The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

shameful connotations from the organization. He described the others—Gulabzoi,Mazdouryar, and Watanjar—similarly.Taraki, who initially attempted to conduct the conversation in his characteristicallypeaceful manner, finally said, “Perhaps you yourself should take a break from state affairs.Why don’t you go abroad as an ambassador to the country of your choice?”Amin glared maliciously at the head of state and uttered a phrase that rendered therest of the conversation unnecessary. “You’d better shut up. Your drunkenness and old agedeprive you of reason.”He left Taraki’s office without saying goodbye. The bridges were burned. Later thesame day he called Taraki and posed an ultimatum: “If you don’t fire these four traitors andtransfer them to my authority, I will stop obeying your orders as head of state.”September 13Here we include the direct testimonials of various witnesses to the events of thatSeptember. *Leonid Pavlovich Bogdanov, Head of the KGB Representative Office in Afghanistan:On the night of September 12, I flew by Aeroflot to Kabul. My first deputy, VladimirChuchukin, picked me up at the airport and briefly described the situation. We agreed to havea more detailed discussion at my home during lunch. I wanted to take a nap after lunch, butwas soon awakened by Assadullah Sarwari, the head of AGSA. He said he needed to speakurgently. I noticed that he appeared very anxious. Skipping the customary prolonged Afghan* The authors of the book interviewed these people during the period of 1989-2010. The interviews wereconducted in Kabul, Moscow, and West European countries.519