The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

training the special forces units and were directly engaged in the formation of the MuslimBattalion.The First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR also reinforced the leadership forthe forthcoming operation. Major General Drozdov, who had recently been appointed headof the “S” Division Headquarters, flew to Kabul on December 19. General Drozdov was aWorld War II veteran who had participated in a number of dangerous intelligenceoperations. Andropov, bidding him farewell, was candid about the gravity of the situation.“The situation is very complicated there. You will have to resolve important problems. Youare one of the few who truly knows what it means to battle.”***But didn’t Amin, this intelligent and perceptive individual, sense the cloudsamassing overhead? Didn’t he sense that he was in mortal danger? He had manyopportunities to monitor the actions of his “Soviet friends,” including KGB operatives,military officials, and diplomats. How can one explain why Amin wasn’t alarmed by themysterious happenings at the airdrome in Bagram, the landing of airplanes at night thatAfghan officers working at the airdrome were discouraged from investigating, sometimesunder threat of death? Why wasn’t he concerned by the tense atmosphere that permeatedthe Soviet military groups that had purportedly been sent for his protection? Or by theincreasing cases of distribution of leaflets urging Afghans to overthrow him, the “tyrant andCIA agent”? His agents reported increasing activity among the Parchamis in hiding. Andthen, of course, there was the issue of the sudden illness of Asadullah and his departure tothe Soviet Union for treatment.698