The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

their disagreements peacefully. The directive suggested the facilitation of mutualcompromises, but frankly speaking, I didn’t believe such a thing was possible. Amin had gonetoo far. He had removed the head of security services from his position and attempted toimprison him. The attempt was accompanied by bloodshed. He had also issued an order toarrest the commanders who were not loyal to him, as well as military political operatives inthe Kabul garrison. It seemed to me that internally, Amin had made his choice, and that hewas prepared to follow it through to the end.***Gulabzoi called Starostin again around 9 a.m. In a tragic, broken voice he said,“Comrade Valery, events are developing very quickly. In the next few hours Amin willeliminate me and my allies, and then he will remove Comrade Taraki from power. Youshould come to my house immediately. If you do not come immediately, it will be too late.”The call was an act of desperation. It had not been twelve hours since Taraki andAmin had agreed to resolve the situation peacefully and the ministers had receivedassurances about their safety at the Soviet embassy. Now there was a call from one of thoseministers requesting an ordinary member of the embassy staff to rescue them fromimminent death. That staff member had to decide whether to go to Gulabzoi’s apartment inresponse to a call that was certainly being monitored by Amin’s people, ensuring thatStarostin was probably already labeled an enemy of the “second man” of the state. IfStarostin were to decline the plea for help, the ministers’ situation would become hopeless.Starostin replaced the telephone and took a small Browning from his suitcase filledwith clothes. He checked to see whether it was loaded, then placed it in the pocket of an oldsports coat that had been sewn by a tailor in Kabul. In an attempt to disguise himself as an533