The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
living. They knew that the armed forces were fully controlled by Amin, and they had littlechance of receiving support from other military detachments. Their assault was more anact of desperation than a well-planned operation.By the evening, several tanks had demolished the division headquarters and thenbegan to advance on Kabul. Nobody could say what the purpose was behind theirmovement, but the Soviet embassy was alarmed. At a Soviet ambassadorial meeting, ananxious General Gorelov reported that the Tarakist rebels had the capacity to destroy halfof Kabul, potentially leading to casualties among the Soviets. “I have already given theorder for aviation to hit the rebels from the sky,” Gorelov said.“According to our information, these tank commanders advanced under the slogans‘Long live Taraki’ and ‘Long live the Soviet Union,’” Bogdanov told Gorelov. “Are youplanning on killing friends of the Soviet Union? We shouldn’t interfere,” he argued. “Letthem figure it out for themselves.”It is possible that the KGB representative secretly hoped that the rebels wouldsomehow pass through the city, take control over the People’s Palace, and destroy Amin. Itwas certainly against the odds, but who could tell? On April 27 of the previous year,Watanjar also had begun his assault against Daoud’s regime with just a few tanks, yet hesucceeded. Just in case, Bogdanov called Kryuchkov and described his position to hissuperior, who did not object.But Gorelov would get his way—he and the other military advisers gave the ordersto suppress the assault, and some even directly participated in subsequent battles againstthe pro-Taraki rebels.600
A secure telephone was in a windowless room adjacent to the ambassador’s office.Puzanov overheard some conversations with Moscow through the door that had been leftslightly opened. Deputy Minister of Defense Pavlovsky was speaking with Ustinov, andprovided his version of events. The next minute, KGB Representative Bogdanov calledKryuchkov and reported a completely different version of what had transpired. Tensionfrom an underlying rivalry between the Soviet agencies in Kabul reached its peak duringthose days.Gorelov was convinced that the KGB was responsible for the armed assault againstAmin. He was so confident in his assessment that when he saw a staff member fromBogdanov’s office sitting in the reception area for the ambassador’s office on the followingday, he couldn’t resist a snide remark. “What, are you here to mourn your failure?” Theobviously perplexed staff member asked, “What are you talking about?” By then themilitary detachments loyal to Amin, assisted by Soviet advisers, had completely defeatedthe rebels.The same could not be said about the situation in other regions in Afghanistan.Taking advantage of the chaos that followed the shift in power in Kabul, detachments of themilitary opposition considerably expanded their spheres of influence. In some northernand southern provinces of the DRA, the opposition controlled up to ninety percent of theterritory, including highways and regional centers. Provincial cities remained underKabul’s nominal control. At the end of each day, the arrival of darkness ushered in theauthority of rebel movements.The organs of local power, which were weak to begin with, were now subject to newpurges. Remaining underground Parchamis and anyone suspected of sympathy to Taraki601
- Page 550 and 551: “No, thank you. I’d rather she
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- Page 554 and 555: the couch to flip through the Sovie
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- Page 560 and 561: you over to Amin,” Starostin repl
- Page 562 and 563: Taraki, his family, or his allies.
- Page 564 and 565: second truck would monitor the inte
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- Page 568 and 569: session so that we might hear his e
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- Page 572 and 573: eplacing him, why did you shelter a
- Page 574 and 575: interlocutor, ignoring Kurilov’s
- Page 576 and 577: issued cargo boxes.These preparatio
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- Page 584 and 585: opposition figures was an obvious e
- Page 586 and 587: “So Taraki’s time is over?” a
- Page 588 and 589: said Zaplatin emphatically. Ustinov
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- Page 594 and 595: expressed.“It is now clear that w
- Page 596 and 597: We were left untouched for the next
- Page 598 and 599: Chapter 8:Death Sentence“The city
- Page 602 and 603: were expelled from local authoritie
- Page 604 and 605: soon considered to be equivalent to
- Page 606 and 607: In the middle of October, military
- Page 608 and 609: The next morning, Bogdanov’s peop
- Page 610 and 611: “We ought to serve,” the ambass
- Page 612 and 613: the translation, was shocked. It wa
- Page 614 and 615: “May I speak to you not according
- Page 616 and 617: In concluding his speech, Amin said
- Page 618 and 619: contribution to this transformation
- Page 620 and 621: It was clear that the Center had to
- Page 622 and 623: circumstances. All conversations of
- Page 624 and 625: attaché reported, “Amin managed
- Page 626 and 627: doctors, he continued to smoke his
- Page 628 and 629: services, which we are currently in
- Page 630 and 631: “We’ve heard this before, Andre
- Page 632 and 633: and hydrogen bombs. He was the mini
- Page 634 and 635: The results of the discussion were
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- Page 638 and 639: minister understood the difficultie
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- Page 642 and 643: Having returned to Kabul, Gorelov s
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living. <strong>The</strong>y knew that the armed forces were fully controlled by Amin, and they had littlechance of receiving support from other military detachments. <strong>The</strong>ir assault was more anact of desperation than a well-planned operation.By the evening, several tanks had demolished the division headquarters and thenbegan <strong>to</strong> advance on Kabul. Nobody could say what the purpose was behind theirmovement, but the Soviet embassy was alarmed. At a Soviet ambassadorial meeting, ananxious General Gorelov reported that the Tarakist rebels had the capacity <strong>to</strong> destroy halfof Kabul, potentially leading <strong>to</strong> casualties among the Soviets. “I have already given theorder for aviation <strong>to</strong> hit the rebels from the sky,” Gorelov said.“According <strong>to</strong> our information, these tank commanders advanced under the slogans‘Long live Taraki’ and ‘Long live the Soviet Union,’” Bogdanov <strong>to</strong>ld Gorelov. “Are youplanning on killing friends of the Soviet Union? We shouldn’t interfere,” he argued. “Letthem figure it out for themselves.”It is possible that the KGB representative secretly hoped that the rebels wouldsomehow pass through the city, take control over the People’s Palace, and destroy Amin. Itwas certainly against the odds, but who could tell? On April 27 of the previous year,Watanjar also had begun his assault against Daoud’s regime with just a few tanks, yet hesucceeded. Just in case, Bogdanov called Kryuchkov and described his position <strong>to</strong> hissuperior, who did not object.But Gorelov would get his way—he and the other military advisers gave the orders<strong>to</strong> suppress the assault, and some even directly participated in subsequent battles againstthe pro-Taraki rebels.600
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