The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

had been studying the situation in Afghanistan for over two months, he summarized theirconversation as follows: “You didn’t understand anything there. You should not have goneto Amin.” He ceased communication with the general for a long spell thereafter.Pavlovsky, who was shocked by Ustinov’s reception, attempted to seek answersfrom an unsympathetic Ogarkov. “The minister doesn’t seek my advice on Afghanistaneither,” said Ogarkov. “He has other sources of information.”Ogarkov, who was sometimes present at meetings of the Politburo Commission,knew by then what those sources were. He understood why his reports were a source ofirritation for the minister. The decision to remove Hafizullah Amin from the political stagein favor of his successor, even if it required the possible participation of the Soviet military,was close to being reached at the very top of the Soviet leadership.A few documents from those autumn days, reflecting the mood of the upper echelonof the Kremlin and the evolution of the decision to invade Afghanistan from an initial policyof military non-interference, have been saved. But it is a fact that by the end of December,after the military intervention and Amin’s assassination, most of the foreign intelligencedocuments were destroyed according to Andropov’s direct orders. It is likely that the GRU’sand the Ministry of Defense’s archives shared a similar fate. This is why the few remainingdocuments, in addition to conversations with surviving participants of those events andtheir memoirs, had to suffice for the purposes of writing this book.In the fall, the closest entourage of the Soviet minister of defense felt that Ustinovwas displeased with his envoys to Kabul, wanted Amin’s blood, and was consideringsending some military units to Afghanistan to finalize the destruction of the counterrevolutionaryforces and to establish the needed stability in the region. However, the637