The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

a new order. Nobody bothered to ask when such an order would arrive, or inquire as to thenature of that order. Amidst heavy silence, Kirpichenko uttered the mysterious phrase,“Somebody is stringing us along.”The next morning, Karmal, Anahita, and other members of the future Afghanleadership flew back to Tashkent.Within several days, almost all military groups that had arrived in Bagram—theMuslim Battalion, Zenit operatives, and the paratroopers—received an order to relocate tothe unfinished barracks near the Tajbeg Palace on the edge of Kabul. The official reasongiven was to protect the future residence of the head of the Afghan state.It was at this point that Valery Kurilov fully understood the absurdity of the planthat they were supposed to have implemented on December 14. The night march on Kabulwould never have been the swift advance that their bosses had in mind. One third of thearmored vehicles broke down while riding on the paved highway. The vehicles had to betowed. Communication worked intermittently or not at all. The soldiers of the MuslimBattalion were at a loss in the simplest situations, could not carry out basic mechanicalrepairs, and ignored their commanders’ orders. It took the column four hours to travel sixtykilometers. When it entered Kabul, it looked miserable. Only the paratroopers in their newBMDs looked presentable.When General Magometov received reports of the failures of the night attempt toredeploy, he grew outraged. He ordered the immediate removal of the commander of theMuslim Battalion, Major Halbaiev. Only with great difficulty was the major’s postpreserved. However, the GRU leadership in Moscow decided to reinforce its position byurgently sending Colonel Kolesnik and Junior Colonel Shvetz, who were in charge of697