The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

“At this point, you should stop saying ‘you,’ and start saying ‘we,’” suggested BorisSemyonovich Ivanov, “as you are now among the very few who have been informed of theplan. You are hereby in charge of the army aspect of the operation. You should familiarizeGeneral Gus’kov with the plan.”Gus’kov, a paratrooper, having listened to Magometov’s presentation at Bagram,could not conceal his bewilderment. “Which wise-ass in Moscow has concocted this plan?When has attacking a well-defended enemy without having superiority in numbers or inany other area produced favorable results? Minus the surprise factor?” he asked indisbelief.The “wise-ass” behind the operation still remains unknown. No written directivesever arrived from the Ministry of Defense or the KGB. The author of the operation’s planhas never been revealed.On the twelfth of December, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSUissued its verdict. Taking into consideration the secrecy and sensitivity of the task at hand,the document (in a previously unheard-of fashion at the Central Committee) was handwrittenby Konstantin Chernenko. This is what was said in the document:“Under the Chairmanship of L.I. Brezhnev.Present: Suslov M.A., Grishin V.V., Kirilenko A.P., Pel’she A.Ya., Ustinov D.F., Chernenko K.U.,Andropov Y.V., Gromyko A.A., Tikhonov N.A., Ponomaryov B.N.Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 176/125Regarding the situation in “A”1. To approve the considerations and actions described by Comrades Andropov Y.V.,Ustinov D.F., Gromyko A.A. To permit, during the realization of these actions, forthem to introduce minor amendments. The issues that require decisions of the686

Central Committee should be introduced in a timely fashion to the Politburo.Implementation of all of these measures should be assigned to Comrades AndropovY.V., Ustinov D.F., Gromyko A.A.2. To task Comrades Andropov Y.V., Ustinov D.F., Gromyko A.A., to inform themembers of the Politburo of the Central Committee regarding the implementation ofthe planned actions.Secretary of the Central Committee, L.I. BrezhnevFew details about that fatal Politburo meeting are known. What is known is that thehead of the government, A.N. Kosygin, who appealed to his colleagues for a more balancedposition towards Afghanistan and who consistently rejected the idea of Soviet militaryintervention, was not present at the meeting because of illness. It is interesting to imaginehow he would have voted if he had been in the Kremlin on that day. All of the otherPolitburo members unanimously approved the document. It is also known that on thatparticular day, December 12, the Americans and their allies announced their plans todeploy new intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which upset strategic parity and wastherefore of great concern to the Soviet leadership.One might inquire as to the whereabouts of the note with the “considerations andactions” that were purportedly narrated by Ustinov, Andropov, and Gromyko. It is quitepossible that such a note never existed. Most probably, they narrated their argumentsorally. The cautious functionaries in those days tried not to leave any traces of their activityon paper, such as decrees, plans, and working notes. Even Afghanistan in that handwrittendocument is hidden shamefully under the letter “A.”But for Kryuchkov it was a clear signal that it was time to act, and he issued an orderto Kabul.687

Central Committee should be introduced in a timely fashion <strong>to</strong> the Politburo.Implementation of all of these measures should be assigned <strong>to</strong> Comrades AndropovY.V., Ustinov D.F., Gromyko A.A.2. To task Comrades Andropov Y.V., Ustinov D.F., Gromyko A.A., <strong>to</strong> inform themembers of the Politburo of the Central Committee regarding the implementation ofthe planned actions.Secretary of the Central Committee, L.I. BrezhnevFew details about that fatal Politburo meeting are known. What is known is that thehead of the government, A.N. Kosygin, who appealed <strong>to</strong> his colleagues for a more balancedposition <strong>to</strong>wards <strong>Afghanistan</strong> and who consistently rejected the idea of Soviet militaryintervention, was not present at the meeting because of illness. It is interesting <strong>to</strong> imaginehow he would have voted if he had been in the Kremlin on that day. All of the otherPolitburo members unanimously approved the document. It is also known that on thatparticular day, December 12, the Americans and their allies announced their plans <strong>to</strong>deploy new intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which upset strategic parity and wastherefore of great concern <strong>to</strong> the Soviet leadership.One might inquire as <strong>to</strong> the whereabouts of the note with the “considerations andactions” that were purportedly narrated by Ustinov, Andropov, and Gromyko. It is quitepossible that such a note never existed. Most probably, they narrated their argumentsorally. <strong>The</strong> cautious functionaries in those days tried not <strong>to</strong> leave any traces of their activityon paper, such as decrees, plans, and working notes. Even <strong>Afghanistan</strong> in that handwrittendocument is hidden shamefully under the letter “A.”But for Kryuchkov it was a clear signal that it was time <strong>to</strong> act, and he issued an order<strong>to</strong> Kabul.687

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