The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

“It would be good for you to send your plenipotentiary representative to Termez tohelp establish mutual contacts with the command of our military group.” Having spokenthese words, Magometov secretly hoped that Amin would send Yaqub, the head of theGeneral Staff, who was considered absolutely loyal to the general secretary, therebypresenting a potential threat to the organizers of the forthcoming coup. If Yaqub were sentto the Soviet Union during those crucial days, then the chances of success would growexponentially.“I will do so. The head of the Operational Headquarters of the General Staff, GeneralBabajan, will go to Termez. Please tell your leadership that he will be granted the necessaryauthority to make decisions on my behalf.”Moscow undertook a number of measures, the goal of which was to mask thepreparations for the imminent operation and to lull Amin’s awareness. The secretary of theCentral Committee of the PDPA and Politburo member Pandzhsheri arrived in the SovietUnion to schedule inter-party activities. An intensive exchange between delegations alongeconomic, cultural, educational, and military lines continued. Ambassador Tabeyev, whenmeeting the head of Afghanistan, officially informed him that the requests to the Sovietleadership regarding military assistance, including sending a number of militarydetachments to the DRA, would be fully satisfied. The date of the Soviet militaryintervention was set for December 25. In response, Amin asked to give his deepestgratitude to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to Comrade Brezhnev personally.According to his closest allies, Amin looked energetic and full of optimism duringthose days. It was clear that he had little sense of what was about to happen. He routinelyconducted meetings of the Revolutionary Council, the government, and the Politburo.700

On December 20, the long-awaited move of the head of state and party into thenewly renovated Tajbeg palace took place. Vasily Safronchuk turned out to be one of thefirst guests in the new palace. He asked to meet with Comrade Amin on the occasion ofcompletion of his tour in Afghanistan.Safronchuk, as well as Ambassador Tabeyev, was unaware of the forthcoming secretoperation. Otherwise he certainly would not have reported the overall positivecharacteristics of the Afghan leader in his final cable to Gromyko. The adviser concededthat the head of state used a bit too much leftist phraseology, and was a Pashtunnationalist. “However, while he is in charge,” he continued, “we shouldn’t be concernedabout the deterioration of relations with Afghanistan.” Safronchuk concluded that Aminwas a reliable partner. Safronchuk wrote to the minister that he could consider his missionin Kabul to be accomplished, and asked for the minister’s permission to leave for Moscowbefore the new year. “Agreed,” Gromyko wrote on the cable, allowing Safronchuk to returnto Moscow.Then Minister-Counselor Safronchuk paid Amin a final visit. Amin put his routineagenda aside and showed off his new residence to Safronchuk with obvious pleasure:luxurious halls for official receptions, offices, personal apartments with expensivefurnishings, even his personal bathtub that had been carved from a single piece of greenonyx.“If Comrade Brezhnev were to arrive here, we would be proud to receive him in thispalace,” concluded Amin after the grand tour.“Certainly,” the diplomat assured him. “Everything has been made according to thehighest world standards.”701

“It would be good for you <strong>to</strong> send your plenipotentiary representative <strong>to</strong> Termez <strong>to</strong>help establish mutual contacts with the command of our military group.” Having spokenthese words, Magome<strong>to</strong>v secretly hoped that Amin would send Yaqub, the head of theGeneral Staff, who was considered absolutely loyal <strong>to</strong> the general secretary, therebypresenting a potential threat <strong>to</strong> the organizers of the forthcoming coup. If Yaqub were sent<strong>to</strong> the Soviet Union during those crucial days, then the chances of success would growexponentially.“I will do so. <strong>The</strong> head of the Operational Headquarters of the General Staff, GeneralBabajan, will go <strong>to</strong> Termez. Please tell your leadership that he will be granted the necessaryauthority <strong>to</strong> make decisions on my behalf.”Moscow under<strong>to</strong>ok a number of measures, the goal of which was <strong>to</strong> mask thepreparations for the imminent operation and <strong>to</strong> lull Amin’s awareness. <strong>The</strong> secretary of theCentral Committee of the PDPA and Politburo member Pandzhsheri arrived in the SovietUnion <strong>to</strong> schedule inter-party activities. An intensive exchange between delegations alongeconomic, cultural, educational, and military lines continued. Ambassador Tabeyev, whenmeeting the head of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>, officially informed him that the requests <strong>to</strong> the Sovietleadership regarding military assistance, including sending a number of militarydetachments <strong>to</strong> the DRA, would be fully satisfied. <strong>The</strong> date of the Soviet militaryintervention was set for December 25. In response, Amin asked <strong>to</strong> give his deepestgratitude <strong>to</strong> the Central Committee of the CPSU and <strong>to</strong> Comrade Brezhnev personally.According <strong>to</strong> his closest allies, Amin looked energetic and full of optimism duringthose days. It was clear that he had little sense of what was about <strong>to</strong> happen. He routinelyconducted meetings of the Revolutionary Council, the government, and the Politburo.700

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