The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

issue an official note today. I think that one week will be sufficient for Comrade Puzanov todeal with all formalities related to his departure. What do you think?”Safronchuk, who was by then accustomed to such a provocative manner, did notrespond, and simply shrugged his shoulders.***By the end of October, representatives of Soviet foreign intelligence in Kabul(Ivanov, Bogdanov, Osadchiy) clearly sensed in which direction the wind was blowing. Itwas clear that Amin’s days were numbered. In cables sent from Kabul to the Center,emphasis was placed on anti-Soviet discourse that became increasingly apparent in thenew leader’s entourage. One source reported that there were some suggestions maderegarding the need for Afghanistan to become more independent from the Soviet Union.The Soviet model of socialism was criticized, characterized as impoverished and hopeless.It was suggested that Afghanistan would be better off following Egypt’s example byorienting itself towards the Islamic world and rejecting large-scale military assistance fromMoscow. The other cable detailed hostile acts of Afghan special services toward Sovietcitizens who worked in the DRA. Claims that Soviet citizens had been followed, thatcompromising material had been collected, and that some Soviet citizens had receiveddirect threats began to mount. Another report stated that Amin’s people were attemptingto establish a dialogue with representatives from the counter-revolutionary movement—religious extremists—and had made promises in the name of the Afghan leadership toexpel Soviet specialists from the country. A conclusion had been reached. Amin and hisclosest allies would lead to the defeat of the revolution and the collapse of the party.619