The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Taraki, his family, or his allies. Our representatives went again to meet with Amin, and againthey voiced the full range of arguments for a united Afghan leadership. Amin reassured usthat, as a true friend of the Soviet Union, he would do everything in his power to fully followSoviet advice, as well as promote cooperation between the USSR and the DRA. He furtheradded that the departure of Taraki not only didn’t harm the unity of the party, but on thecontrary brought the party closer together.Clearly, neither Puzanov nor the colleagues would leave without an explicit guaranteefrom Amin that Taraki would remain safe. They had to report the results of that conversationto Moscow immediately. Amin simply mocked them. He said that the PDPA Politburomembers, at a meeting that took place several hours ago, voiced their desire to remove Tarakifrom all of his government positions. “But last night you promised to let him remain thechairman of the Revolutionary Council,” Puzanov attempted to object. Amin shrugged hisshoulders and responded that he would do everything in his power, but that the will of theparty was law.On that very day I reported my thoughts on the Afghan ministers who were still residingat the Zenit villa. Soon I received a call from the head of intelligence, who told me that thedecision had been made at “the very top” to secretly evacuate the Afghans to the USSR. Iimmediately went to the villa in order to confirm their willingness to leave the country.Fortunately, I didn’t have to spend much time convincing them that this was their onlyrecourse. They understood that they would not otherwise survive.***Once the Soviet leadership in Moscow recovered from the initial shock of HafizullahAmin’s treachery, it began to consider military options to resolve the problem situation.562