The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
In total, twenty-five Afghans, including Shah Wali’s wife, died during the storming ofthe Tajbeg Palace * . Five KGB special service operatives were killed, and fourteen from theMuslim Battalion and among the paratroopers. There were more than a hundred woundedmen. Colonel Boyarinov, the head of Balashikha, who personally led his Zenit fighters tobattle, was killed. A stray bullet killed Colonel Victor Kuznechenkov, a military physician,who had arrived to save Amin from the poisoning.When the battle was at its peak and disparate messages were arriving at theembassy from the palace, Bogdanov received a call from Kryuchkov. Kryuchkov explicitlystated that they did not need Amin taken alive. At approximately 8:30 p.m. local time,Moscow received several reports that indicated that their main target had been eliminated.This, however, was not the end.It was the end of what was later called the “First Stage of the April Revolution.”* This figure only refers to the Afghans who were inside the palace. No numbers exist for casualties during theapproach to the Tajbeg Palace. According to some estimates, several hundred people died during the assault.718
Authors’ DialogueVladimir Snegiryov:I don’t know about you, Valery Ivanovich. As for me, I’ve finished working on mypart of the book with an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand, there is the satisfaction ofhaving completed a big and difficult project. This book is the result of many years ofresearch, meetings, conversations, and difficult contemplation on my part. On the otherhand, I continue to feel that the work is unfinished, and that I have not yet writteneverything that needs to be said. I am concerned that the readers will find many questionsunanswered. One of the most important questions is whether Moscow was justified incruelly eliminating Amin, thus becoming an unwilling participant in the uninterruptedcycle in which Afghan leaders are violently overthrown. Did another scenario exist,whereby Moscow could realistically have closed its eyes to Amin’s betrayal of Taraki andcontinued to support Amin as if nothing had happened? If so, it might have allowedMoscow to avoid military intervention and all of the sad consequences of that act. It isobvious that Amin, with all of his business savvy, was considerably superior [in somerespects?] to his predecessor.Arguments continue around this topic. Was Amin really a CIA agent? If so, then at acritical juncture of the Cold War, Moscow could justify the use of its military to defend itsinterests in a strategically important region. But what if that was not the case?Alas, you and I have had our disagreements regarding this issue. You’re firm in yourbelief that the Soviet leaders had basis to suspect Amin of secret collaboration with theUnited States. I am firmly convinced otherwise. In my opinion, the myth of Amin theAmerican spy was cooked up by the KGB in 1979 in order to push the Kremlin towards719
- Page 668 and 669: doubt flickered across his face. So
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Authors’ DialogueVladimir Snegiryov:I don’t know about you, Valery Ivanovich. As for me, I’ve finished working on mypart of the book with an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand, there is the satisfaction ofhaving completed a big and difficult project. This book is the result of many years ofresearch, meetings, conversations, and difficult contemplation on my part. On the otherhand, I continue <strong>to</strong> feel that the work is unfinished, and that I have not yet writteneverything that needs <strong>to</strong> be said. I am concerned that the readers will find many questionsunanswered. One of the most important questions is whether Moscow was justified incruelly eliminating Amin, thus becoming an unwilling participant in the uninterruptedcycle in which Afghan leaders are violently overthrown. Did another scenario exist,whereby Moscow could realistically have closed its eyes <strong>to</strong> Amin’s betrayal of Taraki andcontinued <strong>to</strong> support Amin as if nothing had happened? If so, it might have allowedMoscow <strong>to</strong> avoid military intervention and all of the sad consequences of that act. It isobvious that Amin, with all of his business savvy, was considerably superior [in somerespects?] <strong>to</strong> his predecessor.Arguments continue around this <strong>to</strong>pic. Was Amin really a CIA agent? If so, then at acritical juncture of the Cold War, Moscow could justify the use of its military <strong>to</strong> defend itsinterests in a strategically important region. But what if that was not the case?Alas, you and I have had our disagreements regarding this issue. You’re firm in yourbelief that the Soviet leaders had basis <strong>to</strong> suspect Amin of secret collaboration with theUnited States. I am firmly convinced otherwise. In my opinion, the myth of Amin theAmerican spy was cooked up by the KGB in 1979 in order <strong>to</strong> push the Kremlin <strong>to</strong>wards719
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