The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Naturally, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan could not seriously affect thestrategic balance in the world, or seriously damage U.S. interests. However, it could resultin extremely unfavorable consequences for our country. That’s exactly what happened.That’s why Amin constantly “invited” our troops into the DRA.Vladimir Snegiryov:Then here is my last argument for you. The version of the double game that theAfghan leader was playing began to develop actively when the “gang of four” appeared onthe stage, correct? It was when the prominent Khalqis—Sarwari, Gulabzoi, Watanjar, andMazdouryar—contacted KGB operatives in Kabul. Their concerns, in particular thestatement about Amin’s alleged involvement with U.S. intelligence, became the basis for thecables that deeply unnerved Moscow. At that time, the opposition figures blamed thedictator for everything in order to save their own skins, and out of concern that his leftistpolitics would result in the defeat of the revolution. But three decades have passed sincethen. Watanjar and Mazdouryar are no longer with us. Sarwari is imprisoned for life inKabul. He was not forgiven for his role in the mass acts of repression. Gulabzoi, having livedabroad during the time of troubles, returned to Kabul and is still active on Afghanistan’spolitical scene. When he is asked if he considers Hafizullah Amin to have been a CIA agent,this veteran of political battles inevitably replies, “I never thought so.”Valery Samunin:Yes, Gulabzoi changed considerably since those times. This, I know. But the versionof the double game of Hafizullah Amin first appeared and then developed well before the728