The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

you are constantly engaged in intrigues behind the minister’s back. Enough is enough!Fulfill the order.” He turned his back dramatically, effectively ceasing the conversation.Having left the minister’s office, the head of the General Staff called Kosygin, thechairman of the Council of Ministers, and Korniyenko, the first deputy foreign minister.Both of them shared Ogarkov’s position.“There is nothing to be done about it,” lamented the marshal. “Ustinov has nointerest in listening to me. He insists on his position.”So how did it happen that Politburo members who had so recently and categoricallyobjected to a military intervention in Afghan affairs changed their minds completely, andwere suddenly prepared to invade Afghanistan? This question has long mystified historiansand analysts. Alas, it will be impossible to give a precise answer to this question, because allof the participants in this fateful decision-making process are dead, and most officialdocuments pertaining to the situation have been destroyed or classified.Still, a thorough examination of the documents that survived, as well as analyses ofarticles, books, memoirs, archival materials, and interviews, allow for the followingconclusion: this decision resulted from the confluence of a number of serious concerns andcircumstances. The influential personages who pushed the decision through were Ministerof Defense of the USSR Marshal Dmitry Ustinov and Chairman of the KGB of the USSR YuriAndropov. These two officials were the ones who managed to convince the generalsecretary, as well as the Politburo, that there was no other way out of the situation. Allother options would likely lead to the loss of Afghanistan, which would represent a majorfailure in the ongoing standoff with the West.662