The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

of the fugitives’ plans based on the conversation he had with his guests. He decided not toexplain why the Afghans had arrived at his home instead of, say, Bogdanov’s. Starostindecided he would make up some plausible explanation if the Center should becomeinterested in the matter.He deliberately withheld the information that he had invited the fugitive Afghans tohis home, knowing that he had no right to issue such an invitation as a regular intelligenceoperative. It would appear to Moscow that he was taking blatantly inappropriate libertiesbeyond his position, which could result in most undesirable consequences.Strangely, neither Orlov-Morozov, who sent the cable to the Center, nor the staffmembers at the Center inquired about how three members of the gang of four had foundthemselves in Valery’s home.The deputy resident did not have time to ask these kinds of questions and spend timelogically piecing together the puzzle on the evening of September 14, 1979. He was busytrying to manage a barrage of events and developments. What to do with the Khalqis, whowere basically holding Starostin’s family hostage? What to do with Amin, who hadcommitted a coup d’etat and effectively removed from power the head of state and party,Taraki, who just four days ago was being kissed by Brezhnev? How were they to saveTaraki’s life? On that September day, the deputy resident appeared to have finally graspedthe full drama of the situation for the first time. His face was pale and his lips trembled.Stuttering slightly, the deputy resident asked, “Valery, are you going to go backthere?”“Of course, Alexander Victorovich. My wife is there.”“Let me stop by the house and pick her up after you return,” offered Orlov-Morozov.549