The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

“You insist that I gather my comrades to tell them that everything I said before isuntrue. Is this what you want? Of course, I deeply respect you all and am prepared to dojust that—but I ask you, is this the appropriate course of action? Would it be wise to recallthe brochure titled ‘The Truth about the Failed Assassination Attempt on Comrade Amin,’which has already been distributed to every army detachment? Wouldn’t that damage ourparty and sully my name as its general secretary?”“Shah Wali’s statement has already damaged Soviet-Afghan relations,” Puzanov wasquick to point out.“Don’t worry, Comrade Ambassador. Nothing can damage our friendship. Ourenemies have no chance of this happening. I give you my word: we are moving forward onthe socialist path step by step. This is the essence of the current moment.”“And we value this highly,” Bogdanov volunteered. “But now we are talking ofsomething else. Moscow expects you to somehow correct this misunderstanding.”“Misunderstanding?” Amin interrupted. “But this misunderstanding is simply yourattempt to denounce the truth! This is not according to communist or Leninist principles.Certainly, you have the right to question our position and to point out our mistakes. Forexample, you can say that four Afghan ministers, on the eve of that incident, did not arriveat the Soviet embassy, and did not attempt to mobilize the military detachments againstme.” Amin looked solemnly upon his guests, whose faces had darkened. “No, you’d betternot insist on refuting the facts. Refutation would reflect poorly on the party and country.They will say that it was done under pressure from the USSR. I am offering you a differentoption. You may inform the ambassadors from the socialist countries about your version ofevents, and we will not object to that.”615