The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
However, not only did Taraki not create such a front, but at Amin’s initiative, he destroyedhis former friends and allies, the Parchamis. Thousands of innocent people, many of whomcould have supported progressive changes in Afghanistan, were eliminated.After Amin removed and killed Taraki, the internal political situation in Afghanistandid not improve at all.Taraki’s death and the salvation of the “gang of four” changed the balance of forcesin Afghanistan radically and determined the further development of Soviet-Afghanrelations. From the point of view of the Kremlin leaders, a real possibility for the creation ofa “front of progressive and patriotic forces,” based on the union of allies of Karmal and thelate Taraki, finally appeared realistic. Certain work was done in that regard. Sarwari,Watanjar, and Gulabzoi formally made peace with Karmal. The concept of the unified “frontof national and patriotic forces” was adopted by the future Afghan leaders. However,Hafizullah Amin and his people never fit into that model of “national unity.” Amin wouldnever, under any circumstances, collaborate with the very same people whom he did hisbest to destroy. He wouldn’t do it even for the sake of salvaging the April Revolution. Andthose people, in turn, would never forgive him for the past.The first phase of the April Revolution in Afghanistan was totally compromised, andthat was why they needed to either give up the revolutionary reforms or enter the secondphase.Vladimir Snegiryov:Well, what is true is that neither the Soviet nor the Afghan leaders should be judgedfrom the position of today. There was a battle of two worldwide systems. Humanity was on730
the brink of nuclear catastrophe and nobody wanted to make a compromise during thatstruggle. It turned out that Amin found himself between two fires. He became the sacrificeof the great confrontation.In our book, we have only slightly lifted the curtain that hides the mysteries of the“first phase” of the April Revolution. There are still many blind spots in its history, from theperspective of both the Afghans and the Soviets. So it is too premature to conclude thisconversation.I am also convinced that now, when Afghanistan has become the subject of thehottest breaking news again as Americans and their allies are trapped there, the lessons ofrecent history should be studied particularly thoroughly, and the correct conclusionsshould be made based on those lessons.731
- Page 680 and 681: “Well, Volodya, it is time to act
- Page 682 and 683: Aligned Movement, of which Afghanis
- Page 684 and 685: Kryuchkov had to issue the signal t
- Page 686 and 687: “At this point, you should stop s
- Page 688 and 689: The “cook” Mikhail T. poisoned
- Page 690 and 691: The poison worked, but strangely, o
- Page 692 and 693: “Everybody is here,” Kurilov as
- Page 694 and 695: “Is it possible to see a floor pl
- Page 696 and 697: Fear of potential failure played a
- Page 698 and 699: training the special forces units a
- Page 700 and 701: “It would be good for you to send
- Page 702 and 703: Amin was happy to hear that. He see
- Page 704 and 705: Akhromeev, the deputy head of the G
- Page 706 and 707: spectacularly into the mountains su
- Page 708 and 709: pancakes, veal, and traditional bak
- Page 710 and 711: A week later, Osadchiy summoned Sta
- Page 712 and 713: “What do you think of me, Vilior
- Page 714 and 715: “The leadership of the Central Co
- Page 716 and 717: the remaining food and drink to be
- Page 718 and 719: In total, twenty-five Afghans, incl
- Page 720 and 721: more decisive action in Afghanistan
- Page 722 and 723: But even the “special people,”
- Page 724 and 725: about their sources of information
- Page 726 and 727: care of. What happened to the famil
- Page 728 and 729: Naturally, Soviet military interven
- Page 732 and 733: BibliographyBooksAblazov, V. I. Afg
- Page 734 and 735: Internal Affairs Advisers about the
- Page 736 and 737: [Afghanistan: Opposition and the Au
- Page 738 and 739: from 1977-1983.Biryukov, L. I. —
- Page 740: Shah Wali — A prominent member of
the brink of nuclear catastrophe and nobody wanted <strong>to</strong> make a compromise during thatstruggle. It turned out that Amin found himself between two fires. He became the sacrificeof the great confrontation.In our book, we have only slightly lifted the curtain that hides the mysteries of the“first phase” of the April Revolution. <strong>The</strong>re are still many blind spots in its his<strong>to</strong>ry, from theperspective of both the Afghans and the Soviets. So it is <strong>to</strong>o premature <strong>to</strong> conclude thisconversation.I am also convinced that now, when <strong>Afghanistan</strong> has become the subject of thehottest breaking news again as Americans and their allies are trapped there, the lessons ofrecent his<strong>to</strong>ry should be studied particularly thoroughly, and the correct conclusionsshould be made based on those lessons.731
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