The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

13.07.2015 Views

Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov, Soviet Ambassador to Kabul:By late August, the situation was worsening by the hour. Amin had cast his net aroundhis “teacher.” Under no circumstances should Taraki have left Kabul, but he was careless.He asked us for an airplane to fly to Cuba, but then, a day before his flight, he declaredthat he would fly in his own plane. The Afghans had recently purchased a Boeing from theUnited States, and Taraki wanted to use that aircraft. Why did he change his mind soabruptly? We felt that something was not right. Anything could have happened; the airplanewas old and the crew had not been vetted. I attempted to talk Taraki out of the idea. “This isnot good, Comrade Taraki. Our government plane is already in Tashkent. The Sovietleadership may react negatively if you refuse their offer to use it.” Amin called me the nextmorning to say, “We don’t need your assistance—we have our own plane.” My response washarsh: “We will stick to the original plan.”We will never find out what had been going on behind the scenes then. Perhaps it wasnothing noteworthy, or perhaps Amin was plotting something.During their meeting in the Kremlin, Brezhnev alerted the Afghan leader in generalterms of possible danger. And, imagine this, after he returned to Afghanistan Tarakicompletely neglected to heed the warning. It is unclear how he could have been so reckless. It’spossible that Amin managed to convince him that his apprehension was baseless, or maybe hesimply ignored our counsel. To make a long story short, everything continued as before. Itwould have been quite easy for Taraki to demote Amin. He could have removed him from hishigh post, using the crackdowns organized by Amin as a pretext, but it did not happen.When we understood that Amin was unstoppable, we sent a very open cable detailingthe matter to the Center. First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko called me to dictate a522

esponse to our cable. “Meet with Comrade Amin immediately and relay the following: a waris underway in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union expresses its serious concerns about thefractious state of the party and Afghan leadership, as well as the continuing hostilities. We areobliged to warn you that if immediate emergency actions are not taken, the consequencesmay be grave.” This is not the message verbatim, but the essence of it.In the evening we went to the Ark Palace. I was accompanied by Pavlovsky, Gorelov,Ivanov, and Rurikov, our interpreter. We told Taraki, “We are tasked with relaying the Sovietleadership’s position, but we would prefer it if Comrade Amin were present during ourconversation.” Taraki explained that Amin was in the palace and would be joining themshortly. Amin appeared soon after, dressed in an Oriental robe and slippers, as if he’d justgotten out of bed. Where did he come from? Why was he dressed that way? Another mystery.I informed them of the directive from Moscow. Taraki replied, “There are a number ofdisagreements within our leadership, but what leadership is without disagreements? Pleaseinform our Soviet friends that we are grateful for their participation and that we assure themthat everything will be in order.”Amin looked absolutely unperturbed and self-confident during the meeting, as if theconversation had nothing to do with his recent actions. He also took the floor. “I agree witheverything that my dear Comrade Taraki said. I would like to add only that I would diepraising Taraki. If destiny has it for Taraki to depart before me, I will sacredly continue thepolicies of my leader and teacher.”I would like to draw your attention to the fact that only a few hours remained until itwas all over.We returned to the embassy, where we discovered four unexpected guests—the Khalqis.523

esponse <strong>to</strong> our cable. “Meet with Comrade Amin immediately and relay the following: a waris underway in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Soviet Union expresses its serious concerns about thefractious state of the party and Afghan leadership, as well as the continuing hostilities. We areobliged <strong>to</strong> warn you that if immediate emergency actions are not taken, the consequencesmay be grave.” This is not the message verbatim, but the essence of it.In the evening we went <strong>to</strong> the Ark Palace. I was accompanied by Pavlovsky, Gorelov,Ivanov, and Rurikov, our interpreter. We <strong>to</strong>ld Taraki, “We are tasked with relaying the Sovietleadership’s position, but we would prefer it if Comrade Amin were present during ourconversation.” Taraki explained that Amin was in the palace and would be joining themshortly. Amin appeared soon after, dressed in an Oriental robe and slippers, as if he’d justgotten out of bed. Where did he come from? Why was he dressed that way? Another mystery.I informed them of the directive from Moscow. Taraki replied, “<strong>The</strong>re are a number ofdisagreements within our leadership, but what leadership is without disagreements? Pleaseinform our Soviet friends that we are grateful for their participation and that we assure themthat everything will be in order.”Amin looked absolutely unperturbed and self-confident during the meeting, as if theconversation had nothing <strong>to</strong> do with his recent actions. He also <strong>to</strong>ok the floor. “I agree witheverything that my dear Comrade Taraki said. I would like <strong>to</strong> add only that I would diepraising Taraki. If destiny has it for Taraki <strong>to</strong> depart before me, I will sacredly continue thepolicies of my leader and teacher.”I would like <strong>to</strong> draw your attention <strong>to</strong> the fact that only a few hours remained until itwas all over.We returned <strong>to</strong> the embassy, where we discovered four unexpected guests—the Khalqis.523

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