The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

However, there remained some problematic issues to address. In essence,Kryuchkov had to plan and implement a regime change in a satellite state of the USSR,which was absolutely sovereign. How would it be possible to explain to the rest of theworld that the Soviets appeared in Afghanistan because of multiple requests from thecountry’s leadership and overthrew that leadership immediately upon arrival? It would bemuch better for the Afghan opposition to be doing the dirty work behind the coup d’état.Then it would remain their internal affairs. But what if they were unable to do that? Whatto do about Amin? Should he be arrested, tried, and sentenced to death for all of the crimeshe committed? Should he be eliminated during the regime change campaign? Should he bebrought to the Soviet Union and be isolated there? The Politburo was not going to getinvolved over such “nuances.” It had made its principal decision. The rest would have to bedone by them, operatives of the KGB. Every mistake would prove costly.The difficulty was that Kryuchkov could rely on only a very small group of people todiscuss these issues. The level of secrecy was such that even some of his deputies had notcaught wind of the campaign.Certainly, it would be better to get rid of Amin during the coup; much of the problemhinged on physically eliminating him—no person, no problem. It could be treated as anexecution based on the sentence of a revolutionary trial. Such an option wouldn’t raiseparticular questions within Afghanistan, because everybody knew that Amin’s hands werecovered in blood. Moreover, the Soviet Union would have to thoroughly prepare responsesto the sensitive questions that would inevitably be asked by representatives of theinternational community, Soviet friends from the socialist bloc, and leaders of the Non-681