13.07.2015
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But even the “special people,” in particular many leaders of the First Directorate ofthe KGB (Foreign Intelligence), in their conversations with me, never said with certaintythat U.S. special services had recruited Amin. They allowed for the possibility of it, but nomore. Their position, more often than not, was that it made little sense to speculate aboutwhether Amin was a CIA agent. The essence was that, objectively, he damaged the outcomeof the April Revolution, along with our interests, by committing his actions. That was whatplayed the decisive role behind making the decision to liquidate him and replace him withthe more loyal and predictable Babrak Karmal.Valery Samunin:Do you really think that “special people,” particularly senior intelligence leaders,would ever tell the whole truth to a journalist or a historian, and would go so far as toreference the source of the information? This is impossible. Even I, your co-author, haveleft a lot of information out of this book, as if I’ve “forgotten” it altogether. A lot of it willfollow me to the grave.However, I can assure you that the operatives of the KGB Residency who wereworking in Kabul then, including Alexei Petrov, who worked with Hafizullah Amin prior tothe April Revolution on an assignment from the CPSU’s Central Committee, suspected thatAmin was a traitor and a CIA agent. There were many signs of this. Moreover, this personwas watched by KGB intelligence long before he emerged as one of the leaders of the PDPA.His biography was scrupulously researched. There was one vague moment in it inparticular. Before leaving for his studies in America, Amin published nationalistic and evenanti-Soviet articles in Kabul newspapers. Judging by those articles, he had absolutely no722
affection for the USSR, at a time when he was already a mature person with well-formedpolitical opinions. For some time in the United States, he successfully led a group of Afghanstudents. And then, right after the founding congress of the PDPA, he quit his studieswithout any apparent reason and returned to Afghanistan. Once he returned to Kabul, hequickly became Taraki’s trusted right-hand man and the mortal enemy of Babrak Karmal,which would lead to the eventual break-up of the PDPA.Since that time, information about Amin’s collaboration with the Americanintelligence services began to arrive in Moscow through KGB channels. The flow of suchinformation was steady. It came from Afghan sources, as well as agents from othercountries. However, for a long time we treated accusations of Amin’s involvement with theCIA as slander, and as a consequence of inter-party disagreements within the PDPA.Vladimir Snegiryov:You agree that there was a basis for believing that Amin was being slandered. Youand I emphasize many times in the book that the factional strife within the party wasaccompanied by such mud-slinging and slander from both sides, and it would have beenvery easy for a party member to accuse another member of treachery. The surviving Khalqleaders say that Babrak Karmal was an informer for President Daoud, which would meanthat he was an agent of the secret police. Parchamis, for their part, freely directedaccusations of that sort at members from the other faction.As to your remark regarding the fact that intelligence leaders would never revealthe whole truth, thank God if this is the case. That’s why their services are called secretservices. However, there remains one significant question here—this is true if one talks723
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Chapter 1:VIRUS: How the invasion o
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arranged meeting point for the emer
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that Orlov-Morozov wrote to the Cen
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political situation developing in t
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as accomplices, received long-term
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World War II, Prince Daoud Khan, th
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“Can you imagine, Comrade General
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no idea that some destructive polit
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General Gorelov was particularly co
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ascent. One plane, flying low above
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would retrieve vodka along with gla
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laid down on the couch. He felt pre
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possible contingency. Any unforesee
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In July 1973, Major Qadir and his g
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the Parcham faction, also became mi
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the military transport division of
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on the morning of April 27, the off
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there were passwords. I think Amin
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commander suddenly stopped and turn
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in the lead tank, which was compris
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KGB colleagues, exiting the embassy
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married?”“I wonder whose side t
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detachments. The analyst of the Res
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front of the airport and drove back
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complained to him, “Your trade re
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“What’s wrong? Should I call a
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awaiting further instructions. My a
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well-prepared speech that touched u
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Youth”) in the 1940s. Babrak also
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eally need to act a year ago, becau
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After Daoud’s visit to Moscow, th
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that could be leveled against me or
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looming in the fields, to be handed
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“And what about Daoud?”“I don
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sent the commander of the President
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another Central Committee member, t
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forces in the country, which had be
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explosions in the night sky. Only a
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When the bodies were removed from t
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Chapter 2:“We Knocked Out Their T
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deputy resident gave Valery an indi
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trusted the deputy resident, who wa
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Alexander Victorovich puffed his pi
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As evening came, the city was shrou
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honor, religion, and property, we d
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evolution and kill the president if
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theory, thinks as if the Pashtun
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analyst’s intentions.***The morni
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Vladimir Alexandrovich was accustom
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intelligence officers, yet they wer
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“He thinks that he will recover s
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Three years ago, General Leonov was
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Politburo would be unpredictable. S
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Tomorrow? What time? I think it’s
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During the meeting, the issues of A
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institutions. Afghan special servic
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to prepare him to work in Afghanist
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favor, and inquired as to the natur
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“We will take care of all funding
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services, and to discuss the budget
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was short, without a moustache desp
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children, and myself—and for the
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“Yes guys, this list is extraordi
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This time, General Zaplatin headed
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through Reuters? Do we not have our
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much to discuss.Ulyanovsky started
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enewed force.“According to our fo
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***One evening Starostin was called
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Parcham officers were passive on th
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operative boss,” mused the deputy
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glad that the Soviet comrades had a
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wasn’t involved in any affairs of
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the April Revolution.”The ministe
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do.”“I have no doubt that we wi
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invited to meet with Minister of Fo
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thirty of them. Two of them were im
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decision. The Afghans listened to h
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coordinate recommendations with eac
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April Revolution.Then Karmal took t
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low would be delivered that would u
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“Because they are Parchamis.”
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Having decided to marry his current
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ambassador. He, on the one hand, ca
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the state and party, which would me
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Bobrak?”This was the extent of th
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Indeed, there would be many more So
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Kharazov was tasked by the Central
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courtyard.”“Yes, of course.”
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again.”With a clear sense of reli
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counterintelligence managed to neut
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treatment. He thought that he would
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intervention. He had a very vague i
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interpretation of events. However,
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Amin interrupted him coldly: “I w
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his tormentors to kill him.“Every
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should ask your colleagues to be mo
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years earlier, he was offered a pos
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“Vladimir Alexandrovich,” begge
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he intended to play his own game. I
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was so enamored by the ideology of
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in Russian, “Do chego zhe mir tes
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Starostin often would run into Frye
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were to stay for another year or tw
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“I think that, from the U.S. pers
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leaders were convinced that the Sov
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Thinking about Americans, Valery re
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cannot, with full certainty, qualif
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As Surnin predicted, a CIA operativ
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wish was for them to make the Afgha
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Listening to Boris Nikolayevich, Bo
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until Bogdanov took the floor. He d
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doubts as to the old Communist warr
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simply didn’t have the means to o
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one hand, there was truth to this s
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auspices of the “National Pashtun
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this version of events becomes the
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Kryuchkov remained silent, digestin
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‘true communist’ and his friend
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Babrak Karmal looked extremely conc
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“Think, who could receive this Ba
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Preparations for the first state vi
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The papers also published Comrade T
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young people at the square, told th
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influential Islamist organizations.
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him as though considering their con
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Politburo superseded all protocol.
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with obvious Soviet participation w
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“I am working, Leonid Ilyich!”
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Once, the professor and the future
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As soon as they entered Dvoryankov
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Khan, Valery treated Dvoryankov to
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Sometimes, one should act extremely
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ecame a colony of Britain. Afghan t
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“Valery, do you think that we wou
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in the committee by a bureaucrat fr
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300 Afghani, according to an exchan
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The decree authorized the re-exprop
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Having said goodbye to him, Valery
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Nikolai Alexandrovich Dvoryankov di
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American intelligence services, eve
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***Sergei Bakhturin, an assistant t
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wife were staying in the room. Vese
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On February 13, a reception in hono
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to invite the archaeologist to spea
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a little over two hours to fulfill
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keep hostages in captivity. In othe
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was discovered that the gas in the
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“But how would the safety of Mr.
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“But then you should realize that
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are not as alert. People are more a
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newspaper. He settled on the name G
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“‘The security operatives, havi
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get inside his car? How can his cal
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“Wipe your tears,” he said in a
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differs from the way they think as
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“He told me to pick up my cleats
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describing what had transpired in H
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“I wonder who this person is? I h
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Starostin was not surprised by what
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Badruddin Bahes was close to Muslim
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nationalist and anti-Soviet. Howeve
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while he ruminated, then stared abs
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A: We failed to capture the terrori
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Question from a correspondent of Th
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flag on it. The U.S. ambassador was
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7. Who were the terrorists? It seem
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perceived at the Center? It would s
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Chapter 5:Rebellion in Herat - Firs
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struggle had become a historical le
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Revolution.“I understand that you
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evolutionary, anti-party, and again
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architectural monuments, and other
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een assumed that the Soviets in Afg
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“All of our leaders are waiting f
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spoke with Amin,” Gromyko added.
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decide to send them to Afghanistan?
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mistakes that they have made. Even
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It was a brilliant ploy. Everybody
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necessary to justify possible milit
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Unexpectedly, Andropov moved to sup
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this government. But can our troops
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military divisions had been deploye
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e illiterate his whole life, and to
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economic reforms as the solutions.
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conversation. “I would like to in
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look of satisfaction. He motioned,
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in connection with the additional m
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ased on the Bolshevik experience. F
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would flee to Pakistan after the de
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General Staff for his ruthless exec
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crucial decisions in complex situat
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and respectful when he met with the
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eason Ivanov did not fall prey to s
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Morozov, Khotyaev, and Starostin to
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Marxist-Leninist theory at the time
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violating their sacred duty.”Osad
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community, and the sinfulness of se
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“Unfortunately, this is not alway
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attempting to build socialism in su
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“In an attempt to halt anti-gover
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5. Confidential contacts with S. A.
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factions. The document mentioned th
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with their requests for direct invo
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armed opposition.Further into his m
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esidencies. Halbaiev, the commander
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discussed, Comrade Amin appeared to
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authority. They figured that the mo
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the stage of advanced capitalism on
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Safronchuk.Amin pretended to be ast
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danger to him. However, it is possi
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example, what was the purpose of Am
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“This is what happened,” began
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Ivanov hesitated. There was a silen
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special typewriter. He also had to
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influence. This topic was last disc
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paratroopers, disguised in aviation
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consequences of the confrontation b
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the organizational talents of Hafiz
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Persian Gulf.Détente was coming to
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duration of the war in Afghanistan.
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eported and objectively interpreted
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countries, including Iran, Pakistan
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officers took a seven-month-long co
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Glotov and Alexander Dolmatov were
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You will be assisting me in special
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was surprised to find out that not
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The taxi driver sensed that his pas
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and PGU with great attention.“It
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“Valery, you should meet with Gul
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***Major General Zaplatin was very
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Zaplatin sternly glanced at the int
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The Afghan understood that the Sovi
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them.“Finally, here is the most i
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neighboring Pakistan to become a re
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Afghanistan. Comrade Taraki is faci
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deal with Amin work? Where do the o
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“It looks like the situation with
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analysts in the International Depar
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1. Find a way to remove H. Amin fro
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water has such healing properties t
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the other leaders of the faction wh
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was burning our hearts. We simply c
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carry out a coup d’etat by overth
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indignation of Czech citizens watch
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global revolutionary movement. That
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workers, avant-garde peasants, and
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Council in leading the party and st
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that is happening behind my back.
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Petrov responded sternly, briefly s
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clear to him that he had to return
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statement without the support of th
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There were also several plain-cloth
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People’s Palace, where a joint me
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position within the leadership of t
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greeting, he informed me that Amin
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Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov, Sov
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I suggested that we kick them out i
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your man or Amin’s man?”“He w
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his friends had already been arrest
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By some strange coincidence, all of
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party, demanding that he remove the
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Afghan school teacher, Valery decid
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path. We must do everything possibl
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Taraki called Amin and spoke in Pas
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esolution. He was now in control of
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in an open power struggle. Or perha
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the Afghans? Maybe we should just h
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had helped create. It was clear tha
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activists.After he drafted the cabl
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“No, thank you. I’d rather she
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ecognized leader of the democratic
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the couch to flip through the Sovie
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custody of the Armed Forces of Afgh
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“I don’t think that will ever h
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you over to Amin,” Starostin repl
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Taraki, his family, or his allies.
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second truck would monitor the inte
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currency. Boris Semyonovich ordered
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session so that we might hear his e
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disappearance of Sarwari and the fo
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eplacing him, why did you shelter a
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interlocutor, ignoring Kurilov’s
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issued cargo boxes.These preparatio
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compact, they faced less difficulty
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and the convoy continued its drive
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suggested that he thoroughly clean
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opposition figures was an obvious e
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“So Taraki’s time is over?” a
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said Zaplatin emphatically. Ustinov
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“This is good. Please tell me, wh
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military intervention.” But it al
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expressed.“It is now clear that w
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We were left untouched for the next
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Chapter 8:Death Sentence“The city
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living. They knew that the armed fo
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were expelled from local authoritie
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soon considered to be equivalent to
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In the middle of October, military
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The next morning, Bogdanov’s peop
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“We ought to serve,” the ambass
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the translation, was shocked. It wa
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“May I speak to you not according
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In concluding his speech, Amin said
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contribution to this transformation
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It was clear that the Center had to
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circumstances. All conversations of
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attaché reported, “Amin managed
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doctors, he continued to smoke his
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services, which we are currently in
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“We’ve heard this before, Andre
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and hydrogen bombs. He was the mini
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The results of the discussion were
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If facts indicating a change in Ami
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minister understood the difficultie
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“We can bring in some of our troo
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Having returned to Kabul, Gorelov s
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The helicopter brought Zaplatin to
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intervention in Afghanistan. Ustino
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Soviet Union. The first secretary o
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Collectively, all of those factors
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state. They would be informed as to
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additional specific instructions ha
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a hill, and was comparatively vulne
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performed culinary miracles, partic
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consulted about ways to install pow
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you are constantly engaged in intri
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possible only under the condition o
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To make a long story short, by the
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doubt flickered across his face. So
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Karmal’s faith in popular support
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Babrak Karmal was an educated and i
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thanks to the pilot’s skill and p
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head of state. He wanted to be rece
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The final decision that day was not
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“Well, Volodya, it is time to act
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Aligned Movement, of which Afghanis
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Kryuchkov had to issue the signal t
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“At this point, you should stop s
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The “cook” Mikhail T. poisoned
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The poison worked, but strangely, o
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“Everybody is here,” Kurilov as
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“Is it possible to see a floor pl
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Fear of potential failure played a
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training the special forces units a
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“It would be good for you to send
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Amin was happy to hear that. He see
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Akhromeev, the deputy head of the G
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spectacularly into the mountains su
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pancakes, veal, and traditional bak
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A week later, Osadchiy summoned Sta
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“What do you think of me, Vilior
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“The leadership of the Central Co
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the remaining food and drink to be
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In total, twenty-five Afghans, incl
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more decisive action in Afghanistan
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about their sources of information
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care of. What happened to the famil
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Naturally, Soviet military interven
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However, not only did Taraki not cr
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BibliographyBooksAblazov, V. I. Afg
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Internal Affairs Advisers about the
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[Afghanistan: Opposition and the Au
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from 1977-1983.Biryukov, L. I. —
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Shah Wali — A prominent member of
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