The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
doctors, he continued to smoke his favorite Novost’ cigarettes until the end. All of the otherrecommendations he fulfilled precisely. It was rare for anyone in his entourage to seeBrezhnev irritated or anxious. Members of his inner circle were trying to protect thegeneral secretary and his family members from bad news that could have a negative impacton his health. And here was this disastrous story with Amin. There was no way to keepsuch a story, which involved the leader of a friendly country, away from Leonid Ilyich. Adecision on how to proceed in this situation would have to be made by Brezhnev himself;nobody from his entourage would be able to assume responsibility for such a decision onhis own. Brezhnev needed to be informed. Despite not feeling well, he had to try to graspthe situation. Unfortunately, the more he understood, the worse his mood became.What was happening? In the meetings, Afghan comrades gave oaths of fealty to thesocialist ideal, emphasized their unwavering friendship with the USSR, and calledthemselves younger brothers of the Soviets. The reality was that they couldn’t care less.“We are paying for thousands of advisers to work there, in every outlet of the Afghan state.We are providing economic and military assistance worth many millions of rubles, whichalone should give us the right to control the situation in the country, as we control thesituation in other socialist countries,” thought Brezhnev. And here arises this unsavorysituation. Some decision needed to be made, but what sort of decision should it be? LeonidIlyich was accustomed to decisions being made by others on his behalf. Those decisionstook form as thoroughly prepared documents placed on his desk for him to sign, withoutthinking too deeply about their content. And now all eyes were on him, waiting for him totake the lead on making such an important decision. Nobody dared to assumeresponsibility for the resolution of the situation.626
“Yura,” he addressed Andropov. “You promised me that not a hair on Taraki’s headwould be harmed. You told me that your people are in control of the situation. Would youcare to explain to me why all of this is happening?”“We have underestimated this Amin, Leonid Ilyich,” professed Andropov quietly.“He turned out to be more insidious than we imagined. He played us very well. He woulddeclare one thing to our comrades, while behind our back he plotted his evil deeds.”“We congratulated him on his election to the top positions in Afghanistan,” Gromykoreminded his colleagues. “Now our ambassador informs us that Amin wishes to come toMoscow on an official visit as the head of state and the party.”Leonid Ilyich furrowed his famous brows and looked increasingly severe. “What,will I have to kiss this adventurist now?”“He cannot be received in Moscow under any circumstances,” responded theminister of defense with an executive air.“We can tell Amin that the schedule of state and working visits for this year is filledup, and there are no opportunities to receive him in the near future,” suggested Gromyko.“He can come next year. We will wait and see what happens in the meantime.”“Yes, the situation in Afghanistan is complicated,” nodded Brezhnev gravely. “Let’smake a decision on how to proceed. I understand, Yura, that your shop doesn’t trust thisAmin too much?”“Yes, we have some alarming information,” said Andropov, shuffling a stack ofpapers in front of him. “I’ve already reported to you before that Amin has committed graveoffenses. He has conducted acts of repression against prominent party members. He is anovert Pashtun nationalist. There are rumblings of possible ties with American special627
- Page 576 and 577: issued cargo boxes.These preparatio
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doc<strong>to</strong>rs, he continued <strong>to</strong> smoke his favorite Novost’ cigarettes until the end. All of the otherrecommendations he fulfilled precisely. It was rare for anyone in his en<strong>to</strong>urage <strong>to</strong> seeBrezhnev irritated or anxious. Members of his inner circle were trying <strong>to</strong> protect thegeneral secretary and his family members from bad news that could have a negative impac<strong>to</strong>n his health. And here was this disastrous s<strong>to</strong>ry with Amin. <strong>The</strong>re was no way <strong>to</strong> keepsuch a s<strong>to</strong>ry, which involved the leader of a friendly country, away from Leonid Ilyich. Adecision on how <strong>to</strong> proceed in this situation would have <strong>to</strong> be made by Brezhnev himself;nobody from his en<strong>to</strong>urage would be able <strong>to</strong> assume responsibility for such a decision onhis own. Brezhnev needed <strong>to</strong> be informed. Despite not feeling well, he had <strong>to</strong> try <strong>to</strong> graspthe situation. Unfortunately, the more he unders<strong>to</strong>od, the worse his mood became.What was happening? In the meetings, Afghan comrades gave oaths of fealty <strong>to</strong> thesocialist ideal, emphasized their unwavering friendship with the USSR, and calledthemselves younger brothers of the Soviets. <strong>The</strong> reality was that they couldn’t care less.“We are paying for thousands of advisers <strong>to</strong> work there, in every outlet of the Afghan state.We are providing economic and military assistance worth many millions of rubles, whichalone should give us the right <strong>to</strong> control the situation in the country, as we control thesituation in other socialist countries,” thought Brezhnev. And here arises this unsavorysituation. Some decision needed <strong>to</strong> be made, but what sort of decision should it be? LeonidIlyich was accus<strong>to</strong>med <strong>to</strong> decisions being made by others on his behalf. Those decisions<strong>to</strong>ok form as thoroughly prepared documents placed on his desk for him <strong>to</strong> sign, withoutthinking <strong>to</strong>o deeply about their content. And now all eyes were on him, waiting for him <strong>to</strong>take the lead on making such an important decision. Nobody dared <strong>to</strong> assumeresponsibility for the resolution of the situation.626
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