The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University

military intervention; there should be no Soviet military intervention.The analysis of the KGB’s Ivanov was the opposite of Gorelov’s. He warned themembers of the Politburo’s Afghanistan Commission about the fissures in the Khalqileadership and the danger of confrontation between Amin and Taraki, and he exudedskepticism about the military capabilities of the Afghan army. However, he was careful toavoid the issue of the possibility of direct Soviet military participation in the conflict.The longer the discussion at the Politburo Commission went, the gloomier the Sovietleaders became. However, judging by some questions and remarks, it became apparent thatIvanov’s analysis more closely appealed to the hearts of the Politburo members.Having just returned to Kabul, Gorelov went to southern Afghanistan to lead anoperation with the goal of liberating Urgun Province from the rebels. General Pavlovskyjoined him at the command quarters of the troops. In the height of the operation, the twogenerals decided to fly over the area of fighting in a helicopter. However, they did not seeany fire or smoke on the ground below them. They landed. Afghan commanders reported:“Success! When the rebels found out that two divisions were deployed to fight them, theyimmediately left for Pakistan. There were no casualties on either side.”Pavlovsky and Gorelov, both of whom were World War II veterans and participantsof the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, looked at each other and, emotionallystirred, hugged. “It is so good, Lev, that there are no casualties,” said Pavlovsky. “Enough ofcasualties. It is time to resolve the situation peacefully.”As strange as it may seem, those two generals did not want a war in Afghanistan.Perhaps it was their direct experience in suppressing the Prague Spring that turned theminto opponents of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Memories of the mass497