The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

In front of the minister of foreign affairs lay a report about the situation in Asia thathad been prepared by his experts. The situation was not evolving in the Soviet Union’sfavor. Relations with China had worsened. A year ago, it had reached the point of militaryclashes on the border. Then Chinese troops were diverted to Vietnam, which maintainedpro-Soviet politics. Though the Chinese were beaten there, there was no indication of theirstopping. The United States was actively pushing them against the USSR. The United Statesresumed diplomatic relations with Beijing and began to supply China with arms. There wasabsolutely precise information suggesting that China, as well as the USA, was activelyassisting Afghan rebels. Khomeini’s regime, which came to power after the IslamicRevolution in Iran, had also positioned itself as anti-Soviet and supported the Afghanpartisans. Almost all Arab countries were prepared to sponsor the Afghan resistance. So, ifwe lose Afghanistan, either the Americans and NATO or radical Islamists will take over,introducing an Islamist cancer that will spread towards the north, into our Central Asianrepublics. However, unlike Andropov and Ustinov, who leaned towards militaryintervention more and more, Gromyko was internally against the direct participation ofSoviet troops in the conflict. To him, this represented a failure of all the efforts of détentethat the Foreign Ministry had strived towards for the last decades. He realized theimpossibility of explaining this step that they were being forced to take to the world. Herealized that his ministry’s efforts, along with all of Soviet foreign policy, would bedamaged irreparably.“We cannot lose Afghanistan,” repeated Gromyko. “However, I would appeal for ouractions to be measured. Any mistake will cost us dearly.”629