The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

military intervention.” But it also observed that, “it’s obvious that the Soviet interests inAfghanistan are more ambitious today than before the coup in 1978. The establishment of aMarxist state in Afghanistan is now considered by Moscow as an important factor inconfirming its strategic and political interests in the region.”The ambiguity of the document created the impression that the intelligence analystswho worked on it were protecting themselves in case of different outcomes as the situationevolved. It was obvious that they were uncertain as to Moscow’s likely behavior in theforeseeable future.That was not surprising, as Moscow itself lacked such clarity.It was also obvious from the memorandum that the CIA operatives did a good job oftracing KGB contacts with the Parchamis who lived in Western Europe. The authors of thedocument report that Soviet representatives attempted to convince the oppositionmembers to return to Afghanistan, where they were promised support in organizing amilitary coup. It is possible that some of the Parcham leaders who lived in exile had,willingly or otherwise, provided Americans with this information.Formally, the United States was on friendly terms with the DRA. They continued toprovide Afghanistan with modest economic assistance. The last major American politicianwho visited the country was Deputy Secretary of State Newsom, in July. He signed anagreement for the construction of an irrigation complex in Gilmand with U.S. assistance, aswell as provision of American assistance for a wheat production program. But behind theveil of official politics, America’s secret strategy of supporting armed opposition wasrapidly unfolding. The Islamic radicals they armed and nurtured would become the chiefenemies of the United States only two decades later.592