The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“We can bring in some of our troops to assist you in your efforts,” offered Brezhnevcongenially, expecting gratitude in response from the adviser. To his surprise, Gorelovobjected to Brezhnev’s suggestion.“This step makes no sense,” Gorelov replied. The Politburo members listened to theproceedings with their faces directed downwards toward the documents before them.“So, is it your belief that the Afghans are adequately equipped to deal with the threatof the mercenaries who are being deployed from Pakistani territory?” asked the generalsecretary, raising his thick eyebrows. “Without our assistance?”“Yes, I am certain of it, Leonid Ilyich. This is both my personal conviction and theopinion of General Pavlovsky, who has been examining the state of affairs in Afghanistanfor a significant amount of time. The Afghans can resolve the situation by themselves. Ourtroops should not be brought in.”“But, why?” Brezhnev looked around the room, astonished. The general secretaryobviously did not anticipate such a turn in the discussion. He had recently been told thatthe April Revolution was hanging by a thread in Afghanistan. He also was told that Gorelovwas a wartime general, a paratrooper, and a participant in the successful suppression ofthe counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. He obviously didn’t expect such a “pacifist”report from this general.“There are a number of reasons why we should abstain from military intervention.First, as I have already stated, the Afghans are capable of defeating rebel attacks bythemselves. They require some assistance in strengthening their border troops, as well assupplies of additional means of communication and military helicopters. Secondly, theAmericans will certainly take advantage of our military presence to openly and generously640