The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
soon considered to be equivalent to a general’s rank. Outside of the USSR, only the GermanDemocratic Republic was home to such an extensive network of KGB operatives.The intelligence operatives paid particular attention to every development dealingwith the Afghan leaders’ interactions with contacts from the USA, China, and Pakistan.However, there wasn’t much to report. All meetings with the Americans took placeofficially, with the approval of Soviet representatives (usually Safronchuk). As for attemptsto improve relations with Pakistan, they were undertaken according to recommendationsfrom the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It was in both Kabul’sand Moscow’s interest to suppress any anti-Afghan sentiment in Islamabad andWashington. Trying to improve relations with Afghanistan’s southern neighbor, Amin evendeclared his consent to postpone resolution of the Pashtun issue, a move that had beenrecommended to him for a long time by his Soviet “friends.” However, Islamabad didn’texpress any particular joy in its response. It was conducting its own game, with theAmericans pulling the strings. The United States’ response to Amin’s offer to normalizebilateral relations was reserved and inconclusive.In October, Amstutz was replaced by a diplomat named Archer Blood. During ameeting with Blood, Amin asked to resume American economic assistance to Afghanistan.However, Blood, who had received specific instructions from the U.S. State Department,responded coldly. “We will be prepared to consider your request only when we receive asatisfactory explanation regarding the murder of Mr. Dubs.” Later, Amstutz wrote in hisbook, “Amin didn’t have any pro-American sentiments. Having been deputy prime ministerand minister of foreign affairs, prime minister, then finally president, Amin undertook fewefforts to gain the trust and support of the United States.”604
Having disassociated himself from his predecessor in many respects, and havingimmediately banished Taraki’s name from public discourse, Amin, as before, continued topester Moscow with requests for military intervention. His demands ranged from abattalion for his personal protection to reinforcements to fight the rebels in the north ofAfghanistan. He received varied responses to those requests, but the essence remained thesame: it was not possible to send troops. Amin himself would have to take care of thesituation using available resources.Did Amin understand that he would not be forgiven for his ruthless murder ofTaraki, and that the Soviet leadership would be unable to resume relations on the sameterms as before? Obvious signs emerged of cooling relations with Moscow. He could sensethis in Puzanov’s and Safronchuk’s eyes.Amin tried to undertake efforts to re-establish the Kremlin’s trust. However, if hehad become a parricide in the eyes of the Moscow leadership, he personally did notperceive his actions as any sort of transgression. He was hardly tormented by hisconscience. On the contrary, he sincerely believed that by removing and killing his“teacher,” he had acted in the best interests of Afghanistan. He considered his actions as anextension of a centuries-old tradition in which the ruler would be overthrown andmercilessly destroyed. None of this had been Amin’s creation—he was merely the son of hispeople, a Pashtun, and acted according to those unwritten laws that he had inheritedthrough his mother’s milk.But the fact remained that Moscow obviously didn’t trust him as they had trustedhis predecessor, and he felt this mistrust in subtle details of subsequent developments.605
- Page 554 and 555: the couch to flip through the Sovie
- Page 556 and 557: custody of the Armed Forces of Afgh
- Page 558 and 559: “I don’t think that will ever h
- Page 560 and 561: you over to Amin,” Starostin repl
- Page 562 and 563: Taraki, his family, or his allies.
- Page 564 and 565: second truck would monitor the inte
- Page 566 and 567: currency. Boris Semyonovich ordered
- Page 568 and 569: session so that we might hear his e
- Page 570 and 571: disappearance of Sarwari and the fo
- Page 572 and 573: eplacing him, why did you shelter a
- Page 574 and 575: interlocutor, ignoring Kurilov’s
- Page 576 and 577: issued cargo boxes.These preparatio
- Page 578 and 579: compact, they faced less difficulty
- Page 580 and 581: and the convoy continued its drive
- Page 582 and 583: suggested that he thoroughly clean
- Page 584 and 585: opposition figures was an obvious e
- Page 586 and 587: “So Taraki’s time is over?” a
- Page 588 and 589: said Zaplatin emphatically. Ustinov
- Page 590 and 591: “This is good. Please tell me, wh
- Page 592 and 593: military intervention.” But it al
- Page 594 and 595: expressed.“It is now clear that w
- Page 596 and 597: We were left untouched for the next
- Page 598 and 599: Chapter 8:Death Sentence“The city
- Page 600 and 601: living. They knew that the armed fo
- Page 602 and 603: were expelled from local authoritie
- Page 606 and 607: In the middle of October, military
- Page 608 and 609: The next morning, Bogdanov’s peop
- Page 610 and 611: “We ought to serve,” the ambass
- Page 612 and 613: the translation, was shocked. It wa
- Page 614 and 615: “May I speak to you not according
- Page 616 and 617: In concluding his speech, Amin said
- Page 618 and 619: contribution to this transformation
- Page 620 and 621: It was clear that the Center had to
- Page 622 and 623: circumstances. All conversations of
- Page 624 and 625: attaché reported, “Amin managed
- Page 626 and 627: doctors, he continued to smoke his
- Page 628 and 629: services, which we are currently in
- Page 630 and 631: “We’ve heard this before, Andre
- Page 632 and 633: and hydrogen bombs. He was the mini
- Page 634 and 635: The results of the discussion were
- Page 636 and 637: If facts indicating a change in Ami
- Page 638 and 639: minister understood the difficultie
- Page 640 and 641: “We can bring in some of our troo
- Page 642 and 643: Having returned to Kabul, Gorelov s
- Page 644 and 645: The helicopter brought Zaplatin to
- Page 646 and 647: intervention in Afghanistan. Ustino
- Page 648 and 649: Soviet Union. The first secretary o
- Page 650 and 651: Collectively, all of those factors
- Page 652 and 653: state. They would be informed as to
Having disassociated himself from his predecessor in many respects, and havingimmediately banished Taraki’s name from public discourse, Amin, as before, continued <strong>to</strong>pester Moscow with requests for military intervention. His demands ranged from abattalion for his personal protection <strong>to</strong> reinforcements <strong>to</strong> fight the rebels in the north of<strong>Afghanistan</strong>. He received varied responses <strong>to</strong> those requests, but the essence remained thesame: it was not possible <strong>to</strong> send troops. Amin himself would have <strong>to</strong> take care of thesituation using available resources.Did Amin understand that he would not be forgiven for his ruthless murder ofTaraki, and that the Soviet leadership would be unable <strong>to</strong> resume relations on the sameterms as before? Obvious signs emerged of cooling relations with Moscow. He could sensethis in Puzanov’s and Safronchuk’s eyes.Amin tried <strong>to</strong> undertake efforts <strong>to</strong> re-establish the Kremlin’s trust. However, if hehad become a parricide in the eyes of the Moscow leadership, he personally did notperceive his actions as any sort of transgression. He was hardly <strong>to</strong>rmented by hisconscience. On the contrary, he sincerely believed that by removing and killing his“teacher,” he had acted in the best interests of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. He considered his actions as anextension of a centuries-old tradition in which the ruler would be overthrown andmercilessly destroyed. None of this had been Amin’s creation—he was merely the son of hispeople, a Pashtun, and acted according <strong>to</strong> those unwritten laws that he had inheritedthrough his mother’s milk.But the fact remained that Moscow obviously didn’t trust him as they had trustedhis predecessor, and he felt this mistrust in subtle details of subsequent developments.605
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