The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“Inshallah!” exclaimed the head of General Staff, Major Yaqub. “They should haveintervened militarily in the summer. These rebels turned my hair white,” he joked.“Perhaps this is because of the Americans,” suggested Abdul Karim Misak, theminister of finance. “The threat of their deployment on Iranian territory seems to be quiterealistic, doesn’t it?”“In Moscow, they call it ‘their international duty,’” clarified Amin, meaning the Sovietmilitary intervention.Two days later, in accordance with earlier plans involving inter-state contacts, ahigh-level Soviet delegation led by Talyzin, the Soviet minister of communications, arrivedin Kabul. Certainly, the decision to send a minister of the Soviet government with hisentourage to Afghanistan was risky. Those who planned the operation to overthrow Aminwere uncertain about the success of their plan. Nobody knew what the outcome would be.They most likely acted in the interest of the state, so that Amin would have little reason tosuspect that something was amiss.If that was the case, then Moscow clearly succeeded. During the last phase of thislarge-scale historical drama, it out-maneuvered the main hero—or anti-hero, depending onone’s perspective.***The Kremlin was in a frenzy. The issue of Amin had to be resolved by the end of1979. As always, when the state put forth any global task to the armed forces or specialservices, there would be no limit in allocating funds and human or material resources.Absolutely no limit.703