The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

said Zaplatin emphatically. Ustinov, having heard these accounts, gloomily advised hisgenerals to work more closely with the KGB operatives upon their return to Afghanistan. Ahint of the minister’s irritation was captured in the advice he gave: “The KGB and GRU aresending us somewhat different information. You cannot agree amongst yourselves, but we,here, are the ones who have to make the decisions.” The principled Zaplatin opened hismouth to complain about Bogdanov and his team, saying, “Once they start drinking less,you will receive more objective information,” but the minister was not interested in such arebuke. The advisers were immediately dismissed in response.Gorelov, along with Ivanov and Puzanov, was invited to a meeting of the PolitburoCommission on Afghanistan, at which the possibility of Soviet intervention in Afghanistanwas discussed for the first time. Puzanov, as was his custom, or perhaps at the behest of hissuperior Gromyko, responded vaguely and formulaically—“On the one hand, on the otherhand.” Ivanov did not exclude Soviet military intervention, though he clarified thecircumstances under which it would likely occur. Gorelov was the only one to insist thatSoviet military presence in the DRA should not be strengthened. He held that the Afghanarmed forces were capable of resolving their tasks on their own.Contacts at the highest level between Afghan and Soviet leaders had not yet beenfrozen completely, but they were put on hold. The only Soviet Politburo member to meet arepresentative from the Afghan Politburo was Gromyko. He spoke with DRA Minister ofForeign Affairs Shah Wali during a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nationsin New York. Andrei Andreyevich asked his Afghan colleague to describe the situation inAfghanistan.“Things are calm now in Afghanistan,” Shah Wali assured his Soviet colleague.588