The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

September in Moscow passed with government officials surveying the new politicallandscape. Alarming information from Kabul arrived daily and was fed into the analyses forthe CPSU Central Committee, the KGB, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of ForeignAffairs. Memoranda were written, proposals were formulated, and classified meetings wereheld behind closed doors. No strategic steps related to regime change were yet taken, butthe time for such action was fast approaching.On September 21 Andropov personally conducted a meeting of the KGB leadership inwhich he sharply criticized Amin’s actions during the takeover. However, he appealed to allpersonnel of the security services currently working in the DRA to continue their workwith the regime and to avoid any provocations. “We should take the objective situation intoconsideration,” said the chairman diplomatically, “and we should take all necessarymeasures to maintain our cooperation with and our influence over Amin.”Senior Military Advisers Gorelov and Zaplatin were summoned to Moscow to presenttheir reports on the situation a week later. Epishev, the head of the Main PoliticalDirectorate, Ogarkov, the head of the General Staff, Ustinov, the minister of defense, andPonomaryov, a secretary of the Central Committee, took turns listening to the advisers’reports. Gorelov and Zaplatin were constantly asked about Amin’s real persona, whether hecould be trusted, and how sincere his loyalty was to the USSR.The generals remained loyal to their prior positions. They spoke very highly of thenew Afghan leader’s business qualities, remarked on his tendency for the theatrical,recalled his Pashtun nationalism, and did not deny his cruelty towards political opponents.As to his “Sovietism,” both Gorelov and Zaplatin assured their interlocutors of Amin’sreliability and loyalty. “He has two most sacred holidays a year, November 7 and May 9,”587