The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

implement our plan,” I told Taraki. “I will fix this myself,” was the general secretary’sresponse. He took the phone and called Amin. “Why can’t you make peace with each other? Ihave Gulabzoi and the others here. Come here and talk like men. You should make peace witheach other.” Amin replied, “I will not come until you remove Gulabzoi and Sarwari. Removethose two at least. Send Gulabzoi away as an ambassador.” But Taraki still insisted: “Come, Iwill help you make peace with each other.”Later that day, Amin himself called Taraki to warn him that he was not going toofficially recognize him as head of party and state anymore. Unable to hide hisdisappointment, Taraki hung up. I had a small pistol on me, and I gave it to the generalsecretary. At first he took it and placed it in the drawer of his desk. But then, after consideringit for a moment, he changed his mind and returned the pistol to me. “It’s better that you haveit, son.”“Comrade Taraki,” Watanjar proposed. “Give us ten minutes and we will resolve thisissue. There is a plan and there are people.”“It’s not going to work,” objected Taraki. “You are military, not politicians. You onlyknow to shoot.”“Then demand an emergency session of the Revolutionary Council or Council ofMinisters,” I suggested. “And we will remove Amin officially.”“That’s not the way out either,” said Taraki.“Well, another option would be to announce formally on radio and television that Aminhas been removed from all positions in party and state. Call a session of Politburo and duringthe session, isolate his allies.”Taraki only shook his head. “Tell me,” he asked me, “is the commander of the guards525