The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
more decisive action in Afghanistan. Let’s bring out our thoughts and arguments regardingthis issue for the reader to judge and decide who is right.Valery Samunin:Yes, let us. Like you, my highly respected co-author, I believe that the question ofHafizullah Amin’s association with the CIA’s network of agents is certainly very interesting.It is understandable for people to get excited about espionage-related intrigues. I also agreethat many people think that if Amin really was a CIA agent, then the Soviet leadership madea just and well-founded, if not wise, decision to eliminate the traitor. But if Amin didn’twork for the American intelligence services, this means that the Kremlin leaders made aserious mistake, if not a criminal act. However, I would not directly link the issue of Amin’s“espionage” with the issue of whether his removal was justified. I am convinced that thesefactors are distinct, yet somehow related.Let’s recall what we know with respect to the accusations of Amin’s involvementwith the American intelligence services.Vladimir Snegiryov:To begin, I would like to say that when delving into the subject of modern Afghanhistory, I came across very different people—PDPA figures, leaders of the Islamicopposition, Soviet politicians, diplomats, intelligence officers, and generals. Most of them(the absolute majority!) never seriously believed that Amin worked as a spy. Many of them,who I regard as figures of great authority, categorically rejected that version. I can even citetheir last names.720
Valery Samunin:I can guess whom you have in mind. Some are probably main characters in ourbook: Deputy Minister of Defense Pavlovsky, Generals Gorelov and Zaplatin, Party AdviserKharazov, and Foreign Ministry Adviser Safronchuk. Due to their work obligations, theymet with Amin on a near-daily basis, and he routinely greeted them with open arms and aHollywood smile. He was always prepared (at least in his words) to accept their advice andfollow their recommendations. It is too bad that Amin didn’t have a tail, like a dog. If he hada tail, it would have wagged with joy when he met those advisers. They liked such“affection.” Well, not all of them.Ambassador Puzanov’s attitude towards Amin begs special attention. I woulddescribe that attitude as “nothing personal.” “I should do my work,” AlexanderMikhailovich used to say. “I am being told to inform Amin as the head of the Afghan stateabout such and such proposals, or such and such considerations of the Soviet side. I shouldattempt to convince him of this or that. I do it, and then I send a detailed cable about howthe task is being fulfilled back to the Center. I should inform Moscow about Amin’s opinionson different issues, and his agreements or disagreements with the Soviet side. But I cannothelp but also attend to my other diplomatic and protocol-related functions. I have toimplement a program of cultural exchange. This was the nature of my work. Whether Aminis or is not a CIA agent, whether or not he betrayed the Afghan revolution, is not myconcern. ‘Special people’ should deal with this. We have plenty of them at the embassy.”Vladimir Snegiryov:721
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Valery Samunin:I can guess whom you have in mind. Some are probably main characters in ourbook: Deputy Minister of Defense Pavlovsky, Generals Gorelov and Zaplatin, Party AdviserKharazov, and Foreign Ministry Adviser Safronchuk. Due <strong>to</strong> their work obligations, theymet with Amin on a near-daily basis, and he routinely greeted them with open arms and aHollywood smile. He was always prepared (at least in his words) <strong>to</strong> accept their advice andfollow their recommendations. It is <strong>to</strong>o bad that Amin didn’t have a tail, like a dog. If he hada tail, it would have wagged with joy when he met those advisers. <strong>The</strong>y liked such“affection.” Well, not all of them.Ambassador Puzanov’s attitude <strong>to</strong>wards Amin begs special attention. I woulddescribe that attitude as “nothing personal.” “I should do my work,” AlexanderMikhailovich used <strong>to</strong> say. “I am being <strong>to</strong>ld <strong>to</strong> inform Amin as the head of the Afghan stateabout such and such proposals, or such and such considerations of the Soviet side. I shouldattempt <strong>to</strong> convince him of this or that. I do it, and then I send a detailed cable about howthe task is being fulfilled back <strong>to</strong> the Center. I should inform Moscow about Amin’s opinionson different issues, and his agreements or disagreements with the Soviet side. But I cannothelp but also attend <strong>to</strong> my other diplomatic and pro<strong>to</strong>col-related functions. I have <strong>to</strong>implement a program of cultural exchange. This was the nature of my work. Whether Aminis or is not a CIA agent, whether or not he betrayed the Afghan revolution, is not myconcern. ‘Special people’ should deal with this. We have plenty of them at the embassy.”Vladimir Snegiryov:721
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