The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

It was clear that the Center had to react somehow to these alarming signals. Andreact it did. Intelligence operatives were sent to European countries to conductconsultations with representatives of the opposition, including Karmal, Sarwari, Gulabzoi,and other prominent PDPA members living in exile. Those exiled politicians sent a letter tothe Central Committee of the CPSU. The letter read, “We are prepared to return toAfghanistan at any moment in order to begin an uprising against the treacherous, antipopularregime.”In early October, Moscow continued to cling to its former position of rejectingrequests for direct military intervention. The exiles’ letter maintained the illusion that theAfghans could solve the problem themselves, without the need for military interference bythe USSR.Kryuchkov had been preparing to work personally with Babrak Karmal inCzechoslovakia before Andropov unexpectedly cancelled the scheduled trip. “It’s too riskyto expose you,” said the KGB chairman. “Who knows how the situation will evolve?”Kryuchkov’s persona at the time was top secret. As a result of this cancelation, the verysame Alexei Petrov whom the Parchami leader had known for a long time went inKryuchkov’s place to the meeting.Karmal learned of Taraki’s death through a BBC broadcast. That morning atbreakfast he commented ominously: “I warned him. And, mark my word, this is only thebeginning. The death toll will continue to rise.” When Petrov arrived to see him, he realizedimmediately that there would soon be major changes in his life. The foreign intelligenceofficer and Karmal held a confidential meeting in one of the four rooms that had beenallocated to the family of the disgraced politician. The next day, Karmal announced to his620