The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
forces in the country, which had been subjected to unfounded persecution and repressionat the hands of the rotten, despotic regime of Daoud, had overthrown the hated regimewith the help of patriotic soldiers and officers of the Afghan army. According to Qadir,Daoud, along with some of his close allies, was given the opportunity to surrender and facea civil trial, but the former president of Afghanistan and his stooges had put up armedresistance to the representatives of the Revolutionary Command and were killed as theresult of cross fire. Colonel Qadir appealed to the servicemen of the Armed Forces andother power structures who continued to defend the non-existent regime to accept theorders of the Headquarters of the Revolutionary Command to put down their weapons inorder to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. He proclaimed that the Afghan army assumed fullresponsibility for maintaining order in the country. Then he announced the introduction ofa curfew for Kabul and other cities, effective immediately.Following the colonel’s speech, the anchor read a list of instructions to the residentsof the capital intended to help them avoid danger.The radio station broadcasted the speeches of the leaders of the Military Councilevery half hour during that evening.The truth was that the legitimate president of Afghanistan was alive and well, andhe never relented in his determination to tip the balance of the battle in his favor.The plotters’ goal was to sow confusion among Daoud’s supporters so that theywould turn themselves in sooner. At that time, a rumor circulated with the help of the fifthcolumn saying that if the resistance continued, the air force would drop a powerful fivehundred kilogram bomb on the palace. Those in the uprising headquarters understood thatthey needed a swift and decisive victory. They knew that every moment lost would work84
against them. If Daoud could establish contact with loyal military detachments, or reachtroops in Kandahar and Jalalabad, the situation would immediately change, and not in theirfavor.Fighter jets and military helicopters intensified their strikes against the president’sshelter. Loyalists from Daoud’s entourage sent a message that the morale of the Guard wasweakening by the hour and that they would raise the white flag and surrender at anymoment. But what should one do with Daoud then? Would he be liquidated during theattack as a despot and an enemy of the people, or would he be captured alive and broughtto face a revolutionary tribunal? Opinions differed. Taraki, Amin, and other Khalqis wantedto physically eliminate the entire presidential family. Karmal and other more moderateparty members preferred to see the head of state live. The disagreement revealed the oldcracks in the party. They argued so intensely that at one point, one Khalqi claimed thatBabrak was Daoud’s agent and suggested killing him along with the despot. Tarakiinterrupted and voiced his final verdict, “If Daoud and his people stop their armedresistance and put their weapons down, they should be taken to a safe place and treatedaccording to the current law and traditions of Afghan society. If they choose to continuetheir resistance, then our comrades have the right to defend their freedom, personalsecurity, and revolutionary order.”However, at the very same time as these deliberations were unfolding, HafizullahAmin gave a very different order to his people: “Sardar Mohammad Daoud and hissupporters should be destroyed.”The shooting continued even after darkness descended upon the city. Aftermidnight, military activity flared up anew. The city was lit up by fires, tracer bullets, and85
- Page 34 and 35: laid down on the couch. He felt pre
- Page 36 and 37: possible contingency. Any unforesee
- Page 38 and 39: In July 1973, Major Qadir and his g
- Page 40 and 41: the Parcham faction, also became mi
- Page 42 and 43: the military transport division of
- Page 44 and 45: on the morning of April 27, the off
- Page 46 and 47: there were passwords. I think Amin
- Page 48 and 49: commander suddenly stopped and turn
- Page 50 and 51: in the lead tank, which was compris
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- Page 54 and 55: married?”“I wonder whose side t
- Page 56 and 57: detachments. The analyst of the Res
- Page 58 and 59: front of the airport and drove back
- Page 60 and 61: complained to him, “Your trade re
- Page 62 and 63: “What’s wrong? Should I call a
- Page 64 and 65: awaiting further instructions. My a
- Page 66 and 67: well-prepared speech that touched u
- Page 68 and 69: Youth”) in the 1940s. Babrak also
- Page 70 and 71: eally need to act a year ago, becau
- Page 72 and 73: After Daoud’s visit to Moscow, th
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- Page 78 and 79: “And what about Daoud?”“I don
- Page 80 and 81: sent the commander of the President
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- Page 88 and 89: When the bodies were removed from t
- Page 90 and 91: Chapter 2:“We Knocked Out Their T
- Page 92 and 93: deputy resident gave Valery an indi
- Page 94 and 95: trusted the deputy resident, who wa
- Page 96 and 97: Alexander Victorovich puffed his pi
- Page 98 and 99: As evening came, the city was shrou
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- Page 108 and 109: Vladimir Alexandrovich was accustom
- Page 110 and 111: intelligence officers, yet they wer
- Page 112 and 113: “He thinks that he will recover s
- Page 114 and 115: Three years ago, General Leonov was
- Page 116 and 117: Politburo would be unpredictable. S
- Page 118 and 119: Tomorrow? What time? I think it’s
- Page 120 and 121: During the meeting, the issues of A
- Page 122 and 123: institutions. Afghan special servic
- Page 124 and 125: to prepare him to work in Afghanist
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- Page 128 and 129: “We will take care of all funding
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- Page 132 and 133: was short, without a moustache desp
against them. If Daoud could establish contact with loyal military detachments, or reachtroops in Kandahar and Jalalabad, the situation would immediately change, and not in theirfavor.Fighter jets and military helicopters intensified their strikes against the president’sshelter. Loyalists from Daoud’s en<strong>to</strong>urage sent a message that the morale of the Guard wasweakening by the hour and that they would raise the white flag and surrender at anymoment. But what should one do with Daoud then? Would he be liquidated during theattack as a despot and an enemy of the people, or would he be captured alive and brought<strong>to</strong> face a revolutionary tribunal? Opinions differed. Taraki, Amin, and other Khalqis wanted<strong>to</strong> physically eliminate the entire presidential family. Karmal and other more moderateparty members preferred <strong>to</strong> see the head of state live. <strong>The</strong> disagreement revealed the oldcracks in the party. <strong>The</strong>y argued so intensely that at one point, one Khalqi claimed thatBabrak was Daoud’s agent and suggested killing him along with the despot. Tarakiinterrupted and voiced his final verdict, “If Daoud and his people s<strong>to</strong>p their armedresistance and put their weapons down, they should be taken <strong>to</strong> a safe place and treatedaccording <strong>to</strong> the current law and traditions of Afghan society. If they choose <strong>to</strong> continuetheir resistance, then our comrades have the right <strong>to</strong> defend their freedom, personalsecurity, and revolutionary order.”However, at the very same time as these deliberations were unfolding, HafizullahAmin gave a very different order <strong>to</strong> his people: “Sardar Mohammad Daoud and hissupporters should be destroyed.”<strong>The</strong> shooting continued even after darkness descended upon the city. Aftermidnight, military activity flared up anew. <strong>The</strong> city was lit up by fires, tracer bullets, and85
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