The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
had helped create. It was clear that his actions would force his leadership into anunenviable position, in which they would face very grave and very complicated decisions.Suspects, state criminals wanted for questioning by the special services of a friendly, evenbrotherly, host country, found shelter in the house of a Soviet diplomat per his owninvitation. The predicament had the potential to become a serious political fiasco. Whatwould the intelligence leadership decide to do now? The incident would be reported to thevery top, and from there any action would have to be considered by the Soviet Politburo.What kind of decision would its members come to? Would they sacrifice the rebels toappease state interests and satisfy Amin? Would they take advantage of the situation tobreak ties with the dishonest and ambitious political adventurist, who was unstoppable inhis thirst for power? If that’s the case, then I must reveal Amin’s true character to the Sovietleadership and justify my brash action.Starostin took out his notebook, sat on the couch beside Sarwari and Watanjar, andaddressed them. “You all accuse Amin of collaborating with the CIA. This line of reasoningis corroborated by many aspects of his behavior and biography. Let me tell youconfidentially that my comrades and I have written about this possibility to Moscow. Butdo you have any specific evidence of his allegiance?”“We have this evidence,” decisively declared the Afghans.“So,” thought Valery. “It’s possible that today I will have an opportunity to receiveconfidential information from two ministers and the head of the national security serviceson the issue of the second-in-command’s involvement with the CIA intelligence network. Acable to the Center containing this information could be earthshaking.”The guests began to cite a series of facts, all of which suggested that Amin carried out546
anti-party and anti-state activities against Parchamis. They spoke of his secretcollaboration with the Americans and his confidential ties with Kabul’s criminalunderworld. Starostin began compiling the text for his cable to the Center right then andthere.Historians who later studied the events of that period would title this document “TenPoints of Evidence of Hafizullah Amin’s Involvement with the CIA Spy Network and Kabul’sCriminal Underworld.” In reality, the title of Starostin’s cable was much shorter and lessexotic. Referring to Sarwari and the ministers, the cable described Amin’s secret meetingswith a staff member of the American embassy in Kabul who was thought to be anundercover intelligence officer. A specific estate in Paghman, in the suburbs of Kabul,where the meetings had occurred, was named. Sarwari also mentioned that Amin had madean earlier attempt to assassinate his “great teacher.” Specifically, on September 11, theplane that flew Taraki back to Afghanistan was to be “mistakenly” shot down by the airdefense systems covering Kabul airport. Sarwari had personally arrested the traitors then.Watanjar described how Mir Akbar Khyber, the prominent PDPA activist, was murdered inKabul by notorious bandits connected to Sadyk Alemyar, a member of the PDPA CentralCommittee and loyal friend and ally of Amin. Amin had ordered the assassinationpersonally. Khyber, who was highly respected among party members, had taken uponhimself the role of “buffer” in the relationship between Taraki and Karmal. Not only did hemediate their relationship, but also his general presence had a very calming effect on thePDPA leaders. Since the day Amin joined the party, he operated with the goal of driving awedge between the leaders and preventing Karmal’s rise to prominence. The ministers alsodescribed an intimate but little-known friendship between Amin and pro-American547
- Page 496 and 497: carry out a coup d’etat by overth
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- Page 508 and 509: Petrov responded sternly, briefly s
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- Page 520 and 521: greeting, he informed me that Amin
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- Page 524 and 525: I suggested that we kick them out i
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- Page 528 and 529: his friends had already been arrest
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- Page 538 and 539: Taraki called Amin and spoke in Pas
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- Page 548 and 549: activists.After he drafted the cabl
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- Page 564 and 565: second truck would monitor the inte
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- Page 586 and 587: “So Taraki’s time is over?” a
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had helped create. It was clear that his actions would force his leadership in<strong>to</strong> anunenviable position, in which they would face very grave and very complicated decisions.Suspects, state criminals wanted for questioning by the special services of a friendly, evenbrotherly, host country, found shelter in the house of a Soviet diplomat per his owninvitation. <strong>The</strong> predicament had the potential <strong>to</strong> become a serious political fiasco. Whatwould the intelligence leadership decide <strong>to</strong> do now? <strong>The</strong> incident would be reported <strong>to</strong> thevery <strong>to</strong>p, and from there any action would have <strong>to</strong> be considered by the Soviet Politburo.What kind of decision would its members come <strong>to</strong>? Would they sacrifice the rebels <strong>to</strong>appease state interests and satisfy Amin? Would they take advantage of the situation <strong>to</strong>break ties with the dishonest and ambitious political adventurist, who was uns<strong>to</strong>ppable inhis thirst for power? If that’s the case, then I must reveal Amin’s true character <strong>to</strong> the Sovietleadership and justify my brash action.Starostin <strong>to</strong>ok out his notebook, sat on the couch beside Sarwari and Watanjar, andaddressed them. “You all accuse Amin of collaborating with the CIA. This line of reasoningis corroborated by many aspects of his behavior and biography. Let me tell youconfidentially that my comrades and I have written about this possibility <strong>to</strong> Moscow. Butdo you have any specific evidence of his allegiance?”“We have this evidence,” decisively declared the Afghans.“So,” thought Valery. “It’s possible that <strong>to</strong>day I will have an opportunity <strong>to</strong> receiveconfidential information from two ministers and the head of the national security serviceson the issue of the second-in-command’s involvement with the CIA intelligence network. Acable <strong>to</strong> the Center containing this information could be earthshaking.”<strong>The</strong> guests began <strong>to</strong> cite a series of facts, all of which suggested that Amin carried out546