The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

Council in leading the party and state, in the conditions of the Afghan revolution, is clear.However, it hardly makes sense for anyone but you to occupy the sole leadership positionof your country, its armed forces, and the state security services. To do otherwise may leadto undesirable consequences.”“That is correct,” quietly mumbled Taraki.Gavrilov, taking advantage of the pause, tried to glean if the guest fully understoodwhat he had been told. That message was the main reason for the meeting. The generalsecretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU had given his colleague an unambiguoussignal: stop playing with fire, stop sharing power with Amin, get rid of him. But Taraki’sdemeanor did not enable his hosts to discern if their guest comprehended the danger orstill remained naively unaware of it. “This is correct,” was Taraki’s only response to thegrave warning.Continuing, Leonid Ilyich pointed out to Taraki the weak military capabilities of theAfghan armed forces, the unsatisfactory political and moral condition of the military, andthe passivity of the army in pushing back the rebels. Brezhnev reminded his guest that theUSSR had provided Afghanistan with hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, heavy weapons,jets, and helicopters in the last six months. He reproached Taraki: “Unfortunately, therecommendations of the 1,500 Soviet military advisers who work in the Afghan armedforces are not being fully implemented.” He then assured Taraki, “The Soviet Union willcontinue to provide comprehensive support and assistance to your party and the Afghanpeople.” Brezhnev seemed visibly relieved when turning over the last page of his text.It was now Taraki’s turn to speak. He was very experienced in bureaucratic protocol, andbegan with a long and elaborate expression of gratitude for the advice and criticism. He504