The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

greeting, he informed me that Amin had ordered his arrest, along with three of his fellowministers. I recommended that all four of them go immediately to Taraki’s palace and remainthere until further notice. I myself went straight to the embassy and called Kryuchkov. “Aminmust be neutralized immediately, or else it will be too late.”Just then, however, Ivanov entered my office. He took the receiver and tried to soften thetone of the conversation: “Allow them to make one last attempt to resolve the conflictpeacefully.” Then we both went to the ambassador to discuss how to proceed. A short whilelater, Puzanov, Pavlovsky, Gorelov, Ivanov, and Rurikov all went to Taraki’s.At about 6 p.m. I was told that Sarwari and the three ministers had arrived at theembassy without prior notice. They persistently requested that I meet with them, so I wentdownstairs and walked outside to where a Mercedes was parked with Sarwari behind thewheel and the three ministers inside. Sarwari repeated his concern about an order that hadbeen issued for their arrest or liquidation. They had come to the Soviet embassy seekingshelter. I tried to calm the unexpected guests by informing them that at that very momentSoviet comrades were talking with Amin, and that they should hope for the best. Anotherguest, Aziz Akbari, head of counterintelligence, arrived unexpectedly. He had been instructedby Amin to inform the embassy about the “gang of four” plot. Noticing the Mercedes, heapproached it, exchanged phrases in Pashto with Sarwari, and left.I understood that it would make no sense for the ministers to remain inside the car, so Iinvited them into the embassy and arranged for tea to be served. At some point, I was alonewith Sarwari. He quietly asked how the Soviet Union would react to the elimination of Amin.My response was the same that I’ve repeatedly used: “We support unity in the Afghanleadership. This is our principal position. It is my personal view that nobody should be allowed520