The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

clear to him that he had to return to Kabul. When he arrived in Yasenevo in the morning ofthe next day, he wrote a detailed report about his conversations with the Afghans. Heconcluded that Amin was going to undertake some decisive steps in the next few days.Kryuchkov held a meeting that evening, and Bogdanov, as head of the KGBRepresentative Office in Kabul, reported his analysis of the situation. He suggested that ifthe coup d’etat succeeded, then Hafizullah Amin would unleash mass repression. He wouldtry to destroy not only the remaining Parchamis, but also the Khalqis who did notdemonstrate personal loyalty to him, which would mean the destruction of the party. As aPashtun nationalist, Amin would transfer military activities to the tribal zone, which meantthe territory of Pakistan. That would inevitably cause an outbreak of major war betweenthe two states. Because the Soviet Union provided Kabul with enormous military aid, thisscenario might cause a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United Statesin the region.After delivering this very grim prognosis, Bogdanov said that he fully supportedthose colleagues who were proponents of severe measures against Amin.Kryuchkov agreed with him: “Amin's influence over the political process must becurtailed.”“We have taken an important step already,” said General Medyanik. “We warnedTaraki about the danger. He must do something about it, unless he wants to die.”“What else is possible and necessary to do?” Kryuchkov stared at the meetingparticipants with displeasure. “Think. Perhaps we can use the parliament in order toresolve the situation in a legitimate way?”His colleagues shrugged their shoulders. Which parliament? The chief seemed to be510