The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University The Road to Afghanistan - George Washington University
carry out a coup d’etat by overthrowing Taraki. This information was news to bothMerimsky and Pavlovsky (as it turned out later). Merimsky responded in very genericterms, hinting that such information required comprehensive verification. Ivanov agreedwith him and asked Merimsky not to tell anyone about the information. However, in theevening, when the generals retired to their residence, Merimsky was paid a visit byGorelov.“What was Boris Semyonovich telling you? Most probably, he was trying to convinceyou that Hafizullah Amin is an American spy. This is nonsense! KGB men always fantasizeabout spies and saboteurs. I am certain that Comrade Amin is an honest revolutionary, aloyal and sincere friend of the Soviet Union. You will have plenty of opportunities in thefuture to see it for yourself.”At the time, Kabul was filled with rumors about the “second-ranking person in theDRA” being an American spy. There were even leaflets with that information disseminatedin the city. It was unknown who authored and dispersed them.Gorelov and Ivanov were invited to report on the situation in Afghanistan at aPolitburo session in Moscow. It was there that the conflict between the head of the Sovietmilitary advisory mission and representatives of the KGB became evident. Gromyko,Andropov, Ustinov, and Head of the General Staff Ogarkov subjected the two generals to abarrage of questions about the potential of the counter-revolutionary movement, themilitary capabilities of the Afghan army, the relationships among the leaders of the DRA,and the reasons for past failures. Gorelov was firm in his assessment: contradictions in theleadership can be overcome, and that will require Moscow to trust Amin more; Afghanarmed forces are capable of defending the revolution even if Pakistan dared to begin direct496
military intervention; there should be no Soviet military intervention.The analysis of the KGB’s Ivanov was the opposite of Gorelov’s. He warned themembers of the Politburo’s Afghanistan Commission about the fissures in the Khalqileadership and the danger of confrontation between Amin and Taraki, and he exudedskepticism about the military capabilities of the Afghan army. However, he was careful toavoid the issue of the possibility of direct Soviet military participation in the conflict.The longer the discussion at the Politburo Commission went, the gloomier the Sovietleaders became. However, judging by some questions and remarks, it became apparent thatIvanov’s analysis more closely appealed to the hearts of the Politburo members.Having just returned to Kabul, Gorelov went to southern Afghanistan to lead anoperation with the goal of liberating Urgun Province from the rebels. General Pavlovskyjoined him at the command quarters of the troops. In the height of the operation, the twogenerals decided to fly over the area of fighting in a helicopter. However, they did not seeany fire or smoke on the ground below them. They landed. Afghan commanders reported:“Success! When the rebels found out that two divisions were deployed to fight them, theyimmediately left for Pakistan. There were no casualties on either side.”Pavlovsky and Gorelov, both of whom were World War II veterans and participantsof the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, looked at each other and, emotionallystirred, hugged. “It is so good, Lev, that there are no casualties,” said Pavlovsky. “Enough ofcasualties. It is time to resolve the situation peacefully.”As strange as it may seem, those two generals did not want a war in Afghanistan.Perhaps it was their direct experience in suppressing the Prague Spring that turned theminto opponents of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Memories of the mass497
- Page 446 and 447: the organizational talents of Hafiz
- Page 448 and 449: Persian Gulf.Détente was coming to
- Page 450 and 451: duration of the war in Afghanistan.
- Page 452 and 453: eported and objectively interpreted
- Page 454 and 455: countries, including Iran, Pakistan
- Page 456 and 457: officers took a seven-month-long co
- Page 458 and 459: Glotov and Alexander Dolmatov were
- Page 460 and 461: You will be assisting me in special
- Page 462 and 463: was surprised to find out that not
- Page 464 and 465: The taxi driver sensed that his pas
- Page 466 and 467: and PGU with great attention.“It
- Page 468 and 469: “Valery, you should meet with Gul
- Page 470 and 471: ***Major General Zaplatin was very
- Page 472 and 473: Zaplatin sternly glanced at the int
- Page 474 and 475: The Afghan understood that the Sovi
- Page 476 and 477: them.“Finally, here is the most i
- Page 478 and 479: neighboring Pakistan to become a re
- Page 480 and 481: Afghanistan. Comrade Taraki is faci
- Page 482 and 483: deal with Amin work? Where do the o
- Page 484 and 485: “It looks like the situation with
- Page 486 and 487: analysts in the International Depar
- Page 488 and 489: 1. Find a way to remove H. Amin fro
- Page 490 and 491: water has such healing properties t
- Page 492 and 493: the other leaders of the faction wh
- Page 494 and 495: was burning our hearts. We simply c
- Page 498 and 499: indignation of Czech citizens watch
- Page 500 and 501: global revolutionary movement. That
- Page 502 and 503: workers, avant-garde peasants, and
- Page 504 and 505: Council in leading the party and st
- Page 506 and 507: that is happening behind my back.
- Page 508 and 509: Petrov responded sternly, briefly s
- Page 510 and 511: clear to him that he had to return
- Page 512 and 513: statement without the support of th
- Page 514 and 515: There were also several plain-cloth
- Page 516 and 517: People’s Palace, where a joint me
- Page 518 and 519: position within the leadership of t
- Page 520 and 521: greeting, he informed me that Amin
- Page 522 and 523: Alexander Mikhailovich Puzanov, Sov
- Page 524 and 525: I suggested that we kick them out i
- Page 526 and 527: your man or Amin’s man?”“He w
- Page 528 and 529: his friends had already been arrest
- Page 530 and 531: By some strange coincidence, all of
- Page 532 and 533: party, demanding that he remove the
- Page 534 and 535: Afghan school teacher, Valery decid
- Page 536 and 537: path. We must do everything possibl
- Page 538 and 539: Taraki called Amin and spoke in Pas
- Page 540 and 541: esolution. He was now in control of
- Page 542 and 543: in an open power struggle. Or perha
- Page 544 and 545: the Afghans? Maybe we should just h
carry out a coup d’etat by overthrowing Taraki. This information was news <strong>to</strong> bothMerimsky and Pavlovsky (as it turned out later). Merimsky responded in very genericterms, hinting that such information required comprehensive verification. Ivanov agreedwith him and asked Merimsky not <strong>to</strong> tell anyone about the information. However, in theevening, when the generals retired <strong>to</strong> their residence, Merimsky was paid a visit byGorelov.“What was Boris Semyonovich telling you? Most probably, he was trying <strong>to</strong> convinceyou that Hafizullah Amin is an American spy. This is nonsense! KGB men always fantasizeabout spies and saboteurs. I am certain that Comrade Amin is an honest revolutionary, aloyal and sincere friend of the Soviet Union. You will have plenty of opportunities in thefuture <strong>to</strong> see it for yourself.”At the time, Kabul was filled with rumors about the “second-ranking person in theDRA” being an American spy. <strong>The</strong>re were even leaflets with that information disseminatedin the city. It was unknown who authored and dispersed them.Gorelov and Ivanov were invited <strong>to</strong> report on the situation in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> at aPolitburo session in Moscow. It was there that the conflict between the head of the Sovietmilitary advisory mission and representatives of the KGB became evident. Gromyko,Andropov, Ustinov, and Head of the General Staff Ogarkov subjected the two generals <strong>to</strong> abarrage of questions about the potential of the counter-revolutionary movement, themilitary capabilities of the Afghan army, the relationships among the leaders of the DRA,and the reasons for past failures. Gorelov was firm in his assessment: contradictions in theleadership can be overcome, and that will require Moscow <strong>to</strong> trust Amin more; Afghanarmed forces are capable of defending the revolution even if Pakistan dared <strong>to</strong> begin direct496
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