The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

soon considered to be equivalent to a general’s rank. Outside of the USSR, only the GermanDemocratic Republic was home to such an extensive network of KGB operatives.The intelligence operatives paid particular attention to every development dealingwith the Afghan leaders’ interactions with contacts from the USA, China, and Pakistan.However, there wasn’t much to report. All meetings with the Americans took placeofficially, with the approval of Soviet representatives (usually Safronchuk). As for attemptsto improve relations with Pakistan, they were undertaken according to recommendationsfrom the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It was in both Kabul’sand Moscow’s interest to suppress any anti-Afghan sentiment in Islamabad andWashington. Trying to improve relations with Afghanistan’s southern neighbor, Amin evendeclared his consent to postpone resolution of the Pashtun issue, a move that had beenrecommended to him for a long time by his Soviet “friends.” However, Islamabad didn’texpress any particular joy in its response. It was conducting its own game, with theAmericans pulling the strings. The United States’ response to Amin’s offer to normalizebilateral relations was reserved and inconclusive.In October, Amstutz was replaced by a diplomat named Archer Blood. During ameeting with Blood, Amin asked to resume American economic assistance to Afghanistan.However, Blood, who had received specific instructions from the U.S. State Department,responded coldly. “We will be prepared to consider your request only when we receive asatisfactory explanation regarding the murder of Mr. Dubs.” Later, Amstutz wrote in hisbook, “Amin didn’t have any pro-American sentiments. Having been deputy prime ministerand minister of foreign affairs, prime minister, then finally president, Amin undertook fewefforts to gain the trust and support of the United States.”604