The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

to flex its muscles in the field. If the army passed the test, they would also achieve thepolitical goal of eliminating Amin and delivering a decisive blow to the rebels, beforereturning home to receive military honors.The marshal had no doubt that the campaign would not last longer than six months.Then, after having achieved its objectives, the army would depart, possibly havingestablished two or three stationary military bases in Afghanistan.The minister of defense’s rationale was fully supported by the chairman of the KGB.However, many of his close allies disagreed, first and foremost Nikolai Ogarkov, the head ofthe General Staff. Nikolai Vasilievich, unlike his boss, who perceived the world from aglobal planetary perspective, had thoroughly studied the specifics of the situation inAfghanistan. He familiarized himself with the sad experience of British military expeditionsto that country, and consulted with the few experts on the Middle East who worked in theCentral Committee of the CPSU, Foreign Ministry, and various academic institutions. Herequested several analytical papers to be prepared by scholars and experts, in which theyconsidered the option of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The conclusion wasgrim. Such a scenario would mean further escalation of military activity with the inevitableparticipation of the Soviet troops, which would give the West reason to considerablyexpand their assistance to the armed opposition. Such a step would be difficult to explaineven to friends from the socialist bloc. The prestige of the Soviet Union would suffer in theinternational arena. The military option was concluded as likely to result in more setbacksthan gains.Ogarkov made several attempts to explain all of this to his minister, and to cite moreand more new arguments. At first Ustinov listened silently, and occasionally a shadow of667