The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
“Is it possible to see a floor plan of the palace?” someone inquired from the backrow.The seniors at the desk exchanged a look before one of them * confirmed, ratherwithout conviction, “We will familiarize you with the floor plan at a later point in time.”“What should we do with Amin after capturing the palace? Should he be takenprisoner? Should he be executed on the spot?”“This is not your concern. There will be people there, including members of thePolitburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, who will take care of Amin. They will knowwhat to do.”“What if the guards put up intense resistance, and receive support from commandosfrom the Bala Hissar Fortress?” asked one of the Zenit operatives, who obviously wasfamiliar with Kabul.“According to intelligence reports, the guards are positively inclined towards theSoviet military men and will not open fire upon you,” assured an elder commander.“And if they do?” many voices asked. “What should we do then?”“Then,” the “senior sergeant” spoke sternly, “you will have to demonstrateeverything that you have been trained to do, and fulfill your task at any cost. Even,” hepaused, “at the cost of your own life. Any more questions?”Now there were no more questions remaining. The meeting’s participants departedin silence. Transport aircrafts containing personnel from the 345th Airborne Divisionbegan to land on the landing strip, one after another. The battalion and reconnaissance* Most probably, this would have been the deputy commander of the airborne troops, Lieutenant General N.Gus’kov.694
group arrived to support the detachment led by Senior Lieutenant Vostrotin. Still, it seemedas though there was not adequate military force to capture the whole city.At approximately the same time, Senior Military Adviser General Magometov calledMarshal Ustinov on the phone. “Comrade Minister, I have studied the situation and shouldstate with full responsibility that currently I do not have sufficient forces and means tosuccessfully fulfill the task, nor to subsequently maintain order in Kabul.”“What, are you a coward?” was Ustinov’s decisive reply.Magometov broke into a sweat. “Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, I am thinkingabout only one thing: how to successfully fulfill the task that has been assigned to me.”“So fulfill the task. Get busy.”Having connected with Gus’kov, and having received confirmation that theparatroopers had arrived, the senior military adviser issued the order to begin theiradvance.However, as soon as the first armored vehicles left the perimeter of the base, anorder to halt arrived.In Moscow, a council of military and KGB leaders, having analyzed the evolvingsituation after receiving information regarding the ineffectual attempt to poison HafizullahAmin, and having consulted with their representatives in Kabul, decided to postpone theoperation. This meant the adoption of the second scenario that had been discussed withinthe Politburo but that was never officially recorded. That scenario called for theintervention of the Soviet Limited Military Contingent and, only then, the assault ongovernment sites and the transfer of power in the capital.695
- Page 644 and 645: The helicopter brought Zaplatin to
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- Page 668 and 669: doubt flickered across his face. So
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- Page 732 and 733: BibliographyBooksAblazov, V. I. Afg
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- Page 738 and 739: from 1977-1983.Biryukov, L. I. —
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“Is it possible <strong>to</strong> see a floor plan of the palace?” someone inquired from the backrow.<strong>The</strong> seniors at the desk exchanged a look before one of them * confirmed, ratherwithout conviction, “We will familiarize you with the floor plan at a later point in time.”“What should we do with Amin after capturing the palace? Should he be takenprisoner? Should he be executed on the spot?”“This is not your concern. <strong>The</strong>re will be people there, including members of thePolitburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, who will take care of Amin. <strong>The</strong>y will knowwhat <strong>to</strong> do.”“What if the guards put up intense resistance, and receive support from commandosfrom the Bala Hissar Fortress?” asked one of the Zenit operatives, who obviously wasfamiliar with Kabul.“According <strong>to</strong> intelligence reports, the guards are positively inclined <strong>to</strong>wards theSoviet military men and will not open fire upon you,” assured an elder commander.“And if they do?” many voices asked. “What should we do then?”“<strong>The</strong>n,” the “senior sergeant” spoke sternly, “you will have <strong>to</strong> demonstrateeverything that you have been trained <strong>to</strong> do, and fulfill your task at any cost. Even,” hepaused, “at the cost of your own life. Any more questions?”Now there were no more questions remaining. <strong>The</strong> meeting’s participants departedin silence. Transport aircrafts containing personnel from the 345th Airborne Divisionbegan <strong>to</strong> land on the landing strip, one after another. <strong>The</strong> battalion and reconnaissance* Most probably, this would have been the deputy commander of the airborne troops, Lieutenant General N.Gus’kov.694
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