The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
party, demanding that he remove the opposition figures from their posts. Taraki agreed onlyto remove Sarwari from the position of head of AGSA and appoint Akbari in his place. Aminsuggested Tarun as a candidate and continued insisting on the removal of the rebellious four.They didn’t manage to agree on anything.Head of General Staff Yaqub entered Amin’s office during our meeting. They exchangedsome phrases in Pashto. Then Amin told us that if the Soviet comrades insisted on hisresignation, he would be prepared to leave, although in his view it would be more appropriateto call an urgent Central Committee plenary session to order and discuss the issues in thatvenue. He also stated that he would be prepared to leave the country and emigrate to theUSSR, or even shoot himself if it were in the interests of the revolution. Then Major Tarunentered the office and started to speak to the prime minister in an agitated way in Pashto.Sensing our displeasure, Amin told Tarun to switch to Russian, a language that he understoodwell.Tarun said the following: “I warned Comrade Amin to decline the invitation to lunch atComrade Taraki’s. If he appears in the palace, he will be killed. There is a specially preparedKalashnikov in Taraki’s office for the occasion, as well as two loaded pistols in his desk.”Amin looked at us without disguising his excitement. “What are you going to tell menow? Several minutes ago I received the same warning from Yaqub over the telephone. Shall Igo to lunch, or not? I ask your advice.”Ivanov and I looked at each other. The situation was very sensitive. “If I were you, Iwould go,” responded Boris Semyonovich, “but it is your decision to make.”We returned to the embassy. I understood that another cable had arrived from Moscowdirecting the leadership to meet again with Amin and Taraki in order to attempt to reconcile532
their disagreements peacefully. The directive suggested the facilitation of mutualcompromises, but frankly speaking, I didn’t believe such a thing was possible. Amin had gonetoo far. He had removed the head of security services from his position and attempted toimprison him. The attempt was accompanied by bloodshed. He had also issued an order toarrest the commanders who were not loyal to him, as well as military political operatives inthe Kabul garrison. It seemed to me that internally, Amin had made his choice, and that hewas prepared to follow it through to the end.***Gulabzoi called Starostin again around 9 a.m. In a tragic, broken voice he said,“Comrade Valery, events are developing very quickly. In the next few hours Amin willeliminate me and my allies, and then he will remove Comrade Taraki from power. Youshould come to my house immediately. If you do not come immediately, it will be too late.”The call was an act of desperation. It had not been twelve hours since Taraki andAmin had agreed to resolve the situation peacefully and the ministers had receivedassurances about their safety at the Soviet embassy. Now there was a call from one of thoseministers requesting an ordinary member of the embassy staff to rescue them fromimminent death. That staff member had to decide whether to go to Gulabzoi’s apartment inresponse to a call that was certainly being monitored by Amin’s people, ensuring thatStarostin was probably already labeled an enemy of the “second man” of the state. IfStarostin were to decline the plea for help, the ministers’ situation would become hopeless.Starostin replaced the telephone and took a small Browning from his suitcase filledwith clothes. He checked to see whether it was loaded, then placed it in the pocket of an oldsports coat that had been sewn by a tailor in Kabul. In an attempt to disguise himself as an533
- Page 482 and 483: deal with Amin work? Where do the o
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- Page 486 and 487: analysts in the International Depar
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- Page 494 and 495: was burning our hearts. We simply c
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- Page 508 and 509: Petrov responded sternly, briefly s
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- Page 522 and 523: Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov, Sov
- Page 524 and 525: I suggested that we kick them out i
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- Page 538 and 539: Taraki called Amin and spoke in Pas
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party, demanding that he remove the opposition figures from their posts. Taraki agreed only<strong>to</strong> remove Sarwari from the position of head of AGSA and appoint Akbari in his place. Aminsuggested Tarun as a candidate and continued insisting on the removal of the rebellious four.<strong>The</strong>y didn’t manage <strong>to</strong> agree on anything.Head of General Staff Yaqub entered Amin’s office during our meeting. <strong>The</strong>y exchangedsome phrases in Pash<strong>to</strong>. <strong>The</strong>n Amin <strong>to</strong>ld us that if the Soviet comrades insisted on hisresignation, he would be prepared <strong>to</strong> leave, although in his view it would be more appropriate<strong>to</strong> call an urgent Central Committee plenary session <strong>to</strong> order and discuss the issues in thatvenue. He also stated that he would be prepared <strong>to</strong> leave the country and emigrate <strong>to</strong> theUSSR, or even shoot himself if it were in the interests of the revolution. <strong>The</strong>n Major Tarunentered the office and started <strong>to</strong> speak <strong>to</strong> the prime minister in an agitated way in Pash<strong>to</strong>.Sensing our displeasure, Amin <strong>to</strong>ld Tarun <strong>to</strong> switch <strong>to</strong> Russian, a language that he unders<strong>to</strong>odwell.Tarun said the following: “I warned Comrade Amin <strong>to</strong> decline the invitation <strong>to</strong> lunch atComrade Taraki’s. If he appears in the palace, he will be killed. <strong>The</strong>re is a specially preparedKalashnikov in Taraki’s office for the occasion, as well as two loaded pis<strong>to</strong>ls in his desk.”Amin looked at us without disguising his excitement. “What are you going <strong>to</strong> tell menow? Several minutes ago I received the same warning from Yaqub over the telephone. Shall Igo <strong>to</strong> lunch, or not? I ask your advice.”Ivanov and I looked at each other. <strong>The</strong> situation was very sensitive. “If I were you, Iwould go,” responded Boris Semyonovich, “but it is your decision <strong>to</strong> make.”We returned <strong>to</strong> the embassy. I unders<strong>to</strong>od that another cable had arrived from Moscowdirecting the leadership <strong>to</strong> meet again with Amin and Taraki in order <strong>to</strong> attempt <strong>to</strong> reconcile532
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