, soap, flour andcooking oil. 33It is also possible that the SAF provided the LRA withan opportunity to make use of ivory it had poachedfrom elephants in Congo. According to at least threedifferent former combatants, in the summer of 2011,Kony, through his personal envoy Major Jon BoscoKibwola, ordered fighters to kill elephants and harvesttheir tusks. According to two former LRA combatants,Kony’s group also looted five tusks from a group ofSouth Sudanese poachers in CAR in early 2011. It appearsthat Kony used the five tusks initially to securegoodwill and then eventually more limited suppliesfrom individual officers in the SAF. LRA defectorsreport that the SAF afforded no substantial materialsupport to Kony, instead offering him safe haven in anarea off limits to pursuing Ugandan forces.Despite this, Kony ordered LRA groups to secure moreivory. When commanders complained that there werenot many elephants in their areas of operations in CAR,Kony tasked the Congo group leader, Binany, to securetusks and transport them to the Kafia Kingi enclave,via eastern CAR. 34Binany reportedly delivered a consignment of ivory toKony at the end of 2012, possibly in late November. 35A former combatant claims that Binany met an LRAgroup north of Zemio, CAR, in September or early October2012 on his way to Kafia Kingi with 38 elephanttusks. Binany was ambushed and shot by Ugandanforces in January 2013 on his return from Kafia Kingi.36 It is unclear if he was able to deliver all the tusksto Kony in Kafia Kingi or whether he hid some of thetusks in CAR and intended to return and pick them uponce contact with Kony was made.32 The SAF provided the LRA with substantial military supportfrom 1994-2004, and since 2009 SAF representativesin Kafia Kingi periodically provide the LRA with food andmedical supplies. See “Hidden in Plain Sight,” 2013.33 Author interview with former LRA combatant, Kampala,29 March 2013.34 Author interview with former LRA combatant, Kampala29 March 2013.35 Interview with former LRA combatant, Gulu, 24 June2013.36 Baguma, Raymond, “UPDF kills LRA leader Kony’s chiefbodyguard,” The New Vision, 21 January 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 17

It is not the first time LRA fighters have bartered goodsfor food, certainly not with the SAF. In the late 1990s tomid-2000s, when LRA groups were based in southernSudan, some LRA elements engaged in small barterwith SAF soldiers, usually marijuana or herbal remediesin exchange for food, soap, and radio batteries.It was small in scale and not organized through theLRA headquarters as Kony had already secured largeamounts of ammunition and food supplies throughthe SAF headquarters in Juba. But the recent barter, includingbush meat and ivory, was reportedly orderedby Kony and overseen by his command element. 37The increase scale and systematic nature of trade representsa shift in the LRA’s behavior. In the past, materialbenefit was not seen as a major organizational aim,which, coupled with a vaguely defined political agenda,made Kony’s movement difficult to categorize. Italso made the LRA hard to understand, particularlyduring the last few years when fighters in need of foodand guns refrained from looting gold and diamondsfrom artisanal mines in eastern CAR.It remains unclear how much ivory the LRA has collectedand whether Kony also issued orders to secure goldand diamonds. At least one former combatant said thatBinany also delivered a “small cup filled with gold”taken from artisanal miners of alluvial gold in Congo. 38It is also unclear how much the LRA is now relying ontrade in valuable illicit goods to survive, though LRAattack patterns suggest that looting food and suppliesfrom small communities remains their primary meansof survival. 39imposed the same frugal lifestyle on his commanders,forbidding them from acquiring wealth, except when itwas strictly necessary for operational reasons. He presentedthe tough lifestyle to new recruits as the hardbut noble code of the true freedom fighter. The harshlife in the LRA was both a source of honor and a distinguishingfeature that set LRA fighters apart fromPresident Museveni and corrupt politicians in Uganda,and from common bandits. It is the adherence to thecode of harsh self-denial in the LRA that makes formercombatants today differentiate Kony from other rebelsin the region who they disparagingly refer to as “warlords.”Kony’s ordering groups to collect ivory was a strategicand perhaps necessary decision. It is not surprising thatfaced with a vanishing Ugandan core and a shortage ofmilitary supplies, Kony would be open to any optionto ensure his own and his organization’s survival.However, his decision to collect ivory has come witha cost. Former combatants interviewed for this reportexpressed disappointment at this “act of banditry.”Though it is unclear how Ugandan combatants still inthe bush perceive the barter in ivory, it may be weakeningtheir belief in the LRA’s ideology, which remainscentered on the political grievances of northern Ugandans.When added to the practical impossibility of returningto Uganda and toppling President Museveni’sgovernment, it has become increasingly difficult forLRA members to keep faith in the group’s ideology.Regardless, Kony’s decision to order the collection ofivory marks a radical break with past LRA practiceand could have significant consequences. The LRA hasnever before engaged in the trade of invaluable illicitgoods, and even though the LRA has never had a rigidset of rules – historically favoring flexibility – therejection of material wealth while in the bush has consistentlybeen a key tenet of the LRA’s “code of honor”and Kony’s lectures to his fighters.Kony has historically taken pride in his Spartan lifestyle,which he has compared with that of Jesus. 40 He37 Author interviews with Ugandan military analyst, Kampala,10 April 2013.38 Author interview with former LRA combatant, June, 24June 2013.39 For more on patterns in LRA lootings, see LRA CrisisTracker, “2012 Annual Security Brief,” 2013.40 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Guluand Kampala, 2011-2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 18

III. HOMEWARD BOUNDDebating Defection Within the LRAThe difficulty of surviving in the bush and the gradualerosion of the LRA’s ideology is motivating an unprecedenteddesire among the LRA lower ranks to defect.Reports from recent returnees indicate that the majorityof LRA members want to leave the rebel group.With the exception of Kony and his two dozen mostsenior commanders (including Okot Odhiambo and,perhaps, Dominic Ongwen), who remain committedto the LRA cause, most of the remaining Ugandan officersand combatants would gladly go home if giventhe chance. Abducted, often at a young age, and forcedto walk ceaselessly in the inhospitable bush of centralAfrica, few would remain in the LRA if not held bytheir circumstances.There are, however, many obstacles to defection, somewith potentially fatal consequences. The four mostprominent barriers to defection for Ugandan membersof the LRA are: 1) fear of encountering hostile communitiesand military forces in CAR, Congo, and SouthSudan, 2) a long, hazardous journey to defection sitesfrom remote LRA locations, 3) mistreatment and persecutionby the Ugandan military upon escaping, and4) lack of reintegration support once they return hometo Uganda. 41Most of the non-Ugandans abducted by the LRA since2008 from CAR, Congo, and South Sudan seek to escapeif given the chance. Mostly Zande, they face lessrisk of harm from hostile communities with whomthey often share cultural or linguistic ties or from nationalmilitary forces. However, many stay where theyare rather than risk punishment from the LRA if theyare caught trying to escape. Additionally, anecdotal evidenceindicates that some Zande may be discouragedfrom escaping due to lack of livelihood options and reintegrationsupport, calculating they may fare better byremaining where they are.Trends in LRA defections highlight the complex dynamicsinvolved in leaving the rebel group. There wereat least 110 returnees from the LRA between January41 Fear of being caught while trying to escape did not featureprominently in interviews with recent LRA returnees.This could be due to the groups becoming smaller and lessable to control the members. It is possible that those still inKony’s group, where there is presumably more control overthe group members, are afraid of being caught trying to escapeand suffering severe punishment.2012 and June 2013 that had spent six months or morewith the rebel group, including 31 Ugandan male combatants.42 If the reported numbers of returnees are correct,it means that in the last 16 months, the LRA haslost approximately 15 percent of the nearly 200 Ugandancombatants and officers that comprise the core ofthe LRA. It should be noted that for at least the pasttwo years, LRA groups have quickly released manyof the non-Ugandans they abduct, particularly adultsused to carry looted goods. However, it is a testamentto the difficulty of leaving the rebel group that so manylow-level Ugandan officers and combatants, as well asabductees, remain within the LRA.A. Deciding to defect“I left because this was a rebellion, I did not join it on myown, I was abducted when I was young. When I was fightingI was told that we were fighting a bad government. But Irealized that things in the bush were bad and what I was toldwas not true. I had discussions with friends and realized thatwhat they were preaching were lies. The one who was tellinglies was the Big Teacher [Kony].” Former LRA combatantwho escaped in 2011, 28 March 20131. The view from within the LRAThe authors of the report interviewed 22 Ugandansformerly with the LRA for this report. 43 Their dates ofabduction, experience within the LRA, and dates andcircumstances of defection varied, but all stated thatthey had been abducted and forced to remain in theLRA and had often thought about escaping. They hadno desire to stay but were scared to leave, fearing punishmentor death if caught. Out of the 22, ten said theyhad tried at least once to leave but were either caughtimmediately, failed to make it out, or came across anotherLRA group who recaptured them. All said theyhad been severely beaten for trying to flee.The common allusion to the “Stockholm Syndrome” –the psychological state in which captives create strongbonds with their captors – as a reason why LRA abducteesdo not risk escaping is overstated in this context. Inrecent years, the authors have consistently found that42 LRA Crisis Tracker, statistic calculated 13 July 2013.43 The authors conducted the interviews in Kampala andGulu in March and April 2013, as well as several additionalinterviews with former LRA combatants in June 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 19

Map: Defection of long-term members of the LRA, January 2012 – June 2013CARWestern Bahr el-GhazalLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunityDefection of long-term member(s)of the LRA, including UgandansDefection of long-term member(s)of the LRA, not including UgandansNote: Long-term defectors are definedby six months or more of LRA captivityMbomouOn November 28, 2012, twomale Ugandan combatants andthree girls defected in Mboki,CAR, one of the first successfulcases of LRA members utilizing aSafe Reporting Site.SOUTH SUDANOn March 21, 2013, four LRAcombatants released 28 womenand children near Digba, DRCongo, the largest single returnof long-term LRA members sinceJanuary 2012. The group consistedof seven boys, 13 girls, and eightwomen.DR CONGON100km200kmLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 20

the majority of LRA members seek only to survive untilthe opportunity and incentives to defect are present.This has never been more true than today. While in thepast former combatants may have expressed sympathytowards Kony and his stated aim of righting thewrongs committed against the Acholi by the Ugandangovernment, the most recent defectors talk of their disillusionmentwith the LRA leader. A relatively seniorcommander who came out of CAR at the end of 2012said, “He [Kony] is only trying to survive now, [he] has noother aim.” 44The decision to defect is not usually the result of a singleincident but rather a long process reinforced byseveral events or experiences such as hunger, thirst,fatigue, and longing for family. In this context, demobilizationmessages encouraging defections, includingleaflets and radio programs, play a crucial role, furtherstrengthening the desire to escape.The desire to leave usually leads to action after discussionwith a friend or groups of friends within an LRAgroup. Though this carries a significant risk of betrayal,it has become comparatively safer as LRA groups getsmaller and command oversight weakens. There arenow more opportunities to slip away. Five former combatantssaid they escaped while being sent on routinechores. Three women were let go by their group leader,citing hardships in the bush that led to the group leader’sdecision to release them.2. The complex role of military pressureMilitary operations have a complex effect on defectiondynamics within the LRA. The Ugandan militaryperiodically clashes with LRA groups and capturescombatants or women and children. However, thesedirect clashes do not necessarily provide the best opportunitiesfor LRA members to defect. Almost all ofthe defectors interviewed for this report who had escapedin the last year did so when they were sent todo menial tasks such as fetching food, wood, or water,or when they simply fell out of the line of march andwere abandoned. Three former fighters interviewed reporteddefecting from an LRA group allegedly basedin Kafia Kingi that was sedentary and faced no militarypressure at the time. The main reason for their defectionwas Kony’s decision to execute three mid-levelcommanders. 4544 Author interview with former LRA combatant, Gulu, 3April 2013.45 Interviews with former LRA combatant, 24 June 2013.Even so, military pressure, or even the perception ofmilitary pressure, does play a significant role in encouragingdefections. Since December 2008, Ugandanmilitary operations have forced most LRA groups intoa continuous state of mobility, making it more difficultfor groups to find food and increasing opportunitiesfor LRA members to defect. All 15 recent returneesinterviewed for this report who had escaped since themiddle of 2012 said they had not been pursued by theUgandan military for more than one year before theyleft but that they feared contact with the army andmoved frequently in the bush. One former fighter saidhe left after he heard radio reports about the AU RTF’sdeployment to areas with LRA presence. 463. How the LRA discourages escapeLRA commanders are adept at manipulating informationand fears in order to discourage would-be defectorsfrom attempting to escape. They restrict radio access tosenior commanders to discourage lower-ranking membersfrom hearing Come Home messages broadcast onFM or shortwave radio. They also sow doubt about theveracity of Come Home messages that use the voicesof former LRA combatants by claiming that those whodefect are killed after the broadcast or slowly poisonedby the Congolese army or the Ugandan government.Similarly, LRA commanders forbid lower-rankingmembers from picking up or reading Come Home leafletsdistributed by disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration (DDR) actors, telling them the fliers arecoated in a poison that seeps through the skin whentouched. Some members pick up leaflets despite therisk, but hide them to avoid punishment.LRA propaganda works best when it exaggerates legitimatefears. Would-be defectors’ biggest fear whenleaving the LRA is being killed or harmed by the localcommunities in CAR, Congo, or South Sudan. This fearis directly related to the LRA’s deliberate strategy ofcommitting atrocities with the intent of alienating thelocal population and deterring defections. LRA commandersreinforce these fears by reminding membersof such attacks, as well as of reports or rumors of communitieskilling or harming defectors.B. The long journey homeOnce a member of the LRA has made the decision todefect, the act of leaving the LRA is difficult and dangerous.The risks involved are not lost on people in the46 Author interview with former LRA combatant, Gulu, 3April 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 21

LRA, particularly as top commanders attempt to exaggeratethose risks as much as possible.But recently, as groups became smaller and more mobile,some members were able to defect without beingpursued. Some groups are now too small or weak tochase those who leave. According to at least two recentreturnees, commanders of small groups worrythat those sent to retrieve defectors would also defect. 47In the past, LRA groups that were more stable couldminimize defections by using established perimeterguards. But sedentary groups run the risk that LRAmembers will build relationships with local communitymembers and seek their help to escape, as happenedin Haut Uele from 2007-2008, as well as in Kafia Kingiin 2011 on at least one occasion.Many LRA escapees who manage to elude their captorsstill must make a long journey through denseforests from remote LRA encampments to the nearestarmy detachment or civilian settlement. They are oftenunable to take sufficient provisions for the journey,for fear of tipping off LRA commanders to their plans.They may face extreme hunger or thirst while traveling,as well as exposure, disease, and wild animals.Though some are able to survive in the bush for weeksor months, some escapees have undoubtedly died inthe attempt.Local communities usually welcome non-Ugandan defectors,mostly Zande, who survive the bush journey. 48If they escape in their country of origin, they usuallyare returned home quickly. However, for those whoescape in a different country than that from whichthey were abducted, the journey home can be perilous.Though government authorities, UN actors, and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) havestrengthened protocols for coordinating cross-borderreturns, these systems work best for children andwomen. 49 Non-Ugandan adult males who escape fromthe LRA in a different country have often been jailed orheld in custody for extensive periods of time, thoughimproved coordination in the past two years has re-47 Interviews with former LRA combatants, Gulu, 3 and 7April 2013.48 Across LRA-affected areas of CAR, Congo, and SouthSudan, there are periodic, localized tensions between Zandefarming communities and Mbororo (Fulani) herdsman.However, Mbororo herders usually feed Zande escapeesthey encounter in the bush and transport them to nearbycommunities or authorities. For more, see The Resolve,“Peace Can Be,” February 2012.49 Even so, there remain long delays in repatriating them insome cases.duced the number of such cases.Ugandan defectors, particularly male combatants, facegreater danger in trying to establish contact with localcommunities. Failure to build trust or communicateclearly with local communities may lead to beating orlynching. Some of the interviewees said they tried tosecure assurances before surrendering by either wavingwhite flags from the side of the road or writingletters to local community leaders. In most cases theyreceived no response and feared they would be attackedif they stayed in the same place. Ugandan LRAdefectors also assume false identities – pretending tobe from one of the neighboring LRA-affected countries– to avoid being killed while coming out. Many,especially combatants, attempt to find civilian garb beforeleaving the bush. Looting or bartering of civilianclothes, particularly suits and shoes, could signal thelooters’ intent to defect. Three different former fightersinterviewed for this report testified that they askedMbororo cattle herders they encountered in the bushfor “good clothes” to help facilitate their defection.Despite their fear, Ugandan defectors often receive assistancefrom local communities. In late 2012, civiliansin the CAR towns of Obo and Mboki helped severalUgandan combatants defect. Their willingness to assistLRA defectors is likely linked to intensive efforts bycivil society leaders, local authorities, the NGO InvisibleChildren, and US military advisers to encouragecommunity members to assist defectors.Ugandan defectors also face potential mistreatment atthe hands of military forces. Five former combatantssaid they avoided surrendering to the Congolese army(FARDC) as they heard rumors while in the LRA thatCongolese soldiers killed LRA defectors on the spot. 50There have also been at least two cases of the SouthSudanese military (SPLA) mistreating Ugandan LRAdefectors it has received, and likely many more. 51However, Ugandan LRA combatants are also wearyof the Ugandan military. Though Ugandan forces donot physically abuse them, defectors fear being recruitedand forced to fight their former colleagues in thebush. 52 The Ugandan army uses many former Ugan-50 There have been several documented cases of Congolesesoldiers mistreating Ugandan defectors. See Cakaj, Ledio,“Too Far From Home: Demobilizing the Lord’s ResistanceArmy,” Enough Project, February 2011.51 For instance, the South Sudanese military held a maleUgandan LRA defector in custody for several months in late2011 and early 2012.52 Three of the former LRA combatants interviewed forLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 22

dan LRA fighters as scouts immediately after theysurrender. Though these men are thought to providevaluable intelligence, often LRA groups change plansonce they know one of their members has defected.Even if the Ugandan military does transport formerLRA fighters back to Uganda, they often pressure andintimidate them to join the UPDF. As of February 2011,there were reportedly over 100 former LRA combatantsin the Ugandan army, fighting against the remainingLRA groups. 53 All the males interviewed for this reportclaimed that they had been asked to join the Ugandanarmy and knew at least one other person who had succumbedto the pressure and joined.Ugandan army officials lure former combatants withpromises of salaries to be deposited into bank accountsin Uganda while the former combatants fight for theUgandan army in CAR. Such promises are almost alwaysfalse as, according to Ugandan law, no personwithout a high school education can be integrated intothe Ugandan army and receive a salary. 54 Most of theformer combatants were abducted as children andhave only a basic elementary education. Almost allof the recently returned former LRA combatants whonow fight for the Ugandan army interviewed by theauthors in the last two to three years have reported thatthey have not undergone any training or other basicprocedures needed to formally be absorbed into thearmy and therefore do not qualify for the salaries theyare promised. 55C. Lack of reintegration aid back home“I have a question. Suppose you were the person who cameout and had nothing, you were suffering and people ask youto go on the radio and tell others to come out, when in factyou wished you were back in the bush? Would you do it?”Former Ugandan LRA combatant who escaped in 2011,29 March 2013“At least in the bush I could find food for myself.” Multipleformer Ugandan and Zande LRA members, April 2013If LRA defectors succeed in surviving the gauntlet ofthis report stated they had been worried the Ugandan armywould recruit them once they escaped. They tried to surrenderto the local population in CAR or even the South Sudanesearmy and police.53 Cakaj, “Too Far From Home,” 2011.54 World Factbook, “Uganda,” Central Intelligence Agency,2012.55 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, Guluand Kampala 2011-2013. Author interview with social worker,Gulu, 24 June 2013.obstacles between their escape and their arrival home,they then face the challenge of reintegrating back intotheir communities. Interviews with former combatantsindicate that even though such concern might beseen from the outside as premature – survival beingobviously the initial worry – members of the LRA aremore likely to undertake the perilous return journey ifthey are convinced that the rewards of being home areworth the risk of getting there.1. Reintegration support for UgandansReintegration of Ugandan former members of the LRArequires a holistic, community-based approach. Evenso, the Ugandan government has a primary responsibilityfor facilitating and funding reintegration activities.Since 2000, it has largely implemented this responsibilitythrough the Amnesty Commission, a bodycreated under the terms of the 2000 Amnesty Act thathas been tasked with granting legal amnesty, as wellas providing rehabilitation to former members of theLRA.Since their creation, the Amnesty Act and AmnestyCommission have faced a variety of critiques, includingconcerns about the appropriateness of a blanketamnesty and the quality of reintegration packages.Regardless, the Commission enjoyed support amongsome elements of northern Ugandan civil society, andfor years it was able at least to provide some returningmembers of the LRA with amnesty certificates.However, the Amnesty Commission’s performancehas steadily declined since 2006, when the LRA abandonednorthern Uganda, as the rate of defectors hasslowed and attention in Uganda has shifted to morepressing domestic issues. The Commission failed to issuemany former combatants their amnesty certificates,while lack of funding meant many defectors receivedreduced reintegration packages, or none at all. TheCommission’s offices in northern Uganda, where mostdefectors return, are closed. The Commission’s workwas also compromised by other Ugandan governmentactors working at cross-purposes, including Ugandanmilitary officials who used the denial of amnesty certificatesto pressure returnees to join the military. Additionally,the Ugandan government has blocked theissuing of an amnesty certificate for Thomas Kwoyelo,a mid-level commander who was captured in February2009, as the Department of Public Prosecution (DPP)attempts to try him for alleged crimes committed whilein the LRA.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 23

The Amnesty Commission was further weakened inMay 2012, when the Ugandan Minister of Internal Affairsfailed to renew the section of the Amnesty Act thatallowed the Commission to grant former combatantsamnesty. The Amnesty Commission retained the authorityto provide LRA returnees with reintegrationsupport, but has lacked the funds to do so. It also retainedthe authority to provide “letters of introduction”to LRA defectors to help facilitate their reintegration,but such letters do not grant them any legal protectionfrom prosecution.Following a year of intense lobbying from Ugandancivil society groups and members of Parliament, inMay 2013 the Ugandan government renewed the sectionof the Amnesty Act that allowed the Commissionto grant LRA returnees amnesty. However, it remainsunclear whether the Ugandan government will investthe resources and political will necessary to implementthe full range of activities in its original mandate.In the absence of adequate support from the Ugandangovernment, the task of providing reintegration supporthas fallen largely on civil society and humanitariangroups. Following the departure of the LRA fromUganda and the subsequent return home of most internallydisplaced people, many international humanitarianorganizations ceased their programs. Consequently,there are fewer services, such as vocational trainingand small loans, available to former LRA members.Aid groups have continued to provide limited medicaland psychosocial support to some returning LRAmembers, but no long-term follow-up care.A local organization, Gulu Support for Children Organization(GUSCO), receives funding from the UN children’sagency (UNICEF) to house young mothers andchildren who return from the LRA, which GUSCO didwith regularity at least until the end of 2011. But due tolack of funds and the small number of people tricklingout of the LRA, GUSCO appears to have stopped offeringsupport to young mothers and children. World Vision,an international organization that offered medicalsupport and reintegration services to adult males formerlyin the LRA, has also faced severe funding shortfalls,though funding from Invisible Children will extendits capacity to operate the reintegration center andsupport livelihood activities. With GUSCO and WorldVision providing limited support, only the ICRC hasrecently remained to carry out “direct reintegration,”a euphemism for the process of reuniting those whohave come out with their families without any medical,psychosocial, or financial support. This only serves tomaintain the cycle of poverty and neglect that helpedlaunch and sustain the LRA rebellion in the first place.The experiences of three Ugandan women and an infantwho came out of the bush in Congo in February2013 and made it to Uganda the following month areparticularly telling. After being transported to Uganda’scapital Kampala by the UN, the four were takenby Uganda’s Amnesty Commission and paraded infront of the Ugandan media. Despite public statementsfrom an Amnesty Commission official that the fourwould receive support, they were transported to Guluin northern Uganda, with the help of an internationalNGO, where they were taken to the Ugandan military’sChild Protection Unit (CPU), a crumbling facilitythat is occupied mostly by Ugandan soldiers and theirfamilies. By mid-April 2013 the women and the infantwere still in the CPU. Neither the Amnesty Commissionnor other actors have provided them with reintegrationassistance.The challenges faced by Ugandans formerly in theLRA are highly deleterious to the current DDR efforts.Many, robbed of educational and livelihood opportunitiesfirst by the LRA and then by the lack of reintegrationsupport, have been among the northern Ugandansunable to take advantage of the economic growth theregion has enjoyed since 2006, which has been highlyuneven and left large portions of the population inpoverty. 56 Some former members of the LRA have evencome home to find that others have appropriated theirlands and homes.Ugandans remaining in the LRA able to keep up ondevelopments in northern Uganda, primarily via internationaland Ugandan shortwave radio programs, areaware of the challenges they will face upon returninghome. 57 Fear of being unable to sustain a livelihood, oracquiring only a menial job, creates a strong disincentiveto accept the grave risks of trying to escape, especiallyfor higher-ranking officers who have comparativelybetter living conditions in the bush.56 For instance, see Owich, James, “Biting Poverty on theRise in Acholi,” Acholi Times, 23 May 2011.57 Up until the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder, LRAforces kept in frequent touch with family, friends, and formercombatants in northern Uganda. Given their isolationand reluctance to use electronic communications, the extentto which members of the LRA in the bush continue to communicatewith such contacts is unclear. There have been recentreports that Kony and other commanders have calledrelatives in northern Uganda, although such reports havenot been confirmed by independent sources and are likelyuntrue. See Lawino, Sam, “Kony calls uncles, vows never toreturn home,” The Daily Monitor, 14 April 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 24

2. Reintegration support for non-UgandansMany non-Ugandans, primarily Zande, who escapefrom the LRA receive even less reintegration supportthan those who return home to Uganda. Upon returninghome, they are forced to restart their livelihoodsfrom scratch, and some are too traumatized to returnto the rural farming communities they were abductedfrom for fear of being abducted again. This leavesthem with few livelihood options, as most Zande relyon small-scale farming, hunting, and fishing to supportthemselves and their families.Non-Ugandan returnees also face stigma from localcommunities when they return. Though many familiesand community members welcome escapees andprovide essential support networks, some communitymembers harass them. These dynamics are extremelycomplex, as returnees may face increased stigma fromcommunity members if they exhibit signs of “LRA behavior,”such as aggression, withdrawal, or psychologicaltrauma. Young women who return from the LRAhaving been raped face heightened stigma, especiallyif they return with children fathered by UgandanLRA members. Family and community members mayrefuse to care for or accept such children, while mensometimes refuse to marry women raped by LRA combatants.These dynamics can be especially pronounced in ruralareas away from the eyes of international observers:“Stigma against LRA returnees may not be evident as muchin urban areas, but in remote rural areas where LRA atrocitieshit the hardest, people are very bitter about the LRA.Because they can’t take out their anger on the LRA, theytake it out on returnees who have spent time with the LRA.LRA violence was worst in rural areas, so most abductionsoccurred there and bitterness is worst there. So most returneesare returning to rural areas where they face the greatestlikelihood of stigma, but where support and sensitization isthe least developed.” – South Sudanese community leaderin Yambio, April 2013National governments in CAR, Congo, and South Sudan,having failed to protect their citizens from abductionby the LRA, have also completely abdicated theirresponsibility to provide reintegration support. In addition,they have failed to provide any legal frameworkto guide the reintegration of former LRA members orto protect them from prosecution for crimes they mayhave committed under coercion from LRA commanders,though none of the three governments have yetmoved to actually prosecute former abductees. Furthermore,unlike many cases in northern Uganda, returningdefectors or escapees in Zande communitiesdo not undergo any community reconciliation processto ease their transition back home.Despite this, non-Ugandan returnees, particularly children,do receive some reintegration support. In southeastCAR, former abductees have formed “Victim’s Associations”in many towns. Several international NGOsand UN agencies provide psychosocial and livelihoodsupport to such associations and other former abductees.However, the Victim’s Association in Obo, whichincludes 140 adults and 100 children, reports that externallivelihood assistance has been sparse and poorlymanaged, preventing them from putting their trainingto productive use. 58In Congo, several groups provide limited but inadequatepsychosocial and material assistance to childrenwho escape the LRA. 59 However, returning adults receivelittle if any formal external assistance. Assistanceis particularly sparse – or absent altogether– for childrenand adults who return home to remote rural communitiesor towns in areas such as Bas Uele that arefar from the headquarters kept by the UN and mostinternational NGOs in Dungu.In South Sudan, where the local government of WesternEquatoria is elected and comparatively well-organized,the local Ministry of Gender and Social Developmentoperates a UNICEF-funded transit center for childrenand women who come out from the LRA. Though fewescape within South Sudan, the center processes manySouth Sudanese women and children rescued or capturedby Ugandan troops operating in CAR. The UPDFhands over women and children to the center underthe terms of a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)agreement it signed with UNICEF. 60 Though the centerprovides some follow-up counseling and supportto South Sudanese returnees, long-term support is limited.For South Sudanese adults who escape from theLRA, no formal reintegration assistance is available.Though it has long been assumed that Zande abductees58 Editor interview, Obo Victim’s Association members,Obo, April 2013.59 For a detailed discussion of the challenges Congolese childrenwho escape from the LRA face, see Discover the Journeyand Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “We Suffer fromWar and More War: Assessment of the Impact of the LRAon Formerly Abducted Children and Their Communities inNortheastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2012.60 The SPLA, FARDC, and the Central African national army(FACA), have not signed similar SOPs with UNICEF.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 25

need no incentive to attempt to escape the LRA, thereis increasing concern among Zande community leadersthat the lack of reintegration support for escapees,particularly youth and adults, could lead some to stayin the bush. If the conflict persists, Zande abducted bythe LRA, aware of the stigma and lack of livelihoodoptions they will face upon returning home, may bemore reluctant to take the dangerous risk of attemptingescape from the LRA.Community-led reintegration in the tri-border areaWith governments and international organizationsproviding little support for adult LRA returneesin CAR, Congo, and South Sudan, localcivil society groups are helping to fill the gapwithin their limited capacities. Local religiousand community leaders often lead such initiatives,operating with few resources and little orno outside assistance. In other cases, formal or informalpeer groups of former abductees provideeach other with financial and psychological support.Arising organically from the local context,such initiatives represent a comfortable and culturallyrelevant opportunity for LRA escapees torebuild their lives.In Congo, Mama Bongisa Center / Centre de reinsertionet d’Appui au Developpement (CRAD),a loose-knit organization run by a local Catholicnun, brings together women who have escapedfrom the LRA, been widowed by LRA attacks,or otherwise been victims of sexual and gender-basedviolence. The women participate in income-generatingactivities such as bread baking,and also have a chance to foster informal peer networksthat help them cope with trauma. Anotherorganization, SAIPED, uses mobile cinema andcommunity gatherings to sensitize communitieson reintegration of former abductees. In addition,the Catholic group CDJP helps operate CentreElikya, in Dungu, which provides psychosocialcounseling and other services to formerly abductedyouth.In southeast CAR, the “Victim’s Associations”that bring together former abductees in manytowns facilitate peer-to-peer counseling and providea forum to address community stigmatization.They also provide financial assistance tonew escapees. Other civil society leaders, suchas Marie Francine in Obo, have initiated local effortsto assist LRA returnees. In South Sudan, localchurch organizations have begun to conductsurveys and needs assessments of adult returneesfrom the LRA, as well as some community reconciliationworkshops.In all of these areas, where literacy rates are lowand print media scarce, community FM radiostations are a critical medium to sensitize localcommunities on the importance of accepting LRAescapees back into the community. Radio Zeredain Obo, Anisa FM in Yambio, and Radio RTK inDungu are excellent examples of this.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 26

IV. A REGION IN CHAOSThe Context for DDR InitiativesWith its command structure under stress and its corecombatants wanting to return home, the LRA is extremelyvulnerable to effective efforts to encourage defections.However, dysfunction in the broader counter-LRAresponse and pressing crises in other areas ofCAR, Congo, and South Sudan threaten to undercut existingDDR interventions and stall efforts to capitalizeon the LRA’s current instability. Though it is beyondthe scope of this paper to analyze fully the broadercounter-LRA response and regional security dynamics,a brief overview is necessary before providing recommendationsfor the future of DDR interventions.DDR interventions are nested within a set of civilianand military counter-LRA initiatives designed to stopLRA violence and protect civilians that have had somesuccess but not been decisive. 61 The main aim of militaryoperations is to pursue senior LRA commandersand protect civilians from LRA attacks, though theways that this is done and the level of effort varies inimportant ways across different operational sectors.The civilian contribution is mainly directed at improvingcivilian protection, monitoring human rights abuses,and providing assistance to affected communities.Overall, the collective effort falls far short of providingan adequate level of protection to the affected communities.The declining political will and the generalsense of defeatism that pervade some agencies withinthe architecture of civilian protection play into Kony’shands. While it should be possible to improve withonly modest adjustments to the present level of effort,counter-LRA actors must at least be able to sustain thepresent level of effort and investment if it is to succeed.61 Major players in the international campaign against theLRA include the AU RTF, two UN peacekeeping missions,MONUSCO and UNMISS, the UPDF, who are supportedthrough a bilateral agreement by US Special Force advisers,the FARDC, the SPLA, and the FACA, the Western EquatoriaMinistry of Gender and Social Development, the UgandaAmnesty Commission, UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR,CAS and UN Child Protection), international NGOs (InvisibleChildren, The Resolve, Human Rights Watch, AmnestyInternational, Conciliation Resources, COOPI, the InternationalRescue Committee), ICRC, and active local church andcivil society organizations (particularly Zande traditionalauthorities as well as JUPADEC in CAR). Local defense militiasin South Sudan and park rangers in Garamba NationalPark in Congo also work against the LRA.Counter-LRA initiatives, in turn, are nested within abroader regional context in which each of the countrieswhere the rebel group operates is faced with burgeoningcrises that overshadow LRA atrocities. Meanwhile,the tri-border region of CAR, Congo, and South Sudanthat the LRA has operated in since 2008 is among themost remote and marginalized regions on the Africancontinent. Distracted national elites in Bangui, Kinshasa,and Juba have at their best dedicated minimal resourcestowards the conflict, and at their worst havedownplayed the severity of the conflict and even opposedlocal and regional efforts to stop the LRA. Themost populous ethnic group in the region, the Zande,do not form a core political constituency for their nationalgovernments, limiting their ability to advocatefor a more effective response. Meanwhile, Kony’s deliberatestrategy to minimize attention-grabbing LRAmassacres and mass abductions creates pressure oninternational partners in the counter-LRA coalition toturn their attention and limited resources to other regionalcrises.A. Counter-LRA dynamics at the local and nationalscale“We have been living on edge for five years.” – Communityleader in Dungu, Congo, March 2013“We are discouraged because nobody can stop the LRA.The LRA is going to finish off the people of Haut Mbomou[CAR].” – Community leader in Obo, CAR, April 20131. CongoThough senior LRA commanders have preferred tooperate in CAR and Kafia Kingi in recent years, 74 percentof the rebel group’s attacks have occurred in Congo’sHaut Uele and Bas Uele districts since 2010. Theeffect of this prolonged insecurity has been calamitousfor the local people, who live on scattered farms andcombine subsistence farming with hunting and fishing– activities rendered excessively dangerous by the LRApresence. LRA groups operating in and around GarambaNational Park frequently attack people travellingalong the newly reconstructed road between Dunguand Faradje, forcing UN personnel to travel with a militaryescort and civilians to use it only at considerablerisk and without protection. LRA violence in the Ueleshas also had a ripple effect, creating an atmosphere ofLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 27

Map: Counter-LRA military bases vs. LRA area of operationsSUDANSOUTH SUDANLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunityAU RTF baseAU RTF (UPDF) baseUS military baseUNMISS baseMONUSCO baseEstimated LRA area of operationsJanuary 2012 - June 2013Note: Locations of military bases are current as ofJune 2013. The map does not show all military deploymentsin the region, only the most notable basesused by counter-LRA forces.CARDR CONGON100km200kmLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 28

chaos that emboldens bandits, rogue Congolese troops,and poachers to copycat LRA tactics. 62The Congolese government, preoccupied with Kinshasapolitical machinations and crises in the Kivus, continuesto discount the threat posed by the presence ofthe LRA. 63 At the local level, Congolese military and civilianauthorities consistently under-report LRA activity,attributing almost all reported LRA attacks to Mbororocattle herders, poachers, or bandits. 64 Congolesecommunity leaders have condemned the government’sdenial of the LRA threat, but to little effect. 65 The Congolesegovernment and military have also blocked attemptsby civil society to develop self-defense units,which have shown flashes of success against the LRA,largely because of very negative experience withself-defense militias in eastern Congo. 66Even as the Congolese government and military havediscouraged self-defense groups, they have been lackluster,at best, in protecting civilians. FARDC troopsdeployed in small towns provide some deterrent toLRA attacks, but are infrequently supplied and oftenresponsible for looting and human rights abuses. 67 In2011, the US-trained 391 st FARDC battalion was deployedto the Ueles, but the overall FARDC commanderin the area prevented it from conducting effective62 Inadequate investigation capacities in the Ueles often preventprotection actors from confirming the identity of attackperpetrators. For one comparison of LRA attacks to thosecommitted by other armed groups, see LRA Crisis Tracker,“2012 Annual Security Brief,” 2013.63 For a brief description of the overarching political and securitychallenges in Congo, see IRIN, “Is More Force in theDRC More of the Same?,” 14 May 2013.64 Author interviews with Congolese officials and FARDCcommander tasked to the AU RTF, Dungu, April 2013.65 Author interviews with Congolese community leaders,Dungu, April 2013.66 A local Zande chief was reportedly imprisoned in Kisanganifollowing an incident in which a local self-defense unithe supported pursued LRA forces and rescued two youngchildren. The unit in question was subsequently disarmed.Author interviews with Congolese community leaders, Dungu,April 2013.67 For recent reports of rape and other abuses of civilians inthe Kivus alleged to have been perpetrated by the FARDCand M23, see MONUSCO and UNHCHR, “Report of the UNJoint Human Rights Office on the Human Rights ViolationsPerpetrated by Congolese Armed Forces and Combatants ofthe M23 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu Province, and in andaround Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to2 December 2012,” 8 May 2013. The pattern of FARDC indisciplineis well established in HRW reporting going backto 2004.operations. 68 In late 2012, it was redeployed to easternCongo, where it was responsible for grave humanrights abuses that prevent the US from continuing tosupport it, even if it were to be returned to the Ueles.Congolese authorities have also been reluctant to cooperatewith regional military efforts to address the LRAthreat. To the extent Congolese officials follow the conflict,they seem more concerned about the perceivedthreat of Ugandan presence on Congolese soil. Politicaltensions and mistrust between the two governmentscontinue to prevent full cross-border cooperation. 69The Congolese government ordered Ugandan troopsto leave the country in September 2011, and has notpermitted them to return since.2. Central African RepublicThe future of counter-LRA efforts in CAR has been inquestion since Seleka rebel forces overthrew PresidentFrançois Bozizé’s government in March 2013. 70 Thenew government, led by Michael Djotodia, has struggledto control looting and human rights abuses bySeleka troops, making the LRA seem a distant securityconcern. 71Following Seleka’s takeover of Bangui, Ugandan troopsand US advisers immediately suspended counter-LRAoperations in eastern CAR. Ugandan troops, in CAR aspart of the AU RTF, withdrew to bases in Obo, Djemah,and Dembia, while US advisers consolidated in theirObo base. Ugandan officials, citing security concerns,have not indicated when the Ugandan military will resumedeployments of tracking teams and other patrols.The UN Security Council and AU Peace and SecurityCouncil have expressed support for continued counter-LRAoperations by Ugandan troops, and Seleka representativeshave indicated that the Ugandan military68 Ibid.69 This theme was repeated in several author interviewswith government and military officials in Dungu, April 2013.70 Bozizé signed agreements with Seleka rebels in Libreville,Gabon in January 2013 aimed at halting the advance of therebel movement in CAR. Seleka rebels resumed hostilitiesand captured Bangui in late March, forcing Bozizé to flee thecountry. Neither the AU nor the Economic Community ofCentral African States (ECCAS) initially recognized legitimacyof self-proclaimed President and Seleka leader MichaelDjotodia. ECCAS led efforts to secure the new government’sagreement to an 18-month transitional process that will culminatein drafting a new constitution and national elections.71 See International Crisis Group, “Central African Republic:Priorities of the Transition,” 11 June 2013. IRIN, “CAR crisisremains dire – and neglected,” 6 June 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 29

can resume counter-LRA operations only in Haut Mbomouprefecture. But the new government in Bangui isdivided, and tensions have flared in several encountersbetween Seleka and Ugandan troops. As matters stoodat the time of writing, operations remained suspended.At present, it seems unlikely that order will arise outof the chaos of Central African politics or that a clearunderstanding of a single best international course ofaction will emerge in the near future.In the vacuum created by the suspension of Ugandanand US operations, the new Seleka government has givenlittle concrete indication of how it seeks to addressthe LRA presence in eastern CAR. 72 Having decided tostructure counter-LRA efforts under the auspices of theAU, it is hoped that diplomacy does not lose sight ofthe need to find political space to allow for a promptresumption of Ugandan and US operations in CAR. Atthe very least, the possibility that the LRA and disaffectedelements of the Seleka coalition might coalesceshould lead to vigorous action to minimize the risk.3. South SudanSouth Sudan, like Congo and CAR, has other problemsto deal with and has elected not to devote significantmilitary resources to the LRA-affected areas of WesternEquatoria State, despite the importance of Equatorianagricultural production to the national economy.However, the new national government has made aconscious decision to allow the state governor of WES,himself a former colonel in the SPLA, wide latitude torespond proactively to the LRA threat. 73The WES governor, Joseph Bakasoro, campaigned inthe 2011 elections largely on the promise that he wouldaddress the security threat posed by the LRA. Sincewinning the election, he has done so by quietly supportinga local self-defense militia known as the ArrowBoys, or Home Guard, and instituting a policy ofwelcoming LRA defectors and swiftly punishing LRAraiders. The Arrow Boys are closely supervised withinthe traditional tribal structure of the Zande, whichremains strong in WES, and have been instrumentalin creating an atmosphere of security within whichfarming, hunting, and fishing activities have resumedin many areas, though fear of the LRA is still persistentin rural areas. 74 State authorities are now concentratingon economic development but monitoring LRA activityin bordering CAR and Congo carefully in case theLRA should return.B. The African Union LRA intervention“African Union officials came to Obo and promised theywould bring peace, but they have done nothing.” Communityleaders in Obo, CAR, April 2013Two years since its official launch, the AU RCI-LRA isstill struggling to generate an effect on the ground. 75The mission remains plagued by a fundamental differencein vision between the AU, participating countries,and donors. The AU planning infrastructure in AddisAbaba has sought donor support to make the AU RTF,the military component of the AU RCI-LRA, a robustpeacekeeping mission. They have been supported inthis by LRA-affected countries, which hope that bringingtheir troops under the AU’s legitimizing umbrellawill result in increased military support from donors.Meanwhile, donors have sought to tamp down expectationsof military support and instead encouraged AULRA envoy Francisco Madeira and the AU RTF to playthe role of facilitator in order to smooth regional politicaltensions that have hindered cross-border collaborationon the LRA crisis.As a result, despite the obvious diplomatic advantageprovided by AU leadership, the RTF is, in terms of realmilitary capacity, verging on irrelevance. Despite this,the diplomatic progress that has led to this point seemsto have satisfied public opinion enough that there hasbeen no serious pressure on the AU or its Westernsponsors to transform the symbolic accomplishment ofan AU mission into a serious effort to strengthen thecapacity of national forces to pursue LRA commandersor protect civilians.72 In June 2013, Djotodia met with AU LRA envoy FranciscoMadeira and Abou Moussa, the UN’s chief LRA official andSpecial Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) forUN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). Djotodia reportedlyexpressed support for the AU RTF, and announced a twoweekoperation to be led by Seleka troops to address LRAactivity in Mbomou prefecture.73 Author interviews with government and UN officials,Yambio, March 2012 and April 2013.74 Author interview, Paramount Chief of the Zande, Yambio,April 2013. See also Danish Demining Group, “ArmedViolence and Stabilization in Western Equatoria: Recoveringfrom the Lord’s Resistance Army,” April 2013.75 For a complete description of the different components ofthe AU mission, see African Union, “Report of the Chairpersonof the Commission on the implementation of the AfricanUnion-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the eliminationof the Lord’s Resistance Army,” 17 June 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 30

1. Standing up the AU RTFHaving failed to attain buy-in from participating countriesinto a common vision, the AU RTF has stalled.The mission is coordinated from a small headquartersin Yambio, but the officers stationed there lack basiclogistical support and secure communications with AUsector headquarters in Obo and Dungu. RTF headquartershas also been unable to deploy liaison teams to itssector headquarters because money to support them islacking.Though the mission has a concept of operations, headquartersstaff cannot translate it into an operationalplan until weaknesses in communications, finance,and logistics capacity of participating forces have beenaddressed. At present the AU RTF consists of between800 and 1,200 UPDF troops, approximately 500 SPLAtroops, and a battalion of 500 FARDC soldiers. 76 TheFARDC contingent only recently formally came underAU command. So far, both the SPLA and FARDC performstatic defense tasks and do not actively track orpursue the LRA. Neither has received operational ordersfrom the RTF headquarters. No agreements existto allow any of the forces to operate across internationalborders except the UPDF, which can operate in CARand South Sudan.The Congolese government has agreed to participatein the AU RTF, but has been reluctant to do so substantivelybecause it sees the mission as a largely irrelevantdistraction from problems in the Kivus and resents thatit is dominated by Uganda. The FARDC sent severalsenior officers to the AU RTF headquarters in Yambio,but did not dedicate any troops to the force until February2013, nearly a year after the SPLA, FACA, andUPDF had committed their contingents. The troopsthey eventually assigned to the RTF came from a notorious“mixed” (i.e., an amalgam of elements from formermilitia forces that once fought each other) battalionof troops. The FARDC reportedly redeployed someof these troops from outlying towns at higher risk ofLRA attack to the AU RTF sector headquarters in Dungu,leaving civilians in remote areas even more vulnerable.77 The AU RTF commander, a UPDF officer, hasbeen frustrated in his attempt to get official clearance to76 These figures are estimates based on interviews and directobservation and differ from those provided by the AU,which claims there are 2,000 UPDF troops and 350 FACAtroops dedicated to the AU RTF. See African Union, “Reportof the Chairperson of the Commission on the Implementationof the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative,”17 June 2013.77 Author interview, civil society leaders, Dungu, April 2013.visit “his” troops in Dungu and they have yet to deployon operations. 78The SPLA contingent to the AU RTF has more cordialrelations with the AU and Ugandans, but is not activelyengaged in pursuing LRA commanders or protectingcivilians from the LRA. Juba, hoping the AUwould provide for its troops, has not made availabletransport or logistics resources, needed more urgentlyat hotspots along the border with Sudan and in Jongleistate, for troops in WES.Prior to its dissolution in the March coup, the CARmilitary had contributed approximately 400 troops,largely used for static point security in the LRA-affectedzone of CAR. But CAR’s participation has beensuspended since March, and it is still uncertain if thenew government in CAR will collaborate or how manysoldiers they could contribute to the AU mission.2. Ugandan military operationsGiven the disarray in its other partner forces, the Ugandanmilitary remains the most critical component tothe effectiveness of the AU RTF. These operations areof particular importance because they straddle LRAlines of communication and may have been the singlemost important factor in pushing Kony to adopt thepolicy of dispersal that has generated new opportunitiesfor defection.Since the launch of Operation Lighting Thunder inDecember 2008, the UPDF has maintained varyingdegrees of military pressure on LRA groups, initiallyin Congo and now primarily in CAR, at least until thesuspension of operations in March. The UPDF’s primarybases are in Nzara, South Sudan, as well as Obo,Djemah, and Dembia in CAR. US military advisers operatein CAR and South Sudan alongside the UPDF,providing intelligence, information operations, training,and logistics support.Ugandan and US operations focus on a combinationof military and information operations (which can bedefined loosely as using information from all sourcesto shape the operational context, e.g., using informationabout the composition of a particular LRA unit tocraft a specific defection message). Military operations,while nominally focused on protection of civilians,concentrate on the tasks of finding and attacking LRAforces. UPDF tracking teams track and attack LRA ele-78 Author interviews, AU RTF commanders, Yambio, April2013. Author interviews, UN JIOC officials, Dungu, April2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 31

ments with technical, training, and intelligence supportfrom US advisers, who also provide some advancedintelligence gathering and processing capacities. Theseoperations were intended to take place within a civilianprotection envelope provided by national armiesin each of the concerned countries, though in practicethey often cannot fulfill that function. While togetherUgandan and US troops have been successful in puttingpressure on the LRA in CAR by restricting their abilityto abduct and train new recruits, resupply themselves,and concentrate forces for major attacks, the task is exhaustingand uncertain, often depending on a certainamount of luck and very good timing. However, theyhave been largely successful in inhibiting Kony’s command,control, and communications.Current operations are limited to CAR and South Sudan,though there are both a US military adviser teamand UPDF liaison team seconded to the Joint Intelligenceand Operations Centre (JIOC), a military intelligenceand coordination unit in Dungu facilitated bythe UN Organization Stabilization Mission in Congo(MONUSCO). The military information operationworks in tandem with direct military operations andfocuses on attempts to encourage and enable defectionsunder the US Military Information Support Team(MIST) guidance, described later in this paper. Bothdirect military action and information operations connectto AU, UN, and civil society initiatives throughloose human networks. 79 They also tie directly into USState Department diplomacy, spearheaded by dedicatedfield staff from the Bureau of Conflict and StabilizationOperations, which is critical to maintaining collaborationat a political level among all the key players.C. The UN Regional LRA StrategyIn June 2012, at the request of the UN Security Council,UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a UN RegionalStrategy on the LRA. In April 2013 the SecretaryGeneral submitted an accompanying implementationplan and loose timetable to the Council. The Strategyseeks to coordinate the activities of the alphabet soupof UN actors working in LRA-affected areas aroundfive primary goals designed to mitigate the immediateeffects of LRA violence and address long-term governance,human rights, and development challenges. 80However, the Strategy remains largely a policy documentthat has little impact on the ground, possibly becauseit is focused on high level actors rather than beingbased on a functional analysis of what actors closeto the ground need to do to achieve the objectives laidout in the Strategy. It has so far failed to create a senseof urgency or any optimism that might carry over intoimplementation. This may be in part because the Strategy,in addition to its overly abstract approach, is notgrounded on an up-to-date understanding of the LRAand its impact on the region.Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to fullyanalyze the implementation of the UN Regional LRAStrategy, an analysis of MONUSCO’s civilian protectionefforts in LRA-affected areas of Congo helpsto highlight some of the challenges facing the effort.MONUSCO, the UN agency with the greatest capacityand resources in the region to assist in counter-LRA efforts,has deployed a Moroccan battalion (MORBAT) ofapproximately 1,000 soldiers to Dungu with companyoperating bases (COBs) in Dungu, Faradje, and Duruand four tactical operating bases (TOBs) along majoraxes. These positions serve as administrative bases forsub-units tasked to patrol roads, escort convoys, providelimited escort to protect some agricultural activities,and present a military presence that is meant toreassure the population. There is an additional Guatemalanspecial forces company (approximately 120strong, known as GUASFOR) that is tasked with limitedfoot patrolling near villages and population centersand which occasionally deploys on jungle searchmissions. In addition, UN Military Observers act withsome independence within the framework of theMONUSCO military force structure and are supposedto patrol and investigate reports of incidents. 81 MON-USCO also hosts the JIOC in Dungu, which consists ofofficers from MONUSCO, the US military, the Ugandanmilitary, and the Congolese military.79 These efforts suffer from excessive turbulence in militarystaff who are rotated through so quickly that they do nothave time to develop effective networks. This might be addressedby having a civilian component attached to the JIOC.80 For a more detailed assessment see NGO coalition, “GettingBack on Track: Implementing the UN Regional StrategyThe MONUSCO forces in northeastern Congo face undeniablecapacity constraints that limit their ability toprotect civilians comprehensively from the LRA. Butinstead of seeking to creatively exploit the resources ithas, MONUSCO has used its capacity constraints as anexcuse to allow its civilian protection strategy to stagnate.MONUSCO military operations are largely limonthe Lord’s Resistance Army” December 2012.81 UN Military Observers are formally distinct from UNtroop contingents. They are mid-level commissioned officersoperating under a separate chain of command tasked withmonitoring and observation functions. They are not permittedto carry weapons of any kind.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 32

ited to passive measures in that they neither seek norpursue LRA elements. MONUSCO troops are staunchlyresistant to assuming any risk of making contact withthe LRA, instead trying to provide a deterrent to LRAattacks by establishing bases in key towns and conductingperiodic “show of force” patrols along roadsor in areas such as Garamba National Park. However,the LRA, which is highly mobile and based in remoteforests, is easily able to exploit gaps in the mission’spredictable civilian protection tactics. Consequently,LRA raiding parties face no threat of being pursued bypeacekeepers, even when they attack communities just1-2 kilometers from MONUSCO bases. 82ters in Bunia but has no authority to task any otherMONUSCO elements for intelligence purposes. Thisincludes the Military Observers, who respond to theirown chain of command and depend on armed escortsprovided by MORBAT to move outside of protected localities.The JIOC, in its present guise, also cannot plan,conduct operations, or formally respond to the AU RTFheadquarters in Yambio.MONUSCO has periodically introduced innovative effortsto improve protection, such as brief deploymentsof troops to highly vulnerable areas or in the immediateaftermath of attacks on remote communities, butits unspoken “zero risk” policy also renders these initiativeslargely ineffective. MONUSCO rapid reactionforces have yet to arrive in time to prevent the escapeof any LRA elements and do not, as a matter of policy,chase them. GUASFOR, for instance, has not madecontact with the LRA since its disastrous initial contactwith the group in 2006, in which eight peacekeeperswere killed. 83With their civilian protection strategy largely static andlittle prospect of encountering LRA forces, MONUSCOpersonnel also have little incentive to consistently gatherintelligence about LRA activity in surrounding areasfrom local community members. Such low-cost, lowriskactivities are essential for understanding patternsin LRA activity and designing effective civilian protectionand DDR initiatives. In many cases, MONUSCOpersonnel not only fail to gather information from localsources, they fail to build trust with local communitiesand adequately explain their actions.MONUSCO’s difficulty in gathering information aboutLRA activity has been exacerbated by failures to properlyutilize the JIOC, which despite frequent mentionin UN and AU public statements, is extremely limitedin its capacity to generate useful intelligence. Thoughthe JIOC is staffed with capable analysts, some are nottrained intelligence officers and they are rarely or neverpermitted to leave their base to collect information.In addition, JIOC answers to both MONUSCO Forceheadquarters in Kinshasa and Ituri Brigade headquar-82 Author interview, UN staff during a security meeting,Dungu, February 2010.83 Lewis, David, “Guatemalan blue helmet deaths stir Congodebate,” Reuters-AlertNet, 31 January 2006.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 33

Map: Come Home message range vs. LRA area of operationsSUDANLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunitySafe Reporting SiteDefection flier dropsiteHelicopter speaker missionEstimated LRA area of operationsJanuary 2012 - June2013SOUTH SUDANCARN100km200kmDR CONGOLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 35

staff in Bangui with improved field-level analysis ofthe conflict, and proactively worked with local civil societyactors active in local defections efforts, such as theCome Home FM radio programs pioneered by RadioZereda in Obo. However, no BINUCA staff has beenbased in Obo since December 2012 due to political unrestin CAR, and future redeployments are uncertain.B. US Military and State DepartmentDDR was one of the four pillars of the comprehensiveLRA strategy that President Obama released toCongress in November 2010. However, when he announcedthe deployment of nearly 100 US militaryadvisers to LRA-affected areas in October 2011 – hisstrategy’s flagship initiative – there was little publicmention of these advisers having an active role inpromoting defections from the LRA. Instead, the focuswas on assisting Ugandan troops to pursue top LRAleaders and improve civilian protection.Once deployed to their forward operating bases inNzara, Obo, and Djemah, US advisers quickly foundthere was a limit to their ability to advise Ugandantroops, in part because of the UPDF’s early reticence totake direction from the US and in part because US advisersinitially were unable to travel to the bush whereLRA groups and Ugandan tracking teams operated.Though frustrating for the advisers, these dynamicshelped shift their focus more toward finding ways toencourage defections from the LRA, a task in whichthe UPDF only minimally engages. In doing so, theyreceived substantial support and guidance from USmilitary advisers from the Military Information SupportOperations (MISO) team based in Uganda, as wellas several US State Department field representativesbased in Bangui and Kampala.US defections work has included a range of initiatives.In late 2012, US advisers pioneered the use of loudspeakersmounted on helicopters that fly sorties in thebush broadcasting Come Home messages. Though thespeaker missions are a relatively new tactic, severalLRA defectors have reported hearing them while in thebush. However, mechanical problems with contractedhelicopters, as well as a lengthy approval process to authorizemissions, has limited their use and the ability ofadvisers to react rapidly to reports of LRA movements.US military advisers and State Department field representativeshave also worked with MONUSCO andInvisible Children to design leaflets, which they havedistributed via handouts to Mbororo cattle herders andairdrops. The US military has also used Department ofDefense (DOD) rewards money to support communityFM radio projects in Mboki and Obo, CAR, as well asYambio, South Sudan. These stations broadcast communitysensitization and Come Home messages, andUS advisers have also attempted to expand access tothem by distributing hand-crank handheld FM radios.This program is distinct from the US State DepartmentWar Crimes Rewards program, announced in March2013, which offers an award of up to $5 million for informationleading to the arrest, transfer, or detainmentof the three senior LRA leaders indicted by the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC).US advisers have also sought to expand “human intelligence”networks and improve local coordination betweenDDR actors. US-initiated Combined OperationFusion Cells (COFCs) hold regular meetings in Nzaraand Obo, bringing together military and civilian actors.US advisers have also started a DDR working group inWestern Equatoria, and expanded outreach to Mbororopopulations in eastern CAR.Many of these initiatives have been integrated into theUS-initiated SRS project launched in CAR and SouthSudan with the support of Invisible Children in late2012. This initiative is similar in principle to MONUS-CO’s Assembly Point project, though instead of placingdefection points along remote roads, it has soughtcommunity buy-in to designate specific towns as SafeReporting Sites. As of June 2013, SRS locations hadbeen launched in Sakure, Nabanga, and Ezo, South Sudan,as well as Obo, Djemah, Zemio, and Mboki, CAR.The project has required US advisers to conduct intensiveoutreach with community leaders to attain buyinto the SRS project, as many communities are justifiablyconcerned that the projects may be unsuccessfulor may result in their communities becoming targetsof LRA attacks. In South Sudan, US advisers and communityleaders have a particularly difficult challengein convincing Arrow Boys and rural farmers that havebeen successful in attacking the LRA to instead facilitatetheir peaceful defection. In addition, US advisershave faced challenges trying to tell LRA members tofind SRS locations. Working with partners, they havedesigned leaflets that provide rudimentary directionsto the locations, and have distributed new leaflets viaMbororo cattle herders and airdrops. They have alsoworked with community FM radio stations to promotethe SRS project.US-led defections initiatives are likely partly responsiblein part for the surge in defections in the latter half of2012, when 29 long-term members of the LRA defect-LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 37

ed. 86 The most direct “proof of concept” was an LRAgroup, including two Ugandan male fighters, that wasgiven defections leaflets by Mbororo herders they encounteredin the bush and then were assisted by communitymembers outside of Mboki in safely reportingto authorities. Since October 2012, Ugandan malecombatants also have successfully defected in Obo,Djemah, and Gougbere.Despite their modest success, US advisers’ LRA defectionsinitiatives face a range of challenges. Their partnermilitary forces, including the UPDF, have shownlittle initiative to actively participate in implementingleaflet drops, the SRS project, or FM radio broadcasts. 87UPDF commanders periodically undermine US advisers’efforts by not providing them with access to recentUgandan defectors, limiting their ability to gather theinsight necessary to create effective Come Home messagesand exploit timely opportunities to encouragedefections that may be revealed in defector debriefings,though collaboration has reportedly improvedin recent months. The AU RTF, which has 30 officersbased in Yambio, also provides little support or initiativeto defections efforts.Despite the millions of dollars spent on the US counter-LRAdeployment, DOD has afforded the adviserswith little discretionary funding for local projects, forcingthem to rely on NGO support to provide basic suppliessuch as printers. Advisers deployed to the fieldrotate out every six months, meaning teams are notgiven nearly enough time to understand their operatingcontext, build relationships with local communitymembers, and implement projects. Though new teamstry to ensure continuity between deployments, communityleaders in Obo and Western Equatoria havebeen critical of the lack of continuity in some projects.This has been somewhat minimized by the presence ofMISO personnel and State Department field representatives,who have had longer deployments. However,US officials should see the frustration Congolese communitieshave with MONUSCO after years of limitedsuccess and poor community relations as a cautionarytale.This issue speaks to larger questions about the sustainabilityof US defections initiatives. Already, they havebeen slowed by the coup in CAR, which helped sparkthe shutdown of the US base in Djemah and has limited86 LRA Crisis Tracker, statistic calculated 13 July 2013.87 Until Uganda suspended counter-LRA operations inMarch 2013, UPDF tracking teams did periodically distributeCome Home leaflets.the advisers’ ability to travel to towns such as Mboki.Also, the Obama Administration has yet to publicly announcewhether it will extend the mission for anotherdeployment when the current teams leave in late 2013.Though the US has sought to foster community ownershipof the SRS project, it is far from clear whetherthese initiatives have taken deep enough root to surviveif the US advisers and the resources they bring arewithdrawn, especially with the AU RTF partner forceslargely disengaged from the project. A US withdrawalcould also spark Ugandan troops to drawdown, leavingcommunities in CAR and South Sudan who haveagreed to participate in the SRS program with far lessprotection and at much greater risk of LRA reprisals.C. Local civil society and NGOs“The general population is not ready to welcome the LRAout of the bush.” – Congolese community leader, April2013After years of brutal attacks, many local communitymembers in CAR, Congo, and South Sudan are fearfulof and bitter towards the LRA. Many have heard ofcases in which LRA raiders used deception, pretendingto enter a town peacefully to defect or use the market,only to launch attacks. Some communities, particularlyin Western Equatoria, see local militias that repel theLRA attacks as the most effective way to improve localsecurity. As a result, attaining community support topeacefully accept and even encourage Ugandan membersof the LRA to defect – knowing it could result inreprisal attacks – is often difficult. For instance, there iswidespread suspicion in Congo and South Sudan thatany Come Home FM radio programs broadcast in theUgandan Acholi language – which Zande communitymembers do not understand – is actually broadcastingdirections to the LRA. These sentiments are reinforcedby local suspicions that MONUSCO and UNMISS areproviding support to the LRA. The lack of UN pursuitof LRA units after attacks increases the local sense ofvulnerability and further undermines the credibility ofpromises of protection.Consequently, local civil society leaders play a criticalrole in sensitizing communities to facilitate safe LRAdefections and to implement Come Home programs.In CAR, prior to the recent coup, civil society in theLRA-affected region had cooperated in the establishmentof SRS locations and efforts to convince LRAmembers to defect. Some of this activity had beenfacilitated through the national NGO Jeunesse Uniepour la Protection de l’Environment et la DeveloppementCommunautaire (JUPEDEC), which continues toLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 38

function in spite of the coup. Other key players includecommunity FM radio stations in Obo, Radio Zereda,and Mboki.In South Sudan, Radio Yambio, an affiliate of the nationalradio network owned by the central government,and Anisa FM, a local Catholic station, playCome Home and community sensitization programs.However, their capacity to do so has been limited byfinancial constraints and their inability to acquire freshCome Home program material. Community leadersfrom the Episcopal Church of Sudan, Catholic Church,and Zande traditional authorities have also played akey role in sensitizing communities via communityworkshops in Safe Reporting Sites and direct outreachto Arrow Boys.of which they give to MONUSCO and US advisers todistribute.Other international NGOs that directly or indirectlysupport defections include Conciliation Resources andIVK Pax Christi, which play a critical role in buildingcapacity and cross-border connections between localcivil society groups in LRA-affected areas.In Congo, community radio stations such as RadioRTK in Dungu have taken a methodical approach todefections efforts. Understanding local mistrust ofAcholi-language programming, Radio RTK operatorsspent months broadcasting community sensitizationprograms and explaining the purpose of Come Homeprograms before actually broadcasting Acholi-languageprograms. Other community organizations,such as SAIPED and CDJP, have played critical roles intraveling to remote towns to gather community inputto defections programs, though their ability to influenceMONUSCO’s DDRRR team remains limited.Internationally, the NGO Invisible Children has takenthe most proactive role in LRA defections initiatives.Along with groups such as the Voice Project, InvisibleChildren staff in northern Uganda produce FMradio content intended for the LRA and affected localcommunities and distribute it to FM stations in CAR,Congo, and South Sudan. Invisible Children has alsofunded the expansion of FM radio stations in Dungu,Faradje, Banda, Obo, and Mboki. Perhaps most importantly,they have worked with the Uganda BroadcastCorporation (UBC) and Radio Mega, a northernUganda-based radio station, to broadcast Come Homemessages on shortwave bandwidths. Shortwave signals,which travel much further than FM signals, areable to reach a far greater proportion of the LRA’s areaof operations than the community-based FM stationsin CAR, Congo, and South Sudan. They also provideUgandan LRA commanders, who often listen to UBC,with a direct link to their homeland. In addition to radio-focusedefforts, Invisible Children worked closelywith community leaders and US advisers on creatingand maintaining Safe Reporting Sites in CAR andSouth Sudan. Invisible Children also develops demobilizationleaflets, some of which they airdrop and someLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 39

VI. BRING THEM HOMETowards a Better Strategy for Encouraging DefectionsThe task of persuading LRA combatants, and top commandersin particular, to surrender has frustrated localcommunity leaders and international policymakers foryears. Initiatives led by religious and political leaders,as well as international DDR experts, have all failed toconvince the most hard-core officers within the LRA togive up their struggle. The ICC indictments hangingover the heads of the three top LRA leaders may negateany efforts to convince them to defect. Fear of beingharmed by local communities, the lack of reintegrationsupport back home, and confusion over the status ofUganda’s Amnesty Act deter many other commandersand combatants who would like to escape from doingso.However, the LRA today is much weaker than at anytime since at least 1994, when its numbers had beenseverely reduced by UPDF pressure, and recent defectionsand upheaval in the command structure indicateschanging dynamics within the organization. This is anopportune moment for an active strategy to encouragedefections which, if properly conducted, could be thesafest and most cost-effective path towards a permanentend to the LRA’s atrocities, as well as a chance forthe hundreds of abductees within the group’s ranks torebuild their lives.As noted in Section V, there are numerous challengesfacing DDR actors. Despite this, there is scope forCome Home information campaigning to counter theyears of propaganda put forward by Kony and topcommanders to deter defections. Leaving aside theneed for military pressure, which is critical to overallsuccess, a fully developed defection strategy shouldinclude: 1) an effective “marketing” strategy to sell theidea of defection, 2) provision of defection services includingsafe surrender procedures, and, 3) improvedamnesty policies and reintegration assistance for peoplewho leave the LRA. They should also seek to targetspecific people in the LRA and address particularconcerns fighters have when contemplating defection,such as the practical steps they can take to avoid harmat the hands of local communities.A. Key considerations for Come Home messagesGiven the difficulty of communicating directly withisolated LRA groups, Come Home messages distributedvia radio, leaflets, and other mediums play a criticalrole in the defections process. They help convince LRAmembers to defect and help communicate the practicaldetails of how to do so safely. 881. Emphasize the “how” of defectingIn a typical DDR program, combatants have alreadyagreed to a peace process and are encouraged throughthe disarmament and demobilization stages of theprocess by the promise of reintegration assistance. Inthe case of the LRA, most of the fighters are alreadyconvinced that they want to leave but cannot find aneasy way to do so because their commanders still wantto fight. A successful LRA-focused DDR campaign,at least concerning disarmament and demobilization,should not necessarily be primarily about encouragingdefections but rather about facilitating them.To do so, Come Home messages in all mediums shouldprovide clear instructions describing how LRA members,particularly Ugandan male combatants, can find asafe and easily accessible place to defect and how theyshould communicate with and act towards communitymembers while escaping. Radio messages can do so byproviding clear instructions from trusted sources onwhere defectors can escape, how to get there, and howto behave towards the community when they arrive.Leaflets can be especially useful in providing practicalinformation, particularly via images and maps.2. Counter LRA propagandaIt would be a mistake to consider the LRA a passive entityunable to adapt and protect itself. In recent years,the effectiveness of any single strategy to motivate defectionshas been limited by the capacity of senior LRAcommanders to perceive the threat and rapidly counterit. Kony has at various times moved his forces out ofreach of radio broadcasts, limited access to radios to hismost trusted leaders, and forbidden followers to touchdemobilization leaflets. LRA groups have also usedbrutal atrocities to intentionally alienate the civilianpopulation who might otherwise welcome defectors.A successful DDR strategy should be flexible enough88 The following points are drawn from interviews with formerUgandan LRA combatants, non-Ugandan LRA escapees,journalists, Ugandan and AU military sources, US militaryadvisers, UN DDR experts, and LRA analysts.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 40

to respond immediately to the counter-measures Konyand his most senior commanders will continue to instituteagainst any defection campaign. The most promisingway to deal with LRA counter-measures is to keepahead of their capacity to respond by developing sequencesof varied strategies directed at keeping Konyuncomfortable. Messaging campaigns should aim atappearing random and unpredictable and should beput together as “action strings” – sets of activities andevents that follow a sequence designed to disrupt andoverwhelm Kony’s capacity to react. Developing suchaction strings requires timely intelligence collectionand analysis as well as imaginative use of communications.Approaches could include:Appealing to parents within the LRAEducation is highly valued in northern Uganda, andparents within the LRA hope of educating their children.Come Home campaigns could use this both toencourage LRA members to defect and to encourageLRA combatants to release women and children fromthe LRA. Specifically, leaflets could include pictures ofkids going to school, reading, or playing football. Leafletscould also include photos of new schools constructedin northern Uganda since the LRA left. Similarly,messages broadcast via radio and helicopter speakerscould encourage parents to defect, and, if accompaniedby programs, promise that their children’s school feeswill be paid.Encouraging homesicknessCome Home message strategies should also encouragehomesickness and add to the sense of the futilityof staying with the LRA in the bush. Direct messagesfrom family members and respected community leaderscan be effective, but content producers should exploreother avenues as well.More subtle communications strategies that do nothave a direct Come Home message can also be effective,such as radio programs in which moderators reporton news from northern Uganda, film stars, footballmatches (including the Cranes, Uganda’s nationalteam; the English Premier League; and the 2014 FIFAWorld Cup), or cultural figures with whom LRA memberswould be familiar. Content producers could alsoattempt to link this cultural milieu into more directCome Home messaging, perhaps by promising Ugandancombatants who defect tickets to a Uganda Cranesgame.Come Home messages should also seek to draw contrastsbetween the harsh life in the bush and the potentialfor better quality of life in northern Uganda. Messagescould directly or indirectly discuss local food, theability to stop moving frequently and acquire or claimland, or the possibility of being buried in one’s homeland.For LRA groups operating in Congo, messagescould reiterate that combatants are already in closeproximity to Uganda. They could also recall the LRA’slast formal, peaceful meetings with Acholi communityleaders in nearby Nabanga, South Sudan, as a way toencourage them to defect.Come Home messages could also promise better healthcare for LRA defectors, which would appeal to commanderswho are sick, injured, or older. If possible,messages should draw upon intelligence gatheredfrom LRA defectors about specific health problemsthat LRA commanders face.Communications strategies to encourage homesicknessshould also be targeted at Zande abductees withinthe LRA, with Zande leaders taking a leading role indeveloping culturally appropriate messages. Leafletsand community FM radios are likely the most effectivemediums to deliver such messages.Avoid lying or straying from truthEven as Come Home message content producers seekto encourage homesickness within LRA members, theyshould take great pains to be truthful. Ugandan LRAmembers are aware of continuing economic and politicaldifficulties in Uganda, and any attempt to over-emphasizethe quality of life and opportunities back homewill likely be detected and reinforce LRA propagandathat Come Home messages are misleading.Past examples of leaflets designed by Come Home contentproducers, while largely accurate, have includedsome details that could be used by LRA commandersas propaganda. For instance, one leaflet about the deathof Binany showed a photo of a casket being buried innorthern Uganda, but LRA members likely know thathe was buried in the bush. 89 Similarly, content producersshould be careful about designing leaflets withphotos of escaped LRA commanders posing happily infreedom if they are in fact still in UPDF custody, as isthe case with Caesar Achellam. Leaflets with Achellamposing happily will look particularly duplicitous if theUgandan government decides to prosecute him.Come Home radio broadcasts should note that the am-89 Author interviews with former LRA combatants, April2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 41

nesty provision has been reinstated to Uganda’s AmnestyAct. However, they should be careful to state thatcivil society activists are still working to ensure that returningcombatants consistently receive amnesty, andthat the Ugandan government is trying to prosecuteThomas Kwoyelo. As LRA members are likely aware ofKwoyelo’s prosecution via radio news programs, anyperceived attempt by Come Home programs to hidethis fact could diminish their credibility.Exploit schisms in the LRA command structureAs discussed in Section II, there has been significantupheaval in the past year within the LRA ranks, includingAchellam’s defection, the killing of Binany,Kony’s execution of several officers, and the transitionof power to younger Ugandan officers. This upheaval,combined with the awareness that Kony and seniorofficers have of the declining will to fight in the ranks,likely makes senior officers suspicious, and even paranoid,of each other.Come Home messages addressing these dynamics andtargeting specific commanders could exploit these tensionsin order to weaken the LRA. Unfortunately, thelack of a comprehensive mapping of LRA commandersand combatants limits the ability to properly targetmessages. Even so, commanders at whom ComeHome messages are targeted could be inspired to finallydefect, or feel forced to do so by fear that Konywill lose trust in them. Should commanders choose notto defect, Kony may very well react to such messagesby choosing to demote, punish, or kill officers, whichwould also weaken the LRA. Such an outcome, thoughfar less ideal than a peaceful defection, could in turnspark others to defect.Despite these tensions, many Ugandan commandersand fighters still feel loyalty to Kony, or at the veryleast fear him. Come Home content producers shouldbe careful to separate the act of escaping from betrayingKony. They should encourage combatants to thinkof leaving the LRA not necessarily as an affront toKony, but rather due to changed circumstances.This method could be particularly effective on commandersand combatants, such as those in Congo, whohave had little contact with the LRA leader in recentyears. Similarly, Come Home messages could encourageolder LRA commanders who have been marginalizedwithin the LRA to consider their defection moreof a “retirement” than a full-scale betrayal of Kony andthe LRA.Dominic Ongwen may be one commander who couldbe effectively targeted by a Come Home campaign. Hehas had a tumultuous relationship with Kony, who hasperiodically demoted or placed him under escort. Ongwenwas also abducted as a child, which could mitigateany future punishment of him by the ICC. 90 It ispossible that an information campaign aimed directlyat Ongwen explaining mitigating factors to his caseand emphasizing that the ICC does not issue deathpenalties could persuade him to escape.David Olanya, Kony’s half-brother, may also be susceptibleto targeting. He has a reputation for being disorderlyand misbehaved, and reportedly drew Kony’sire in 2012 by sleeping with one of his “wives.” A messagingcampaign could encourage him to defect beforehe receives any further punishment from Kony. If hedefects, it could open up other possibilities for ComeHome message action strings, such as those highlightingthat even Kony’s family members are no longerwilling to fight.3. Utilize former LRA membersThe effectiveness of Come Home messages dependson the content producer’s grasp of the psychology ofthe target. The LRA’s insular and unique nature makesit extremely difficult for outsiders to understand whatfactors may influence the decision-making of LRAmembers still in the bush. Consequently, former LRAcombatants can provide Come Home content producerswith invaluable insight into how to compose anddeliver messages, as well as provide specific detailsabout LRA members still in the bush that can be usedin communications campaigns targeting specific commanders.Recent Ugandan defectors should also be directly featuredin Come Home campaigns. Ugandan LRA combatantsare most receptive to messages from formercombatants who come out and talk directly to theirfriends in the bush on radio programs, and to leafletswith photos of recent defectors. 91 Immediately afterUgandan members of the LRA defect, new radio programsand leaflets should be produced with their voicesor photos, as well as other practical and encouraginginformation, such as where they made contact with localcommunities, who received them, and what medi-90 For more on Ongwen, see Baines, Erin, “ComplicatingVictims and Perpetrators in Uganda: On Dominic Ongwen,”Justice and Reconciliation Project, 31 July 2008.91 Former Ugandan LRA members interviewed for this reportexpressed this sentiment almost unanimously.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 42

cal care they received. Such messages will undermineKony’s claims that Ugandan authorities kill defectors.Messages recorded by combatants who escaped sometime ago should include proof that they were recordedrecently.Come Home content producers should seek to ensurethat former Ugandan combatants who participate incommunications campaigns are not exploited, particularlyas many of them already have trouble sustaininga livelihood. They should consider compensatingparticipants in some fashion, while taking care thatparticipants are not motivated by purely financial considerations.They could also form an “advisory council”of former combatants, which could serve the dualpurpose of allowing former combatants to collectivelybrainstorm Come Home messaging ideas while alsogiving them a communal, constructive outlet for discussingtheir experiences within the LRA. 92 Contentproducers could also test the effectiveness of plannedcontent with such an advisory council.Similarly, Zande former LRA abductees can contributemeaningfully to Come Home messaging campaigns. InObo, former abductees have hosted programs broadcaston Radio Zereda in which they use Zande, Sango,and Acholi to urge LRA members to defect. As innorthern Uganda, such initiatives can also provide abducteeswith a positive outlet for traumatic experiencesthey had while with the LRA.4. Prioritizing community inputCivil society leaders interviewed for this report inCAR, Congo, and South Sudan expressed the growingweariness of communities in the face of persistent LRAviolence and the willingness of the population to participatein any initiative that might help bring the conflictto a close. However, civil society leaders stressedthat DDR actors, particularly in Congo and South Sudan,have done an insufficient job of attaining the inputand buy-in of local communities into defectionscampaigns. Often sensitization efforts attain superficialbuy-in from the community, but not true ownership.As one Congolese community leader put it: “Communityleaders have given their surface support to the idea, butthe broader populations are not supportive.”Civil society leaders stress that religious and traditionalleaders, as well as local authorities, must take a leadingrole in sensitizing local populations on defections92 As with any forum that brings together former LRA members,great care is needed to prevent the replication of unhealthypower relationships that existed in the bush.campaigns such as Come Home messaging and SRSprojects. They also emphasize the importance of methodical,face-to-face consultations, such as communitytown hall meetings, in which community membershave a chance to vent their concerns, ask questions, andactively participate in the process of designing and implementingnew initiatives. Sensitization via FM radio,mobile cinema, and other tools can be useful, but personalinteractions with communities remain the mosteffective.B. Shortwave and FM Radio“We did not think about coming out earlier but only recentlybecause the radio programs have allowed us to know thatpeople who come out are alive, not killed. In the past we weretold by others that if you came out you were killed, it madeus afraid. But now the radio programs help us understandthat it is not true.” Former Ugandan member of the LRAcaptured by Garamba Park rangers in May 2013Former LRA combatants confirm that both shortwaveand FM radio broadcasts help reaffirm the decisionto leave the LRA. At least seven of 25 Ugandan LRAmembers who defected in 2012 had heard Come Homemessages via radio, though it is not clear how muchthis influenced their decision to defect relative to otherfactors. 93 The current approach to radio broadcasts isbased largely on the experience in northern Uganda,but has been adapted to take into account more recentdevelopments in the operating environment, includingchanges to LRA composition, different national contextsin the affected states, and the growing difficultiesof command and control within the LRA.1. Establishing a target audienceKony and other commanders listen to a range ofshortwave channels, including BBC, RFI, UBC, RadioMiraya, and Voice of America. All senior UgandanLRA commanders listen attentively to any broadcaststhat mention them by name. Many of them will alsotune into broadcasts discussing conditions at home innorthern Uganda.In recent years, Kony has restricted access to handheldradio receivers in an attempt to limit the permeationof Come Home messages among LRA members. Forthis reason, it may make sense to target many ComeHome radio broadcasts at senior commanders, as theymay be the only ones who will be able to hear them.Such broadcasts are good vehicles to deliver complex93 LRA Crisis Tracker, “2012 Annual Security Brief,” 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 43

or nuanced messages targeting specific commandersthat could not be conveyed on leaflets.However, there are renewed indications that despiteKony’s orders, many low-ranking fighters and abducteesmay have periodic access to radio broadcasts. Thescattering and reduction in size of LRA groups makesit more difficult for senior commanders to sustain disciplinein the ranks, meaning some LRA groups, particularlythose with no senior officers present, may nolonger abide by the radio ban. This is especially true inCongo, where Kony is a remote figure and commandstructures have been upended by Binany’s death. Evenin groups in which commanders maintain restricted radioaccess, combatants, “wives,” and abductees taskedwith preparing food and sleeping arrangements for seniorofficers occasionally overhear broadcasts.The heterogeneity of LRA groups provides an opportunityfor community FM radio stations, which havea limited broadcast range, to play messages targetingspecific commanders that operate nearby, or to targetlower-ranking LRA members, as well as commandersin areas such as Congo where discipline is weaker.2. Honing the messageCome Home radio broadcasts should include messagesthat are short, concise, and varied in content. Most ofthe messages should be crafted with the understandingthat the majority of those in the LRA want to come outbut are still trying to figure out the final details of theirescape. Whatever their content, radio messages shouldbe short and frequently changed.Whenever possible, messages should be recorded livein an impromptu or loosely scripted manner, allowingthe speakers to express their feelings in the most naturalway possible. 94 Those in the bush pick up on themost subtle nuances, which they interpret defensively.They are very quick to assume that messages arethe result of coercion. Having former combatants talkdirectly to a person still in the LRA and referring tospecific events in the bush is the most effective way togain the trust of remaining fighters. Similarly, addressingcommanders directly by referring to their families,both in the bush and outside, is crucial. It is, however,not a good idea to try to counter Kony’s lessons or otherwisespeak badly of him and his actions as Kony isstill a charismatic leader who has managed to convince94 There is however the risk that such messages might not beheard during the time of broadcast, thus recorded messagesand reruns of live broadcasts are also needed.many followers that he is the single source of truth andis acting in a noble cause. Direct criticism of him mayplay into his hands.Former high-ranking LRA commanders, particularlythose who left the LRA a long time ago, have little credibilityin the eyes of the remaining LRA. Commanderstell their followers that senior commanders who cameout a long time ago are either paid spies or are undersome form of house arrest and coerced to talk on theradio. Any speaker who is openly affiliated with Ugandangovernment officials, such as local governmentcouncilors, army representatives, or ruling party politicians,runs the risk of delivering counter-productivemessages, and should not be used for Come Home programming.Former combatants interviewed for this report almostunanimously agreed that they felt most convincedwhen hearing from those who had been their friends inthe bush, or other combatants who had been abductedlike them, and who knew the situation well. Messagesfrom such speakers undermine Kony’s claims that theUgandan authorities kill defectors.A very good model speaker would be a male formerLRA junior officer. He would ideally have spent between10-20 years in the LRA and would be well knownby other top commanders. If such a speaker were toannounce that the LRA propaganda that he had supportedin the bush was all lies, his message would bepowerfully persuasive to those still in the bush.Other suitable speakers include: male former low rankingcombatants, women and children formerly in theLRA, and relatives of those still in the bush, particularlymothers, wives, fathers, children, and siblings. Familymembers can be especially effective for Come Homeprograms that are more heavily produced and includemusic and other forms of entertainment.3. Expanding radio broadcast coverageDonors and civil society groups should urgently investin expanding FM radio Come Home broadcastsin LRA-affected areas. The map on page 45 comparescurrent broadcast coverage of FM radios playing ComeHome messages to the LRA’s area of operations. Thesefigures clearly demonstrate that many LRA groups operateoutside the range of FM radios and that even inexisting areas of coverage, Come Home messages oftenplay for just a few hours a week.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 44

Map: FM radio Come Home broadcast coverage vs LRA area of operationsWau14SOUTH SUDANLegendInternational boundaryAdministrative boundaryCommunityFM radio broadcast rangePlanned FM radio broadcastrange expansionFM radio with no Come HomebroadcastsFM radio Come Home broadcasts1. DDRRR Bangadi: 40km signal radius, 2.5hours/day2. DDRRR Dungu: 40km radius, 4.5 hours/day3. Dungu FM: 15 km radius, 1.5 hours/day4. Radio Ani Dusa: 20km radius, 0.5 hourtwice per week5. Radio Okapi: 100km radius, 1 hour/day6. Radio Rhino: 10 km radius (125km plannedradius), 1 hour/day7. Radio RTK: 150km radius, 2 hours/day8. Radio Zereda: Approximately 55km radius,1 hour/day9. Yambio FM: 100km radius (175km plannedradius), 1 hour twice per week10. Yambio FM Repeater (Ezo): 75km radius,1 hour twice per week11. Yambio FM Repeater (Tambura): 75kmradius, 1 hour twice per weekFuture FM radio construction12. Banda community FM: 150km plannedradiusFM radios with no Come Home broadcasts13. Ango14. WauOther radios with Come Home broadcastsDDRRR mobile FM: Deployed periodicallyto Congolese towns with UN peacekeeperdeployments, 30-50km radiusUBC (Kampala): Shortwave radio that reachesall LRA-affected areasCurrent as of July 2013CAR4121381110132579Estimated LRA area of operationsJanuary 2012 - June2013966N100km200kmDR CONGOLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 45

Expand UN and AU radio coverageUN missions throughout the LRA area of operationsshould be consistently playing Come Home messages.Specifically,• UNMISS, the AU – UN Mission in Darfur (UN-AMID), and BINUCA should consistently playCome Home messages on their respective nationalradio stations; 95• MONUSCO DDRRR should expand its mobile radioprogram to all MONUSCO bases in Haut Ueleand Bas Uele where they do not already have a permanentradio;• MONUSCO DDRRR should be provided with thefunds and personnel to expand permanent FM stationsto bases in Duru and Ango;• The EU should fund the dispersal of mobile FMradios to be used by AU RTF forces operating inLRA-affected areas, particularly to UPDF trackingteams that have close proximity to LRA groups.Expand community FM radio coverageDonors and international NGOs should also seek toconstruct more community FM radio stations in theLRA’s area of operations, and provide capacity buildingto local community radio associations to broadcastCome Home messages and ensure the radio stationsare commercially viable. Target towns for new or expandedcommunity radio FM stations, or capacitybuilding to expand Come Home messaging, include:• Raga, South Sudan (possibly by building a relaystation for the Catholic FM radio station in Wau)• Bakouma, CAR• Bangassou, CAR• Birao, CAR• Ango, CongoC. Leaflets and other physical itemsNumerous Ugandan and non-Ugandan defectors inthe past two years have reported seeing leaflets whilein the bush, and some have even escaped carrying leaf-95 Their respective radio stations are: Radio Miraya (UN-MISS), Radio Dabanga (UNAMID), and Radio Ndeke Luka(BINUCA).lets. 96 Though senior LRA commanders forbid combatantsand abductees to touch leaflets, many are able toview or pick them up when they are collecting food,water, or are otherwise out from under their commander’swatchful eye. Consequently, like billboardsalong a highway, leaflets are hard to miss and act asconstant reminders about the possibility of escape tofighters and to their commanders, who fear defections.1. Technical considerationsA leaflet should be designed with the knowledge thatit likely will be hidden on the body or in the personaleffects of someone in the LRA. It should therefore besmall and easily bendable but not easily destructible,as it must endure the elements.Within these physical constraints, a leaflet must includepractical information in as few words as possible.A typical LRA combatant was abducted at a young ageand is possibly illiterate or functionally illiterate (i.e.,able to read the words but unable to comprehend sentences),therefore cannot fully evaluate the substanceof long text. This underscores the need for leaflets tohave as much visual material as possible, includingmaps, photos, and drawings.Apart from being unable to read well, many in the LRAmight also have difficulty fully grasping notions thatmight be normal to those living outside of the bush. AsLRA commander Alphonse Lamola once told an LRAanalyst, “I don’t know what peace is, exactly.” 97 A leafletthat promises peace, demobilization, reintegration,and so on, might not be fully understood, certainly inthe absence of significant text. It is therefore importantto portray notions of peace, or rather the absence ofstrife, in images.2. Honing the leaflet messageLike radio messages, leaflets help LRA members tomake the final decision to defect. Interviews with formercombatants indicate that LRA members who manageto secretly keep leaflets often show them to friendsand discuss them in detail. Photos of former fighters, aswell as images of friendship – particularly in a Ugandancontext, such as people watching and playing soccer,eating together, and watching movies – can be especiallyuseful in convincing LRA members to finally96 At least 10 Ugandans who escaped the LRA in 2012 reportedseeing defection leaflets while in the bush. LRA CrisisTracker, “2012 Annual Security Brief,” 2013.97 Author interview with Ugandan political analyst, Kampala,23 June 2013.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 46

attempt escape.But given that most LRA members already want toleave the group, leaflets should focus primarily on givingthem practical information on how to defect safely.In this they may have some comparative advantageto radio messages, because leaflets can provide LRAmembers with information that they can keep and reviewmultiple times.To ensure such messages are understood clearly, ComeHome leaflet producers should consult with formercombatants. LRA combatants can provide valuableinsight into how the LRA interprets the physical andhuman geography of the region, including by showingwhich major towns, rivers, landmarks, and campsitesare most known within the LRA, and the “LRAnames” the group uses to refer to these sites. Also, leafletsshould show clearly the location of Safe ReportingSites or other locations where LRA members can comeout with minimal chances of being harmed.Like the radio broadcasts, leaflets should be varied andchanged often to reflect changes in the LRA or to portraythose who came out most recently. Whenever aUgandan member of the LRA escapes, leaflet designersshould create new versions in which the escapee isclearly featured. If possible, such new versions shouldinclude photos of recent defectors, as well as wherethey made contact with local communities, who receivedthem, and what medical care they received.Other leaflet campaigns should send messages to commandersand fighters directly. Localized leaflet distributioncan provide a certain degree of assuranceto commanders by addressing specific concerns theyhave about how and where to safely defect, and whatwill happen to them after they do so. Many of thoseinterviewed for the report said that group commandersoften referred to the leaflets, with some asking theirgroup members to fetch the leaflets, while others forbidtheir collection.3. Expanding leaflet coverageThe map on page 35 shows the location of select leafletdrops in LRA-affected areas from January 2012 to July2013. Though MONUSCO DDRRR, US military advisers,and Invisible Children have collectively droppednearly one million leaflets in the past 18 months, thereremains an enormous untapped potential to get moreleaflets into the hands of more members of the LRA.DDR actors should take the following steps to expandthe range, targeting, and saturation of leaflet drops inthe LRA’s area of operations:Expand the geographic range of leaflet drops• The AU should request permission from authoritiesin Bangui for the US and UPDF to distributeleaflets in the prefectures of Mbomou, Haut Kotto,and Vakaga, targeting areas along the Mbari andVovodo-Chinko river systems, the Bangassou-Bakouma-Nzakoaxis, and areas bordering the KafiaKingi enclave;• MONUSCO should expand leaflet drops into BasUele, focusing along known areas of LRA movementbetween Ango and Zemio, CAR.Improve the targeting of leaflet drops• Increase the frequency of leaflet drops along rivercrossings, Mbororo cattle trails, historic LRA campsites,and other known paths of LRA movement sothat groups find leaflets as they walk;• Increase the frequency of leaflet drops onto knownLRA campsites in northern Garamba NationalPark, the Vovodo-Chinko forest, and the Ango-Zemioaxis;• DDR actors should target 20-25 LRA officers withCome Home leaflet strategies over the next sixmonths, specifically tailored to the potential vulnerabilities,experiences, and family ties of each.Increase the saturation of leaflet drops• DDR actors should set a collective goal of dispersingat least 300,000 leaflets per month for the nexttwelve months;• The EU should supplement funds currently beingprovided by Invisible Children to print leaflets inorder to expand production.Moving beyond airdrops of standard leaflets?To date, DDR actors have focused primarily on airdropsof leaflets as the medium to deliver physical messagesto the LRA. In recent months, however, US militaryadvisers have encouraged Mbororo cattle herders andtraders to disperse leaflets along trails and to any LRAmembers they meet. Such strategies can carry risks toparticipants, but have shown some promise, includingthe defection of several Ugandan combatants in Mboki,CAR, in late 2012 following contact with Mbororoherders. DDR actors should expand on efforts to usenon-airdrop distributions of leaflets. For instance, theyLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 47

should work to ensure UPDF tracking teams operatingin the bush disperse leaflets consistently during militaryoperations.In addition, DDR actors should experiment with otherphysical items to drop beyond standard leaflets. Thesecould include “talking leaflets,” using technology similarto that used in commercial greeting cards. Thesmall, embedded speakers could include instructionsin Acholi for how LRA members can safely defect. DDRactors could also experiment with dropping items intendedto make Ugandan LRA members nostalgic forhome or remind them of the hope of a better life, suchas toys, Ugandan shillings, or rosaries. Talking leafletsand other items would be more expensive to producethan standard leaflets, limiting their use, but could beused when the location of targeted groups was knownand the chance of reception was higher.Similarly, DDR actors could experiment with radicalbreaks in the design of standard leaflets. One optionwould be to design some less as practical informationdelivery vehicles, but more to represent abstract ideasthat, again, remind LRA members of home or the hopeof a better life. Such leaflets could be designed to looklike school report cards, or to simply include largephotos or drawings of items not available in the bush,such as Acholi food, school materials, medicine, sportsequipment, or cultivated fields. Such leaflets, as well asother physical reminders of northern Uganda, could beespecially useful if inserted among more standardizedleaflets, so that LRA groups coming across an area thathas been blanketed would not see simply one designrepeated uniformly, but a mix of items that would bothremind them of home and provide practical informationabout how they can get there.D. Helicopter loudspeakersHelicopter loudspeaker Come Home broadcasts, pioneeredby US military advisers and the UPDF, began insoutheast CAR in late 2012. Mechanical problems withhelicopters, delays in speaker procurement, and politicalinstability have limited their use, but the small samplesize available indicates that they can be an effectiveand innovative delivery mechanism for Come Homemessages. Several LRA defectors in 2012, including atleast four Ugandans, referred to hearing messages fromloudspeakers mounted on helicopters flying close totheir locations. 98 However, mechanical problems withcontracted helicopters, as well as a lengthy approvalprocess to authorize missions, has limited their use and98 LRA Crisis Tracker, “2012 Annual Security Brief,” 2013.the ability of advisers to react rapidly to reports of LRAmovements.As of May 2013, there had been no helicopter speakersorties in Congo. The Congolese government deniedpermission to the US government, as well as NGOs, toconduct targeted flights in April and May 2013 in responseto reports that a large LRA group near Faradjewanted to defect. MONUSCO has expressed interest inusing its helicopters for speaker missions, but had yetto do so by May 2013.1. Opportunities and challengesHelicopter speaker broadcasts initially confused LRAcommanders, who traditionally have enforced an anti-helicopterdrill in which all members would scatterand hide at the first sound of an approaching helicopter.This strategy worked well to protect LRA elementsfrom the possibility of observation or gunship attackand also created an excellent listening opportunitywhen loudspeakers were used. In some cases, the messagescould not actually be heard but the dispersionreaction created opportunities for scattered elements tocrawl away to eventually defect.However, LRA commanders have since adapted theirreactions and changed their drills, likely aware nowthat the helicopters with loudspeakers are not attackgunships. One possible way of exploiting this would beto alternate types of helicopters so that LRA elementscannot tell in advance which drills are appropriate.In general, helicopter speaker broadcasts should followthe same messaging guidelines as FM radios andleaflets. However, helicopter speaker missions have aunique value in providing flexible platforms for DDRactors to respond to new opportunities. For instance,DDR actors should encourage Ugandan combatantswho defect from the LRA to participate in “live” helicopterspeaker missions soon after they defect. 99 Unlikenew radio programs or leaflets, which take daysor weeks to produce, such missions could immediatelybe deployed to target areas where the combatant’sformer group is still operating. However, the US mustensure that all available helicopters are in good workingcondition, and that advisers have the authority toimmediately approve speaker missions in response to99 DDR actors would have to ensure that LRA combatantshad received adequate medical help before conducting suchmissions, that they did them voluntarily, and that such missionswere limited to a few days so that former combatantscould still promptly return to Uganda and not be draftedinto the UPDF.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 48

information about LRA group movements.Though helicopter speaker missions might have alreadyachieved diminishing returns, the perception ofmilitary pressure the helicopters provide is significant.Since the most important process leading to defectionsis perceived pressure, usually relating to the fears associatedwith military action, messages via helicoptersseem to provide better results than other methods.2. Expanding helicopter speaker coverageThe map on page 35 shows the location of helicopterspeaker sorties in LRA-affected areas as of July 2013.To expand on the use of this innovative tactic:• US military advisers and the UPDF should immediatelyrestart helicopter broadcasts in Haut Mbomou,CAR;• The AU should request permission from authoritiesin Bangui for the US and UPDF to fly helicopterspeaker sorties in the prefectures of Mbomou,Haut Kotto, and Vakaga;• MONUSCO should immediately start flying sortiesin Haut Uele and Bas Uele;• The US ambassador to Congo should work withthe UN SRSG for Congo to acquire permissionfrom the Congolese government to conduct helicopterspeaker sorties in Haut Uele and Bas Uele,particularly in and near Garamba National Park.E. Safe Reporting Sites (SRS)Possibly the most important factor in facilitating successfuldefections, establishing Safe Reporting Sitesconstitutes the logical conclusion to the hard work ofpersuasion in the form of leaflets and radio and helicopterbroadcasts. Given that Ugandan LRA defectorsfear retribution from local community members, establishingfixed sites throughout the LRA area of operationswhere all parties agree that defectors will besafely received addresses a key barrier to increasingdefections.1. Attaining community input and buy-inAfter much dialogue between US military advisers andlocal community leaders, the towns of Obo, Djemah,Zemio, and Mboki were finalized as Safe ReportingSites in CAR, while the towns of Sakure, Nabanga, andEzo in South Sudan were also designated as SRS locations.MONUSCO initiated a similar project in HautUele, Congo, but is currently reevaluating their model,in which sites were placed away from population centers,which failed to attract defectors. Moving forward,MONUSCO should move to establish SRS locationsin Haut and Bas Uele, keeping in mind that ideally anLRA escapee should be able to report into any MON-USCO military post.Experience in CAR, Congo, and South Sudan points toseveral lessons learned and recommendations for attainingcommunity buy-in and input into SRS projects:Establish clear guidelines for receiving defectorsInternational DDR partners such as the US military,MONUSCO, and Invisible Children should continueto work with local communities to refine the guidelinesfor receiving defectors. Such guidelines shouldcover topics such as how community members shouldbehave towards potential LRA defectors, who theyshould alert when an LRA member defects, and whichlocal authorities will take custody of defectors untilthey begin the journey home.Establish sustainable reception committeesTo help ensure such guidelines have support at thelocal level, communities should form reception committeescomposed of community and religious leadersand local government officials, with internationalDDR partners participating as needed. Given the uncertaintyabout how long US military advisers will bedeployed in CAR and South Sudan, such committeescould ensure that the SRS project is sustainable beyondtheir deployment.To help ensure this, the US should set aside enoughfunding to support regular meetings of reception committeesfor at least one year after US military adviserswithdraw. It should also ensure that State Departmentfield representatives maintain engagement with receptioncommittees for at least one year following thewithdrawal of US military advisers.Encourage and fund local sensitization effortsCommunity-led sensitization programs in the form ofcommunity workshops or town hall meetings, mobilecinema, and radio programs are of primary importanceand need to be conducted alongside the establishmentof each SRS and reception committee. They can playa critical role in addressing grassroots concerns aboutthe project and ensuring that all community membersare aware of the guidelines for safe defections. Donorsshould provide funding to community groups to con-LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 49

duct such outreach.Provide additional incentives to communitiesAs soon as a community agrees to become a Safe ReportingSite, it takes on the risk associated with thepossibility of LRA reprisal attacks. However, becauseLRA defection patterns are so unpredictable, it couldbe months or even years before an LRA member defectsthere. To help communities see tangible resultsfor their efforts sooner, international DDR partnersshould provide them with additional incentives, suchas funding for community reconciliation and abductee-reintegrationprojects, or assistance in repairing localinfrastructure.Be consistent with community outreachUS military advisers have been largely successful insecuring community support for SRS projects in CARand South Sudan. But community feedback suggeststhe need for more consistent outreach to communitymembers, particularly as personal relationships withcommunity members are upended each six monthsonce advisers rotate out. The MONUSCO DDRRRteam has an even greater task in repairing its severelydamaged reputation with local communities.LRA DDR actors should draw on the lessons learnedfrom MONUSCO DDRRR’s successful work in protecting,screening, repatriating, rehabilitating, and reintegratingformer combatants from the Front Democratiquede Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) in easternCongo. There, locally hired community sensitizers arespread out across the region to act as contact personsand conduits for would-be defectors. Over the years,the community sensitizers have developed a numberof local innovations that allow them to establish contactwith FDLR fighters and to begin the process of negotiatingtheir defections. In the case of the LRA, directcontact with the groups is difficult and dangerous butsimilar community sensitizers could be used to informcommunity members on what to do when coming intocontact with would-be LRA defectors.2. Keeping civilians safeHistory has shown that LRA commanders can exact revengeon communities perceived as hosting escapees,thus making local communities less willing to assistdefectors and would-be defectors fearful of encounteringlocal hostility should they escape. 100 The LRA need100 The need to protect committees is paramount as in atleast two cases in Uganda and one in Congo, communitiesonly succeed once in recapturing defectors in the vicinityof an agreed SRS, or in committing a brutal reprisalattack against an SRS community, to discredit the SRSmodel in the eyes of potential defectors and host communities.This is particularly likely if there is no effectiveresponse from military forces.Given the weak capabilities of military forces in the regionand the LRA’s stealth in committing attacks, therisk of such reprisals cannot be completely eliminated.MONUSCO’s experience with the FDLR suggeststhat successful sites will soon be monitored by theLRA command structure and that potential defectorswill quickly lose trust in them if LRA commanders decideto set ambushes somewhere near one of the sites.Again, experience in eastern Congo suggests that eachdefection will require some level of risk as well as a littlecreativity on the part of all those trying to completea defection.To mitigate the risk of LRA reprisals, internationalDDR actors and military forces must improve on civilianprotection.Establishing guidelines for local protectionBefore a community decides to become an SRS location,international DDR actors should ensure it isclearly aware of what level of protection local militaryforces can provide. DDR actors, military forces, andcommunity leaders should also ensure that modalitiesof behavior from both civilian communities andmilitary installations are assured by clear proceduresand constant supervision. Such initiatives require anenormous amount of effort and it is not a given thatthe various parts that must work together will agree orthat channels of communications will operate as theyshould. The history of cooperation between nationalmilitary, MONUSCO forces, and local communities isnot promising.Deploying rapid reaction forcesThe need for rapid response and pursuit after any attackon a SRS community cannot be overstated. Staticguards are likely to be bypassed by the LRA. But theLRA would be deterred by the credible threat of pursuit.In Congo, the strategy currently being developedthrough DDRRR, with MONUSCO military support,should address some civilian protection concerns.However, it still lacks a credible rapid response mechanismshould one of the communities around the SRSthat had facilitated LRA defections were attacked by LRAcommanders angry that their fighters were escaping.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 50

locations be attacked. 101In SRS locations in CAR, it has been possible to managethe LRA threat in large part because of the threat of immediatepursuit by UPDF elements should there be anattack. However, US forces may withdraw from CARas early as late 2013, and Ugandan forces would likelywithdraw soon after US forces do. If that happens, theywill have left SRS locations in CAR extremely vulnerableto LRA reprisals. They could take some steps tomitigate the risk by encouraging the CAR governmentor incoming AU peacekeepers to deploy in southeastCAR. But such steps would only slightly mitigate thethreat of LRA reprisals, highlighting the risks of aUS-Uganda pullout from CAR.In South Sudan, US and Ugandan troops play a similardeterrent role. Should they pull out however, localArrow Boy militias will still provide a rapid reactionforce, and Rwandan UNMISS troops provide additionalreasons for LRA forces to not risk launching majorattacks in Western Equatoria.3. Expanding the range of SRS projectsInternational DDR partners should work with localcommunities to expand the SRS project into the followingcommunities and locations• Birao, CAR• Bangassou, CAR• Bakouma, CAR• Ango, Congo• “Camp Swahili,” Congo (one of the LRA’s oldcampsites in Garamba National Park during theJuba peace talks)• Raga, South Sudan (in collaboration with UNMISS)• Nabanga, South Sudan101 As described in Section IV, MONUSCO’s previous attemptat providing rapid reaction capabilities through itsCommunity Action Network (CAN) collaboration with thelocal Catholic Church was largely ineffective, with respondingforces never once arriving in time to pursue or make contactwith LRA raiding parties. The US military is currentlyvetting the FARDC contingent to the AU RTF with the hopesthey will be able to provide them with training in order toprotect the SRS location in Faradje.F. Reintegration assistance“The community treats us like we are still LRA. We weretreated better in the bush than we are now. Someday I willrejoin the LRA and come back to kill those who have tauntedme.” Zande man held captive by the LRA for over fouryears, April 2013More effective reintegration of people who return fromthe LRA is not only a moral imperative, it is a criticalincentive for LRA members to undertake the risk of defecting.1. Fairness and clarity for UgandansThe first step in reintegrating Ugandan returnees fromthe LRA is to ensure that they return to Uganda safely.Though the Ugandan military should be allowed togather intelligence from adult Ugandan defectors immediatelyafter they return, former members shouldnot be forced or intimidated into joining the Ugandanmilitary. They should be granted amnesty and given amandatory six-month “readjustment period” to undergomedical and psychosocial treatment and get reacquaintedwith family and community members beforebeing allowed to join the UPDF. This will help ensurethat former combatants are able to make an informedchoice between civilian and military futures.The US government, given its support to the UPDF,should play a leading role in advocating for these measures.US advisers in the field should encourage UPDFcolleagues to allow Ugandan LRA defectors to returnhome, and report to higher-ranking US officials whenUgandan troops do not allow defectors to do so. TheUS embassy in Kampala should also advocate for theUPDF to formally institute the six-month readjustmentperiod before Ugandan LRA combatants can join theUPDF.US and international partners should also advocatewith the Ugandan government to provide more clarityabout the criteria it will use to decide which seniorLRA commanders are given amnesty and which aredeemed ineligible. The prosecution of mid-rankingcommanders such as Thomas Kwoyelo and the uncertainfate of Caesar Achellam likely have a chilling effecton mid-to-senior ranking officers within the LRA whomay want to defect. Ideally, the Ugandan Departmentof Public Prosecutions could publicly release a list oftop LRA commanders it intends to prosecute whichshould include no more than 5-10 of the most senior officerswithin the LRA. Come Home content producersshould then communicate these developments to LRALOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 51

groups via leaflets and radio and helicopter broadcasts.2. Reintegration for Ugandan returneesThe Ugandan government should also give the AmnestyCommission the resources and political support itneeds to promptly provide amnesty certificates for allUgandans returning from the LRA, as well as provideamnesty certificates to returnees who did not receiveone in the past several years. As appropriate, returningcombatants should also be given the opportunityto participate in community reconciliation and traditionaljustice projects, in line with the guidelines beingdeveloped in consultation with northern Ugandancommunities for a more comprehensive national transitionaljustice framework.The Ugandan government should also increase fundingfor the Amnesty Commission to resume disbursingrobust reintegration packages for LRA returnees,or formally request the World Bank or another donorto provide such funding. To encourage the Ugandangovernment to do this, donors and UN agencies shouldtake up the topic through one of their informal workinggroups in Kampala.Finally, donors should increase funding for flexible,civil society-led reintegration aid that aims to ease thetransition from LRA membership to civilian life. Mostimmediately, they should ensure GUSCO and WorldVision have the funding necessary to provide shorttermmedical and psychosocial support to returnees.Donors should also fund longer-term projects that helpreturnees build sustainable livelihoods, which shouldbenefit both returnees and the communities they arereintegrating into, as well as scholarship programs forreturnees who wish to resume interrupted schooling.3. Reintegration for non-Ugandan returneesZande returnees from the LRA currently face far lessrisk of prosecution for crimes committed while withthe LRA than their Ugandan counterparts. However,the governments of CAR, Congo, and South Sudanshould urgently draft amnesty provisions for thosewho have been abducted by the LRA into nationallaw. This could be especially important if some Zandecombatants rise to become commanders responsiblefor atrocities, which would necessitate a distinctionbetween low-ranking combatants forced to commitcrimes who should be given amnesty and officers whoshould be held accountable for their crimes.More importantly, Zande returnees are in need ofgreater reintegration support. The first step is to reducestigma, a task that requires more leadership from religiousand traditional leaders, as well as local authorities.They should facilitate reintegration introductionsand reconciliation ceremonies between returnees andtheir home communities, proactively mediate any conflictsbetween returnees and community members, andgo on community FM radio programs to sensitize communities.There is also a need for large-scale reintegration projectsthat benefit both the community and returnees.Such projects can be healing for both as communitiessee positive contributions returnees can make. Reintegrationprojects should place particular emphasis onhelping adults who have escaped, and should accommodatethe particular livelihood activities of Zandecommunity members such as farming, hunting, fishing,and petty trade. The focus areas of such initiativesshould be informed by a more complete mapping ofatrocities and disappearances attributable to the LRA,as well as by where returnees from LRA captivity arecurrently living.International donors can play a critical role in fundingand providing capacity building to local organizations.However, international donors must take great care toavoid mistakes made in previous reintegration programsseen across the continent, in which huge sumsof available funds have been invested in internationalstaff and logistics, or controlled exclusively by internationalNGOs. Wherever possible, donor funds shoulddirectly support locally-driven, locally-led projectsthat are more attuned and responsive to communityneeds. They should also avoid the trap of supportingprograms only in the handful of major towns such asDungu, Obo, and Yambio where most internationalagencies have their local headquarters, and insteadseek to ensure that rural areas that were hardest hit byLRA violence are included.G. Expanding into fresh mediumsHelicopter-mounted loudspeakers provide a good exampleof how innovative new tactics can spark newdefections. All Come Home mediums are subject tocounter-measures, but each new innovation stressesLRA control and provides an opportunity to increasethe effectiveness of information campaigns, especiallywhen mixed with other mediums.1. Direct negotiationsInitiating direct contact with LRA commanders wouldrequire acquiring the number of one of the LRA’s fewLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 52

satellite or mobile phones, cracking into their HF radionetwork, or sending a messenger directly into a remoteLRA camp. The first two options are extremely difficultto do, and the third is difficult and very dangerous.Even if contact is established, any LRA commanderwould be hostile or at the very least suspicious of anycommunications from the outside world.However, given the state of the LRA today and the possibilitythat some commanders are disillusioned with orphysically distant from Kony, there is some hope thatdirect contact could bear fruit. Potential targets includethe so-called exiled commanders (Angola, Abuchingo,Lamola, and Bwone), those in need of medical attention(Odhiambo), or those who are directly threatenedby Kony (Olanya and Ongwen).There is also hope that LRA commanders could initiatecontact with outside actors with the intent of defecting.Since December 2008, such cases have been fewand far between, with some even perpetrated by conmen. 102 However, there have been a number of cases inthe recent past in which groups of would-be defectorshave tried to communicate their desire to come out inwriting, sending verbal messages with abductees theyrelease, or even waving flags by the side of the road.These cases, which have occurred almost exclusivelyin Congo’s Haut Uele district, seldom lead to successfuldefections because of the difficulty of establishingtrust. In 2013, DDR actors attempted to react to reportsof an LRA group wanting to defect by bringing in aUgandan who hosted Come Home radio programs.However, this initiative did not succeed in part becauseof difficulties in establishing some form of directcommunication that would be needed to work out thenext steps in arranging safe defections.One way of facilitating direct contact between LRAgroups and DDR actors is to use preset call times. Ifdefectors are trying to report in areas that fall withinrange of cell phone service, DDR actors could distributemobile phones to the LRA either via airdrops or, ifcontact through the local community is viable, one ofthese phones could be sent out with an agreed contacttime or pre-set numbers to call that connect to an Acholispeaker. Such an initiative could be supplemented byCome Home messages that give LRA members phonenumbers to call should they want to arrange a defection.2. Information rewards programsThe LRA’s isolation provides a steep challenge to theUS State Department’s War Crimes Rewards programseeking the arrest of Kony, Odhiambo, and Ongwen.The only people with information about their whereaboutsare within the LRA, so LRA defectors have thegreatest chance of providing the correct information.The US should expand its information campaign to explainthe program to LRA members, via leaflets andradio broadcasts, but it is best to do so outside of theCome Home framework in order to avoid contradictorymessages. Even if the defectors are not able to provideinformation that leads to the arrest of the LRA commanders,messages related to the War Crimes Rewardsprogram could reinforce schisms within the commandstructure that lead high-ranking officers to defect.It is possible that non-LRA members, such as hunters,poachers, or traders could have information about thewhereabouts of the top three LRA commanders. Thisis especially true in northeastern CAR and Kafia Kingi.The US should seek to sensitize such populations viaradio broadcasts, including via stations listened to innortheastern CAR and Kafia Kingi, or direct outreachwith community members by US military advisers.However, as with similar rewards programs for suspectedRwandan génocidaires, some people do notbelieve that $5 million is actually available, or cannotvisualize having that much money. In addition, theprogram could encourage people in northern Ugandawho might still have contact with the LRA to come forwardwith information, though there is little evidencethat such direct contact still exists.In addition to these initiatives, US military advisersshould continue to use the less-publicized DOD rewardsprogram as a tool to encourage community involvementin defections initiatives.102 For instance, news agencies falsely reported the surrenderof Okot Odhiambio in 2009. Xan, Rice, “Uganda deputyrebel leader defects,” The Guardian 29 January 2009.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 53

VII. CONCLUSIONWhile it is tempting to focus on all that is wrong withthe current counter-LRA effort, it is vital that all engagedagencies continue their work and collaborateto overcome remaining obstacles. The research conductedfor this paper indicates that the LRA is losingcohesion and facing command and control problemsthat are a direct result of the pressure that has built upover the past few years. This pressure is the productof aggressive UPDF and US military action astride themain lines of communication between LRA commandheadquarters and dispersed units in southern CARand northern Congo, the increased presence of AU andUN military installations in Congo and South Sudan,the aggressive defensive activities of the Arrow Boys inSouth Sudan, and the relentless defection campaignsconducted by US personnel, MONUSCO DDRRR, localcivil society leaders, and international NGOs suchas Invisible Children. Just the number of helicopterbroadcasting messages addressed to the LRA adds tothe pressure that is building.Though the AU RTF remains an unmet promise andthe FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, continue tomaintain a defensive posture that fails to deliver effectiveprotection to civilian communities, their presenceacts as a potential risk to the LRA that they struggleto manage. While it is unlikely that dramatic improvementsto military effectiveness can be achieved withoutinvesting significant diplomatic and financial capital, itis possible that a modest investment in improving thedefection campaign will push the LRA to the point ofdespair – and possibly collapse.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 54

ANNEX I. ESTIMATED LRA COMPOSITIONEstimated LRAcomposition, April 2013Ugandan menNon-Ugandan men*Women**Children*Primarily Zande abductees from CAR,Congo, and South Sudan** Including approximately 40-60Ugandan women27001407283188Estimated LRA combatantcapacity, 1999-2013** A significant majority of LRA combatantsare Ugandan males, butsome Ugandan women and abducteesfrom CAR, Congo, and SouthSudan also serve as combatants8004002531999 2008 2010 2013Estimated number of armed LRAcombatants vs total membership,April 2013Total LRA membershipArmed combatants491253Note: These graphs represent estimates of membershipwithin the LRA. At least 59 reported adult males couldhave been counted twice in the groups under the “LRAgroups with unidentified status or location” section inAnnex II. Some groups, however, might not have beenmentioned at all due to lack of information from formercombatants.Estimates are derived from: Author interviews withformer LRA combatants, Gulu and Kampala, 2011-2013. Cakaj, Ledio, “The Lord’s Resistance Army ofToday,” Enough Project, November 2010. Lancaster,Philip, Guillaume Lacaille, and Ledio Cakaj, “DiagnosticStudy of the Lord’s Resistance Army,” InternationalWorking Group on the LRA, World Bank, June 2011.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 55

ANNEX II. APPROXIMATE LRA GROUP LOCATIONSNote: Groups are listed underneath their primary commander.Group locations are based on their reportedpresence as of April 2013, unless otherwise noted. Tosee the location of these groups on a map, see page 12.A. LRA groups in CongoNote: Vincent “Binany” Okumu was reportedly the seniorLRA commander in Congo until his death in January2013. Since then, Major Thomas Odano has reportedlyinherited Binany’s group and his status as seniorLRA commander in Congo.Major Thomas Okello “Odano”Area of operations: Congo, Haut Uele district, includingGaramba National Park and near the towns of Bangadiand DorumaOdano seems to have inherited Binany’s group, afterthe latter’s reported death in CAR in January 2013. Accordingto recent reports, Odano has 30 armed men inhis group, mostly Ugandans, and 20 women and children.Odano’s group, which splits into smaller units,operates out of northwest Garamba Park.Major Denis Obol “the one-eyed”Area of Operations: Congo, near BangadiObol used to operate under Binany in Congo but likelymoved to CAR in 2011 where he took over a largegroup from Okello Okutti. Okutti split his group intotwo and left with two escorts at the end of 2011 to lookfor Kony. Obol’s group, now operating in Congo, has28 armed men, 18 women, and ten children.Second Lieutenant Okello RayArea of operations: Congo, Haut Uele district, includingnorthern section of Garamba National Park nearNabanga, South SudanThere are approximately 14 people remaining in OkelloRay’s group, including three armed Ugandan men,eight women, and three children.B. LRA groups in CARMajor Michael Odooki “Gwee”Area of operations: CAR, Haut Mbomou prefecture,north of ZemioOdooki commands another satellite group of Odhiambo’s,which includes 24 people. There are 11 armedmen, nine Ugandans and two from CAR. There are alsoten women and two children. David Olanya, Kony’shalf-brother, is reportedly part of this group. He is unarmedand without escorts.Jon Bosco KibwolaArea of operations: CAR, Mbomou prefecture, northof intersection of Vovodo and Chinko riverKibwola’s group includes at least eight armed men.His group includes Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odek,as well as Santo Acheta, who is one of the oldest fightersremaining in the LRA. It is unclear what this groupintends to do, though there are indications that it mayhave tried to connect with Odhiambo and move to KafiaKingi during the 2013 rainy season in June or July.Second Lieutenant RichardArea of operations: CAR, Mbomou prefecture, west ofRafai, near AgoumarRichard’s group has 26 people, including six armedUgandan men and four unarmed men. Three of theseunarmed men – Colonels Lamola, Bwone, and Abucingu– are former LRA senior officers treated as prisoners.Richard’s group also includes ten women and sixchildren.Major Massimiliano WatmonArea of Operations: CAR, Mbomou prefecture, northwestof the Chinko River, far north of DembiaWatmon’s group has between 46-50 people, includingabout 14 armed men, all Ugandans. It also includes 12unarmed abductees from Congo and CAR, 20 womenfrom Uganda, Congo, CAR, and South Sudan, and betweeneight and 12 children.Note: Olanya David, Kony’s half-brother, was formerlycommander of LRA groups in CAR. Jon Bosco Kibwolahas reportedly replaced Olanya, who was demoted forimpregnating one of Kony’s wives.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 56

C. LRA groups in CAR and Kafia Kingi directlyassociated with KonySecond Lieutenant OlooArea of operations: Likely on the border betweenCAR and Kafia KingiOloo, once a bodyguard to Kony, commands one of hissplinter groups. He travelled to Boro Medina, SouthSudan, in September 2010 with Kony, but returned toCAR after losing contact with Kony following a clashwith South Sudanese and Ugandan soldiers. There are15 people in this group, nine armed men, three women,and three childrenSecond Lieutenant OkweraArea of operations: CAR, Haut Mbomou prefectureOkwera commands another splinter of Kony’s maingroup. It includes 24 people in total, nine armed men(eight Ugandans and a South Sudanese), as well asnine women and six children.Captain Bosco Oroko LoriadaArea of operations: CAR, Haut Mbomou Prefecture,northeast of OboLoriada also commands one of Kony’s satellite groups.It includes 24 people, including 17 adults, seven ofwhich are armed men, and seven children. The groupalso includes three of Kony’s wives and three smallchildren he fathered.Otto LadeereArea of operations: CAR, Vakaga or Haut Kotto prefecture,near the border with Kafia KingiLadeere commands Kony’s last splinter group. 17 peopleare in this group: eight armed men including twoCongolese and one from CAR, one unarmed youngperson from CAR, and eight women and children.Joseph KonyArea of operations: Likely in Kafia Kingi, possibly inVakaga or Haut Kotto prefectures in northeastern CARAccounts of Kony’s group vary, particularly as he oftenchanges the commanders, group composition, andnumber of people he personally moves with. While hisgroup splits into smaller units to avoid detection andincrease mobility, by October 2012 the collective grouphad 220 people in total, including 56 armed men. But asof May 2013 Kony had four satellite groups not includinghis main unit, which had about 60 people including38 armed men, 12 women, and eight children. AcayeDoctor is one of the military leaders in Kony’s group.D. LRA groups with unidentified statusor locationCaptain Otim LarwedoArea of operations: CAR, vicinity of Odhiambo’s groupLarwedo’s group is one of Odhiambo’s satellite groups.It has 28 people, including ten armed men, of whichseven are Ugandans and three are from CAR. There arealso 13 women and five children.Major Kidega Murefu “Min Tigi Tigi”Area of Operations: Possibly in Vakaga or Haut Kottoprefectures in CAR, or in Kafia KingiIt is possible that Murefu’s group is one of the groupsalready counted under Kony’s collective group. It had31 armed men, including senior commander Nixman“Opuk” Oryang (whom the UPDF declared dead in2009) and Achellam Smart “Ojara.”Okot OdhiamboArea of operations: Likely in CAR, possibly in Mbomouprefecture near the Congo border, or possiblyacross the border in CongoThere are 32 people in Odhiambo’s group, 13 armedmen and approximately 19 women and children. Othercommanders in this group including Major “Doctor”Saidi and Major Owila “Marisako.”Major Okot LuwilaArea of Operations: Likely CAR or CongoLuwila’s group escorted Binany from Congo to CARon the way to Kafia Kingi in 2012. It was composed offighters from Binany’s group in Congo as well as thosefrom Otto Agweng’s unit who went to fetch Binany. InOctober 2012 this group had 30 people, all armed men.Binany was killed in January 2013, while a “wife” toAgweng claimed he was also killed recently. If so, andif this group is still intact, it would have 28 armed menunder Agweng’s deputy, Major Luwila.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 57

ANNEX III. PROFILES OF SELECT UGANDAN LRA COMMANDERSThis Annex contains profiles of select Ugandan LRAcommanders, including their reported location as ofApril 2013, unless otherwise noted. Bios are absentfor senior commanders about whom there is little orno available information, including some group commanderslisted in Annex II. Bios are also absent forprominent LRA commanders reportedly killed in recentyears, such as Otto Agweng and Otim Ferry.Though military ranks within the LRA are intended todemonstrate the existence of an institutional hierarchy,in practice Joseph Kony has absolute authority to approveor change ranks at will. Throughout the LRA’shistory, he has often changed command assignmentspersonally, ignored conventional military commandstructures, and given direct orders to individual commandersof all ranks. He has also ensured that an officer’srank does not necessarily correlate with the levelof responsibility he has, the number of commanders heleads, or his years of experience within the LRA.This dynamic reinforces Kony’s role as the undisputedcenter of the LRA’s universe by ensuring that everycommander’s position depends on Kony’s decisionsand not on any coherent institutional logic that couldfunction without him. It also creates intense competitionamong commanders, as Kony also uses the practiceof awarding rank to determine access to food rations,servants, and even women.A. LRA commanders in CongoDenis ObolOther names: Lawang Acel (One Eyed)Rank: MajorAge/DOB: 36 or 37Origin/place of birth: Pajule, Pader districtLocation as of April 2013: Congo, near BangadiObol was abducted in 1992 from Pajule and was initiallyan escort to Abudema Bok. After the LRA movedto South Sudan, Obol was trained in artillery supportand became a lieutenant in 1996 after he lost his eye inbattle with South Sudanese rebels. After the Ugandanmilitary launched Operation Iron Fist in 2002, Obolmoved with top commander Raska Lukwiya’s group.After Ugandan soldiers shot Lukwiya, Obol joinedDominic Ongwen’s group. He moved with Ongwento Congo from Uganda, one of the last LRA groups todo so. He remained a support commander with Ongwenin Garamba, and also stayed with Achellam Smart“Ojara.” After Otti’s death in 2007, he was a commanderin Central Brigade, initially under Okot Odek andthen Binany. Obol stayed under Binany’s leadershipat least until 2011 when he moved to CAR and tookover Okello Okutti’s group. By 2013, he was reportedlyoperating in Congo, near the town of Bangadi in HautUele district.B. LRA commanders in CARAlphonse LamolaOther names: NARank: ColonelAge/DOB: Early 40sOrigin/place of birth: Omeri, Gulu districtLocation as of April 2013: CAR, Mbomou prefecture,along Chinko river north of the intersection of Chinkoand Vovodo riversAbducted at some point in the mid-1990s, Lamola wasa lieutenant within the LRA by 1999. He served in theLRA’s Meno Battalion in South Sudan under the commandof Owor Lakati before moving to Safo battalionunder Raska Lukwiya.A bodyguard to Kony for a long time, Lamola rose tobecome Kony’s chief bodyguard when he moved toGaramba National Park in the spring of 2006. Laterthat year, he was placed in charge of the High ProtectionUnit (HPU), the main security group overseeingall units tasked with protecting Kony and his families,but was later replaced by Otto Agweng. Lamola wasthen given the leadership of a small unit, one of threecomposing the external wing of HPU, tasked withprotecting Kony’s camp. Lamola was often selected tomove with Kony to Nabanga and establish a securityperimeter ahead of Kony’s arrival.Dominic OngwenRank: BrigadierAge/DOB: 1980Origin/place of birth: Paibona, Gulu districtLocation as of April 2013: In Kibwola’s group in CAR,Mbomou prefecture, north of intersection of Vovodoand Chinko riversAfter his abduction in 1990, Ongwen was placed in the“household” of Vincent Otti, a senior LRA commander.Ongwen grew close to Otti, who eventually rose tobe Kony’s chief deputy before Kony ordered his execu-LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 58

tion in October 2007. LRA defectors report that Ongwenwas the only commander who pleaded with Konyto spare Otti’s life, a move that weakened his influencewithin the LRA. However, Kony spared Ongwen fromthe subsequent purge of Otti loyalists due to Ongwen’svalue to the LRA, particularly his ability to leadtroops on daring missions. Ongwen proved his worthsoon after, leading a raid on a South Sudanese militarygarrison in Nabanga in June 2008 in which LRA forceskilled 14 soldiers. In 2005, the International CriminalCourt indicted Ongwen on seven counts, including enslavement,making him the first person to be chargedby the court for committing the same crime committedagainst him.Ongwen is known as much for his volatile nature ashis bravery, and some former LRA fighters testify hehas risked Kony’s wrath several times. Not only didhe openly oppose Otti’s execution, Ongwen also publiclystated during the Juba negotiations that he wouldkill Kony if the LRA leader failed to secure favorableprovisions for his commanders and fighters at the negotiationtable. Ongwen reportedly also refused to joinother senior LRA commanders in CAR for most of 2009and 2010 despite being frequently ordered to do so byKony.Though Kony has spared Ongwen’s life, he has takenaction to punish Ongwen. In 2009, Kony received reportsthat Ongwen was communicating with Ugandanofficials with the intention of surrendering alongsidehis 60 fighters. Kony sent a large force of loyal troops tointercept Ongwen’s group, which at that time operatedalongside the Duru River in Congo, while frequentlycrossing into southern Sudan to raid civilians there.They split up Ongwen’s group and replaced key memberswith fighters from Kony’s loyalist Central Brigade.Kony reportedly also demoted Ongwen and gave Lt.Col. Binany command of LRA forces in Congo, thoughOngwen remained an influential commander.Despite all the reported insubordination – whichwould have likely resulted in execution for any othercommander – Kony persisted in trying to convinceOngwen to join him in CAR. By the summer of 2011,Ongwen’s force had reportedly dwindled to half a dozenfighters, and he then joined Kony and Odhiamboin CAR. Recent reports state that Ongwen was injuredand had difficulty walking and that Kony gave MajorJon Bosco Kibwola many of Ongwen’s commandresponsibilities. Ugandan military forces reported attackingOngwen’s group southwest of the CAR townof Djemah in August and September 2012. In early 2013there were indications that Ongwen was again rising instature within the LRA, but as of April 2013, Ongwenwas in Kibwola’s group, operating under his commandin CAR’s Mbomou prefecture.Francis AbuchinguOther names: Lutwala, Abuchingo, Abucingiro, AbuchiuRank: Colonel, possibly without rank by 2013Age/DOB: Mid to late 50s (one of the oldest remainingLRA commanders)Origin/place of birth: Alero, Nwoya districtLocation as of April 2013: CAR, Mbomou prefecture,along Chinko river north of the intersection of Chinkoand Vovodo riversAbuchingu is one of the very few remaining commanderswho has been with Kony since the foundingdays of the LRA. Abuchingu was reportedly part of theUgandan People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), the rebelgroup composed of former soldiers from the Ugandanarmy deposed by Museveni in 1986. Abuchingu waspart of the group of UPDA fighters who joined Konyunder the leadership of Odong Latek in 1987. He wasalso part of the spiritual wing of the LRA for manyyears.Jon Bosco KibwolaOther names: JBRank: ColonelAge/DOB: 38Origin/place of birth: Lamogi, Amuru districtLocation as of April 2013: CAR, Mbomou prefecture,north of intersection of Vovodo and Chinko riversKibwola was abducted in 1992 when he was about 17.He became the commanding officer of the third battalionin Gilva Brigade in the late 1990s. He was initiallyunder brigade commanders Jon Odur and Okello Director,who were both shot by the Ugandan military,and eventually Ochan Bunia (who reportedly died in2010 in Congo of HIV). Kibwola assumed various positionswhile in Gilva Brigade and reportedly was promotedto lieutenant colonel when his group made it toGaramba National Park.In Garamba, Kibwola was initially in charge of the firstbattalion of Hondo Brigade and when the brigade wasdissolved he was assigned leadership of the so-calledFirst Brigade. There were only about 30 armed fightersunder his command and many more women andchildren. In the aftermath of Otti’s death at the end of2007, Kibwola became Deputy Director of Operations,LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 59

initially under Otto Agweng and eventually underMichael Otika. It is unclear if Otika’s reported deathrecently means that Kibwola is now Director of Operations.There are reports that Kibwola has become effectivelythe leader of all CAR based groups replacingKony’s half-brother David Olanya who was demotedafter reports he impregnated one of Kony’s wives.In September 2009 Kibwola was part of the group thatmade it to Dafak in Kafia Kingi. He was one of thefighters taken by the SAF and kept for a week in theirbarracks, the other being a young fighter called OryemKomakech. Both Kibwola and Oryem were returnedto the group a week after they were “arrested” by theSAF, having reportedly been taken to a larger SAF baseby helicopter for interrogation. It is unclear if Kibwolahas maintained relationships with SAF sources since2009.Leonard BwoneOther names: Lubwa, LubwarRank: ColonelAge/DOB: Mid to late 40sOrigin/place of birth: UnidentifiedLocation as of April 2013: CAR, Mbomou prefecture,along Chinko river north of the intersection of Chinkoand Vovodo riversA long-time member of the LRA, Bwone was in thepast tasked with logistics and finances. In October 2009he was part of the group sent to Kafia Kingi to establishcontact with the SAF. Together with Agweng, he ledthe group and composed in English all the correspondenceto SAF elements. He was also present duringmeetings with the SAF together with Okello Mission(now in Gulu) and Otto Agweng (possibly killed). Asof March 2013, Bwone, together with Abuchingo andLamola, was part of the exile group led by a young 2 ndLt Richard.Michael Odooki(pronounced ODORRE)Other names: Gwee (“kick”)Rank: MajorAge/DOB: Early 40sOrigin/place of birth: UnidentifiedLocation as of April 2013: CARAn Odhiambo loyalist, Odooki seems also to haveKony’s full trust. He has been in charge of one groupthat operates under Odhiambo in CAR for more thanthree years. One of his three wives is Christine Aling(Alinga), the only remaining female officer holding therank of captain. After giving birth to two children, Alingdoes not carry a gun or fight any longer but formercombatants describe her as a tough and able commanderOkumu Santo Acheta(pronounced ACHERRA)Other names: Mango DingodiRank: CaptainAge/DOB: Early to mid-50sOrigin/place of birth: Anaka, Gulu districtLocation as of April 2013: Possibly in a group led byKibwola in CARAcheta was abducted in the late 1990s from his birthplaceof Anaka where he worked at the local hospitalas a nurse. One of the oldest people in the LRA, Achetawas in charge of the Sick Bay in Garamba NationalPark during the Juba peace talks. He later moved toCAR where he joined a group led by Odhiambo, thenOlanya, and most recently Kibwola. He has reportedlyalso served as a personal doctor to Kony in the past.Olanya DavidOther names: NARank: Major, possibly without rank in 2013Age/DOB: Late 30sOrigin/place of birth: Odek, Pader districtLocation as of April 2013: CAR, north of Chinko, inOdooki’s groupDavid Olanya is Kony’s half-brother, from his father’sside. Olanya joined the LRA during the Juba talks atKony’s request. He stayed in the bush after OperationLightning Thunder started and moved with Kony toCAR. Kony promoted him quickly and eventuallyplaced him in charge of all LRA groups in CAR, havinghim reporting directly to Okot Odhiambo who wasstill considered Army Commander, thus effectivelybecoming the third-ranking commander in the LRA.But in April 2012, one of Kony’s wives who moved inOlanya’s group gave birth even though she had notseen Kony for over a year. It transpired that Olanyawas the father of the child, and the matter was reportedto Odhiambo. He replaced Olanya with Kibwola anddemoted and disarmed the former. Olanya is now reportedlyunder arrest, moving in the group of MajorOdooki. It is unclear what fate awaits Olanya, particularlywhen he meets Kony, who by the end of 2012 hadnot yet been able to see his half-brother.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 60

C. LRA commanders in CAR and Kafia Kingi directlyassociated with KonyJoseph KonyRank: GeneralAge/DOB: Circa 1961Origin/place of birth: Odek, Pader districtLocation as of May 2013: Likely in Kafia Kingi, possiblyin northeastern CARJoseph Kony is the founder and leader of the LRA. Heis the Chairman of the Lord’s Resistance Movement.The International Criminal Court indicted Kony on 33counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity in2005. Kony was based in Congo’s Garamba NationalPark for a majority of the Juba peace talks from 2006-2008, and fled to CAR in 2009 following the launch ofOperation Lightning Thunder. Since then, he has operatedprimarily in eastern and northeastern CAR as wellas in the neighboring Kafia Kingi enclave. He reportedlyfled his camp near Dafak in Kafia Kingi in early 2013,possibly returning to nearby northeastern CAR, but byMay 2013 had likely returned to the enclave.Kidega MurefuOther names: Min Tigi Tigi (“flicker”)Rank: MajorAge/DOB: Mid to late 30sOrigin/place of birth: Pajule, Pader districtLocation as of April 2013: CAR, possibly in Haut KottoprefectureA former bodyguard to Kony and his personal envoyto Nabanga and Rikwangba during the Juba peacetalks, Murefu is possibly the most photographed LRAfighter to date. He appears to have taken over commandof Kony’s group, possibly replacing MichaelOtika, Kony’s former chief security officer, who waskilled in 2010. Murefu is considered to be an influentialcommander now that he moves exclusively with Konyand is his escort.Otto LadeereOther names: NARank: MajorAge/DOB: Mid 30sOrigin/place of birth: Pajule, Pader districtLocation as of April 2013: CAR, Vakaga or Haut Kottoprefecture, near the border with Kafia KingiLadeere was initially trained as a signaler in South Sudanunder the unit of Patrick Lumumba, Director ofCommunications. After his initial training in the late1990s, Ladeere was assigned as a reserve signaler inKony’s compound, a task he continued to do simultaneouslywhile being an escort to the LRA leader.In Garamba National Park, Ladeere had become oneof Kony’s top bodyguards. At the end of 2006 Ladeerewas the commanding officer of Independent Battalion,one of Kony’s security units composed of about36 fighters. In that post he replaced Otto Agweng whobecame head of High Protection Unit.During the Juba talks, Kony promoted Ladeere to Directorof Intelligence for the entire LRA. IndependentBattalion became a brigade with between 80 and 100fighters and was led by Charles Arop. After Otti’sdeath in October 2007, Kony boosted Independent Brigade,the main supplier of fighters, to his own bodyguardranks, with more troops and renamed it CentralBrigade.In recent years, Ladeere reportedly operated under Binany.It is unclear whether he was demoted or if hewas Kony’s personal envoy in Binany’s group taskedwith overseeing various directives from Kony, includingsecuring ivory. Following Binany’s death in January,Ladeere was reportedly given command of a satellitegroup of Kony’s operating in Haut Kotto or Vakagaprefecture in CAR, near the border with Kafia Kingi.D. LRA commanders with unidentified locationAchellam SmartOther names: Sasa, Ojara (six fingers)Rank: UnidentifiedAge/DOB: UnidentifiedOrigin/place of birth: UnidentifiedLocation as of April 2013: Unidentified; possibly deadThe UPDF reportedly killed Achellam Smart in action.It is unclear if he is actually dead or if he has been confusedwith another fighter. Ojara means “six fingers,”and there are at least three fighters still in the LRAnicknamed Ojara. In the Acholi tradition a sixth fingeris cut, leaving a small stump.Okot OdhiamboRank: Lieutenant GeneralAge/DOB: Circa 1970Origin/place of birth: Palugula, Gulu, UgandaLocation as of April 2013: CAR, possibly in Mbomouprefecture near the Congo borderLOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 61

Not much is known about Okot Odhiambo, who assumedthe role of Kony’s chief deputy following theexecution of Vincent Otti in October 2007. He likelyjoined the LRA in the late 1980s and rose through theranks thereafter. He was allegedly in charge of two separatebrigades when the LRA was based in what is nowSouth Sudan. He has demonstrated absolute loyalty toKony, who has rewarded him with senior positionswithin the LRA, including that of Army Commander.In 2005, the International Criminal Court indictedOdhiambo on ten counts of war crimes and crimesagainst humanity. Following the Ugandan military’slaunch of Operation Lightning Thunder in December2008, Odhiambo and his fighters were the first to movetowards CAR. On Kony’s orders, Odhiambo stoppednear the Congo-CAR border in May 2009 and allowedKony to cross first. Odhiambo then followed Kony intoCAR. As of early 2013, Odhiambo was likely operatingin CAR, possibly in Mbomou prefecture near the Congoborder, or possibly across the border in Congo.Onencan Aciro KopOther names: Angola UnitaRank: ColonelAge/DOB: 45Origin/place of birth: UnidentifiedLocation as of April 2013: UnidentifiedIt is unclear if Onencan Aciro Kop is his real name, asAciro Kop is the name of his mother or a female relative.Aciro is a female name in Luo meaning “to persevere”while Kop means “words” or “things peoplesay.” Onen means “to see” and Can is “poverty.” It isalso unknown why he uses the nickname Angola Unitabut it is unlikely that he has any connection to the Angolanrebel group.Onencan is a senior commander that has occupied variousimportant posts in the LRA in the last 15 years.Like Abuchingo, Onencan was part of the spiritualwing of the LRA. By the late 1990s, he was Chief Controller,in charge of all groups that organized prayerservices. He was reportedly part of LRA teams in theearly 2000s that were sent by Kony to meet with variousexternal peace negotiators. Onencan was reportedlyplaced under Odhiambo in the last few years, sinceOtti’s death in 2007, but former combatants rarelymention his name, indicating that he may have a lowprofile. He had reportedly been placed in the so-called“exile groups” alongside Abuchingo, Lamola, andBwone, but as of April 2013 was no longer with them.LOOSENING KONY’S GRIP | 62