IPCC Report.pdf - Adam Curry

Chapter 8Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Future(Wilbanks, 1994, p. 544). This means that conflicts of interest must beacknowledged and addressed, whether they are between governmentdepartments, sectors, or policy arenas, and suggests that simplepanaceas are unlikely without tradeoffs in decisionmaking (Brock andCarpenter, 2007).There is no single or optimal way of adapting to climate change ormanaging risks, because contexts for risk management vary so widely.For example, risk management decisions can be oriented towardincremental responses to frequent events that are disruptive butperhaps not ‘extreme.’ Often, tradeoffs between multiple objectives areambiguous. For example, focusing on and taking actions to protectagainst frequent events may lead to greater vulnerability to larger andrarer extreme events (Burby, 2006). This is a particular challenge forinvesting in fixed physical infrastructure. Social investments and riskawareness, including early warning systems, can be strengthened bymore frequent low-impact events that maintain risk visibility and allowpreparedness for larger, less frequent events (see Case Studies 9.2.11and 9.2.14). Pielke Jr. et al. (2007) also warn that locating adaptationpolicy in a narrow risk framework by concentrating only on identifiableanthropogenic risks can distort public policy because vulnerabilities arecreated through multiple stresses.As one salient example, during disaster reconstruction, tensions frequentlyarise between demands for speed of delivery and sustainability of outcome.Response and reconstruction funds tend to be time-limited, often requiringexpenditure within 12 months or less from the time of disbursement.This pressure is compounded by multiple agencies working with oftenlimited coordination. Time pressure and competition between agenciestends to promote centralized decisionmaking and the subcontracting ofpurchasing and project management to non-local commercial actors.Both outcomes save time but miss opportunities to include local peoplein decisionmaking and learning from the event, with the resultingreconstruction in danger of failing to support local cultural and economicpriorities (Berke et al., 1993; Pearce, 2003). At the same time it is importantnot to romanticize local actors or their viewpoints, which might at timesbe unsustainable or point to maladaptation, or to accept local voicesas representative of all local actors. When successful, participatoryreconstruction planning has been shown to build local capacity andleadership, bind communities, and provide mechanisms for informationexchange with scientific and external actors (Lyons et al., 2010). As partof any participatory or community-based reconstruction, the importanceof a clear conflict resolution strategy has been recognized.Tradeoffs may also arise through conflicts between economic developmentand risk management (Kahl, 2003, 2006). The current trend of developmentin risk-prone areas (e.g., coastal areas in Asia) is driven by socioeconomicbenefits yielded by these locations, with many benefits accruing toprivate investors or governments through tax revenue. For example,export-driven economic growth in Asia favors production close to largeports to reduce transportation time and costs. Consequently, theincrease in risk has to be balanced against the socioeconomic gains ofdevelopment in at-risk areas. Additional construction in at-risk areas isnot unacceptable a priori, but has to be justified by other benefits, andsometimes complemented by other risk-reducing actions (e.g., earlywarning and evacuation, improved building norms, specific floodprotection). This introduces the possibility for those benefiting financiallyto offset produced risk through risk reduction mechanisms ranging fromfair wages and disaster-resistant housing (to enhance worker resilience)to support for early warning, preparedness, and reconstruction. Suchapproaches have been considered in some businesses through corporatesocial responsibility agendas (Twigg, 2001).One climate change/development tradeoff linked both to timeframesand the magnitude of climate extremes is the future need for riskreduction infrastructure that would require changes in ecologically orhistorically important areas. For example, when considering additionalprotection (e.g., dikes and seawalls) in historical centers, aesthetic andcultural elements as well as building costs will be taken into account.Existing planning and design standards to protect cultural heritage orecological integrity may need to be balanced with the needs of adaptation(Hallegatte et al., 2011a). Difficulties in attributing value to cultural andecological assets mean that CBAs are not the best tool to approachthese types of problems. Multi-criteria decisionmaking tools (Birkmann,2006) that incorporate a participatory element and can recognize thepolitical, ethical, and philosophical aspects of such decisions can also beuseful (Mercer et al., 2008). But the magnitude of emerging climateextremes is an important issue. If climate change is relatively severe,rather than moderate, then the focus on preserving iconic areas is likelyto increase, as will the costs.Another contextual complication that introduces tradeoffs is the factthat impacts of climate change extremes extend across multiple scales.The challenge is to find ways to combine the strengths of addressingmultiple scales, rather than having them work against each other(Wilbanks, 2007, 2009). Local scales offer potentials for bottom-upactions that ensure participation, flexibility, and innovation. At the sametime, efforts to develop initiatives from the bottom up are often limitedby a lack of information, limited resources, and limited awareness oflarger-scale driving forces (AAG, 2003). Larger scales offer potentials fortop-down actions that assure resource mobilization and cost sharing.Integrating these kinds of assets across scales is often essential forresilience to extremes, but in fact, integration is profoundly impeded bydifferences in who decides, who pays, and who benefits, and perceptionsof scalar effects that often reflect striking ignorance and misunderstanding(Wilbanks, 2007). In recent years, there have been a number of calls forinnovative co-management structures that cross scales in order topromote sustainable development (e.g., Bressers and Rosenbaum, 2003;Cash et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2010).What might be done to realize potentials for integrating actions atdifferent scales to make them more complementary and reinforcing?Many top-down interventions (from international donor developmentand disaster response and reconstruction funding to new adaptationfund mechanisms and national programming) may unintentionallydiscourage local action by imposing bureaucratic conditions for access449