The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

To make a long story short, by the beginning of the 1980s, the world was again onthe verge of global catastrophe. Both sides were deeply suspicious, if not paranoid, inregards to each other’s military activities. These suspicions were triggered by the smallestshift in the geostrategic balance of forces. This is why the situation in the Middle Eastcaused Ustinov understandable anxiety.There was another important consideration of concern to the minister. Whileordinary citizens might be convinced by Soviet propaganda that the country’s armed forceswere capable of deterring any aggressor and winning any future wars, Ustinov himselfharbored great doubts about the actual infantry and naval capabilities of the Soviet Union.He was aware that during the last military exercise, many tanks and armored vehicles wereunable to leave their bases because of technical conditions related to their poor upkeep.Many of the tanks that did manage to leave their bases never made it to their targets due toproblems with both technology and personnel. The rockets that were launched did not hittheir targets, paratroopers landed in wrong locations, means of communication wereobsolete, coordination among the military detachments failed, readiness to mobilize was ata very low level, and military personnel of different ranks were engaged in stealing anddrinking.At the same time, the Americans, who had created a professional army, had farsurpassed the Soviets in the arenas of military readiness, training, coordination, anddiscipline. They had ample practice in Vietnam, as well as in other local conflicts. They werehighly mobile, were equipped with satellite reconnaissance technology, and displayed greatconfidence and occasional arrogance in military operations around the world. That’s whyUstinov considered Afghanistan an opportunity to test the Soviet army and its arsenals, and666