17.07.2015 Views

IPCC Report.pdf - Adam Curry

IPCC Report.pdf - Adam Curry

IPCC Report.pdf - Adam Curry

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Chapter 5Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes at the Local LevelBox 5-4 | Collective Behavior and theMoral Economy at WorkA variety of socio-political networks that were used to offsetdisaster losses existed throughout the Pacific region prior tocolonization (Sahlins, 1962; Paulson, 1993). One example ofsuch a system is the Suqe, or graded society, which existed innorthern Vanuatu, a small island nation in the South WestPacific Ocean. In the Suqe ‘big men’ achieved the higheststatus by accumulating surpluses of valued goods such as shellmoney, specially woven mats, and pigs. Men increased theirgrade within the system by making payments of these goodsto men of higher rank. In accumulating the items men wouldalso accumulate obligations to those they had borrowed from.Accordingly, networks and alliances emerged among theislands of northern Vanuatu. When tropical cyclones destroyedcrops, the obligations could be called in and assistance givenfrom members of the networks who lived in islands thatescaped damage (Campbell, 1990). A number of processesassociated with colonialism (changes to the socio-politicalorder), the introduction of the cash economy (the replacementof shell money), and religious conversion that resulted in thebanning of the Suqe), as well as the provision of post-disasterrelief, have caused a number of elements of the moral economyto fall into disuse (Campbell, 2006).case of wildfires, shelter-in-place becomes a back-up strategy whenevacuation routes are restricted because of the fire and include protectingthe structure with garden hoses or finding a safe area such as a waterbody (lake or backyard swimming pool) as temporary shelter (Cova etal., 2009). In Australia, the shelter-in-place action is slightly different.Here the local community engagement with wildfire risks has two options:stay and defend or leave early. In this context, the decisions to remainare based on social networks, prior experience with wildfires, gender(males will remain to protect and guard property), and involvementwith the local fire brigade (McGee and Russell, 2003). The study alsofound that rural residents were more self-reliant and prepared to defendthen suburban residents (McGee and Russell, 2003).The social organization of societies dictates the flexibility in the choiceof protective actions – some are engaged in voluntarily (such as in theUnited States, Australia, and Europe), while other protective actions forindividuals or households are coordinated by centralized authoritiessuch as Cuba and China. Planning for disasters is a way of life for Cuba,where everyone is taught at an early age to mobilize quickly in the caseof a natural disaster (Sims and Vogelmann, 2002; Bermejo, 2006). Theorganization of civil defense committees at block, neighborhood, andcommunity levels working in conjunction with centralized governmentalauthority makes the Cuban experience unique (Sims and Vogelmann, 2002;Bermejo, 2006). Recent experience with hurricanes affecting Cuba suggeststhat such efforts are successful because there has been little loss of life.In many traditional or pre-capitalist societies it appears that mechanismsexisted that protected community members from periodic shocks such asnatural hazards. These mechanisms, sometimes referred to as the moraleconomy, were underpinned by reciprocity and limiting exploitation sothat everyone had basic security. The mechanisms are often linked tokinship networks, and serve to redistribute resources to reduce the impactson those who had sustained severe losses, and have been identified inSoutheast Asia (Scott, 1976), Western Africa (Watts, 1983), and thePacific Islands (Paulson, 1993). The moral economy incorporated social,cultural, political, and religious arrangements, which ensured that allcommunity members had a minimal level of subsistence (see Box 5-4).For example, traditional political systems in the semiarid Limpopo Basinin northern South Africa enabled chiefs to reallocate surpluses duringbad years, but this practice has declined under contemporary systemswhere surpluses are sold (Dube and Sekhwela, 2008). In NorthernKenya, social security networks existed among some groups of nomadicpastoralists that enabled food and livestock stock to be redistributedfollowing drought events, but these are also breaking down with themonetization of the local economy, among other factors (Oba, 2001).Although the concept of moral economy is generally associated withpre-capitalist societies and those in transition to capitalism (in the past),significant features of moral economy, such as reciprocity, barter, cropsharing, and other forms of cooperation among families and communitiesor community-based management of agricultural lands, waters, or woodsare still part of the social reality of developing countries that cannot beconsidered anymore as pre-capitalist. Many studies show that moraleconomy-based social relationships are still present such as traditionalinstitutions regulating access, use, and on-going redistribution ofcommunity-owned land (Sundar and Jeffery, 1999; Rist, 2000; Hughes,2001; Trawick, 2001; Rist et al., 2003). The revitalization, enhancement,and innovation of such moral economy-based knowledge, technologies,and forms of cooperation and interfamily organization represent animportant and still existing source of fostering collective action thatserves as an enabling condition for preventing and coping with hazardsrelated to natural resource management. While aspects of the traditionalmoral economy have declined in many societies, informal networksremain important in disaster risk reduction (see Section 5.4.3).The notion of the moral economy does not recognize the inequalities insome of the social systems that enabled such practices to be sustained(e.g., gender-based power relationships) and tended to perhaps providean unrealistic notion of a less risky past. In addition, kinship-basedsharing networks may foster freeloading among some members (diFalcoand Bulte, 2009). Nevertheless, a reduction in traditional copingmechanisms including the moral economy is reflected in growingdisaster losses and increasing dependency on relief (Campbell, 2006).Collective action to prepare for or respond to disaster risk and extremeclimate impacts can also be driven by localized organizations and socialmovements. Many such groups represent networks or first respondersfor climate-sensitive disasters. However, there are many constraints thatthese movements face in building effective coalitions including the need309

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!